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 PREFACE
Martine Courant Rife, Shaun Slattery,  
and Dànielle Nicole DeVoss
You have been invited to participate on a college-wide commit-
tee to examine work-for-hire policies at your institution. During 
your first meeting, a committee member boldly claims that all 
work faculty and students create during their tenure at the insti-
tution should rightly be the property of the institution—especially 
considering the economic hardship and budget cuts facing most 
institutions of higher education. What is your response to this 
claim?
An undergraduate student has accepted work doing freelance web 
authoring and design. She comes to you to ask what materials 
produced in a freelance capacity can be included in her profes-
sional portfolio. As both professor and professional mentor to this 
student, how might you advise her?
You serve on an advisory committee for your college’s library. A library 
representative and faculty member co-present their proposal to adopt a 
college-wide media use policy. The policy includes requirements such 
as “ faculty can use 30 seconds of a 5-minute song” in their teaching, 
or “ faculty can post 10 minutes of a 90-minute film on the college’s 
streaming server” for class use. How might you advise in this situation?
While working with a departmental curriculum committee, a 
committee member claims that there is no need to revise a writ-
ing course to include copyright and fair use because “there’s not 
enough time to teach that, too.” What might your response be?
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Intellectual property, more and more, rubs up against the work we do in 
our classrooms, libraries, and offices and in our curricula, teaching, and poli-
cies. When we craft teaching materials that include visuals, audio, and video, 
we implicate ourselves in intellectual property issues. When we ask students 
to craft multimodal compositions, we implicate them in intellectual property 
issues. What intellectual property issues are involved depend on each compo-
sition, audience, context, purpose, and use. Intellectual property is an inher-
ently rhetorical set of laws and practices, worthy of our attention as researchers, 
teachers, colleagues, and members of our institutional communities.
Appropriately, more and more rhetoric and composition studies scholars 
have entered into the conversation about intellectual property issues, especial-
ly as these issues orbit around digital writing practices and new media texts. 
However, very, very few of us are lawyers; few of us have had formal training 
in U.S. law. The purpose of this edited collection is to gather together stories, 
theories, and research that can further inform the ways in which we situate 
and address intellectual property issues in our writing classrooms. We focus 
in this introduction on the motivations for this collection and the intellectual 
backdrop for the work presented here, we include an overview of the collec-
tion’s contents, and, in the appendix to this introduction, we provide a brief 
discussion of the foundational laws and legal precedents that frame our work. 
WHY NOW?
We want to call attention to one tiny moment, one that might seem mun-
dane but is incredibly important in terms of understanding our current cultural 
and political time and what changes we may foresee to intellectual property in 
the United States. That moment is this: One of the last acts President George 
W. Bush took as he planned to vacate the presidency in fall of 2008 was to 
create a cabinet-level position of intellectual property enforcement coordina-
tor, or “copyright czar,” as the position came to be referred to in the press. 
The position was created by the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for 
Intellectual Property Act of 2008, designed to coordinate the anti-piracy and 
intellectual property protection work of agencies including (but not limited to) 
the Department of Justice and the Patent and Trademark Office. Not only did 
this Act provide for the appointment of a copyright czar, but it also created a 
requirement that the czar chair an “interagency intellectual property enforce-
ment advisory committee” and that this committee develop an administrative 
strategy to increase “enforcement against intellectual property infringement.” 
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In April 2, 2009, a consortium—including the American Library Asso-
ciation, EDUCAUSE, the Internet Archive, Wikimedia Foundation, and oth-
ers—delivered a letter to President Obama, encouraging him to break from 
the direction being pursued by the copyright czar. This consortium asked the 
president instead to “create offices devoted to promoting innovation and free 
expression” (American Association of Law Libraries, et al., 2009). The letter 
raised concern about Obama’s potential candidates for copyright czar, noting 
that in the past almost all had close ties with or served as representatives for 
copyright industries. The letter warned, “we ask you to consider that individu-
als who support overly broad IP protection might favor established distribu-
tion models at the expense of technological innovators, creative artists, writers, 
musicians, filmmakers, and an increasingly participatory public.” Potential 
implications noted by the consortium ranged from constraints to technology 
innovation to barriers being established to citizen use of cultural heritage ma-
terials. The key argument made in the letter is that although the government 
has established and adopted a range of copyright protection positions and acts, 
the government has not balanced such action by establishing any positions, 
acts, or offices devoted to encouraging technology innovation and intellectual 
property distribution. 
In an April 20, 2009 response letter, a group representing copyright pro-
tection argued against the creation of a false dichotomy between control and 
innovation and noted that “intellectual property drives innovation and creativ-
ity” (Copyright Alliance, 2009). In a smart move—given the current economy 
in the U.S. and in the world—the authors called attention to the employment 
of some 38 million U.S. workers in the creative industries.
On September 25, 2009, President Obama appointed Victoria A. Espinel 
as the first U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator. Prior to the 
appointment, Vice President Joe Biden, a staunch intellectual property protec-
tionist, promised industry groups—including the Motion Picture Association 
of America—that they’d be pleased by Obama’s pick. 
On February 23, 2010, the Federal Register published a notice authored by 
Espinel. The notice invited public input and participation in the larger process 
described in the document:
The Federal Government is currently undertaking a land-
mark effort to develop an intellectual property enforcement 
strategy building on the immense knowledge and expertise 
of the agencies charged with enforcing intellectual property 
rights. By committing to common goals, the Government 
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will more effectively and efficiently combat intellectual prop-
erty infringement. (Espinel, 2010) 
Public comments were specifically requested to document the “costs to the 
U.S. economy resulting from intellectual property violations, and the threats 
to public health and safety created by infringement” and to provide “detailed 
recommendations ... for improving the Government’s intellectual property en-
forcement efforts.” The Federal Register notice further outlined twenty areas 
where additional public comments were sought, including, for example: 
Describe existing technology that could or should be used by 
the U.S. Government or a particular agency or department 
to more easily identify infringing goods or other products ... 
Suggest how state and local law enforcement authorities could 
more effectively assist in intellectual property enforcement ef-
forts, including whether coordination could be improved, if 
necessary, and whether they should be vested with additional 
authority to more actively participate in prosecutions involv-
ing intellectual property enforcement ... Describe the adequa-
cy and effectiveness of the reporting by the various agencies 
responsible for enforcing intellectual property infringements, 
such as the reporting of investigations, seizures of infringing 
goods or products, prosecutions, the results of prosecutions, 
including whether any further voluntary reporting of activi-
ties should be made, in keeping with other federal law ... Sug-
gest specific methods to limit or prevent use of the Internet 
to sell and/or otherwise distribute or disseminate infringing 
products (physical goods or digital content) ... Provide in-
formation on the various types of entities that are involved, 
directly or indirectly, in the distribution or dissemination of 
infringing products and a brief description of their various 
roles and responsibilities ... Discuss the effectiveness of recent 
efforts by educational institutions to reduce or eliminate ille-
gal downloading over their networks. (Espinel, 2010)
The call clearly focuses on documenting intellectual property violations 
and suggesting enforcement strategies; increased governmental oversight and 
enforcement of intellectual property thus continues to move forward.
In response to the call for comments on the joint strategic plan, the Confer-
ence on College Composition and Communication—with support from the 
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National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE), and with the endorsements 
of over 80 academics across the U.S. as well as organizational support from the 
Association of Teachers of Technical Writing and the Writing in Digital Envi-
ronments Research Center—submitted a letter to the copyright czar reflecting 
the concerns of writing teachers in preserving fair use in teaching and learning 
(Conference on College Composition and Communication, 2010). Over 1,600 
comments were received by Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 
Espinel, and the 2010 Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforce-
ment was issued in June 2010. Writing teachers have started to mobilize in 
their efforts to be heard regarding the continued development of copyright law 
and policy. The contributors to this collection drive that point further home as 
they detail the concerns and strategies that we face in our day-to-day responsi-
bilities as teachers and researchers of writing.
We think that this particular cultural, historical, and technological moment 
offers us the opportunity to make unique contributions to educating students, 
teachers, and others about the rights they currently have and about the issues 
they will face due to what clearly appears to be a government-backed “enforce-
ment” mode in the area of intellectual property protection. If we want to be 
part of the conversations that craft fair work-for-hire policies at our institutions, 
and position ourselves as experts to teach copyright and fair use to writing stu-
dents and to raise the legal issues professional writers will face in their work 
lives, now is the time to act. As a small move toward this, we offer a collection 
of writing that we hope will be just the beginning of the additional larger con-
versations we need to have about copyright and writing in the digital age.
COPYWRITE SCHOLARSHIP: 1994 TO PRESENT
This collection builds on a body of scholarship over a decade old. We sum-
marize this foundation of pioneering scholarship to contextualize and scaffold 
the contributions in this collection. Of particular interest here are those ques-
tions that endure—that remain points of contention from our field’s earliest ex-
aminations of the intersection of composition and copyright—and those issues 
that arise anew. One of the most compelling emergent issues is the changing 
nature of composition through the proliferation of digital content production 
technologies and the development of a popular culture of media participation. 
In 1994, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede began publishing on their ex-
plorations of collaborative authorship and the teaching of writing, laying the 
groundwork for further copyright discussions in the context of teaching writ-
ing. It’s also been a decade since Tharon Howard (1996) originally published 
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“Who ‘Owns’ Electronic Texts?,” urging the field to attend to copyright and 
fair use issues as they intersect with technical communication. The conversa-
tion was continued in the 1997 special intellectual property issue of Kairos, in 
which TyAnna Herrington explained the fair use doctrine and its importance 
to the teaching of writing in online environments. In her article, Herrington 
argued that, contrary to popular belief, copyright laws do apply to digital com-
munication, the public does have fair use rights, and fair use is necessary to 
protect freedom of speech. In an interview included in the same issue of Kairos, 
Johndan Johnson-Eilola (1997) characterized intellectual property as a social 
and economic construct existing to maximize profits for capitalists. Johnson-
Eilola was asked during the interview where fair use should begin on the web, 
because everything is “published.” The question was as interesting to the field 
in 1997 as it is still, and yet the question remains without a clear answer, even 
from legal scholars. 
Interest and inquiry within composition studies on fair use, copyright, and 
their relevance to the teaching of writing was further expanded in a special 
issue of Computers and Composition (1998) edited by Laura Gurak and John-
son-Eilola. In this issue, Herrington, Henrietta Nickels Shirk and Howard 
Taylor Smith, John Logie, and Janice Walker discussed positions on copyright, 
fair use, and implications for the teaching of writing. Herrington connected 
free speech to fair use; Shirk and Howard discussed the implications of the 
Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) guidelines on writing pedagogy; Logie re-
minded us of intellectual property law’s history and connections to developing 
technologies, calling for teaching copyright issues; and Walker argued that, 
because the Internet changes what writing teachers do in the classroom, we 
should develop theories that show differences and similarities between plagia-
rism and copyright.
It was in these earlier years that Jim Porter (1997) addressed the need for 
developing an ethical stance toward Web writing. He argued that if the law is 
unethical to follow, we can break it. Several years later, Logie (2005) addressed 
Porter’s argument, stating that if we are going to engage in civil disobedience, 
it needs to be organized and public so our behaviors aren’t mistaken for igno-
rance—or, even worse, seen as active theft.
More recent scholarship has emphasized the need to teach writers basic 
copyright law and fair use (DeVoss & Porter, 2006; DeVoss & Webb, 2008; 
Dush, 2009; Herrington, 2003; Howard, 1996; Juillet, 2004; Logie, 2005, 
2006b; Reyman, 2006, 2010; Rife, 2006, 2007, 2010; Rife & Hart-Davidson, 
2006; Waller, 2006a, 2006b). Because most research and writing is done on 
computers and in networked environments, reliance on the fair use doctrine 
has become crucial for the educational community. We live in a cut-and-paste 
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world where remix is commonplace (Grabill & Hicks, 2005; Lessig, 2004, 
2008; Ridolfo & DeVoss, 2009; Westbrook, 2006); however, it is unknown 
how (or if) composition teachers are teaching copyright. Thus far, only one 
collection in our field focuses on copyright law and its pedagogical implica-
tions—Steve Westbrook’s (2009) excellent Composition & Copyright: Perspec-
tives on Teaching, Text-making, and Fair Use. 
Recent media coverage of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing cases—coupled 
with lawsuits against hundreds of schools, individuals (including students), 
and peer-to-peer software distributors—has understandably kindled disciplin-
ary interest. In the context of P2P file sharing and teaching, writing pedagogy 
pieces have appeared by Porter and Martine Courant Rife (2005), Dànielle 
Nicole DeVoss and Porter (2006), and Rife (2006). Following Porter and Rife’s 
short position paper on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that Grokster was 
secondarily liable for the copyright-infringing behaviors of users of its soft-
ware, the Caucus on Intellectual Property and Composition/Communication 
Studies (CCCC-IP) began a yearly publication, “Top IP Events,” published on 
the NCTE Web site. In 2009, the CCCC-IP also began publishing a monthly 
report on the NCTE Web site and an announcement in the NCTE email list. 
In 2010, the Top Intellectual Property Developments annual, currently coor-
dinated by Clancy Ratliff, one of the contributors here, contained the largest 
number of contributions (nine) in the 5 years since its inception. 
In Controlling Voices: Intellectual Property, Humanistic Studies, and the Inter-
net (2001), Herrington examined how intellectual property law impacts educa-
tors, including those in rhetoric and technical communication. Two years later, 
she produced A Legal Primer for the Digital Age (2003), a short textbook cov-
ering a wide range of laws relevant in the everyday practice of technical com-
municators. The text contains a section on intellectual property issues, where 
Herrington noted that copyright law is applied in conjunction with other laws 
and discussed basic work-for-hire issues. 
Lunsford (1999) and Sarah Robbins (2003) combined feminist rhetorical 
theory with discussions of intellectual property. Lunsford’s concern was with 
corporate authorship. Robbins argued that, as we try to understand intellectual 
property, we should look at cases and issues of authorship involving women’s 
ways of making knowledge, particularly via collaboration. 
Logie (2005) provided a broad overview of copyright laws (including a bit 
of history), and argued for the importance of teaching copyright in technical 
communication. In a short position paper a year later, Logie (2006b) argued 
that copyright instruction should have a central place in the writing classroom. 
He included a 1790s view of copyright in the U.S., explicitly arguing for the 
“importance of scholarly access” (p. 1). Copyright law was originally invented 
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to assist learning, he noted, “and we, as educators, have failed in our obligation 
to embed this simple fact in the public’s consciousness” (p. 1). To address this 
problem, Logie urged us to include a focus on copyright within our pedagogy.
Steve Westbrook (2006) made an important move by connecting visual 
rhetoric and copyright in a very pragmatic context—a student’s multimedia 
piece, which was unable to be published because the requisite permissions were 
denied by the copyright holder. Pointing to the missing student piece in his 
article, Westbrook wrote that copyright affects composition teachers and stu-
dents “on the level of daily practice” and threatens to silence both teachers and 
students. The author suggested using Lessig’s Creative Commons licensing as 
an immediate practical solution to the copyright problem. Westbrook’s 2009 
collection includes a chapter where he continues this discussion, pushing further 
at issues of visual rhetoric and copyright in the context of writing pedagogy.
Jessica Reyman (2006) championed teacher awareness and activism, not-
ing that the Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) 
Act of 2002 was developed to update copyright law to accommodate the uses 
of copyrighted materials in distance-education environments. And, yet, pursu-
ant to her analysis of the TEACH Act and its implications for teaching writ-
ing, the act fails to offer the same protections for online teaching as it offers in 
face-to-face environments. Reyman argued that the TEACH Act provides an 
opportunity for faculty and their institutions to become more involved in the 
conversations about copyright and to influence law and policies. In Reyman’s 
(2010) recent book, she discusses the narratives and metaphors within the intel-
lectual property debate in a rhetorical context.
This rich base of existing work in the field is the conversation we enter with 
this collection. Our collection is timely because we have some evidence from 
the legal and media literacy fields that teachers tend to misunderstand copy-
right and fair use and pass that misunderstanding on to their students (Hobbs, 
Jaszi, & Aufderheide, 2007). In September 2007, the Center for Social Media at 
the School of Communication at American University released a report stating 
that the key goals of teaching media literacy are “compromised by unnecessary 
copyright restrictions and lack of understanding about copyright law” (Hobbs, 
Jaszi, & Aufderheide, p. 1). In another study, Marjorie Heins and Tricia Beck-
les (2005) found that artists and scholars have only a vague sense of what fair 
use means, and this uncertain knowledge circumscribes composing practices. 
An additional study, “The Digital Learning Challenge,” reported that undue 
fear about copyright infringement liability has constricted exchanges of valu-
able information across social network spaces (Fisher & McGeveran, 2006). 
William Fisher and William McGeveran found that because of digital rights 
management (DRM) technologies, the only way certain media can be accessed 
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even for purely educational uses is for teachers and individuals to knowingly 
violate copyright law by circumventing anti-access measures.
This collection, more generally, also emerges from recent pedagogy-focused 
scholarship that argues that, because of the changed nature of writing in digital 
environments, teachers need to recalculate what they teach. On a broad level, 
the argument in favor of teaching intellectual property derives from the grow-
ing body of scholarship on informational literacy, multiliteracies, and digital 
literacies (American Library Association, 2004; New London Group, 1996; 
Sorapure, Inglesby, & Yatchisin, 1998). The teaching of digital literacies im-
bricates the teaching of copyright because it relates to how one might legally 
use others’ materials, and vice versa (see also Digital Rhetoric Collective, 2006; 
Grabill & Hicks, 2005; Henning, 2003; Selber, 2004; WIDE Research Center 
Collective, 2005).
COPY(WRITE): PREFACE AND PREVIEW
Copy(write) includes a range of voices and perspectives on copyright, fair 
use, and related topics such as originality, authorship, cultural participation, 
and institutional authority and power. We include several chapters by “copy-
write” pioneers—composition and rhetoric scholars among the first to bring 
discussion of copyright to our scholarship, many of whom are revisiting the 
conversations they helped start—as well as the voices of new scholars and 
students, whose experience with and reflection on copyright issues are now 
shaping our scholarly conversations. Copy(write) includes a mix of traditional 
scholarship, original research, and personal reflection to engage the copyright 
issues we experience as university workers and participants in contemporary 
digital culture. The book is divided into three topic areas: Part I focuses on 
the law and legal landscape; Part II focuses on the tools and resources avail-
able to researchers and teachers; and Part III focuses on pedagogical practices 
and approaches for addressing intellectual property in the writing classroom. 
Each part concludes with a response by a notable scholar who helps highlight 
connections among the chapters and identifies enduring questions and future 
directions for scholarship and action.
Part I: The Law, the Landscape
In Part I: The Law, the Landscape, contributing authors explore the laws 
and institutional structures and policies that make up the scene of our copy-
right practices. We begin Part I with Jeffrey Galin’s “The Fair Use Battle for 
Martine Rife, Shaun Slattery, and Dànielle Nicole DeVoss
xx
Scholarly Works,” in which he revisits and extends the discussion of academics’ 
rights and responsibilities in using scholarly work which he, along with several 
other scholars, began a decade ago. Galin examines the key issues and emer-
gent transformations that educators face with respect to copyright practices 
and fair use advocacy. He also offers advice for how we as academics can reas-
sert our fair use rights.
Through an engaging combination of scholarly discussion and personal 
reflection, Russel Wiebe examines the nature of plagiarism and cheating by 
complicating the concepts of authorship and originality in “Plagiarism and 
Promiscuity, Authors and Plagiarisms.” His discussion resonates with our field’s 
struggles with plagiarism and the origin of ideas. Alternately entertaining tax-
onomies of plagiarism and the impossibility of “some single, stable author,” 
Wiebe advises teachers to engage students in conversations about intertextual-
ity and plagiarism rather than acting as police.
In “Authoring Academic Agency: Charting the Tensions between Work-
for-hire University Copyright Policies,” Timothy Amidon explores the ambi-
guities and tensions that exist between university IP policies, Title 17 of U.S. 
Code, and various kinds of academic authorship. Amidon first describes his 
struggle in his institution as he tried to license his Master’s thesis under a Cre-
ative Commons License and then discusses “work-for-hire” as defined by U.S. 
Code before providing an insightful analysis of the IP policies of 14 universi-
ties. He concludes with suggesting actions for academic authors to strengthen 
our ownership of the works we create.
A different kind of copyright policy is studied in Barclay Barrios’ “Soul 
Remedy: Turnitin and the Visual Design of End User License Agreements.” 
EULAs, as they are commonly known, are legal contracts that specify the 
rights and responsibilities of a company offering a service or software and its 
end users. In this chapter, Barrios analyzes the wording and design of these 
contracts and of the plagiarism-detection service Turnitin in particular, and 
discusses their implications for instructors and students. As opposed to the 
unreflective clicking of “I Agree” that we and students may engage in, Barrios 
suggests using EULAs as a teachable moment, and as documents that can be 
put to use to discover and question how these agreements position the user’s 
work.
Bob Whipple contributes a reflection on collecting digital images as an im-
portant part of the construction of self. In “Images, the Commonplace Book, 
and Digital Self-Fashioning,” Whipple compares image downloading and 
posting to the keeping of “commonplace books”—collections of texts and clip-
pings used by men and women from the late medieval and renaissance periods 
through the mid-19th century. Often overlooked as frivolous, these catchall 
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spaces, Whipple argues, are important for the development of our ideas and 
ourselves.
Composition and IP scholarship pioneer Tharon Howard revisits ideas 
first raised in his 1996 work, “Who Owns Electronic Texts?” In “Intellectual 
Properties in Multimodal, 21st-Century Composition Classrooms,” Howard 
examines the origins of copyright law to challenge the commonly held view 
that authors have a “natural right” to their work that supersedes all other po-
tential claims on how the public may rightfully use the work. Ultimately, he 
sees copyrights not as “rights” but instead as privileges granted by the State to 
balance the needs of society with the needs of the individual. Howard argues 
that today’s students need a robust understanding of copyright laws in order 
to negotiate the complexities of digital authorship and IP laws and policies. To 
model this understanding, Howard poses five copyright conundrums from his 
teaching and professional experience and provides a lucid discussion of the le-
galities and rights at work in each.
In “Is Digital the New Digital?: Pedagogical Frames of Reference and Their 
Implications in Theory and Practice”, Rob Dornsife explores the challenges of 
moving between analog and digital forms of media. He reflects on the incom-
patibility of their rules and aesthetics and, therefore, the problems of writing 
assignments that fail to acknowledge these differences. Through a fascinat-
ing discussion of recording and production technologies, Dornsife arrives at 
the problems with the concepts of “the copy” and “the original” in the digital 
world, and, thus, problems with copyrights and notions of plagiarism based 
solely on these concepts. To address analog bias, he proposes an ethic of “digital 
stewardship” and “artistic license.” 
We conclude Part I with a response by John Logie, author of the influential 
Peers, Pirates, and Persuasion (2006a) as well as numerous articles and chapters 
on copyright issues in the writing classroom. 
Part II: The Tools
Part II: The Tools explores copyright and fair use in practice, through 
scenes of use and through techniques and tools for responding productively in 
moments when copyright is implicated. The authors provide stories, struggles, 
and solutions for the challenges of navigating authorial decision-making. Steve 
Westbrook begins Part II with a reflection on the nature of our field’s conver-
sation about fair use. “What We Talk About When We Talk About Fair Use: 
Conversations on Writing Pedagogy, New Media, and Copyright Law” is an 
examination of our scholarship, textbooks, and pedagogy. In addition to advo-
cating that we teach students the four factors for determining fair use, West-
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brook uses the case of Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc. (2004) to model the 
kind of rich, complex analysis of the fair use of digital material that we might 
engage in with our students.
To further complicate print-based notions of authorship and originality, 
E. Ashley Hall, Kathie Gossett, and Elizabeth Vincelette analyze YouTube’s 
interface and examine parody videos posted there to explore practices of sam-
pling, remixing, and appropriation in the composing process. “Parody, Penalty, 
and Pedagogy” reveals the complicated motives and composing decisions made 
in this important form of expression and cultural participation. They suggest 
strategies for helping students to thoughtfully and legally engage in digital dis-
course.
In “Copyrights and Copywrongs: Intellectual Property in the Classroom 
Revisited,” copywrite pioneer Janice Walker returns to some of the questions 
she first raised in 1998. In light of the recent proliferation of digital pro-
duction technologies and the increase in online teaching and digital peda-
gogy, Walker finds the majority of the textbooks and style guides of our field 
unhelpful for students and teachers in their treatment of copyright, often 
ignoring multimodal compositions or the use of copyrighted work in the 
classroom. In examining the use of IP in classrooms, she discusses the law, 
policies, practice, and responsibilities of various players in our educational 
systems. Walker’s discussion of the evolution of her own IP pedagogy offers 
numerous examples of what we can do as teachers to inform, challenge, and 
empower students in relation to their own work. She closes with guidance 
for what we can do for our students, our peers, and ourselves to productively 
engage these complex issues.
Jim Ridolfo and Martine Rife untangle the Gordian knot of free speech, 
privacy, orphan works, in loco parentis, publicity/contractual rights, and 
fair use issues raised in the case of a student whose picture was taken at a 
protest but remixed and reused by her university for promotional materi-
als. “Rhetorical Velocity and Copyright: A Case Study on the Strategies of 
Rhetorical Delivery” explores the copyright implications and unanticipat-
ed possibilities of rhetorical delivery in the mix-mash-merge age of digital 
rhetoric. Through a cogent analysis of the legalities of the use of Maggie 
Ryan’s image, Ridolfo and Rife tease out the rights of and implications for 
the student and the actions of the university. Maggie’s case is a rich source 
for discussion of ethical, cultural, and other issues in copyright, intellectual 
property, and rhetoric, and the authors include generative questions for use 
in the classroom.
TyAnna Herrington expands our discussion of fair use to include free 
speech in “Following the Framers: Choosing Pedagogy to Further Fair Use and 
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Free Speech.” In this chapter, Herrington broadens her original work on fair 
use and free speech, drawing upon the spirit of the law drafted by the original 
framers of the U.S. Constitution to present a moving argument for the neces-
sity of access to information and protected fair use for enacting free speech. 
Herrington argues that educators must choose pedagogies that support free 
speech and fair use to prepare students to participate in the democratic process 
as digital citizens.
We conclude Part II with a response by Jim Porter of Miami University, 
whose early work on networked spaces and ethical issues is considered land-
mark in the field (Porter, 1998) and whose recent work has addressed issues 
of digital delivery and research practices and copyright implications in digital 
spaces (McKee & Porter, 2008, 2009). 
Part III: The Pedagogy
In Part III: The Pedagogy, contributing authors share their responses to the 
challenges of teaching students about copyright and fair use in the digital age.
In “Toward a Pedagogy of Fair Use for Multimedia Composition” Renee 
Hobbs and Katie Donnelly review the ongoing dialogue about fair use within 
the media literacy community, which has worked to reduce copyright confu-
sion among educators through the development of the Code of Best Practices 
in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education. Hobbs and Donnelly discuss the fair 
use implications of two practices that specifically concern student multimedia 
composition: using copyrighted materials in creative work and sharing that 
work with authentic audiences as part of the teaching and learning process. 
Their chapter provides clear suggestions for negotiating classroom and student 
use of IP from a wide range of media.
To learn how teachers and students from introductory writing courses un-
derstand IP issues, Nicole Nguyen—an undergraduate student when she con-
ducted her study and now a law student at DePaul University—conducted 
surveys and interviews. “Intellectual Property Teaching Practices in Introduc-
tory Writing Courses” presents Nguyen’s findings, illustrating the shared con-
cern among students for IP issues both in and out of the classroom and their 
sometimes limited exposure to and understanding of IP issues. Nguyen’s study 
helps us see, in part through her inclusion of student participants’ voices, the 
importance of instilling “a spirit of curiosity, awareness, and ethics” to prepare 
students for authorial decisions in the classroom, in their workplaces, and as 
participants in digital culture.
 In “Moving Beyond Plagiarized/Not Plagiarized in a Point, Click, and 
Copy World,” Leslie Johnson-Farris documents her “journey from ordinary, 
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average community college composition instructor to intellectual property 
rights pedagogical philosopher.” Her journey involves the realization that typi-
cal writing assignments automatically implicate copyright issues—issues some 
of us have not attended to as much as we might. Johnson-Farris turns to the in-
stitutional policies at her college and discusses how her understanding of these 
policies evolved in the context of her classroom teaching experiences. She out-
lines tensions present in the very infrastructure of community college teaching 
and the increasing need to produce students sophisticated about copyright and 
plagiarism issues in a digital world.
In “Couture et Écriture: What the Fashion Industry Can Teach the World 
of Writing,” Brian Ballentine discusses the “piracy paradox” within the fashion 
industry. Ballentine describes this paradox as founded on the idea that “profits 
and productivity are greater due to an absence of copyright protection for fash-
ion designs.” In this chapter, he discusses an attempt at addressing this para-
dox through a now-defunct bill, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, and issues 
around the piracy paradox are layered into Ballentine’s experience teaching a 
writing course in which the students were all fashion industry majors.
In “The Role of Authorship in the Practice and Teaching of Technical 
Communication,” Jessica Reyman discusses issues of authorship and attribu-
tion for working technical communicators. She offers specific suggestions for 
the teaching of technical writing, as we support students in making the transi-
tion from the educational setting to the workplace in the context of copyright, 
authorship, and ownership issues. 
Rebecca Moore Howard, a key scholar in issues of plagiarism, intellectual 
property, and authorship in our field, provides a response to the Part III chap-
ters. We are delighted to include an afterword by Clancy Ratliff, editor of the 
CCCC-IP Annual: Top Intellectual Property Developments. 
Our initial goal in crafting this collection was to situate the need to identify 
and describe pedagogical strategies for addressing intellectual property in the 
teaching of writing. The authors in this collection offer theories, research, ap-
proaches, cautionary tales, and local and contextual successes that can further 
inform the ways in which we situate and address intellectual property issues in 
our writing classrooms. Because the law is a living entity, laws will of course 
evolve, as will digital tools, technologies, and networks. We hope that readers 
find in this collection both established landmark cases and current and pre-
dicted changes to our technologies, our laws, and our teaching. We hope read-
ers will find relevance, resonance, and broad strategies that transcend specific 
cases and that are nimble enough for application at our wide range of institu-
tional and disciplinary homes, and in the diversity of spaces in which we teach, 
research, serve, participate, and live. 
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APPENDIX: EXPLANATIONS OF LEGAL 
CONCEPTS RELATING TO COPYRIGHT
In the educational setting, in some ways the risks are great for inaccurate in-
tellectual property knowledge, but in other ways the risks are low. The risks are 
great because the average cost of defending a copyright infringement lawsuit is 
just under one million dollars, but the risks are low in the academy because—
until very recently—educators weren’t often being sued (Fisher & McGeveran, 
2006); this, however, may be changing (Rife, 2008). The complex writing lives 
of students are not completely encompassed in the space of our classrooms. Yet, 
the teaching of copyright issues in the writing classroom may be the only for-
mal instruction many students ever receive. This knowledge will have to carry 
them forward in their jobs and future careers.
Four main areas of copyright law often arise in the teaching of writing: 1) 
the basic protections of copyright law; 2) exceptions to that protection as pro-
vided in the fair use statute; 3) the work-for-hire provisions within Title 17; and 
4) authorized or licensed use (use with permission). We summarize these con-
cepts here to help those unfamiliar with copyright law understand the legally 
based arguments of the chapters included in this collection.
The Basic Protections of Copyright Law
U.S. copyright law, enacted through Congress’ constitutionally granted 
power under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, is applicable to the 
teaching of composition because this law provides automatic protection to any 
work fixed and original at the moment of its fixation. For example, any origi-
nal text, visual, sound, etc., published to the Web (or elsewhere) is copyright 
protected. Because of copyright law’s broad application, virtually all digital 
publishing—whether or not it incorporates another’s text, visuals, sounds, or 
movie clips—will invoke copyright law. Protected works include notes, webpag-
es, software, computer code, emails, reports, patterns, tutorials, instructions, 
manuals, visuals, video, audio, and all other “fixed” media. Under current law, 
a copyright holder has the exclusive right to copy, distribute, perform/display, 
and create derivative works.
The Fair Use Statute
The fair use doctrine, as codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, provides relief from copyright holder monopoly. This doctrine provides an 
exception to the copyright holder’s exclusive rights and is heavily relied upon 
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in educational environments as students and teachers complete remixes, per-
form critical analysis, generate research, and compose mash-ups for purposes of 
teaching and learning (DeVoss & Porter, 2006; Grabill & Hicks, 2005; Lessig, 
2004; Westbrook, 2006). Fair use is, essentially, unauthorized use—use that 
does not require authorization (in the form of permissions or licensing). 
Section 107, Title 17 defines fair use as “reproduction in copies ... or by any 
other means” for uses including “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” The 
four factors that courts use to make legal determinations regarding infringe-
ment are listed in the statute, and function as a legal heuristic guiding not only 
judges, but also attorneys, users, authors, and others who attempt to make and 
justify everyday composing decisions. The four factors ask that one consider:
1. the purpose and character of the use including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market. 
Although not often acknowledged, reliance on fair use is even alive and well 
in the business sector. For those of us teaching technical and professional writ-
ing, or for those of us using a service-learning component in our curriculum, 
fair use has continued utility outside the educational institution. 
Further, everyday activities on the Internet rely on fair use. Search engines 
send out “spiders” that crawl the Web, copying increasingly vast amounts of 
data then stored in the search engines’ databases (Band, 2005). This copying is 
completed without direct permission of Web site owners. Jonathan Band notes 
that “the billions of dollars of market capital represented by the search engine 
companies are based primarily on the fair use doctrine” (Band, p.5). Another 
example of for-profit reliance on fair use is the invention and sales of software 
that records screens or captures images on the web or from software applications 
(for instance, TechSmith Camtasia, a screen-casting tool, or Adobe Photoshop, 
image-editing software). If such uses were not deemed potentially fair, this soft-
ware could be outlawed due, in part, to charges similar to those raised in cases 
against peer-to-peer software—its potential to “induce” users to infringe.
Preface
xxxi
Work-for-hire Provisions
Just like copyright protections and fair use exceptions try to control or orga-
nize how texts can be appropriated and circulated, the work-for-hire provisions 
of Title 17 provide a default author in employer–employee contexts. Under 
copyright law, the default in employer–employee situations is that an employ-
ee’s creations made within the scope of employment are technically “authored” 
by the employer, who thus owns all copyrights:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom 
the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, 
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument 
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. (Title 17, 
201 (b): Works Made for Hire)
Many of us have become familiar with work-for-hire through our attempts 
to change default policies at our institutions so that policies better preserve 
faculty and/or student authorship in individual creations. Some institutions 
for example, allow faculty to retain ownership over their teaching materials 
and/or books and other materials they produce while employees—employees 
who, most often, rely on the institution’s library databases, network con-
nections, computers, and other resources to do their work. The most fac-
ulty-friendly work-for-hire policies are often won after hard-fought battles. 
Work-for-hire issues are also relevant for student writers, who will very quick-
ly leave educational settings and become employees at organizations where 
their notions of individual authorship may be seriously challenged (Reyman, 
2008; Rife, 2010).
Authorized or Licensed Use
Sometimes writers do not need to worry about whether or not they are 
within the perimeters of fair use because they receive express permission from 
a copyright holder, or they use work within the confines of a pre-attached 
license. Creative Commons and ccmixter, for example, provide a number of 
boilerplate copyright licenses that writers and musicians can affix to their 
work, allowing future authors and composers to appropriate under certain 
conditions as stated in the license. Creative Commons is a “major player 
shaping the production and distribution of creative works” (Katz, 2006, p. 
391). Creative Commons licenses do not enhance nor detract from fair use; 
rather, they simply allow users to avoid fair use determinations in most cases 
(Rife, 2007). 
Martine Rife, Shaun Slattery, and Dànielle Nicole DeVoss
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More Information
The U.S. copyright web site, copyright.gov, is perhaps the best reference for 
the law itself and also plain-language discussion of the law. Many, many other 
helpful online resources exist, offering access to the full-text of various govern-
mental statues, proposed laws, enacted policies, copyleft advocacy information 
and support, and more. The combined references cited in the chapters of this 
collection offer an abundance of work from fields with stake in and interesting 
perspectives on intellectual property issues. 
1PART I: THE LAW, THE 
LANDSCAPE

31 THE FAIR USE BATTLE FOR  
SCHOLARLY WORKS
Jeffrey Galin
“Lobbying by special interests would invariably ensure that 
copyright and patent law favors private interests over public 
ones. That is not to say that politicians are always corrupt or 
that democracies always fail; it means simply that politicians 
respond to the same incentives as the rest of us and that con-
sequently, democracies tend toward predictably biased out-
comes.”
Bell, 2002, p. 7
Writing faculty and administrators might be surprised to discover how 
much the focus on fair use has changed in the decade since several of us in the 
Conference on College Composition and Communication Intellectual Proper-
ty Caucus (CCCC-IP, 2000) published a short piece in College Composition and 
Communication titled “Use Your Fair Use: Strategies toward Action.” In that 
piece, we presented an overview of fair use and identified application strategies 
for academic settings. That piece emerged in the wake of two highly publicized 
cases—Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp. (1991) and Princeton Univer-
sity Press v. Michigan Documents Services (1996)—which dramatically limited 
faculty rights to produce course packets for students. Around the same time, 
the Copyright Clearance Center established its online presence—in 1995, just 
as the Web was becoming commercially viable. The Center’s mission grew dra-
matically as blanket licensing practices became the norm for publishers who 
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eagerly sought new revenue streams and the means to hold greater copyright 
control. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) emerged in 1998, 
making it a crime to circumvent anti-piracy measures in digital works and to 
build, sell, or distribute code-cracking devices, and, more importantly to edu-
cators, made many previously fair uses no longer legal. Furthermore, in late 
1997, the Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) sought to achieve consensus on a 
new set of copyright guidelines for clarifying fair use practices and to achieve 
more input and buy-in than the 1976 guidelines that emerged from the Com-
mission on New Technology Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). Neither 
report reached consensus or legal status, but both have been influential. Pub-
lishers, libraries, university policies, and even courts use these guidelines on 
fair use as if they were legal standards. The CCCC-IP caucus was eager to 
encourage faculty to resist the chilling effects of overly zealous legislation, in-
creasing corporate control, and over-reliance on guidelines. We wanted faculty 
to explore and exploit the extent of their fair use rights.
Although we still support these goals, the complexities of fair use have 
grown significantly. Since 2000, fair use has been subjected to important legis-
lative changes, tested in several high-profile cases, and supported by the forma-
tion of new organizations championing fair use causes; new statements of best 
practices have also emerged. Fair use has been directly attacked and narrowed 
in some contexts, while it has expanded in other contexts as a result of, for 
instance, peer-to-peer technologies, online reserve policies at universities, cor-
porate copyright control, and, conversely, the emergence of new open-source 
and open-access practices and policies. Although the struggle has been waged 
from many sides, corporate interests have achieved a decided advantage; Carol 
Silberberg (2001) argued that such changes “have reduced the scope of fair use 
in the educational setting,” and that these trends “will eventually eliminate 
fair use for schools, colleges, and universities” altogether (p. 617). Whether 
fair use will be eliminated is difficult to assess, given the emergence of a strong 
open-source movement, legal professionals who champion fair use causes, and 
legislative and legal momentum, but there is little doubt we are moving in that 
direction and the impact on educators and scholars will intensify and likely 
fundamentally change how we conduct our work in higher education.
In the face of these changes, faculty must understand fair use and how it 
will continue to impact our scholarly work, particularly as more and more of 
us integrate a range of digital media into our teaching and research. To in-
troduce the basic tenets of fair use and to explore the complexities posed by 
digital media, this chapter opens with the examples of Jane Caputi and Sut 
Jhally. These two cultural theorists are documentary filmmakers whose cultural 
critiques of corporate and commercial images expose the chilling effects of cor-
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porate copyright controls. I then examine the heightened rhetoric of copyright 
controls fostered by high-profile file-sharing cases like those involving Napster 
and Grokster, which further lead to hyper-control of copyright through legisla-
tive action. I also consider the literary estates of T.S. Eliot, Marianne Moore, 
and James Joyce, which would, arguably, charge for each cited word in scholarly 
works if able to do so. To restore the constitutional balance on which copyright 
was formed and provide Caputi, Jhally, and those who wish to draw upon the 
work of Eliot, Moore, and Joyce a fighting chance against corporate and estate 
copyright control, I then turn to copyright advocacy organizations such as Har-
vard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society, the Chilling Effects Project, 
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. I conclude by describing the most likely 
means by which faculty can reassert fair use rights and better control scholarly 
works with a discussion of the history, accelerated growth, and reception of the 
open-access movement, and by suggesting disciplinary open-access archives. 
My aim is not to provide legal advice or a comprehensive history of fair use 
in higher education. Rather, as a scholar who has studied and written about in-
tellectual property concerns for over a decade, served as co-chair of the CCCC-
IP, co-drafted IP policies at two different universities, and served as a member 
of the union bargaining team for IP at my current institution, I hope to provide 
a clear picture of the forces currently driving academic fair use and how we can 
play a significant role in averting the fate that Silberberg (2001) predicted. 
SCHOLARLY PRODUCTION
Jane Caputi has been giving presentations on the pornography of everyday 
life for over 11 years. Her work examines about 130 images mostly drawn from 
contemporary advertising and other popular cultural images, including some 
drawn from ancient and contemporary art. These images often juxtapose imag-
ery from mainstream media showing, for example, cropped torsos and images 
representing hierarchal gender roles with graphic depictions from actual por-
nography showing women’s bodies in similar or nearly identical sexually explic-
it positions. Caputi (2004) uses the term pornography to signify a world view 
based in gendered ideas and practices of sexualized inequality and draws upon 
circulating imagery to support her claims. The impact of her insightful cultural 
critiques is magnified by the images she presents. Several years ago, Caputi re-
ceived an unsolicited grant from a progressive foundation in New Mexico to 
make a documentary based on her illustrated lectures. Because of the funding 
structure, her contract with the filmmaker and her plans for the film had to be 
approved by her academic institution’s legal counsel. She discussed issues with 
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the campus attorney off and on for 2 years as she struggled with the producer to 
begin the project. University council was concerned that she needed permission 
from the copyright holders of the popular press images she was discussing in the 
film, even though the uses were for educational purposes. 
An earlier case inspired Caputi to contact a copyright specialist: In 1991, 
Sut Jhally, a communications professor at the University of Massachusetts, suc-
cessfully thwarted MTV’s (and its parent company, media giant Viacom’s) at-
tempts to prevent him from showing his documentary, which critiqued sexist 
images in music videos (Jhally, 1990, 1992, 1995, 2007). Attorneys for MTV 
threatened to sue him and the university for the use of their trademarked logo 
and copyrighted broadcasts if he did not stop distributing Dreamworlds. Kem-
brew McLeod (2001) detailed Jhally’s game of legal chicken with the major 
media conglomerate, explaining that even though his “appropriations of the 
music network’s intellectual property fit the very definition of ‘fair use’” and 
his university’s attorneys acknowledge as much, they still advised him to back 
down. When he didn’t, they told him he was on his own because the legal li-
ability for the university was too great. Jhally established the Media Education 
Foundation to distribute the film and to bear the brunt of any legal battle. 
He then managed to get press releases picked up by many major news outlets. 
(MTV never responded, presumably because MTV’s lawyers knew his work 
qualified as fair use.) 
With this important precedent in mind, Caputi knew she should be able 
to produce her documentary, but she had to convince legal counsel and her 
producer to allow her to do so. She sought external consultation and learned 
that the public is entitled to use copyrighted material without permission or 
payment in certain circumstances, particularly for “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research” (Title 17 U.S.C., Section 107) . Caputi also learned that if a copy-
right owner sues and wins in court, then the defendant may be responsible for 
damages and court fees. Although her copyright attorney explained that there 
was no precise “right way” to proceed, the fair use four-factor analysis favored 
her use of the material: 
1. the purpose and character of the use, whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
2. the nature of the copyrighted work, whether factual or creative; 
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and
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4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The circumstances for fair use mentioned above, including educational use 
and teaching, do not guarantee fair use; however, such uses are favored, es-
pecially when there are cultural or social benefits involved. Kenneth Crews 
(2000) explained that although fair use “is intended to apply to teaching, re-
search, and other such activities ... educational purpose alone does not make 
a use fair.” Purpose is only one of four factors, and each factor is subject to 
interpretation by courts and must be reviewed within the specific facts of each 
case. Some policy-makers have incorrectly concluded that if a work is com-
mercial, then the factor dealing with the nature of the work weighs against fair 
use. If this were true, no clip from a video production or a trade book could 
ever prevail for that factor. Other commentators have argued that if a viable 
license is easily available, “the action will directly conflict with the market for 
licensing the original” (Crews) and thereby tip the effect factor against fair 
use. Neither of these simplistic constructions of fair use is a valid generaliza-
tion, even though they are rooted in “some truths under certain circumstances” 
(Crews). A reasoned analysis of all four factors must be conducted for a reliable 
evaluation. Furthermore, not all factors must lean in one direction for a given 
finding. A fifth moral factor is also often applied: Judges have evaluated the 
four criteria to find against fair use if the user acted either in bad faith (i.e., not 
being able to demonstrate that s/he reasonably believed that the use was a fair 
use) or in an offensive manner.
Caputi’s and Jhally’s cases make good demonstrations of how the factors 
are applied:
Purpose: In both cases, the images and video clips are part of 
academic arguments for educational purposes, which weighs 
in favor of fair use. The courts also favor transformative uses 
that do not merely reproduce but transform the work into 
something new of new utility. Clearly both documentaries are 
transformative; the purpose factor weighs unambiguously in 
favor of fair use.
Nature: The nature of the work examines characteristics 
of the work being used. The more factual and less creative 
the original work is, the more likely courts find for fair use. 
Because commercial, audiovisual, creative works are more 
strongly protected than factual works in print, this factor may 
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weigh more in favor of copyright holders like MTV and com-
mercial advertisers. Yet, the transformative purpose for schol-
arly critique may mitigate the focus on this factor. 
Amount: The two cases differ on this factor. Caputi utilized 
entire print ads, photographic representations or etchings from 
online sources and archeological texts, and single frame com-
ics. Jhally edited clips of music videos, removing the music and 
dubbing a lecture track over the music. For Caputi, the amount 
factor could weigh in favor of the copyright holder in certain 
instances, particularly if many of the images were taken from 
the same source. But the court also takes into consideration 
whether the entire work is necessary for the educational pur-
pose. Because her images come from so many sources and are 
clearly necessary for her analysis, this factor is likely to weigh 
in favor of fair use. Few courts would consider Jhally’s use ex-
cessive unless he drew upon a large percentage of individual 
videos or excerpted the “heart” of a particular video. The lat-
ter would be hard to claim since no music track was included. 
Market effect: In neither case is there likely to be any confu-
sion of the cultural critiques of the commercial images with 
the originals, nor is it likely that a court will find that a pur-
chase of the original should have been necessary for the use. 
When the purpose is research or scholarship for non-commer-
cial uses, market effect may be difficult to prove. Courts are 
unlikely to find in either case that the limited circulation of 
these documentaries for dramatically different audiences and 
purposes is likely to compete with the original advertisements 
or music videos. 
Although copyright owners might object to their products being critiqued in 
these ways, the very purpose of the fair use exemption for critical commentary 
is to prevent copyright holders from silencing critical voices. In this way, the fair 
use defense is often aligned with freedom of speech. Although there is no guar-
antee that fair use would be determined for Caputi or Jhally, assessment suggests 
fair use. Furthermore, if both scholars could prove that they completed this 
four-factor assessment prior to the actual production of their work, both would 
likely to be deemed to have acted in good faith, which could help their cases. 
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Even if both Caputi and Jhally prevailed, however, they have both risked 
being sued and being held responsible for damages and court fees. Unlike Jhal-
ly, most professors do not have the resources or audacity to take on potential 
lawsuits. Caputi, for example, took into consideration questions of which im-
ages to use, whether to use video clips, whether to obscure corporate logos, and 
how best to distribute her work. Some faculty, given the potential consequenc-
es, would simply give up the project. 
INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC SHIFTS 
COPYRIGHT BALANCE
The examples of Caputi and Jhally shed light on several additional issues 
that concern faculty research. These cases expose a much broader problem that 
impacts scholarly work: Inflammatory copyright rhetoric leads corporate copy-
right holders to assert greater pressure on all markets they can control. To un-
derstand how this market pressure impacts our work, we must understand the 
role of fair use in the copyright regime. 
Few of us realize how recently (1999) Shawn Fanning first conceived of 
Napster, which initiated grand-scale peer-to-peer music sharing (Lessig, 2004). 
Within 9 months of its launch, the tool claimed 10 million users. In another 
9 months, there were 80 million registered users. The cultural, technological, 
and legal terrains were poised to change dramatically, in large part due to Nap-
ster. Tolerance for fair use plummeted, cease and desist letters proliferated, and 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) prosecuted users who 
“shared” files across the spectrum of peer-to-peer services that emerged be-
tween 2000 and 2002—Kazaa, Aimster, Morpheus, Musiccity, and Grokster, 
to name a few. One need only visit Grokster’s Web site to find a permanent me-
morial to illegal peer-to-peer sharing of music files. The page, still emblazoned 
with the Grokster trademark, reads:
The United States Supreme Court unanimously confirmed 
that using this service to trade copyrighted material is illegal. 
Copying copyrighted motion picture and music files using 
unauthorized peer-to-peer services is illegal and is prosecuted 
by copyright owners.
There are legal services for downloading music and movies. 
This service is not one of them. 
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YOUR IP ADDRESS IS <your ip address here> AND HAS 
BEEN LOGGED. Don’t think you can’t get caught. You are 
not anonymous. 
Lawrence Lessig (2004) explained the various forms of trading files and the 
recording industry’s understandable reaction to it and posed the fundamental 
question that lies at the core of copyright law: “While the recording industry 
understandably says, ‘This is how much we’ve lost,’ we must also ask, ‘How 
much has society gained from p2p sharing?’”
Copyright law was designed to protect creative works and foster the cre-
ation of new culture. The U.S. Constitution provides the mandate for fair use 
by promoting “the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ing and discoveries” (U.S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8., cl. 8). This limited monopoly 
of rights was designed to balance the needs of creators to make a reasonable 
return on their works and inventions for a limited period of time, with the work 
then turning toward the public domain to serve as fodder for the development 
of future creative works. Thus, as Jessica Litman (2001) argued, “copyright was 
a bargain between the public and the author, whereby the public bribed the 
author to create new works in return for limited commercial control over the 
new expression the author brought to their works” (p. 78). The delicate balance 
on which this bargain was struck, however, has shifted in favor of copyright 
holders. Bell (2002) noted that “the influence of ... rough-and-tumble politics 
merely ensures that copyright and patent law put public and private interests 
into an indelicate imbalance” (p. 8). 
We can see the impact of this imbalance in copyright legislation over the 
course of the past 220 years. The first federal copyright legislation of 1790 
set the maximum copyright term of 14 years with one 14-year renewal avail-
able. Over the course of the next 110 years, both the initial and renewal terms 
doubled. In 1961, the maximum length of a copyright term was 56 years. From 
1962 to the present, the term has changed three times, extending copyright 
protection to 70 years, then life of all authors plus 50 years, and now life plus 
70 years or a total of 95 years for commercial owners (Bell, 2007). 
Perhaps the escalation of copyright term extension encouraged Congress in 
1976 to codify the common law concept of fair use from the 1909 Copyright 
Act. With a delay of about 100 years before works move into the public domain, 
the codification provides a loose framework to ensure that copyright holders do 
not have absolute monopolies on their works. Furthermore, the “Supreme Court 
has described fair use as ‘the guarantee of breathing space for new expression 
within the confines of Copyright law’” (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2002).
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SCHOLARSHIP ON CREATIVE WORKS
As Caputi learned, creative works are more protected than factual works. 
We see the implications of such a practice in the miniscule word count limits 
and rigid standards that publishers and literary estates have placed on fair use 
citation of published materials. Boynton Cook/Heinemann/Greenwood Press, 
for example, set a 300-word maximum for the use of any text (excluding illus-
trations) before permission is required and fees are paid; Peter Lang follows the 
same standard for citing poetry. Literary estates vary widely in what they will 
allow to be published and how much permissions cost. There are several par-
ticularly notorious estates that so regularly threaten lawsuits for what amounts 
to fair use citation that publishers typically would rather consent to arbitrary 
and sometimes outlandish demands rather than risk a lawsuit based on a fair 
use defense. 
Anyone who has sought to publish a biography on T.S. Eliot has been 
thwarted by his widow for the past 40 years. D. T. Max (2006) noted the 
distaste the Eliot estate has for academics, recalling Eliot’s widow Valerie’s 
“distaste for members of the ‘Ph.D. industry’ and her ‘dry, formal, excessive-
ly polite notes giving them the least help possible.’” Max also mentioned the 
niece of Marianne Moore, who “has been unusually strict with permissions; in 
1989, she demanded that a biographer remove all quotations from the poet’s 
unpublished letters.” By far, however, the most notorious estate executor is Ste-
phen James Joyce, grandson of James Joyce. Nate Anderson (2006) noted that 
“Stephen James Joyce has proved himself extraordinarily unwilling to allow 
scholars access to Joyce’s private letters and writings, and has even objected to 
their use of passages from his grandfather’s works.” The difficulties of dealing 
with Stephen Joyce became so notorious that a special panel was formed to 
help scholars deal with him: The International James Joyce Foundation Special 
Panel on Intellectual Property has developed a lengthy online FAQ for schol-
ars seeking permission from the Joyce estate. The FAQ notes that, contrary to 
common practice by many publishers and estates, “fair use cannot be reduced 
to a certain quantity of words or number of lines.” This outlook is aligned with 
the multi-factor analysis that I use to discuss Caputi’s and Jhally’s work, which 
is flexible and depends on case circumstances. Nonetheless, publishers can and 
typically do insist on extremely conservative rules to avoid any possibilities of 
litigation. 
One of the only cases to ever challenge and prevail against the Joyce estate 
was settled in June 2007. Carol Loeb Shloss, a Stanford professor, had been 
working on a biography of Lucia Joyce, Stephen’s mentally ill aunt, and was 
about to publish Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake. Stephen Joyce wrote her 
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and implied that he might sue if she quoted from copyrighted material. Ac-
cording to D. T. Max (2006), “Stephen pressured her publisher, Farrar, Straus 
& Giroux, which asked Shloss to cut many quotations.” With great angst and 
frustration, she complied, cutting her use from 10,000 words to 7,000. When 
an attorney wrote to Stephen to explain the cuts and how they followed the 
provisions of fair use, Stephen responded, “this sounds like a bad joke.” Copy-
right, he wrote, was meant “to protect the author’s rights as well as those who 
inherited them, which is my case with respect to James Joyce.” He noted, “You 
should be aware of the fact that over the past decade the James Joyce Estate’s 
‘record,’ in legal terms, is crystal clear and we have proven on a number of oc-
casions that we are prepared to put our money where our mouth is.” 
Such disregard for the balance of rights set forth in the U.S. Constitu-
tion is not uncommon. The shift in metaphors from bargain to incentive that 
Litman (2001) discussed has emboldened corporate and estate owners alike. 
Taking is taking from the owners’ perspective, a belief strengthened in the 
post-Napster era. Soon after the publication of her book, Shloss met the copy-
right lawyer Lawrence Lessig. After Shloss shared with him her correspondence 
with Stephen Joyce, Lessig decided to take her case pro bono. In March 2005, 
he suggested that she gather the material that she had purged from the book 
and post it on the Web “to aid scholars and researchers.” Although much of 
the material that Shloss sought to publish online was previously unpublished 
work, the fair use statute states specifically that unpublished work will not bar 
the finding of fair use if the case details warrant such a finding. Furthermore, 
when scholars or publishers ask permission to use material in ways that would 
normally be understood as fair use, they typically do so to avoid litigation or 
threats of legal action. Even if permission is denied, fair use is not negated 
under U.S. copyright law. With this knowledge in mind, Lessig crafted a letter 
to the Joyce estate and explained that even though Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux 
had asked Shloss to remove the material, the quotations did in fact fall under 
the fair use doctrine. Joyce’s lawyers responded, as one might imagine, with 
surprise and veiled threats. In response, Lessig joined forces with Robert Spoo, 
a Joyce scholar turned copyright lawyer, and David Olson, a Stanford associate, 
to prepare a lawsuit for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to allow 
Shloss to publish the materials online without the threat of being sued by the 
defendants. After additional posturing, the estate realized it would likely lose 
the case if it went to trial and settled out of court; Shloss was granted attorney 
fees in a separate settlement hearing. Although the estate’s attorney called the 
result “more of a nuisance settlement,” the Fair Use Project saw the “case more 
broadly, as part of its ongoing efforts to loosen the tightening grip of copyright 
holders’ intent on discouraging new creative works” (Cavanaugh, 2007). The 
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atmosphere of intimidation that Napster and Grokster spawned in the music 
world had already been brewing in estate permission practices, but finally came 
to a head in this example. 
If the case had been litigated and decided in favor of Shloss, it would have 
had more legal impact. Also, had Stephen Joyce not pursued rights well beyond 
those made available in the U.S. copyright statute—including calls to librar-
ians to prevent Shloss from viewing unpublished Joyce letters or publishing 
Lucia Joyce’s medical records (which he did not own)—the case would have 
had a wider impact. Although the settlement does not offer litigants great lever-
age for future cases, it does frame the set of issues that scholars who work pri-
marily with creative works must face in order to publish their scholarly works. 
Furthermore, it sets an important precedent that literary estates and publishers 
need to heed. 
EMERGENCE OF STRONG FAIR USE ADVOCATES
If no strong and vocal advocates had emerged to fight for fair use over the 
past 10 years, Silberberg’s (2001) proclamation that fair use was doomed for 
schools might have already come true. These issues are further represented in 
another recent, high-profile case. In October 2008, J. K. Rowling won a deci-
sion against RDR Books for copyright infringement for an encyclopedic work 
entitled The Lexicon that Steven Vander Ark wrote based on his comprehensive 
Web site of all things Harry Potter. For 10 years, the site had been growing and 
serving as a resource for fans and even J. K. Rowling, her publisher, Blooms-
bury, and her film producer, Warner Bros. When Vander Ark began to pursue 
a book project, Rowling and Warner Bros. sued, claiming copyright violations 
(Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. and J. K. Rowling v. RDR Books et al., 2008). 
J. K. Rowling is known for her desire to control all aspects of productions 
concerning Harry Potter. Most of the materials for the book had been posted 
online for many years; thus the Stanford Law School and its affiliated Fair Use 
Project joined forces with RDR’s legal team to defend the case. Here was an 
opportunity to win a strategic case against both the movie industry and a huge 
publishing conglomerate—and to gain high-profile notoriety by taking on J. 
K. Rowling. The drama of the case was impressive. The popular press set up a 
battle between media giant Warner Bros. and famously wealthy J. K. Rowling, 
and the little publisher RDR Books and librarian Stephen Vander Ark. 
The judge’s decision was, in the end, even-handed and significant for both 
copyright holders and creators who do scholarship on creative works. Judge 
Patterson found that The Lexicon used too much of Rowlings’ creative language 
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and descriptions, often without citation. He also found that although the ency-
clopedic text was transformative enough not to infringe upon the novels, it was 
not considered transformative enough of the two companion books Rowling 
has published, Quidditch Through the Ages and Fantastic Beasts & Where to Find 
Them, themselves encyclopedic in nature. The court also found that The Lexi-
con was not derivative because it was mostly transformative; the fact that Rowl-
ing planned to write her own encyclopedia thus had no bearing on the case. 
Even though Vander Ark and RDR lost their fair use defense, the case was 
as much a win for creators as a win for fair use advocates. It set useful standards 
for future encyclopedic works and other non-creative works that faculty may 
produce if they follow a few clear rules: 1) use all copyrighted material care-
fully; 2) use only as much from the work as necessary—do not include full 
songs, poems, or creative language that could be rephrased or summarized; and 
3) ensure the work is consistently transformative—include additional scholarly 
reflection that does not appear in the original works. The judge concluded that 
The Lexicon was not fair use “in its current state,” but he did leave the door 
open not only for a revision and resubmission of the work but also future works 
by stating that “reference works that share the Lexicon’s purpose of aiding read-
ers of literature generally should be encouraged rather than stifled” (Warner 
Bros. Entertainment Inc. and J. K. Rowling v. RDR Books et al., 2008). RDR 
Books withdrew its initial appeal when Vander Ark completed a substantial re-
vision. The Lexicon: An Unauthorized Guide to Harry Potter Fiction and Related 
Materials has now been on sale since January 2009.
Both the Shloss and Vander Art cases demonstrate a dramatic shift in copy-
right litigation within the past few years. Prior to the emergence of strong advo-
cate organizations like the Fair Use Project, the Berkman Center of the Harvard 
Law School, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, publishers, authors, and 
professors like Caputi and Jhally were left to their own resources if challenged 
by a copyright holder. Almost no fair use cases have gone to court concern-
ing faculty work because faculty typically have not been able to pay the legal 
costs. Furthermore, scholars usually agree to unreasonable and overly restrictive 
publishing contracts to get published, and without much reflection. Little at-
tention is paid to increasing copyright restrictions, citation limitations, and the 
insistence by publishers to garner permissions for nearly all cited work. Faculty 
are not often aware of what Bell (1998) identified as fared use—the increased 
expectations of publishers that all uses of copyrighted work should be licensed. 
We see the impact of this thinking in the dramatic growth of the Copyright 
Clearance Center and the increased emphasis in the courts on the harm to exist-
ing markets in fair use cases concerning use of scholarly works. Most faculty do 
not realize that the courts recognize customary practices as evidence for shift-
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ing markets and business models. Perhaps most important of all, faculty do not 
seem to realize that these chilling effects on scholarship, teaching, and creation 
are not inevitable, even though they are currently tipping the delicate balance 
on which copyright is constitutionally founded in the favor of copyright holders. 
This quiet acquiescence will lead to greater copyright restrictions unless faculty 
learn more about advocacy organizations, consciously assert their rights, and 
play an active role in advocating for alternative disciplinary practices. 
Since 1998, when the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
Law School was officially named, increasing numbers of fair use advocacy 
groups have emerged to counter these chilling effects. Wendy Seltzer origi-
nally envisioned the Chilling Effects Project as a clearinghouse to vet cease 
and desist letters—like the ones that Sut Jhally received from MTV—which 
are often sent to intimidate scholars and other users. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, with which the Chilling Effects Project is affiliated, provides legal 
support to important fair use cases. But the Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society at Harvard Law School, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Future 
of Music Foundation, Digitalconsumers.org, Creative Commons, and Stan-
ford’s Center for Internet and Society and the Fair Use Project, among others, 
have limited resources and must be selective in the cases they support. 
Each new, high-profile copyright case and each piece of legislation that 
carves out exceptions and exemptions for corporate interests or further restricts 
educational or public use of copyrighted works (like the Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act) inspires fair use advo-
cates to explore new options. To pay for its litigation with J. K. Rowling and 
Warner Bros, RDR Books created the Right to Write Fund. The nonprofit 
Berkman Center’s Citizen Media Law Project pledged to work with the Right 
to Write Fund’s mission of serving as “an educational repository and clearing-
house for freedom of expression and ‘fair use’ issues that writers, filmmakers, 
professors, recording artists, and publishers encounter when moving among 
the worlds of print, Internet, film, the fine arts, and new media” (Reidy, 2008). 
As these resources continue to grow and proliferate, more faculty who find 
themselves in need of legal support or advice will benefit from them. In the in-
terim, faculty must be aware of the ways in which affirmative fair use rights are 
shrinking and must become advocates for alternative management practices.
ADVOCATING FOR AFFIRMATIVE FAIR USE RIGHTS
Faculty have a range of ways to advocate for affirmative fair use rights for 
their scholarly works. Knowing and understanding rights is the first step to-
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ward protecting them. There are many resources available for helping fac-
ulty better understand the nuances of copyright law and the role of fair 
use. In 2008, the MLA Style Manual and Guide to Scholarly Publishing 
published a chapter on copyright, providing a clear and concise summa-
ry of each facet of the U.S. copyright law. Although this chapter makes 
few recommendations on how to interpret the statute, it is easily accessible 
and provides a useful framework for understanding the complex copyright 
landscape. Stanford’s Copyright and Fair Use Web site is an excellent re-
source; its FAQs for copyright and fair use pose the questions we need 
to ask, provide brief but accurate summaries of copyright principles, offer 
brief summaries of key case law examples, and address all forms of media. 
The Berkman Center for Internet and Society provides an extensive list 
of advocacy projects including the Center for Citizen Media, Chilling Ef-
fects, Citizen Media Law, Cooperation, Copyright for Librarians, Creative 
Commons, Cyberlaw Clinic, Freedom To Teach: an Educational Fair Use, 
and many others. Each of these projects provides its own unique set of re-
sources, all worth exploring. 
Faculty can also pay attention to the rhetorics of control and free access 
that drive most public debates over access to academic works. Understanding 
the impact of examples like those described earlier in this chapter provides 
important guidance. Furthermore, faculty can seek university copyright poli-
cies. In another collection, I (2009) provide a careful analysis of university 
intellectual property policies and strategies for faculty for reading these poli-
cies; in the appendix to that chapter, I offer fifteen recommendations that all 
faculty should consider when reading intellectual property policies at their 
institutions. 
Among the possible strategies that faculty can pursue to extend public ac-
cess to work and even the playing field with corporate interests that control 
copyright, the most significant are publishing in open-access journals and par-
ticipating in university institutional repositories (IRs). The open-access (OA) 
movement has been building for about two decades, but has expanded dra-
matically in the past 5 years or so. Participation in OA practices provide faculty 
ways to resist over-control of scholarly work and to change the ways in which 
new knowledge is produced and disseminated. Institutional repositories pro-
liferated beginning around 2003; although related to open-access initiatives, 
institutional repositories are typically university-based and have not been as 
successful as open-access initiatives as a whole. I close this chapter with a brief 
explanation and history of OA and IR initiatives, the reception these initiatives 
have had by faculty, and a set of strategies that faculty can use to guide their 
publishing practices. 
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THE OPEN-ACCESS MOVEMENT AND 
INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORIES
Peter Suber (2007b) explained in his blog that open-access works are “digi-
tal, online, free of charge, and free of most copyright and licensing restrictions,” 
and are “compatible with copyright, peer review, revenue (even profit), print, 
preservation, prestige, career-advancement, indexing, and other features and 
supportive services associated with conventional scholarly literature.” There are 
two primary standards of OA publishing: gold and green. Gold OA journals 
are peer-reviewed, allow authors to retain copyrights, and typically provide 
open access to research titles without delay. The green standard represents non-
peer-reviewed works in archives or repositories that are often pre- or postprint 
reproductions of journal articles. Faculty have a choice of where they publish 
and can influence journal editors to participate in open-access practices. 
In 1991, Paul Ginsparg helped to develop what is now called the arXiv.org 
e-print archive while he was working for the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
Since that time, he and Stevan Harnad, a cognitive scientist, have advocated 
for and written about the need for open-access electronic archives to subvert 
the time delays, access problems, and costs of scholarly publications. In a pro-
posal, Harnad (1995) laid down the gauntlet for open-access archiving. He 
stated that if
every esoteric [non-trade, no-market] author in the world this 
very day established a globally accessible local ftp archive for 
every piece of esoteric writing from this day forward, the long-
heralded transition from paper publication to purely electron-
ic publication (of esoteric research) would follow suit almost 
immediately.
His proposal spawned a series of online discussions among physicists, 
chemists, publishers, librarians, developers of the Web, and others. (A valu-
able archive of these exchanges is available, along with the original proposal, 
by the Association of Research Libraries.) More importantly, this conversa-
tion launched over a decade of advocacy, partnerships, experiments, research, 
dramatic growth of the e-print arXiv, emergence of thousands of open-access 
journals, and a host of self-archiving initiatives. 
Soon after Harnad (1995) posted his proposal online, he helped to craft 
several important initiatives. He played an important role in galvanizing an in-
ternational group of colleagues with funding from the Open Society Institute 
that led to the 2002 Budapest Open Access Initiative, which became a major 
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turning point in the movement. Over 4,000 individuals signed the initiative; 
380 organizations signed as well, including universities from all over the world, 
libraries, medical schools, non-profit organizations, journals, institutes, societ-
ies, councils, research centers, and other institutions (Chan, 2002).
Other declarations followed, including the 2003 Berlin Declaration on 
Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities and the 2003 
Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing. The latter initiative estab-
lished PubMed as a free digital archive of biomedical and life sciences journal 
literature at the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH). In July 2004, the 
U.S. House Appropriations Committee adopted a set of recommendations for 
the 2005 federal budget, which became the House Report 108-636. This bill 
expressed concern that insufficient public access was available for reports and 
data resulting from NIH-funded research. Citing the rising costs of scientific 
journal subscriptions, the report recommended that the NIH begin requiring a 
copy of any manuscript produced by or through NIH grant-funded work and 
that work be added to the National Library of Medicine’s (NLM) PubMed 
directory. The report further stipulated that supplemental materials be “free-
ly and continuously available six months after publication, or immediately in 
cases in which some or all of the publication costs are paid with NIH grant 
funds” (Wallace, 2004). In January 2008, the NIH announced a revision of its 
policy as a result of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. This law now 
stipulates that, when consistent with copyright law,
all investigators funded by the NIH [shall] submit or have 
submitted for them to the National Library of Medicine’s 
PubMed Central an electronic version of their final, peer-re-
viewed manuscripts upon acceptance for publication, to be 
made publicly available no later than 12 months after the of-
ficial date of publication. 
At the same time that the NIH pursued its public-access initiative, the RoMEO 
(Rights Metadata for Open Archiving) and SHERPA (Securing a Hybrid Envi-
ronment for Research Preservation and Access, an institutional repository part-
nership of over 30 universities) projects were developing in the U.K. The former 
project studies “issues relating to the open-archiving of research papers by UK 
academics,” while the latter lists publishers and their associated copyright agree-
ments concerning self-archiving. SHERPA also runs a service called OpenDOAR, 
which lists a number of subject-based institutional repositories for self-archiving 
world-wide. Not surprisingly, PubMed sponsors a comparable list (the Open Ac-
cess List) of publishers willing to participate in NIH’s open-access archive. 
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Concurrently in the U.S., a similar initiative took root under the auspices of 
the Coalition for Networked Information (CNI). Clifford Lynch and Joan Lip-
pincott (2005) described a CNI survey of its academic member institutions to 
examine the current state of institutional repositories in the U.S. Their survey 
went out to U.S. research institutions and colleges, with a return rate of about 
80%. They found that about 40% of the responding universities and 43% of 
responding colleges had developed institutional repositories; 88% of the insti-
tutions that did not yet have repositories were planning to develop them or be-
come part of multi-institutional repositories. Lynch and Lippincott concluded 
that IRs in the U.S. “are being positioned decisively as general-purpose infra-
structure within the context of changing scholarly practice, within e-research 
and cyberinfrastructure, and in visions of the university in the digital age.” The 
purposes of these repositories differ considerably, from dissertation or preprint 
archives to digitized music scores and campus blogs. 
Based directly on the language of the open-access archive movement, the 
policies of the NIH, and the explosive growth of IR initiatives, the University 
of California system published white papers that directed faculty to participate 
in a mandatory state-wide archive. In December 2005 the University of Cali-
fornia Academic Council’s Special Committee on Scholarly Communication 
published a set of white papers in which they argued that: 
faculty shall routinely grant to The Regents of the University 
of California a limited, irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide, non-
exclusive license to place the faculty member’s scholarly work in 
a non-commercial open-access repository for purposes of online 
dissemination and preservation on behalf of the author and the 
public.
This proposal was bold and direct and was the biggest of its kind in the 
U.S. It met much more resistance from faculty than administrators anticipat-
ed; terms like “irrevocable,” “perpetual,” and “worldwide” are not humanities-
friendly. Faculty expressed their concerns in a 2007 attitude survey. Perhaps 
the most telling response stated that “scholars are aware of alternative forms 
of dissemination but are concerned about preserving their current publishing 
outlets” (University of California, 2007). Furthermore, faculty asserted that 
“the current tenure and promotion system impedes changes in faculty behav-
ior.” As a result of faculty responses, the University of California Open Access 
Policy worked for 2 years to soften its mandate by qualifying which texts would 
be posted and by shifting its tone significantly. The 2007 revision sought to 
“increase authors’ influence in scholarly publishing by establishing a collective 
Jeffrey Galin
20
practice of retaining a right to open access dissemination of certain scholarly 
works” (p. 2) and asserted that faculty would routinely grant the “Regents of 
the University of California a license to place in a non-commercial open-access 
online repository the faculty member’s scholarly work published in a scholarly 
journal or conference proceedings.” Although the tenor of the language shifted 
in useful ways from the initial white paper, the commitment from the universi-
ties dramatically increased. The new policy asserted that the Academic Senate, 
in collaboration with the President’s office, would “contact scholarly publish-
ers and establish support mechanisms for the policy and the use of scholarly 
work which it covers.” The University would “support faculty in their efforts 
to retain open access dissemination rights, and to foster a broad spectrum of 
publication venues” and would not receive any money for doing so.
Faculty resistance outside of the sciences is disappointing, albeit not sur-
prising; the economy of status that drives faculty work is fueled by tenure and 
promotion. As the work of Harnad (1995, 1997) and Ginsparg (1997) have 
demonstrated, faculty in the sciences have typically valued dissemination and 
first discovery in their scholarly work. Those of us in the humanities have typi-
cally valued scholarly achievement and production over immediacy and first 
ownership of ideas. 
One might account for these differences in several ways: 1) scientific re-
search often leads to time-sensitive medical or pharmaceutical developments; 
2) scientific research may also lead to development of patents, licenses, or com-
petitive grants; and 3) scientific culture is founded on a spirit of international 
cooperation and the desire for first recognition of discoveries. On the other 
hand, research in the humanities rarely leads to time-sensitive discoveries and 
does not foster a first-to-market ideology. Collaboration is typically based on 
personal relationships rather than teams of scholars striving to solve the same 
set of problems across international borders. Furthermore, although many hu-
manities scholars lament the pace of production, few attempt to advocate for 
changes in the systems driving production practices. Perhaps most important 
of all, humanities faculty depend so much on peer-reviewed research for tenure 
and promotion that they are nervous about any changes that could jeopardize 
their chances for promotion. Ultimately, the sciences have proven that open ac-
cess publication and institutional and professional association repositories have 
not negatively impacted tenure and promotion decisions. Physics, chemistry, 
and certain fields in math and computer science have been posting nearly all of 
their scholarly work as pre- and postprints since the 1980s in online archives. 
For humanities faculty to realize the benefits of disciplinary open-access ar-
chiving, the culture of publishing has to change, which involves shifting fac-
ulty attitudes and practices, participating in institutional promotion practices, 
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garnering university support for open-access initiatives, and fomenting change 
in relationships with publishers. This is no small set of changes.
In 1998, Joan Latchaw and I called for open-access publishing of work in 
the field of computers and composition. Change in academic culture occurs 
slowly but is often marked by precipitating events. Assertive initiatives are nec-
essary to stimulate the shift of culture needed in the humanities. The Califor-
nia open-access repository and the NIH mandate set the stage for what would 
become, according to Suber (2007a), the first U.S. open-access, faculty-initiat-
ed, university-wide mandate. On February 18, 2008, the Harvard University 
faculty of Arts and Letters unanimously voted for what has become the first 
open-access mandate “to be adopted by faculty rather than administrators, the 
first adopted policy to focus on permissions rather than deposits, and the first 
to catch the worldwide attention of the press and blogosphere” (Suber, 2008). 
Suber, an open-access activist with Public Knowledge, a nonprofit group in 
Washington, D.C., explained the permissions focus of this mandate as op-
posed to a deposit mandate: Rather than requiring faculty to deposit copies 
of their articles after they publish postprints in an institutional repository, the 
Harvard mandate merely requires faculty “to give the university permission 
(non-exclusive permission) to host the postprints in the IR.” Harvard’s man-
date required all faculty in the College of Arts and Letters to participate in this 
open-access repository or write for permission to opt out. Further, the univer-
sity takes responsibility for depositing the work itself. Such a model “reduces 
the demands on faculty and increases the certainty about permissions. As long 
as the university is willing to pay people, usually librarians, to make the actual 
deposits, it could be a faster and more frictionless way to move the deposit rate 
toward 100%.” Suber cataloged the astounding range of reactions in the popu-
lar press, at universities worldwide, at open-access organizations, and on fair 
use advocacy sites. 
Notwithstanding resistance to the California institutional repository, the 
California and Harvard initiatives mark an important turning point in IR and 
OA mandates, shifting the focus from the sciences to the humanities. Suber 
(2007a, 2007b, 2008), Harnad (1995), and Ginsparg (1997) continue to advo-
cate strongly for the growth of the movement. Suber has consolidated recom-
mendations from scholars into a comprehensive list of strategies that faculty 
can use to advocate for open-access publishing at all levels of our daily work. 
These recommendations include submitting research in the form of preprints, 
postprints, or simultaneous prints to open access journals; advocating for in-
stitutional repositories at our home institutions; asking publishers to release 
certain ownership rights so that scholars can post published work in an institu-
tional repository; depositing research data with corresponding research in OA 
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archives; accepting invitations to join peer-review boards of OA journals but 
not journals that are not open-access; and numerous additional possibilities 
(Suber, 2007b). 
CONCLUSION
Composition scholars have typically been more open to change than others 
in the humanities. We were among the first to theorize assessment and make 
assessment part of our scholarly mission. We led the way in integrating all 
forms of computer technologies into the classroom and theorizing their many 
strengths and recognizing their liabilities. We have been the first to form an 
intellectual property caucus to educate our scholarly communities of the sig-
nificance of copyright concerns in our classes and research. We are in a unique 
position as a discipline to extend the purpose, promise, and value of fair use by 
advocating open-access publishing in the humanities. In 2001, the emergence 
of CompPile, a comprehensive online composition bibliography of scholarship 
ranging from 1939 to the present, marked the most significant contribution to 
the spirit of free research and scholarship in the field. Even with this extraor-
dinary resource, however, and several open-access initiatives in composition 
studies like the WAC Clearinghouse, the Computers and Composition Digital 
Press, and a few open-access text books (including Flat World Knowledge and 
Writing Spaces: Readings on Writing), compositionists as a whole have not in-
vested in open-access publishing. 
When Joan and I (1998) first proposed the development of a disciplinary 
preprint archive for the field of computers and composition, we were imag-
ining something more than a bibliography—even more than an open-access 
archive. We explored the development of a community-based preprint archive 
that would serve as the hub of research, conversation, and professional develop-
ment for a dynamic online community whose work was tied to such a home 
base resembling Michel Foucault’s heterotopic spaces. Foucault used this term 
to define cultural spaces that have “precise and determined functions” that 
may shift over time. Among other traits, heterotopias function in relation to 
all spaces that exist outside of them. At the same time that they mark a cultur-
ally definable space that is unlike any other space, they also act as microcosms 
reflecting larger cultural patterns or social orders.
We wrote:
If we developed a preprint archive system to which all mem-
bers of the community contributed their pre-published texts, 
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we could create the most complex heterotopic virtual archive 
available to date. And because this community is so diverse 
and crosses so many disciplinary boundaries, this site could 
eventually house most new knowledge that concerned intel-
lectual property, copyright, fair use, cross disciplinary con-
cerns of integrating technology into teaching, and more 
generally the impacts of computer technology on culture at 
large. (Galin & Latchaw, 1998)
At that time, we were imagining a living archive that would serve as 
a place to meet, do research, house and present scholarly work, and build 
community relationships beginning within the burgeoning community 
of computers and composition. We realized then that such a radical shift 
in academic culture would have to begin small within a community that 
was already innovative, accepting of cultural change, and ready or willing 
to make such a shift. We imagined that “not-for-profit academics, profes-
sional organizations, and electronic journal editorial boards could build 
in value added resources that would encourage regular and repeated use 
of this professional working space.” In so doing, a crystallizing structure 
would emerge on which larger sectors of the discipline could build. We sug-
gested that:
Spin-off publications would surely emerge as the archives 
continued to grow exponentially. Students in undergraduate 
and graduate classes would likely develop real-world writing 
projects that contribute to the review and linking systems of 
the raw materials available online. Libraries would develop 
reference systems to manage the dynamic body of resources 
and materials online as professional organizations developed 
LASE-like disciplinary search engines and electronic agents 
developed more advanced on-the-fly annotated meta-hyper-
text engines. (Galin & Latchaw, 1998)
We offered this vision at the moment that the open-access movement had 
really just begun, building on Harnad’s (1995) and Ginsparg’s (1997) vision 
of preprint archives. The range of possibilities has grown exponentially since 
that time with the development of pre- and postprint open access archives, 
green and gold standard open-access journals, institutional repositories, 
open-access agreements and legislation, Creative Commons licensing, the 
emergence of advocacy organizations, and mandates for open-access publish-
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ing. All of these changes have made it possible to envision online disciplinary 
heterotopic spaces that challenge the ways in which we have done our work 
for over 100 years. 
Just a decade ago, few could see the way forward to such a disciplinary 
culture. There were too many obstacles, too little attention to fair use and its 
impact on scholarly work, and too much habitual thinking. Still, substantial 
obstacles remain; as Bell explained (2007), “lobbying by special interests ... 
invariably ensure[s] that copyright and patent law favors private interests over 
public ones” (p. 7). In February 2009, the Fair Copyright in Research Works 
Act (H.R. 801) was introduced to the Judiciary Committee in the House of 
Representatives to reverse the NIH open-access mandate. The act seeks to 
amend the U.S. Copyright Code to prohibit “federal agencies from requir-
ing as a condition of funding agreements public access to the products of the 
research they fund” (DigitalKoans, 2009). Such legislation and continued 
corporate pressure in high-profile lawsuits (like those of Napster, Grokster, 
and RDR Books) can only be overcome by organized efforts at all levels. 
While the faculty in the University of California system remind us that no 
such models can work that do not take into consideration tenure and promo-
tion practices, the slow process of disciplinary change occurs with moderate 
steps forward.
Fair use practices lay at the heart of this vision. Faculty have to as-
sert their rights to pursue their research despite corporate attempts to shut 
them down. Jane Caputi, Sut Jhally, Carol Shloss, Steven Vander Ark, and 
the advocacy groups that support them remind us how important it is to 
push back. Paul Ginsparg, Stephen Harnad, and Peter Suber offer strate-
gies for us to push forward. The CompPile database, Joan Latchaw, and I 
offer a starting place to imagine future possibilities. The CCCC Caucus on 
Intellectual Property is keeping an eye on these larger concerns and mak-
ing steps to educate National Council for Teachers of English (NCTE) 
members as a whole. The organization will continue to publish summaries 
of important cases affecting NCTE constituents and present on issues of 
fair use, open-access, open-source, and copyright in the classroom and our 
scholarly works, but we as faculty need to advocate at our own institutions, 
promote change on our campuses, and participate in institutional reposito-
ries and other open-access initiatives. It may take 10 more years before we 
realize the kind of heterotopic community that Joan and I were imagining 
in 1998. Certainly, it will take more work to articulate what that digital 
community will look like and to negotiate the changes necessary to arrive 
there; to get there, however, faculty must assume greater control over their 
scholarly works.
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2 PLAGIARISM AND 
PROMISCUITY, AUTHORS AND 
PLAGIARISMS
Russel Wiebe
When I was about 19 years old, a dissolute and desperate character, at least 
in my imagination of myself, a friend of mine was attending Everett Commu-
nity College. He had been asked to produce a book report on Rollo May’s The 
Courage to Create for a psychology class he was taking. He had determined that 
he did not have enough time to read the book and produce the requisite book 
report and asked me if I would do it in exchange for a case of beer. “Sure,” I 
said. I read the book and produced a poor, but (barely) passing, report on the 
book’s strengths and weaknesses. My friend passed the course. He didn’t get 
caught. As an outsider to the entire enterprise of the academy, I didn’t then, and 
maybe don’t now, feel much in the way of guilt for my violation of academic 
codes of conduct. My friend never got a college degree; I doubt he ever reflects 
back upon this exchange. But I have occasion to think of it every time the sub-
ject of cheating comes up in one of my classes. 
The classroom conversation about cheating, at least as I’ve observed it in 
classrooms over about 20 years, simply takes cheating of whatever stripe as a 
given. If I ask a question like “who has cheated in school?,” it’s the rare class 
in which there is more than one “no, I’ve never cheated” response. Far more 
common are the classes in which everyone admits that they’ve cheated. In the 
conversation that ensues, there is almost always both derision toward the claim 
that anyone might really assert that they are innocent and a pretty willing ac-
knowledgment of shared guilt. In an abstract way, students seem to think that 
cheating is so much the norm that admitting it hardly needs cover. Of those 
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unanimous or nearly unanimous in agreement, only a few are willing to say 
that anything at all is wrong with the practice. The airline pilot who cheated 
to get his pilot’s license or the surgeon doing “your mother’s surgery” who 
cheated his or her way through medical school usually elicits a response that 
differentiates those activities, which are real and therefore have consequences, 
from school tasks, which are largely “unreal” and therefore, outside the realm 
of ethical consideration.
At some point in that classroom conversation, some student will ask me 
if I have ever cheated. Just a little sheepishly, I tell the story of my foray into 
ghost-writing. Maybe like many of my students, I tell that story as a kind of 
rationalization. After all, I seem to claim, that is the worst of what I have done 
in the way of academic dishonesty. It was barely cheating. Despite more years 
of school than I like to count and more situations in which it might have been 
easy to cheat—to turn in someone else’s paper, to look over the shoulder at 
someone else’s calculus answer sheet, or to peek at the proper third-person pos-
sessive of some German verb or the dative case “Stan, Stane, Stanes” (which 
I’m sure even now is the wrong string of Anglo-Saxon words)—I only note this 
one single example of academic dishonesty. Excluded from that account are all 
of the lies of omission and commission that I have told and not told in order 
to wrangle an extension on a paper or postpone the date of a dreaded exam 
on rat psychology or the Franco-Prussian war. I guess that in the hierarchy of 
cheating these examples of dishonesty seem to fall into some other category of 
behavior than simple cheating, which points to a key problem with any consid-
eration of plagiarism, which is just where it fits in the hierarchy of cheating, or 
what campus policies call “academic dishonesty” or, as Barclay Barrios’ institu-
tion calls it, “academic irregularity” (see this volume). Because categories like 
“academic dishonesty” and academic honesty are so fraught with ambiguity, 
that definition (let alone action based on those definitional attempts) seems 
almost impossible. 
As the Internet has inevitably entered our classrooms as well as student 
dorm rooms, cafes, bars, airport terminals, and many other places, the simplic-
ity of cheating appears to have increased in some exponential way. It’s no longer 
necessary to creep into the office after hours, sneak a folder out of a filing cabi-
net, and make copies to appropriate another’s text. All you have to do is hack 
a password or find an obscure repository of textual information and claim it. 
It’s easy to cheat on the Internet; multiple articles in the Chronicle, Newsweek, 
and daily newspapers notice and decry the increase in academic dishonesty of 
all kinds. In a study on Internet plagiarism among college students, Patrick 
Scanlon and David Neumann (2002) surveyed the recent public attention that 
student cheating has received. They noted that “a perception reflected in media 
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accounts is that acts of academic dishonesty among students in college as well 
as high school have increased sharply” (p. 374). Rebecca Moore Howard (2001) 
wrote in The Chronicle Review that “if you are a professor in the United States 
and you have a pulse, you have heard about the problem of Internet plagiarism” 
(p. B 24). Several contemporary Web sites highlight both the apparent ubiquity 
of Internet cheating and the tone of some academic responses to the problem. 
The Web site Plagiarism Stoppers (2008) includes a statement that posits: 
Plagiarism is a rapidly growing problem in many venues 
today. Because it is so easy to locate information using the 
Internet, students have given in to the temptation to take ma-
terials and use them for their own. This needs to be addressed 
by all who are in the education field—by teaching the obser-
vance of proper citation and copyright compliance AND by 
making sure our students know that stealing someone else’s 
work is wrong. 
Another Web site, Plagiarized.com (2008) queries:
Think plagiarism detection services are the answer? Think 
again! These services don’t catch “custom essays”, and they 
don’t catch plagiarism when the original work isn’t already in 
the digital domain. If you rely on detection, you are doing a 
disservice to your students. Do your research. Take a look at 
some of the custom essay services (they probably have ads on 
this page). If you are thinking of spending precious resources 
on these services, you should take on the role of a student 
to test their detection rates. Buy some custom essays, have 
them scanned by the services you are considering. The fact 
is detection services help to catch the cheaters who fall into 
the “not so bright” category. Smart cheaters can skate circles 
around these services. Well designed and original curriculum, 
attention to detail, and a true understanding of the plagiarism 
problem throughout your institution are the keys to dealing 
effectively with the issue. 
I could multiply such complaints a thousand—maybe a hundred thou-
sand—fold. Plagiarism, it seems, is everywhere. And perhaps we have even 
started to notice how common plagiarism is among at least some of the more 
high profile among us. As I drafted this chapter, Joe Biden, an admitted—
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though perhaps accidental—plagiarist, had just become our vice president-
elect and Doris Kearns Goodwin, yet another apparently inadvertent plagiarist, 
commented upon his election both through live online coverage and in static 
written text.
I begin with my story of “academic dishonesty” not to court academic em-
barrassment—though I’ve agonized about the confession—but to suggest that 
it is probably the rare academic who has not engaged in some form of “dis-
honesty” in school or in our professional lives. Perhaps any consideration of 
plagiarism—whatever we might think plagiarism is—would be well-served to 
consider and empathize with all of the simple and complex behaviors that “aca-
demic dishonesty” encompasses.
Michel Foucault (1984) wrote that 
The coming into being of the notion of “author” constitutes 
the privileged moment of individualization in the history of 
idea, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences. Even 
today, when we reconstruct the history of a concept, literary 
genre, or school of philosophy, such categories seem relatively 
weak, secondary, and superimposed scansions in comparison 
with the solid and fundamental unit of the author and the 
work. (p. 101) 
In asking questions like “who is the author?” or “to whom does this work 
belong?,” we are simply asking whether or not the work is plagiarized. Is it pla-
giarized? Is it a fraud? Is it “genuine?” We thus find ourselves in a definitional 
abyss.
In an attempt to define just what should be considered plagiarism and what 
should be seen to fall outside that definition, Moore Howard (1995) has sug-
gested three categories that we might consider: cheating, non-attribution, and 
patchwriting. She continues:
It is perhaps never the case that a writer composes “original” 
material, free of any influence. It might be more accurate to 
think of creativity, of fresh combinations made from exist-
ing sources, or fresh implications for existing materials. An 
important requirement of most academic writing is acknowl-
edging one’s sources. We all work from sources, even when we 
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are being creative. American academic culture demands that 
writers who use the exact words of a source supply quotation 
marks at the beginning and end of the quotation, so that the 
reader can know where the voice of the source begins and 
ends. In addition, the writer must use footnotes, parenthetical 
notes, or endnotes to cite the source, so that the reader can 
consult that source if he or she chooses. Writers must also 
acknowledge the sources not only of words but also of ideas, 
insofar as is possible, even when they are not quoting word for 
word. Moreover, in final-draft writing, academic writers may 
not paraphrase a source by using its phrases and sentences, 
with a few changes in grammar or word choice-even when the 
source is cited. Plagiarism is the representation of a source’s 
words or ideas as one’s own. Plagiarism occurs when a writer 
fails to supply quotation marks for exact quotations; fails to 
cite the sources of his or her ideas; or adopts the phrasing of 
his or her sources, with changes in grammar or word choice. 
(pp. 798-799)
As Moore Howard suggested, in academic writing, at least, there is no sim-
ple “originality,” no such work that simply jumps from the student’s mind to 
the page in some unmediated way. 
Brian Martin (1994) offered two interesting lists of plagiarism types. The 
first might serve as a kind of taxonomy and the second raises what might seem 
to be some embarrassing questions about academic and social practice in the 
realm of “acceptable plagiarisms.” Martin wrote that “the most obvious and 
provable plagiarism occurs when someone copies phrases or passages out of a 
published work without using quotation marks, without acknowledging the 
source, or both. This can be called word-for-word plagiarism. When some of 
the words are changed, but not enough, the result can be called paraphrasing 
plagiarism.” This sort of “paraphrasing plagiarism” resembles Moore Howard’s 
(1995) patchwriting. Martin continued: “A more subtle plagiarism occurs when 
a person gives references to [an] original source, and perhaps quotes them, but 
never looks them up, having obtained both from a secondary source—which 
is not quoted. This can be called plagiarism of secondary sources.” A third 
and more elusive type of plagiarism that Martin described is the use of an ar-
gument’s structure without acknowledgment. Related but more general is the 
case of plagiarism of ideas. And, finally, Martin described “the blunt case of 
putting one’s name to someone else’s work, which might be called plagiarism 
of authorship.” 
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Having highlighted what he takes to be the primary forms of academic 
plagiarism among students, Martin generated a taxonomy of “institutionalized 
plagiarism”—a list of what we might think of as at least occasionally acceptable 
forms of authorial behavior. The list includes ghostwriting: “when a politician, 
famous sports figure, business executive, or movie star gives a speech or writes 
a book or newspaper column, frequently the actual writing is done by someone 
else.” Martin noted also the phenomenon of “honorary authorship,” such as 
political speech writing, some comedy writing, and much bureaucratic writing. 
As Martin’s two lists demonstrate, the accusation of plagiarism is frequently the 
product of hierarchical relationships. When a student borrows a paper to turn 
in for a class, that’s plagiarism. When an academic borrows another teacher’s 
materials to produce a class lecture without citation, that’s scholarship (howev-
er sloppy). When a supervisor takes credit for an underling’s work, that’s busi-
ness. As Martin’s taxonomy makes clear enough, the designation of plagiarism 
has at least as much to do with where you reside in a power structure as it does 
with whether you did or did not present someone else’s text as your own. As 
Martin revealed, the practice of presenting someone else’s text as one’s own is 
widespread and unremarkable in a variety of corporate and academic contexts. 
At the same time as the plague of plagiarism has come to seem a surpassing 
educational problem, plagiarism has also gained prominence in our contem-
porary shared culture. In addition to Vice President Biden and Doris Kearns 
Goodwin, historian Stephen Ambrose, presidential speech writer Timothy S. 
Goeglein, (Derringer, 2008), and the playwright Byrony Lavery have defended 
themselves against charges of plagiarism. But if a student who plagiarizes in 
a composition class can expect some actual punishment, most of these high-
profile cases result in a lot of hand-wringing but no real consequences.
I began thinking of this chapter as a chance to articulate for myself the dif-
ferences among “kinds” of plagiarism, or at least of creating a taxonomy that 
I could use to adjudicate—if for no one other than myself—the licit from the 
illicit forms plagiarism might take. But I find that my imagined taxonomy is 
blurred. As compelling as I find Moore Howard’s consideration of patchwrit-
ing, I don’t think we can solve the problem of plagiarism (if indeed there truly 
is a problem) by saying that the writer is multiple, written by as much as she 
writes her culture. I also doubt, likewise, that—a la Barthes and Foucault and 
Derrida—there is such a thing as origin. Almost all contemporary literary and 
artistic practice acknowledges this fact. And although this certainly compli-
cates the adjudication of plagiarism, as Moore Howard and many others rec-
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ognize, I don’t think we can solve the problem by saying that an appeal to an 
author’s intention can be a viable alternative when it is the category “author” 
as a single, originary unit that Moore Howard and others have acknowledged 
can never exist. More useful (at least for me) in providing some purchase on 
the question of plagiarism in the composition class are the pedagogies of Amy 
Robillard and Ron Fortune (2007) and Kelly Ritter (2006), who seek to bring 
the practices of forgery, impersonation, and the use of paper mills into the 
structure of our classes.
Robillard and Fortune (2007) articulated that “we believe that in order to 
expand our understanding of the work we do with texts, we must legitimate the 
work of both literary forgery and plagiarism as forms of writing” (p. 185). Of 
course, Robillard and Fortune don’t mean that we should make forgery or pla-
giarism legitimate forms of student writing. Rather, they suggest that by mov-
ing the study of the forger and the plagiarist to the forefront of our pedagogy, 
we can more accurately and compellingly understand the kinds of questions 
the plagiarist and the forger force us to confront.
Robillard and Fortune (2007) offered one possible solution to plagiarism 
as problem—they urged us to move the study of plagiarism and forgery to the 
center of the composition classroom, to make of that study the new content of 
composition; through an examination of “legitimation strategies” in the cre-
ation of bogus texts, students can learn how to produce similar, though per-
haps ultimately more honest, versions of such legitimation. They posited that 
“literary forgery and whole-text plagiarism as instances of writing dependent 
on the production of belief rather than as instances of anti-writing can help us 
understand the processes by which a text is authorized” (p. 185). By moving 
the conversation away from the notion of plagiarism as a legal question, Rob-
illard and Fortune make an important contribution to our ability to rethink 
plagiarism as a strategy in our classes. If we study legitimation as they ask us to 
do, then perhaps we can also study the nature of the original as Sherrie Levine 
(discussed later in this chapter) and other appropriators have and continue to 
do. Robillard and Fortune argued that
Composition’s disciplinary attachment to the process para-
digm together with a deep investment in our collective profes-
sional ability to differentiate between the “authentic” and the 
“fraudulent” have rendered the symbolic aspects of plagiarism 
unavailable for analysis. Just as English studies’ dismissal of 
forgery as a species of writing has allowed us to avoid asking 
questions of it that we ask of legitimate writing, so too has 
our near dismissal of plagiarism as anything other than an 
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academic crime allowed us to avoid confronting asking ques-
tions of it that we ask of legitimate writing. These questions 
we avoid have everything to do with belief. (p. 197)
Kelly Ritter (2006) argued that a better response to whole-text plagiarism 
than punishment is to attempt an understanding of the motives that drive a 
student to purchase an essay. She concluded by noting that students who pur-
chase essays 
base their choices (of whether to purchase or produce) specifi-
cally on which site of authorship—that which resides within 
themselves or that which resides online—will provide the bet-
ter product for gaining a college degree, which students be-
lieve is a proof-of-purchase certificate and faculty believe is in 
an intangible intellectual achievement.(p. 26)
Ritter suggested that students see the plagiarism question not as a question 
of morality but rather as a question of utility: “We cannot believe that simply 
bringing ethics into the classroom means that our students will either mimic 
what is ‘right’ or internalize what they should believe, reproducing those beliefs 
in their written work” (p. 31). Ritter posited that rather than treating plagia-
rism as a crime, we are better served to examine the paper mill and its rhetori-
cal strategies in order to reveal the extent to which the purchase of a paper is a 
bad bargain. 
The plagiarism question cannot be answered through better and better def-
initions of the term. As Moore Howard (1995) and others have shown, the term 
is tasked to define and organize too much at the level of the student, and, as 
Martin (1994) argued, too little at the level of the administrator or other high 
profile utilizer of text. As the search technologies of Google and plagiarism-de-
tection programs and processes make it ever more possible to find the conver-
gences—deliberate, inadvertent, and otherwise—of textual similarity, we can 
see that the problem of plagiarism is at least in part a product of the techniques 
of its discovery. In other words, what we didn’t used to know might not have 
been hurting us as much we now think it must have been. 
As a kid at the dinner table, I listened to my dad tell a lot of stories from 
his work. He was a medical malpractice insurance adjuster, with a perhaps 
twisted sense of humor. He’d tell these really gruesome stories of medical ac-
cidents—the man with gangrene in his right leg whose left was amputated and 
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so on. For years he collected what he called “humorous incidents,” and kept the 
documents and notes in a manila folder. One involved a naked man, a leaking 
kitchen sink pipe, and a playful cat—the inadvertent image of the ball being 
batted funny to all but the cat’s victim. One year, my dad came home to tell us 
that his file had gone missing. It was sad but momentary—in its own perverse 
way just another humorous incident—until the day about 7 years later when 
my sister arrived at the house with a book called Humorous Incidents, made up 
of my dad’s humorous incident file purportedly authored by a man my dad had 
worked with years earlier. Of course my dad was annoyed. I suppose this had 
ceased to be merely a humorous incident, but my dad wasn’t sure what to do 
and ultimately did nothing.
I guess I could say that this was an instance of plagiarism—though I con-
fess I’m not sure that it really was. It seems to me that something wrong had 
happened, but my dad did not write the incidents; he was just the person who 
originally put them on the page and brought the documents together. If we 
think of the manila folder that was the humorous incident file we can think of 
the crime—if there was one—as the theft of property. But anyone who reads 
understands the limits of that idea of textual ownership. I could say that this 
“theft” was close to my friend’s use of my work to pass his psychology class at 
Everett Community College, though there are some obvious differences. He 
had my consent; in fact, he paid for my consent. Whatever my friend was (pla-
giarist, slacker), he was also a consumer. He got exactly what he paid for. The 
guy who stole my father’s file, whatever else he might have been, was a thief. 
Perhaps he was a plagiarist. He could probably be seen to have committed a 
fraud in presenting those incidents as his own experiences. But if we consider 
the totality of this process from my dad’s collection of events, usually marked 
by their occurrence as descriptions in “incident reports” submitted to various 
insurance companies, through the stories he made of those events (and con-
tinues to tell to this day) to the placement of “copies” of those incident reports 
into a manila folder, through the removal of that file from my dad’s possession 
through some clandestine means to an unknown set of events that led to their 
publication, we can see both plenty of room for dishonest behavior (though 
perhaps no more dishonest than my friend’s and mine in the production of that 
book report) and room for change, transformation, and possibly even “genu-
ine” authorship. The incidents about which or upon which my Dad built his 
stories were not themselves the stories.
Those “incidents” as more or less discrete ontological events, were in fact 
available to anyone as the means of making a story. Any reading of the inci-
dent reports would include facts—for instance, the free-swinging genitalia of 
the naked plumber—but not the enabling context, the story, or the acts of 
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compilation and authorship that made humor of those incidents. It is not clear 
to me that those incidents, collected in a folder and kept in a filing cabinet, 
constituted property that could really be stolen in the way that you could steal 
a hundred dollars. But, at the same time, I’m also pretty sure that there is a 
significant way in which my dad was the author of his humorous incident file. 
I’m certain that he is the author of the stories he makes of those incidents. I 
might even say that in some way he is made by those stories, or at least the guy 
I know as my dad is made of those and hundreds of other stories that he and 
I tell about him. But that guy—my dad—remains intact after the humorous 
incident file is stolen. Indeed, the theft of the file becomes yet another humor-
ous incident in its own way. Perhaps there is no less postmodern guy than my 
dad, by which I mean no one who seems less like an amalgam of others. Yet, 
as my dad’s own appropriation of other’s reports to make his stories seems to 
suggest, his own authorship of the humorous incident file is at best dependent 
on the narratives of others; our ability to make of the stories solitary meanings 
attached to solitary authors comes to an end. As the actual insignificance of 
the theft of my dad’s humorous incident file shows, my dad’s ability to own, to 
tell, to compile, to publish, and to author all of those stories isn’t stolen. They 
aren’t taken from him when the file is. It might be argued that something 
else—credit, money, whatever—is, but my dad isn’t truly diminished by that.
Malcolm Gladwell (2004) noticed the ways in which plagiarism can actu-
ally benefit its victim. In writing about the plagiarism case of Bryony Lavery 
and her play Frozen, Gladwell reported that when he read her play—which in-
cluded lines taken directly from an essay he had written—and faxed her a letter 
objecting to her theft, he felt that 
Almost as soon as I’d sent the letter, though, I began to have 
second thoughts. The truth was that, although I said I’d 
been robbed, I didn’t feel that way. Nor did I feel particularly 
angry. One of the first things I had said to a friend after hear-
ing about echoes of my article in Frozen was that this was the 
only way I was ever going to get to Broadway—and I was only 
half joking. On some level, I considered Lavery’s borrowing 
to be a compliment. A savvier writer would have changed all 
those references to Lewis, and rewritten the quotes from me, 
so that their origin was no longer recognizable. (p. 41)
Gladwell suggested that his own “aura” is actually enhanced by Lavery’s 
“borrowings.” He noticed, too, the ways in which Lavery’s uncomplicated tak-
ing of his text might have been “complicated” by a savvier writer, which sug-
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gests exactly the difficulty of some of our students’ plagiarisms. Example after 
example of plagiarisms that I have encountered in composition and literature 
classes display just the lack of sophistication that Gladwell noticed in Lavery’s 
borrowings. Papers downloaded from the Internet and turned in with the URL 
still displayed on the corner of the page, papers submitted with the names of 
authors who are not students in the class, and papers with class names and 
numbers that are not those of the class for which the work is submitted are just 
the grossest of these examples, but so too are examples that come much closer 
to Moore Howard’s (1995) patchwriting. 
About two thirds of the way through her “Sexuality, Textuality, The Cul-
tural Work of Plagiarism,” Moore Howard (2000) admitted, “I don’t like cheat-
ing. I’m mad when I discover that a paper has been ghostwritten. I don’t think 
teachers should look the other way” (p. 487). These three sentences—offered 
almost in staccato, in a paragraph of their own—can be imagined by anyone 
who has encountered or engaged the academic discourse of the plagiarist. I 
can imagine Howard replying to a colleague as she makes her argument for 
the pedagogical utility of patchwriting or argues that the student who failed to 
provide adequate citation to his paper was not a cheater but misguided. I can 
imagine the anxiety of Moore Howard’s response as she types into Google or 
some other search engine the suspicious sentences from some unnamed stu-
dent’s work only to find that work exists in a prehistory that is more than, or 
different from, the postmodern “death of the author.” The line is not just the 
theoretical result of the student/author/non-author’s situation or situatedness 
in a discourse, but also, and perhaps more (most?) importantly a line written 
by someone else. 
Elaine Whitaker (2001), for example, responded to Moore Howard in Col-
lege English, noting that, “for Howard, plagiarism is a purple cow—something 
you don’t expect to see and don’t wish to be. To me, nullifying the term is a 
form of erasure. I think we need a collective noun that will allow us to label 
all of the forms of textual appropriation that are likely to get our students in 
trouble with us or with others” (p. 374). Jonathan Malesic (2006) argued: “I 
believe in relentlessly exercising my students’ critical abilities, but I also be-
lieve in punishing plagiarism. A student who plagiarizes refuses to be educated. 
There shouldn’t be room in my classroom for that kind of student. Indeed, that 
person is not really a student at all” (p. C 3). Maybe we could say that Malesic 
and Whitaker represent one side of the contemporary debate over plagiarism. 
They are pretty much untroubled by the postmodern critique of the author, by 
any of the fancy semantical games that I or anyone might play in relation to the 
possibility of an origin from which to copy, and are pretty sure that they know 
plagiarism when they see it.
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Moore Howard’s reply—she doesn’t like cheating and she is capable of 
anger—expresses both the ambiguity and the anxiety that any discussion of 
plagiarism generates. Despite my certainty that plagiarism is a complex issue 
that cannot be separated from other issues of academic (and even personal) 
honesty, I don’t like plagiarism either. I too have had the vertiginous moment 
of realization—”I don’t think this paper was written by this student.” In a 
movie I admire called The Year of Living Dangerously, the character Billy Kwan 
asks “what then must we do?” He quotes his source as a text of Tolstoy’s I don’t 
know. If we don’t like plagiarism but we aren’t sure how to define it—what 
then must we do?
Since I began teaching composition as a graduate student I’ve been engaged 
in the job of ferreting out the plagiarist. For a long time that was a pretty 
clear mandate. The first “plagiarism” I dealt with was simple. I was teaching a 
freshman writing class and two students in the same class turned in the same 
paper—word for word. Like Moore Howard, I can get mad even now thinking 
about it. Neither student confessed—not even when confronted with the (was 
it truly?) shocking evidence of two identical papers, one with one name on it, 
and the other with another name. I suppose that I can infer that one or both 
of those students had framed a dishonest intent. Apparently one of them had 
copied the other and the copier would seem to have been the guilty party. But 
which one was it? Both students maintained their innocence. 
In the late 1970s the artist Sherrie Levine began to engage in a form of post-
modern art known variously as appropriation, plagiarism, or rephotography. 
In a well-known series of photographs, she reproduced nude photos of Edward 
Weston’s son Neil. She displayed these works under the title “After Edward 
Weston.” To examine the ways in which a consideration of Levine might speak 
to or about plagiarism in the comp class, I quote at length from Courtney Col-
bert (2005), a student who describes the “scene” of Levine’s “crime” or inter-
vention, or plagiarism, or forgery, or theft: 
In 1977, the Witkin Gallery in New York bought original 
Edward Weston photographic negatives from his son Neil 
Weston. They then commissioned artist/photographer George 
A. Tice to make new prints from some of those negatives for 
a collection that the gallery was going to show/publish. Tice 
was already a well-established artist at the time and had many 
pieces of his work in permanent collections throughout the 
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country. He went ahead and reprinted the negatives and had 
this to say about the process; “I’m not in business as a printer. 
I take an image and I make it an art object. I memorize it. It 
becomes mine.” It is important to note that a lot goes into re-
printing negatives beyond simply skill in photographic print-
ing. A person reprinting photographs has the opportunity to 
embellish and interpret the negative in any way they please. 
In this way, Tice was able to do things in the printing process 
that might not have been done in the same fashion (or done 
at all for that matter) had Edward Weston done the printing 
himself. The Witkin Gallery had a series of large posters made 
to promote the publication and featured six of the reprinted 
negatives. An artist named Sherrie Levine rephotographed the 
prints featured in the poster and placed them in a show under 
the idea that they were her photographs… her art. The ideas 
inherent in most acts of appropriation in art fall along the 
lines of challenging originality within art. Levine made sure 
to emphasize this by giving the work the title, “After Edward 
Weston.” This act of appropriation brought a lot of attention 
to Levine and her work. In fact, George Tice attacked Levine 
under the charges that he was a victim of copyright infringe-
ment and that Levine should be shunned for her “forgeries.” 
The prints Levine made were not identical to the ones printed 
by Tice. Her reproductions of the photographs from the post-
er were changed subtlety in size and clarity (due to the fact 
that they were photographed from a mass produced poster). 
Rosalind Krauss (1985) analyzed Levine’s copies, and stated that Levine’s 
work “seems most radically to question the concept of origin and with it the 
notion of originality. Levine’s medium is the pirated print, as in the series of 
photographs she made by taking images by Edward Weston of his young son 
Neil, and simply rephotographing them, in violation of Weston’s copyright” (p. 
168). Krauss’s point—that there can be no true original—is one made again 
and again in postmodern criticism: for instance, in Derrida’s critique of origin 
and in Foucault’s “death of the author.” An original, whether in words, picture, 
or photographs, has never been and never will be seen has become a critical 
orthodoxy in both composition and literary studies. 
Indeed, that critique of origin is one pole of Moore Howard’s (1995) claim 
that we can no longer see patchwriting or other forms of collaborative writing 
as plagiarism because this view of plagiarism derives from a notion of the sin-
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gular and original author. Although I find the critique of origin compelling, 
I’m concerned that Moore Howard’s (2000) solution to this problem is to ap-
peal to authorial intention: “The comprehensive term plagiarism asserts a unity 
among disparate textual practices; it often differentiates intentional and unin-
tentional violations but derives these judgments from features of the text, not 
from actual author’s intentions. It asserts a moral basis for textual phenomenon 
that are a function of reading comprehension and community membership, 
not ethics” ( p. 474). I suggest that Moore Howard’s claim that authorial inten-
tion can simply be known smuggles the unitary romantic author back into the 
discussion of plagiarism. If we could simply untangle authorial intention, then 
the issue of plagiarism, which is the problem of its definition, would already be 
solved. The author differentiated from all of his or her sources, either does—or 
perhaps more often does not—respect, acknowledge, and cite the necessary 
sources and is thus a plagiarist. But the problem of the author, as Foucault 
inquires, is precisely this problem of relation, priority, and so forth. It is one 
aspect of that problem that Levine foregrounded through her “interventions.” 
Don Keefer (1991) described defenses of Levin’s work, noting that Rosalind 
Krauss (1985)
tells us that Levine’s activity is no more parasitic than 
Weston’s. He after all, Krauss concludes, was borrowing the 
classic forms of order and representation of the past. More-
over, Weston with his camera produced an image, or copy, 
of something that had been constructed. Levine, therefore, 
reveals to us, that her copy is no more than a copy of a copy. 
As Levine’s work makes clear, the appeal to “authorial intention” can’t pro-
duce what Moore Howard and others seem to desire, which is a plagiarism pol-
icy grounded in what the author meant to do. To do so is simply to reinstitute 
the idea of a single unitary author, an original, if you will, who can frame the 
intent to deceive and produce a forgery. The most difficult aspect of identify-
ing “intent” in the way Moore Howard (2000) suggested is that the “text” of 
that intent remains frustratingly unavailable. Although I often suspect that my 
students are not sophisticated plagiarists in the way of Sherrie Levine and oth-
ers, that suspicion remains grounded in instincts that seem to defy definition.
In this description of Levine’s “forgeries,” her work, Weston’s work, and 
Tice’s work can be seen to illuminate the problems of the plagiarized essay 
encountered in almost any of our classes. Although Tice apparently called 
Levine’s works “forgeries,” I think this is one conclusion we can agree not to 
draw. Whether Levine’s work is legitimate—that is, proper, moral, and accept-
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able—as art is either (or perhaps both) an aesthetic and a political question is 
not simply a question of her intentions, which are no doubt complex. I think it 
is clear that Levine’s work calls into question the idea of a forgery just as it calls 
into question the idea of an original. By calling this and other works “After,” 
Levine highlighted the relation her work has to a source; and, in doing so (and 
in other ways), it does not efface the source. At some level, her work actively 
depends upon that source. For Levine’s work to be a “forgery,” she would have 
to have endeavored to obstruct our recognition of the relation of her work to 
Weston’s. By calling her work “After,” she declines to do that. On the other 
hand, her relationship to Tice does seem somewhat problematic. She does not 
call her work “after Weston through Tice” or some other clumsy homage to 
both the photographer and the printer. Tice’s claims to an artistic role in the 
production of the Weston photos are effaced by Levine’s “intervention.” But 
of course that effacement is licensed by our understanding of the nature of 
the photograph as something taken “in the field” and then “developed” by a 
technician. I doubt if many of us credit the woman who staffs the photo center 
down at the Rite Aid when we show our photos. And while Levine’s failure (or 
omission) to credit Tice certainly erases his artistic role in the creation of the 
Weston prints, that erasure is licensed by practice. 
My own first encounter with Levine’s works resulted in my asking the ques-
tion “what can be photographed?” And perhaps this question can help us think 
about what kinds of writing we can or will allow in our classes. What makes 
Levine’s photo of another photo unacceptable? In general, I think most of us 
would say that almost anything can be photographed—our dog, coffee table, 
son or daughter, our parents, our houses, our friends, cars, books. The list is 
truly endless and the dissemination of these photos is ubiquitous with smart 
phones and Web 2.0 technologies. 
On the wall of my office is the photograph of a picturesque lighthouse just 
outside the coast town of Bandon, Oregon. Although the photo is “original,” 
my wife took it with her new digital camera and I printed a copy on my digital 
printer, bought a two dollar frame and hung the picture on the wall to remind 
me—all pathos and sentimentality—of the beautiful and borrowed summer 
that my family spent with my mother just months ago. In another way the 
photo is nothing but a cliché—absolutely conventional and unoriginal—all 
pathos and sentimentality. The lighthouse in the background of a conventional 
beach shot—the stuff of dollar post cards in beach shops up and down both 
coasts. To think about plagiarism and forgery at all, we have to engage the 
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question or the differentiation of the enterprise of the writing class. What do 
we want to have happen? The “badness” of my wife’s photo (or perhaps its 
goodness, when seen from the angle of my mother’s recovery) cannot be sepa-
rated or understood except in terms of its associations, which are not simply 
the intentions of the photographer or the viewer, but the unspeakable threshold 
upon which they meet.
In a New Yorker article, Gladwell (2004), himself the “victim” of a high-
profile plagiarism, asked whether or not a charge of plagiarism should ruin 
one’s life. His conclusion is a sort of qualified “no.” His essay is an illuminating 
take on a plagiarism case that seems somehow more real than the plagiarisms 
we may be called on to deal with in our classes, if only because it happens 
outside the cloistered walls of the academy. Gladwell asked one of the central 
questions of any conversation on the subject of the plagiarist: “So is it true that 
words belong to the person who wrote them, just as other kinds of property 
belong to their owners? Actually no” (p. 44). This is merely the linguistic ver-
sion of the question Levine seems to force upon us: To whom does the object 
photographed belong? To whom and under what circumstances can words be 
said to belong to someone? Can we really say that once a picture has been taken 
that picture becomes an object outside the realm of the photographable? This 
question becomes even more vexed when we think of the nature of language as 
a shared medium. If we do not all “own” the words, then the words themselves 
are worthless. In fact, to the almost exact extent that we “own” a single word, 
that word will become without value either to us or to anyone. The precondi-
tion of writing is the shared vocabulary, the fact that we are all in language 
together.
Perhaps inevitably, I, too, have become a collector of incidents however un-
humorous—of appropriation, theft, plagiarism, art—whatever we can agree to 
call these textual “events.” Although the convergence of Levine’s photos and 
my students downloaded papers is apparent to me—I mean I can see that al-
though my students might (or at least theoretically might not) lack Levine’s 
self-consciousness—the accusation that Levine faced had its source in exactly 
the feelings that I had when my students turned in another’s work as their own.
I got a paper last week that referred to a play by John Van Brugh that we 
had not read in my class. In fact, it was a play I had never read and the paper 
compared The Country Wife (which we had read) to this Van Brugh play. Right 
away I knew that the student had “copied” his paper, though I could not find 
its source. I know he did something wrong, even if I’m not sure what name to 
give it.
I am pretty sure that Levine is doing something different than my student 
who downloads a paper except when I am not sure at all. In addition to my 
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collections of student plagiarisms, I’ve recently begun to work on another col-
lection—texts that explore various contemporary plagiarisms. It would not be 
hard for me to delineate dozens, maybe more than dozens, of vexed examples 
of textual “borrowing.” Jonathan Lethem’s (2007) “The Ecstasy of Influence” 
is just such a catalog, meditation, collage, or plagiarism. Lethem’s essay con-
fronts, even transforms, the conversation about plagiarism. In the essay, subti-
tled, “A Plagiarism,” Lethem appropriates and arranges, twists and transforms, 
the works of others to foreground the ways in which all writing is derived from, 
owes its origins, meanings, and significances to the ways in which it engages 
texts that belong and don’t belong to each and all of us. Lethem ends the essay:
Any text is woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, 
cultural languages, which cut across it through and through 
in a vast stereophony. The citations that go to make up a text 
are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read; they are 
quotations without inverted commas. The kernel, the soul—
let us go further and say the substance, the bulk, the actual 
and valuable material of all human utterances—is plagiarism. 
For substantially all ideas are secondhand, consciously and 
unconsciously drawn from a million outside sources, and 
daily used by the garnerer with a pride and satisfaction born 
of the superstition that he originated them; whereas there is 
not a rag of originality about them anywhere except the lit-
tle discoloration they get from his mental and moral caliber 
and his temperament, and which is revealed in characteris-
tics of phrasing. Old and new make the warp and woof of 
every moment. There is no thread that is not a twist of these 
two strands. By necessity, by proclivity, and by delight, we all 
quote. (p. 68)
On his Web site, Lethem has provided groups of his own texts as the basis 
for the texts of others. In essence, he has renounced his copyright/write and 
offered what he calls the “promiscuous materials” project. On the Web site, he 
writes “I recently explored some of these ideas in an essay for Harper’s Maga-
zine. As I researched that essay I came more and more to believe that artists 
should ideally find ways to make material free and available for reuse. This 
project is a (first) attempt to make my own art practice reflect that belief.”
Lethem’s promiscuous materials, Levine’s rephotographs, Robillard and 
Fortune’s (2007) examination of fraud and forgery, and Ritter’s (2006) focus 
on the rhetoric of the paper mill begin to suggest some ways in which we 
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might engage the question of plagiarism without simply viewing plagiarism as 
a crime with a catalog of possible punishments. Rather than simply submit to 
the impossibility or impermissibility of claiming some single, stable author of 
our students’ papers and therefore abandoning the category of plagiarism as 
something against which, however tentatively we may choose to stand, we can 
choose rather to embrace a discourse which includes an awareness of plagiarism 
as a foundation or a beginning.
In conclusion, I’d like to suggest that as teachers we engage Lethem’s pro-
miscuity—that we highlight and foreground the extent to which all writing 
is “plagiarized.” I confess that I do not know if we can do this and cope with 
students who refuse to engage the honor of this promiscuity. But I prefer that 
risk to the risk that we surrender our role as teachers to our role as policemen, 
gatekeepers, or keepers of the cultural heritage of the west or the United States. 
Perhaps all of our students will not be Lethem or Levine. But I suggest that if 
we engage the best of our students rather than using the Internet and plagia-
rism-detection programs to investigate our students in the mistaken belief that 
this somehow helps them, we will be far better able to impact the reality of our 
student’s integrity than any honor code or plagiarism policy can make us.
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3 AUTHORING ACADEMIC 
AGENCY: CHARTING THE 
TENSIONS BETWEEN WORK-
FOR-HIRE UNIVERSITY 
COPYRIGHT POLICIES
Timothy R. Amidon
“Writing... occurs within a matrix of local and more glob-
al policies, standards, and practices. These variables often 
emerge as visible and at times invisible statements about what 
types of work are possible and valuable (encoded, often, in 
curricula, assessment guidelines, standards, and policies).” 
DeVoss, Cushman, & Grabill, 2005, p. 16 
For the better part of two decades now, writing and technical communica-
tion specialists have engaged in a spirited discussion about, as Andrea Lunsford 
and Susan West (1996) described it, “the question of who owns language” (p. 
383). Taking seriously Lunsford and West’s call to action, writing and technical 
communication specialists have problematized the intersections of authorship, 
intellectual property, and copyright. The substantive body of research dedi-
cated to topics such as plagiarism (DeVoss & Rosati, 2002; Johnson-Eilola & 
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Selber, 2007; Moore Howard, 2007; Valentine, 2006), the commodification of 
texts and authors (Lunsford, 1999; Ritter, 2005; Selfe & Selfe, 1994), the ethics 
of collaboration (DeVoss & Porter, 2006; Ede & Lunsford, 2001), and the ways 
in which federal law affects writing and communication (DeVoss, McKee, & 
Porter, 2008; Herrington, 199a, 199b, 2003; Reyman, 2006; Rife, 2008) il-
lustrates that writing and technical communication specialists have not only 
concerned themselves with addressing who owns language, but also the when, 
where, why, what, and how of the matter. 
This chapter, then, is situated within an already rich conversation. Adding 
to that conversation, I argue that academic authors—tenured and non-tenured 
faculty, instructional staff, research and teaching assistants, and graduate and 
undergraduate students—are positioned “within a matrix of local and global 
policies, standards, and practices” that seeks to determine their relationship to 
the ownership of scholarly products (DeVoss et al., 2005, p. 16). More specifi-
cally, I examine the ways that Title 17 of the United States Code and university 
policies associated with copyright affect the work possible within academic 
contexts. 
Throughout the chapter, I offer a narrative account of the types of chal-
lenges I encountered when licensing a thesis for a Master of Arts under a Cre-
ative Commons License. At times, I weave in scholarship that either seeks to 
inform the types of specific challenges I faced or scholarship that provides an 
entry point into the more technical aspects of copyright and/or institutional 
IP policy. I also offer the findings and implications of a qualitative study that 
investigated how 14 academic institutions approach the ownership of copy-
rightable texts. In extending this research, I hope to demonstrate how various 
policies and agents coalesce, affecting how agency is constructed within the 
distributed forms of authorship unique to academic contexts. More simply, 
I seek to understand how tensions between copyright policy and copyright 
law can be approached as sites of fissure where academic authors might exert 
agency to redefine how universities construct and maintain relationships with 
academic authors through policy. 
A NARRATIVE ON DISTRIBUTED AGENCY 
AND TEXTUAL GENERATION 
The thesis I composed as a requirement for the Masters of Arts in Eng-
lish at Indiana University−Purdue University, Fort Wayne (IPFW), is unlike 
most other M.A. theses—well, at least those at IPFW. That thesis, Institutional 
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mulgated at IPFW and Its Peer Institutions carries a Creative Commons (CC) 
Attribution 3.0 License. It—if one reads policy literally—shouldn’t. The stan-
dard formatting requirements of “A Guide to the Preparation of Theses and 
Dissertations” (2007) explain that the copyright page should contain the sym-
bol for copyright, “©”, my name, the year of submission, and the language “All 
Rights Reserved.” Mine doesn’t; my copyright page is improperly formatted. 
If you were to cruise over to the English Department Office at IPFW, pick up 
my thesis, and turn to its copyright page, you would find that the page proudly 
displays the Creative Commons (CC) by attribution logo, my name, the year of 
submission, and the language “Licensed Under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 3.0 License ... Some Rights Reserved” (Amidon, 2007, p. iii). Those for-
matting deviations are deceptive little buggers; they won’t reveal the intensive 
process that enabled them. I, however, will. 
But before I get to the crux of that story, it is important that I stress what 
is offered is one story. Certainly, it is an account of how agency might be con-
structed in academic contexts. As such, I wish to make clear that I am not pre-
senting grand claims about agency, but rather a story representative of a specific 
place in time and space—a story about the discursive flows of a deliberative 
process that involved members of a thesis committee, agents acting on behalf 
of IPFW, policies and texts local to that institution, copyright law, and myself. 
It is, as they say, a pretty mundane tale, and it of course involves two equally 
mundane arguments: standards and formats are not rigid, but flexible, and 
veering from standards and guidelines is often the result of a collaborative act, 
or as Stuart Blythe (2007) told us, “individuals seldom act autonomously” (p. 
183). As the epigraph to this chapter holds, authorial decisions (in other words, 
agency)—and the textual artifacts that evidence them—often obscure the full 
complexity of processes, agents, and artifacts that lead to their production. 
The vantage point and framework I employ within this chapter, especially 
as it relates to agency, is not my own. It derives largely from James E. Porter, 
Patricia Sullivan, Stuart Blythe, Jeffrey Grabill, and Libby Miles’ (2000) “Insti-
tutional Critique: A Rhetorical Methodology for Change” and Blythe’s (2007) 
“Agencies, Ecologies, and The Mundane Artifacts in Our Midst.” Blythe ex-
panded on the nuanced conceptualizations of institutional agency offered in 
“Institutional Critique,” arguing that writing and agency “are best understood 
... by identify[ing] and relat[ing]” variables (p. 183). Stuart Selber (2009) also 
offered his understanding of this perspective towards agency, describing a 
framework “not so much about defining but positioning. Researchers who em-
ploy its techniques are interested in relative weightings and interpretations” (p. 
14). As Selber lucidly explained, the type of agency Porter et al. envisioned is 
one already implicated within a complex interplay of “contexts and constituent 
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parts (including operating procedures and working conditions)” where actors 
“acknowledge their own involvements and commitments” (p. 13). Agency for 
all of these scholars, then, is about working rhetorically within the parameters 
of a system, instead of fighting for change from the outside. 
This was the case as I worked toward deviating from the formatting stan-
dards set forth for theses at IPFW. Deviating from those standards—that is, 
utilizing a CC license, instead of copyrighting my thesis—meant working 
within a community that consisted of the members of my thesis committee. 
And, like other academic communities, we worked in contexts where local doc-
uments and institutional policies defined the parameters of our productive ef-
forts. Yet, as I learned, local communities are also often subject to more global 
documents and policies (e.g., Title 17 of U.S.C.) that also set parameters for 
productive efforts. 
As a graduate student of English operating within a graduate program 
at IPFW, “I” composed a thesis to which a number of institutional agents 
and institutional texts converged to give shape. Through completing in-
stitutional forms; garnering signatures; organizing committee members; 
authoring proposals; meeting formally and informally with agents of the 
university (e.g., the department chair, the director of graduate program, and 
the members of my committee); reading and creating memos, notes, and 
emails; conducting and synthesizing research; examining and understand-
ing institutional policies; and, finally, by writing in the more traditional 
sense, “I” composed a thesis. This statement is indicative of the type of 
agency I sketched above. 
Moreover, my case demonstrates what Blythe (2007) called “the paradox 
of agency” (p. 173)—a form of agency gained “not by being an autonomous 
individual, but by being part of something larger, by being a part of systems 
that constrain and enable simultaneously” (p. 173). There were many junctures 
where agency was exerted. I encountered the paradox of agency because, as the 
production of the thesis progressed, agency was distributed among numerous 
members who made up the local community I was situated within, and we 
commonly turned to local and global texts to guide our actions. Many texts 
and many people constrained and enabled our efforts, but ultimately they were 
all influential (in the positive sense) in helping me produce a thesis. 
For the purposes of brevity, I touch upon four texts and four agents that, 
most notably, did the constraining and enabling: The texts include Title 17 of 
U.S.C., the Purdue University Faculty and Staff Handbook: 2005−2006, In-
diana University’s “A Guide to the Preparation of Theses and Dissertations” 
(2007), and TyAnna Herrington’s (2003) A Legal Primer for the Digital Age. 
The human actors (in the Latourian sense) involved were the three members 
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of my thesis committee and myself. In retrospect, I now find it somewhat pro-
found that my name on the thesis cover suggests sole authorship. 
Given that, I wonder whether or not agency—in terms of writing—is syn-
onymous with or inextricable from solitary notions of authorship. If not, how do 
we reconcile how ownership does or should relate to the types of more distrib-
uted understandings of agency and authorship emerging in disciplinary scholar-
ship? It is my hope that this chapter convinces readers that these are the types of 
questions we in writing and technical communication should be asking. 
THE NEBULOUS ORIGINS OF A RESEARCH PROJECT
It is difficult for me to determine what precipitating moment sparked my 
interest in questions of authorship and ownership and the complex spaces in 
which they exist. In a certain respect, my thesis research began before I was 
aware of it. In a graduate class on multimodal composition, the professor gave 
a lecture on open-source and free-source code, licensing, and publishing. That 
lecture sold me on the fact that the principles upon which open-source and 
free-source software, licensing, and publishing are built—cooperation, free-
dom, sustainability, and sharing—were principles I was concerned about (see 
Galin, this volume). I knew that I wanted to contribute to those principles. 
And I knew I could: I was a graduate student, and I had to write a pretty labor-
intensive document (that is, an M.A. thesis), so I wanted that text to mean 
something. I also wanted to share it with others. I wished to produce a text 
that would be of institutional value (i.e., meet the university’s requirements 
for theses) so I could graduate, but I also wished to create something of use to 
others. What I wanted to do, ultimately, was put a Creative Commons License 
on a text, and if it happened to be a totally awesome thesis, well, that would 
be good too. 
 I wasn’t sure if I had the agency to make the licensing choice, so I did what 
other people do in these types of circumstances: I sought the assistance of the 
appropriate institutional agent. Oddly enough, the person who knew the most 
about copyright was also the chair of my thesis committee and the interim 
chair of the department. I went to his office with a list of topics I was interested 
in exploring in the thesis and asked if I could put a CC license on my thesis. 
I have a sense that, on first impression, he thought the timing of the question 
was kind of funny. It was as if he was thinking, “what does it matter at this 
point? Write the thing first, and we’ll worry about the formatting issues later.” 
Having reflected on that moment, I realize that I had thought of the ques-
tion as a document-shaping decision: If my thesis could be shared more openly 
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with others, I would care about it more. I mean, honestly, how compelling is 
writing a document that takes up so much time when only four or five people 
are likely to read it? I’m serious. As a student who struggled through my fresh-
man year of college and now has a strong background in rhetoric and compo-
sition scholarship, I think it is obvious that students enabled to create viable 
audiences and strong writerly motivation produce better quality work. As Dàn-
ielle Nicole DeVoss and James Porter (2006) put it, 
people write because they want to interact, to share, to learn, to 
play and to help others. They engage others for connection, com-
patibility, love, sex, desire, self-fulfillment (or egomania), the thirst 
for justice, the thirst for freedom, out of boredom, out of need for 
interaction, to make their lives more comfortable, and yes, they en-
gage others for money, which they need to survive. (p. 203)
After a bit of discussion, my professor’s interest was sparked too. He did 
what other people do in these types of circumstances: He turned to his shelves, 
located the Purdue University Faculty and Staff Handbook: 2005−2006, opened 
the index to find “copyright,” and then turned to the appropriate page.1 He 
read the passage on copyright, looked quizzically at me, and passed the book 
to me. I read:
The University shall own all domestic and foreign rights in and 
to any and all inventions and materials made or developed by 
University personnel either in the course of employment by the 
University or through the use of facilities or funds provided by 
or through the University. [...] Materials, whether written or 
recorded, shall be considered as having been developed in the 
course of employment in those cases where the individual was 
employed by the University for the specific purpose of prepar-
ing or producing the materials or was specifically directed to do 
so as a part of his or her duties. The rights owned by the Univer-
sity include all economic and property rights as well as the right 
to patent inventions and copyright materials. In accordance 
with custom established in institutions of higher education, 
copyright ownership of textbooks and manuscripts prepared at 
the author’s initiative for classroom, educational, or professional 
purposes, including all royalties from publication or distribu-
tion of such materials, belong to the author except when the 
material is prepared as an assigned project and/or University 
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facilities or resources were used, in which case these materials 
shall be University property, as described above. (pp. 55−56)
In turn, we each discussed portions of the policy that seemed ambiguous 
and contradictory. The text had failed to clarify how the institution would 
approach this type of action. Rather than clamping down on the idea (the 
too common institutional approach to problem solving), my chair suggested 
that I contact two scholars from our field more versed in issues of copyright. I 
emailed the two professors a copy of Purdue’s policy, and asked if they thought 
I had the agency to license my thesis under a CC license. One suggested that 
doing so may have consequences, such as having to write another thesis if the 
thesis was not accepted. The other suggested I pose the question at the 2007 
Conference on College Composition and Communication Intellectual Prop-
erty Caucus (CCCC- IP) meeting. Unfortunately, I had to wait to ask that 
question, but in the meantime I was accepted to attend the 2006 Digital Media 
and Composition Institute (DMAC) at Ohio State University. 
At that institute, a multimodal presentation by DeVoss, McKee, and Por-
ter (2006) expanded the underdeveloped notions of copyright and IP that I 
had at the time. I came to understand that IP, copyright, and work-for-hire 
are wickedly complex conceptual entities. Prior to that institute, I had little 
understanding about my rights as an author. Prior to that, though, I had not 
had any reason to want to know about those rights. I took an important lesson 
home with me from DMAC: If the chair of my committee did not know if I 
had the right to utilize a CC license, and if other students didn’t know if I had 
that right, it was likely that others encountered the same difficulty. The curios-
ity stemming from that lack of knowledge led me to an appropriate research 
question for my thesis: How do IPFW and its peer institutions approach copy-
rightable IP created by university authors? I knew by the time I was finished 
conducting the research I would be closer to having an answer to my about 
licensing the thesis through Creative Commons. 
RELATING TEXTS: SITUATING HOW TEXTS SHAPE TEXTS
Up to this point in the chapter, my aim has been to argue that a number of 
agents and texts influence the composition of a text in educational contexts, fo-
cusing on the discipline of writing. But what mundane texts influence textual 
generation in these contexts? As Blythe (2007) posited, they are “documents 
that set parameters for our labor and for the labor of those who work with us—
including secretaries, students, editors, and so on” (p. 181). Think about the 
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influence an assignment sheet has upon how a student approaches an assign-
ment; think about institutional policies like the excerpt provided earlier from 
the Purdue Faculty and Staff Handbook; think about documents like IU’s “A 
Guide to the Preparation of Theses and Dissertations”; and think about texts 
that have the power of law behind them, like Title 17. I now delve deeper into 
how those “mundane” texts influenced the production of my thesis. As I began 
my research into how IPFW and its peer institutions approach copyrightable IP 
created by university authors, I encountered a number of difficulties. 
First, I had to determine which universities were IPFW’s peer institutions, 
and although this should have been relatively easy, in practice it was not. The 
administrative assistant I was directed to ask was somewhat reluctant to hand 
over the document containing that information. The document was for facul-
ty; I was a graduate student and may not have been authorized to ask for such a 
document. She acted, in my assessment, quite appropriately. So, I talked to the 
chair of my thesis committee who, in turn, procured a copy of IPFW’s Strate-
gies for Excellence: The Strategic Plan 2001−2006. The document detailed 13 
institutions with similar missions and identities (see Table 1). 
Table 1. IPFW’s Peer Institutions and Identifying Acronyms.
Institution Identifying acronym
Boise State University BSU
Cleveland State University CSU
CUNY—College of Staten Island CSI
Northern Kentucky University NKU
Oakland University OU
Portland State University PSU
University of Central Oklahoma UCO
University of Nebraska−Omaha UN
University of New Orleans UNO
University of Texas−El Paso UTEP
Wichita State University WSU
Wright State University WS
Youngstown State University YSU
Second, while collecting the respective policies dealing with copyrightable 
IP (all but one were available publicly online, and links to each are included in 
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the references at the end of this chapter), I found that like IPFW (which follows 
Purdue’s policy mandates in most instances), UTEP, UNO, UN, and CSI are 
governed via policy through the larger institutional systems of which they are 
a part. This finding posed a difficulty, because it excluded the ability to make 
claims or trace patterns based on institutional similarities. For example, IPFW 
and Purdue—while part of the same system—are quite dissimilar in many 
respects. 
Third, I was underprepared to understand aspects of the policy language 
useful to the study. TyAnna Herrington (1999a, 1999b, 2003) proved invalu-
able in preparing me to analyze the respective institution’s IP policy language.2 
From Herrington’s work, I came to understand that copyright law defines four 
types of circumstances in which texts are authored: independent authorship, 
work-for-hire, contractual or commissioned, and collaborative. Put simply, 
U.S. copyright code defines authorship as contingent upon a variety of con-
textual factors. 
Understanding who owns independent, contractual or commissioned, and 
collaborative works is relatively simple: If an author has not signed a contract 
to produce work or been commissioned to produce work (which is contractual 
or commissioned authorship), if an author is not working with another author 
to produce the work (which is collaborative authorship), and if the work is not 
work for hire, then the author is creating the work independently. 
Work for hire is much more complex. Herrington (1999a) described work 
for hire as “a legal fiction that makes the author of a work the employer or hir-
ing party who contracted for the work” (p. 129). An author is working under 
work for hire when two factors are met:
1) An author must be found to have produced the work as an 
employee, determined by a 13-element agency law test, and 
2) he or she must have produced the work within the scope of 
employment and have not specifically contracted rights to the 
work (Herrington, 2003, p. 97)
However, the difficulty with this test is that many scholars do work under 
the provisions of signed or unsigned contracts, and institutions can and do—
as the data I provide later suggests—claim these contracts to be binding. Ad-
ditionally, Herrington (2003) informed us that work-for-hire relationships are 
fixed, those involved may negotiate the ownership of copyrights. Moreover, be-
cause little case law dealing with work for hire and university authorship exists, 
courts could find university policies to be binding just because those policies 
are overly restrictive (in relation to Title 17).3 Those who work in business con-
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texts, for example, routinely sign over rights to the copyrightable works they 
create, and it is not unlikely that courts could turn to those cases in making a 
decision about how work for hire operates in university contexts. Martine Cou-
rant Rife (2008) wrote in an essay focused on fair use that
if our institutions have restrictive guidelines that we disobey, 
you can bet that the courts will not listen to our pleas when 
we explain. Judges love to use ‘official guidelines’ as heuristics 
for evaluation. Our institutional guidelines will be used, and 
the courts will tell us that, if we do not approve of the guide-
lines, we should change them rather than engage in blatant 
civil disobedience. (p. 152)
Still, as Herrington (1999a) advised, universities “distribute detailed guide-
lines listing additional criteria to help clarify their own interpretations of the 
work for hire doctrine, but these guidelines do not peremptorily carry the force 
of law” (p. 3). Herrington provided Brinson and Radcliff ’s 13-element agency 
law test to use in deciding who and what constitutes legal definitions of owner-
ship. It is important for faculty, staff, and students to use these factors to ap-
proach policy as judges do—that is, as heuristics for gauging how to determine 
work-for-hire authorship and not legally supported dicta. Because these fac-
tors are important, I include here the 13-element test as found in Herrington 
(1999b):
1. whether the hiring party had a right to control the manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished;
2. the level of skill required;
3. whether the instruments and tools used were provided by the 
hiring party or the hired party;
4. whether the hired party worked at the hiring party’s place of 
business or the hired party’s place of business;
5. the duration of the relationship between the two parties;
6. whether the hiring party had the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party;
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7. the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how 
long to work;
8. the method of payment;
9. whether the hired party had a role in hiring and paying as-
sistants;
10. whether the work was part of the regular business of the hir-
ing party;
11. whether the hiring party was doing business;
12. whether employee benefits were provided by the hiring party 
for the hired party;
13. how the hiring party treated the hired party for tax purposes. 
(p. 406)
Equally important are two aspects of this test: first, that the Copyright Act 
of 1909 held the first factor to be the “sole determinant of employment status”; 
and, second, that the 1976 act holds that the “‘totality’ of each of these ‘factors’ 
is important” in making these types of determinations (Herrington, 1999b, 
p. 407). In other words, after the introduction of the 1976 act, courts began 
to approach agency, ownership, and authorship as in a highly situated, highly 
contextualized way.
The fourth difficulty of the study arose out of the contextual distinctions 
associated with authorship under work for hire. Before reading and under-
standing the nuances of Brinson and Radcliffe’s 13-point test, I originally be-
lieved that authors were the people who created a work. Once I came to realize 
that work-for-hire authorship complicates traditional notions of authorship, I 
developed not only a better ability to approach the policies through a legal lens, 
but also to understand the ways that work for hire relates to the prior discus-
sions of agency and location apropos Blythe (2007), Selber (2009), DeVoss et 
al. (2005), and Porter et al. (2000). Most simply, determining one’s “employee-
ness,” and resultantly a text’s author, has as much to do with challenging tradi-
tional notions of what a worker/author is as it does with the conditions under 
which the work was created. This poses difficulties for the work performed in 
writing classrooms for, and with, academic intentions; the work-for-hire doc-
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trine challenges traditional concepts of employees and institutional authors 
and texts produced in these working environments. 
The work-for-hire doctrine seems to suggest that full professors, associate 
professors, assistant professors, adjunct professors, visiting professors, emeritus 
faculty, lecturers, fellows, graduate students, undergraduate students, admin-
istrative assistants, maintenance personnel, safety and police staff, and even 
visitors to academic institutions could be viewed as producing works for hire. 
Herrington (1999b) indicated the problems tied to authoring in nonacademic 
contexts:
Work for hire status usually is clear when nonacademic em-
ployees create their projects at the employer’s work site, using 
their employer’s equipment and supplies, within an ongoing 
business relationship. But conflict arises when any one fac-
tor or any combination of factors is otherwise. Disagreement 
often arises over whether a work was created within or outside 
the creator’s scope of employment when industry employees 
create their own work away from their place of employment 
and on their own time. (p. 130) 
However, these disputes are further exacerbated by authoring in academic 
contexts, where various faculty, staff, and students “work under unique cir-
cumstances” (Herrington, 1999a, p. 135). This is due in large part to the fact 
that “employee status,” under the 13-point test, is not easily discernible. Courts 
may truly be, then, the only decision-makers in how various readings of the test 
might apply to faculty, students, and staff. It still seems reasonable to warrant 
that as more of the test’s permutations are met a text is more likely to be con-
sidered a work for hire and its author an employee. 
This has significant implications for the individuals who create texts for 
and within academic contexts. For instance, the expertise required to produce 
a literacy narrative, a manuscript for a journal, or a chapter like this varies; 
moreover, the institutions we write for and within often supply us with access 
to libraries, computer labs, and writing centers, all of which could be viewed as 
types of academic instruments and tools. Even more confusing is the variance 
with which institutions control the manner and means by which the products 
are produced. If an undergraduate student and an assistant professor compose 
literacy narratives, the agency test will apply much differently. The agency test 
will also apply differently if, for example, the professor writes the narrative in 
his or her respective office on a computer provided by the university while the 
student writes his or hers at home on a personally owned computer. 
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Understanding the basics of work for hire seems a good start toward clari-
fying complexities. However, many of us are not fully versed in the legal com-
plexities associated with U.S. copyright law. My experiences (then and since) 
suggest that, relatively speaking, few professors and fewer students are aware of 
how these laws exert a shaping power on how we produce texts. Again, know-
ing how copyright and work for hire function is important, but approximating 
how these laws correspond to institutional polices and documents is just as im-
portant if we wish to better clarify our ownership claims to texts we produce. 
For instance, recall the excerpt from Purdue’s IP policy concerning copy-
rightable texts. As I noted, portions of the policy seemed ambiguous and con-
tradictory. The policy both claimed and disclaimed certain copyrightable 
works. Why is it that the policy first claimed ownership to “all rights in all 
materials made or developed by University personnel either in the course em-
ployment ... or through use of facilities and funds,” but then later disclaimed 
“ownership of textbooks and manuscripts prepared at the author’s initiative” 
(p. 55)? What this policy fails to account for, acknowledge, or forward to those 
authoring in and for the institution is that work for hire does make these types 
of renderings. Simply put, such policies may not necessarily carry the force of 
law, whereas Title 17 does. PU’s policy is problematic in that it does not fully 
disclose the totality of factors that constitute legal authorship. Rather, the insti-
tution works from the position that it owns a controlling interest in all works, 
but releases control of some. This fails to mesh with the 13-point agency test. 
Academic institutions cannot determine work for hire status; only courts can 
do this legally. Why, then, does the policy work from this premise? 
WHAT DO ACADEMIC COPYRIGHT POLICIES TELL US?
Generally speaking, the policies I collected4 sought to delineate three as-
pects: First, who was and was not included within the policy parameters; sec-
ond, which texts were included or excluded from institutional ownership and 
control; and, third, when or under what circumstances authors would be creat-
ing work that would be considered under university control (i.e., the policies 
defined how the institution interpreted work for hire). These are the reasons 
why I, initially, felt that the analyses were less useful: The policies were not 
in line with the scholarly definitions of work for hire, authorship, and textual 
ownership with which I was familiar. The policies did not resonate with what 
I knew about work for hire and copyright. However, this aspect is precisely 
what made the analyses useful. Simply put, while Herrington’s explanations of 
authorship, textual ownership, and work for hire suggest that Title 17 takes an 
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ecological view that synthesizes the interconnectivity of these concepts, some 
policies seem to do the opposite.
Policies Delineate Institutional Authors
The institutional policies evidenced six different approaches to defining 
the types of authors generating texts in academic contexts. The policies also 
evidenced one wild card group that resists classification into the six otherwise 
normative approaches:
1. The ambiguous language5 approach: Institutions used only ambiguous 
language to define authors (e.g., “originators,” “creators”).
2. The mixed-language approach: Institutions used both ambiguous and 
precise language (e.g., “faculty,” “adjunct faculty,” “emeritus faculty,” 
“undergraduate student”).
3. The one-tiered approach: Institutions used precise language situat-
ing authors into one category (e.g., “employee”).
4. The two-tiered approach: Institutions used precise language situ-
ating authors into one of two categories (e.g., either “student” or 
“staff ”).
5. The three-tiered approach: Institutions used precise language situat-
ing authors into one of three categories (e.g., either “student,” “fac-
ulty,” or “staff ”).
6. Collective bargaining agreement (CBA) approach: Institutions used pre-
cise language situating authors into one category (e.g., “members of the 
union”);
7. Wild card: Institutions used mixed language that suggested others were 
also subject to the provisions of policies (e.g., “visitors,” “users of facili-
ties”).
At a general level, these approaches suggest that the institutions make dis-
tinctions regarding authorship in two ways: 1) the policies’ language evidences 
that institutions either make authorial distinctions between faculty, staff, stu-
dent, and/or other types of authors (BSU, CSU, IPFW, UCO, UN, UNO, 
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UTEP, WSU, WS), or make no authorial distinctions (CSI, NKU, PSU, OU, 
YSU); 2) the authorial distinctions suggest that policies may vary in applicabil-
ity based on which type of author is creating a text (BSU, CSU, IPFW, UCO, 
UN, UNO, UTEP, WSU, WS). That there were at least six types of approaches 
within 14 institutions demonstrates a wide variance in how institutions ap-
proach concepts of institutional authorship (see Table 2). 
This variance may suggest that these institutions, more specifically the ad-
ministrators vested with the responsibility of creating those IP policies, are 
uncertain as to whom the policies should and should not apply. For instance, 
whereas a number of policies did not expressly state that policies applied to 
“faculty” (they used ambiguous language such as “originator,” “creator,” or 
“staff”; YSU, WS, WSU, PSU, OU, NKU, IPFW), other institutions used 
precise language denoting nearly every conceivable type of “faculty” (“post-
doctoral fellows,” “instructors,” “visiting faculty,” “adjunct faculty,” “emeritus 
faculty”; UCO, UNO). 
Table 2. Approaches to Application of Policies.
Approach Institutions
Ambiguous language approach CSI, NKU
Mixed-language approach IPFW
One-tiered approach PSU
Two-tiered approach WS, WSU
Three-tiered approach BSU, CSU, UCO, UN, UNO, UTEP
Collective bargaining approach OU, YSU
Wild card IPFW, UCO, UN, UTEP, WS
Identifying these approaches is important because the 13-factor agency 
test provided by Herrington (1999a) posited that distinctions cannot be made 
based solely on who performs the work conducted. The differences associated 
with the roles and functions performed by the various types of authors cre-
ating work will be important in determining if a work is made for hire, but 
these policy distinctions seem to blur some of the other factors important to 
determining whether or not a work is made for hire. The most troubling ap-
proach is that of PSU; PSU’s policy either seems to hold that all institutional 
authors are “employees” or that “employees” are much different authors than 
faculty and student authors, but the policy fails to clarify which view it may 
be taking. Ironically, the works that utilize the terms “creator,” “author,” or 
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“originator” may be most useful because they insist on the more wholesale 
renderings homogeneous to work for hire’s 13-factor agency test.
Policies Claim and Disclaim Texts
The policies evidenced six different institutional approaches towards 
claiming work and five approaches toward disclaiming work. Analysis of the 
policy language also yielded a trend in how the institutions codify types of 
works: Texts can be independent works (commonly referred to by policies 
as traditional works), texts can be works made for hire, texts can be con-
tractual works, and works can be those works that make significant use of 
facilities and/or funds. The conflation of independent works and traditional 
works problematizes independent works, because traditional works could be 
approached as works made for hire. This conflation suggests that institutions 
may not be aware of the 13-point agency law of the work-for-hire doctrine 
that aids in making these types of distinctions between works produced inde-
pendently and works produced for hire. The presence of distinctions between 
works made for hire and works that make significant use of facilities and/or 
funds suggests that some of these institutions may not understand that uses 
and significant uses of facilities and/or funds is just one part of the 13-point 
agency test associated with work for hire. If the policies had subsumed uses 
and significant uses within works made for hire, and if the policies had in-
cluded language on collaborative works, the policies would have been closely 
aligned with the four types of circumstances in which authors generate texts 
as posited by U.S. copyright law.
Texts policies claim include:
1. All-inclusive approach: Policies claim all works.
2. Catch-and-release approach: Policies claim all works but disclaim 
others.
3. Claim three–disclaim one approach: Policies explicitly claim works that 
make use of facilities and/or funds, works made under contract, and 
works made for hire, but disclaim traditional works.
4. Claim two–disclaim two approach: Policies explicitly claim works that 
make use of facilities and/or funds and works made under contract but 
disclaim works made for hire and traditional works.
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5. Claim contractual–ignore others approach: Policies claim works made 
under contract and do not discuss other types of works.
Claim works made for hire-ignore others approach: Policies claim works 
made for hire but do not discuss other types of works. (See Table 3 for corre-
sponding institutional approaches.)
Table 3. Approaches toward Claiming Work.
Approach Institutions
All-inclusive approach PSU
Catch-and-release approach BSU, CSI, IPFW, WS,UN, 
UNO UTEP
Claim three–disclaim one approach CSU, UCO
Claim two–disclaim two approach NKU
Claim contractual–disclaim others approach OU
Claim works made for hire-ignore others approach WSU, YSU
 
 Texts policies disclaim include:
1. Disclaim none approach: Policies disclaim no works. 
2. Traditional works approach: Policies disclaim all traditional works.
3. Some traditional works approach A: Policies disclaim traditional works, 
except those subject to work for hire, but do not discuss use of facilities 
and/or funds. 
4. Some traditional works approach B: Policies disclaim traditional works, 
except those that make significant use of facilities and/or funds, but do 
not discuss works made for hire.
5. Some traditional works approach C: Policies disclaim traditional 
works, except those which are made for hire or that make use of fa-
cilities and/or funds. (See Table 4 for corresponding institutional ap-
proaches.)
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Table 4. Approaches toward Disclaiming Work.
Approach Institutions
Disclaim none approach PSU
Traditional works approach CSU, NKU, UN, OU, YSU
Some traditional works approach A WS
Some traditional works approach B BSU, UTEP
Some traditional works approach C CSI, IPFW, UCO, UNO, WSU
At a general level, the approaches suggest that institutions make distinc-
tions regarding texts to which they claim or disclaim a controlling interest. 
The most noteworthy aspects of these approaches is the great variance in which 
works the respective institutions claim and disclaim and great variance in how 
the policies define works that will fall into the respective categories (for in-
stance, works made for hire are delineated quite differently across policies). 
The most unique approach toward claiming and disclaiming texts appeared in 
PSU’s policy, which claimed all works and disclaimed none. 
This is problematic for two reasons: First, it seems to suggest that authors 
at PSU are always creating works for hire.6 This cannot be the case, as the 
13-factor agency test associated with work for hire tells us. Other problematic 
issues exist; for instance, BSU, CSI, IPFW, WS, UN, UNO, and UTEP—in 
what could be labeled the majority approach—claim all works but then dis-
claim others. Why these universities employ this catch-and-release approach is 
uncertain. It could be that these institutions seek to build false ethos with fac-
ulty (i.e., through claiming all works and then disclaiming some of the works) 
wherein the institution appears to be giving the authors back their work. It 
could be that the institutions are creating a back door (i.e., through claiming 
all works and then disclaiming some of the works so the institution can later 
reclaim those works with little resistance). It could be that those who wrote 
these policies do not realize that even if an institution disclaims works, the 
work-for-hire doctrine still applies to those works and the institution may still 
exert a controlling stake in those works. Although the first two explanations 
are certainly quite disillusioning if applicable, I would suggest it is the last that 
is the most troubling, because the institutions may be trying to cede authorial 
rights to the individuals who create texts, but are in actuality making a terrible 
go at it. 
To reiterate, approaches to the works policies claim suggest that institu-
tions make distinctions regarding textuality that are not representative of 
Authoring Academic Agency
67
all of the factors yielding legal distinctions as to whether or not works may 
be works made for hire. Simply, an institution may claim to have a control-
ling interest in certain texts, or may claim and then disclaim those inter-
ests, but in many cases those claims or disclaims may not be accurate—or, 
worse yet, they mislead those who operate as authors within and for uni-
versity contexts. 
These findings correspond to a study similar to this one, but much larger in 
scope and conducted almost 20 years ago, in which Laura Lape (1992) noted 
that “none of the policies collected in this study fails to claim at least some 
faculty works, which suggests the purpose of [policy] adoption was to...claim 
ownership of certain works for the university” (p. 253). Lape also observed that 
genre is the basis upon which some policies claim and disclaim work. And, like 
Herrington, Lape indicated that the ambiguity of policies may be territory for 
future contentions. 
What appears most striking, in relation to this chapter, is that Lape’s (1992) 
investigation revealed the following aspect: “It should be noted that under nei-
ther the 1909 Act nor the 1976 act can an agreement between employee and 
employer determine whether a work is a work made for hire within the terms of 
the statute” (p. 239). With that in mind, I now shift attention toward how the 
policies defined or otherwise interpreted work for hire.
Policies Seek to Self Define Work for Hire
The policies evidenced four approaches to outlining or otherwise defining 
when or within what contexts institutions would approach texts as work for 
hire. Institutionally described contexts creating work-for-hire circumstances 
include: 
1. All contexts approach: In all contexts authors are creating works for hire.
2. Some, but not other contexts approach: Specifically assigned tasks are 
works made for hire; traditional works are not.
3. Contractual contexts approach: Works made by, or under, provisions of 
signed contracts is work for hire. 
4. These contexts are ignored, or ambiguously defined: Contexts signaling 
work for hire are not discussed, or unclear. (See Table 5 for correspond-
ing institutions.)
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Table 5. Approaches toward Work-for-hire Contexts.
Approach Institutions
All contexts approach PSU
Some, but not other contexts approach CSU, UN
Contractual works approach UCO, UTEP, WS, YSU
Ignores or ambiguously defines contexts 
approach
BSU, CSI, IPFW, NKU, UNO, 
OU, WSU
Generally, the approaches suggest that institutions often attempt to self-
define contextual conditions for work for hire. As with the approaches toward 
defining authors operating under institutional control and texts that will or 
will not be regarded institutionally controlled or owned, the policies evidenced 
variance in how the universities sought to define or delineate work-for-hire 
contexts. All of the approaches in this section are problematic in one way or 
other; for instance, the all contexts approach does not account for the 13 factors 
creating work-for-hire distinctions. Quite simply, this approach takes no notice 
that authors performing within institutions can, and may, be operating outside 
of work for hire. 
The some, but not other contexts approach attempts to disclaim certain con-
texts, but these institutions do not exert the legal agency needed to render 
these types of decisions. The contractual contexts approach is problematic in 
that it conflates contractual authorship with work for hire authorship. This 
is a misrepresentation, as the discussion copyright law designated that these 
are two distinct forms of authorship. The last approach is both more and less 
problematic. In ignoring contexts that could create work-for-hire distinctions, 
the policies are less problematic because they do not misrepresent how work 
for hire operates. However, the policies also fail to disclose circumstances that 
signal work-for-hire distinctions, which vests the responsibility for understand-
ing work for hire with institutional authors—authors who may be unaware of 
the conditions that signal if a text was made as work for hire. The ambiguous 
approach is problematic in that it fails to acknowledge the complexity and vast-
ness of the 13 factors that signal that texts could be made as works for hire. 
Consequently, it is difficult to determine which policy is most or least prob-
lematic, but one could argue that it again is PSU’s, as it approaches all con-
texts in which institutional authors could be operating as work for hire. PSU’s 
approach seems to suggest that authors at this institution are always creating 
works for hire. Certainly, this cannot be the case, as the 13-factor agency test 
associated with work for hire tells us. 
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Other problematic issues exist regarding how the policies delineated con-
texts and conditions that would signal when institutions would approach work 
as made for hire. Institutions also sought to outline which uses of facilities, 
funds, and institutional time would create an institutional claim (see Table 6 
for examples and associated institutions). Again, use is just one of the thirteen 
provisions that help courts determine if a work is or is not made for hire. Trends 
in the approaches to use show that policies more ambiguously defined contexts 
or uses constituting institutional claims, and more clearly defined contexts or 
uses not resulting in institutional claims. This finding demonstrates the types 
of territories rife for future contention—the type of contention Lape (1992) 
and Herrington (1999a, 1999b) forecasted. 
Table 6. Uses Signaling Institutional Claim.
Type of use May signal claim May not signal claim
Use of office BSU, CSI, UCO, UN, WS
Use of facilities UCO, UN, WS, 
CSI
BSU, CSU, CSI, UCO, 
UN, WS
Provision of salary CSU, CSI, UN
Use of administrative staff UN, WS CSU, UCO, UN, WS
Additional costs BSU, UCO, WS
Research grants CSU, YSU
Leave/sabbatical CSU, CSI, UCO, YSU
Reduced instruction or other 
assignments
UCO, WS CSU, CSI, YSU
Use of computers UCO CSU, UCO, UN, WS
Use of phones UCO
Use of equipment/tools UCO UCO, UN, WS
Ambiguous language CSU, UCO, WSU
Does not specify (either) IPFW, NKU, OU, PSU, UNO, UTEP, YSU
Policies that attempt to undo some of the work-for-hire provisions are prob-
lematic in that they could lull institutional authors into a false sense of security, 
leading authors to believe that they are not authoring under the conditions that 
may create a work made for hire, when in fact they could be. Further, policies 
stressing the use provision fail to acknowledge the twelve other factors that aid 
courts in making work-for-hire distinctions are problematic in that they could 
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lead institutional authors into believing they may be creating a work made for 
hire, when in fact they are not. 
Lape (1992) noted that these types of policy provisions could lead to con-
tention between institutions and institutional authors:
Aside from the possibility that the university may be found to 
have waived promises by faculty members to assign copyrights 
by nonenforcement of the policy, broad claims that are selec-
tively enforced will lead to surprise on the part of professors 
and increased conflict between professors and the university. 
(p. 258)
Institutional authors may still utilize the 13-factor test to produce baseline 
action. Additionally, authors could sign contracts explicitly delimiting owner-
ship rights for each copyrightable text they create. Institutional actors could 
also use areas of ambiguity to prompt discussion and perhaps prompt revision 
of policies that administration, faculty, and students find problematic. 
What, then, do these policies tell us? They tell us we should not be shocked, 
as evidenced in Blythe (2007): “the possibility that policy must be interpreted, 
and will be interpreted differently by different people, should not be surpris-
ing” (p. 178). The presence of institutional variances toward work for hire, au-
thorship, and ownership of texts seems to suggest that Blythe’s insight could be 
extended to readings of copyright upon which institutions base policies. 
RECONSTITUTING AGENCY IN ACADEMIC CONTEXTS: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGING COPYRIGHT POLICIES 
There are many lessons to be learned about utilizing agency as authors per-
forming work within and for academic institutions. Here, I have attempted 
to demonstrate how agency worked in such one specific context. The analysis 
of institutional policies suggests that institutional policy related to copyright 
might misrepresent or muddle legal distinctions of work for hire, authorship, 
and/or textual ownership. It is imperative, then, to keep two points in mind as 
we move forward. 
First, as Rife (2008) and Jeffrey Galin (2008) posited, institutional policies 
and governing documents are not law, but courts may and often do use them to 
assemble interpretations of cases related to copyrightable intellectual property. 
Second, these policies and their implementation are not rigid but flexible; they 
are, as Porter et al. (2000) explained, important elements that give consistency 
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to institutions. Porter et al. posited that institutions “are rhetorically construct-
ed human designs (whose power is reinforced by buildings, laws, traditions, 
and knowledge making practices) and so are changeable” (p. 611). As such, it is 
important to remember that we—people that work for and within these insti-
tutions—are endowed with situated and distributed agency. 
If we are dissatisfied by policies or governing documents, we can work 
rhetorically to change those documents and policies. Recall Blythe’s (2007) 
statement on the paradox of agency and Rife’s (2008) statement on civil dis-
obedience. As these scholars suggested, ignoring these policies is not only a 
counterproductive action, but an act not responsible to our roles within the in-
stitutions within which we work. Working through and within the institutions 
is not just a way to affect change, but a deliberate way to do so. As this applies 
to institutional documents and policies concerned with copyright, we need to 
ensure that people entering institutional contexts are alert to and cognizant of 
not only the implications of these documents and policies and how they give 
shape to institutional knowledge about copyright, but also how these policies 
derive from interpretations of larger governing texts and policies. 
Perhaps the most important contextual factor is the impact emergent tech-
nologies have had with how information and knowledge is invented and deliv-
ered. These technologies have already affected how scholarship is performed 
for and within academic institutions. Physicist Gordon Kane (2008), for in-
stance, noted that in his field, an open-access publishing venue called arXiv 
has largely replaced and altered the way research is performed. Open-access 
venues, as Kane warranted, have extremely small operating costs with respect 
to traditional forms of information delivery; Kane noted that arXiv functions 
at approximately 2% of the budget of the largest traditional print U.S. phys-
ics journal. Journals like Computers and Composition Online and Kairos have 
turned to Creative Commons licensed open-publishing and sharing, and this 
might be a clue that CC is becoming a popular alternative to traditional forms 
of copyright with scholars from within our field. 
However, policies that require institutional authors to protect their work 
with copyright may discourage—or, worse, prohibit—authors from pursuing 
these types of publications. For instance, if an author creates a text borrow-
ing from others using “share-alike” forms of CC licensing, but that author’s 
institution claims ownership to all texts, it places that scholar in a difficult 
ethical and legal position. Are authors working in institutions with restric-
tive IP policies prohibited from working with “share-alike” texts? If yes, then 
we need to seriously consider how these policies affect our abilities to perform 
scholarship. Doing so will mean preparing institutional constituents—staff, 
faculty, administrators, and students—to communicate so that they may act 
Timothy R. Amidon
72
purposefully with regard to these issues. Preparing these individuals to partake 
(institutionally and communally) in this debate is the work that we perform as 
teachers of rhetoric, communication, and writing. Locally, this means working 
with others to decide what is in our institutions’ interests. But, it also means 
thinking reflectively and globally to ensure that we are making the types of 
ethical choices that enable our disciplines to proceed in a sustainable fashion. 
We must work on various contextual levels to affect social change. What we 
do at one contextual level has implications for other contexts. The choices we 
make about how to act within institutions and which journals and publishers 
we choose to submit articles to will affect the coherence and cohesion of how 
connected contexts relate and assume consistency. 
We must participate in the full breadth of that process—not in a solitary 
fashion independent from the ways that policies, documents, and people in-
terrelate. As to the way copyright functions within institutions, we have to 
acknowledge questions about who owns language (Lunsford & West, 1996). 
Enabling individuals to affect change in informed, responsible, ethical, and 
fair ways is primarily the work our field advocates and performs. As Selber 
(2004a, 2004b) noted, writing can be approached as a tool, an artifact, and a 
process, and each perspective affords vantage points that are vital to one an-
other. If we do not take up the work of identifying and relating, we are left with 
impartial views. 
As I see it, it is difficult to exercise rhetorical change without a multitude 
of views. Blythe (2007) offered one way to exercise rhetorical action based on 
how texts function in context. Blythe explained that texts “derive power in 
three ways ... the way they are written, presented, and received” (p. 182). Acting 
locally, then, requires rhetorical action that attends to these matters. If Blythe 
were to apply this reading of power to the case of institutional copyright poli-
cies and documents, I bet he would argue that this is rhetorical action that fac-
ulty, staff, and students can precipitate. For example, there will be institutional 
constituents with the agency to revise policies by serving on committees that 
address and revise policies. These individuals can work to ensure that policies 
are more sensibly written. Those without the authority to write, however, can 
still educate those who do about the implications these issues hold for scholars 
and the multiple communities they inhabit. This may take the form of address-
ing policies within faculty and student senate meetings. Others with the agency 
to control how these policies are disseminated could ensure that all members 
of universities get copies of the policies. Those with knowledge of these topics 
can utilize the opportunities common to classrooms, departmental and institu-
tional meetings, and scholarly and non-scholarly publishing—as well as local, 
statewide, and/or national conferences—to help bring others up to speed about 
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how important these issues are for writers and readers. Quite simply, there are a 
number of routes we can take to prepare members of our communities to par-
ticipate within these conversations.
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
I learned a great deal about how texts derive power when I wanted to license 
my thesis through Creative Commons. I learned how different institutional 
perspectives toward policy (such as PU’s institutional policy on copyright) 
relate to the perspectives found in documents such as IU’s formatting guide 
(2007). Part of this meant understanding how to navigate IPFW, a hybrid 
of two institutional systems. I came to learn that as an employee of IPFW, I 
worked under PU’s policy, but as a graduate student of IPFW, I worked under 
IU’s policies. The expertise and professionalism of the members of my thesis 
committee facilitated this understanding. By helping locate institutional docu-
ments and by explaining how those documents shaped the thesis-composing 
process, I learned what it means to work within a system. 
When it came time to make a formal decision about how I was to format 
the copyright page of my thesis, I also had to demonstrate to my committee 
that the knowledge I had procured strengthened the claims I made for my CC 
licensing choice. To accomplish this, I used the thesis itself to communicate; 
for instance, I included explanations of CC licensing in the review of the lit-
erature section, outlining that CC licensing operates not against, but in con-
junction with, copyright. This section also provided explanations of copyright, 
work for hire, and concepts of legal authorship. In some senses, the text became 
a performative space, where law, policies, and interpretations converged. I was 
responsible for ensuring that my committee felt comfortable signing off on a 
text that deviated from the normative route of copyright formatting for theses 
at IPFW. In my rendering, then, to say “I” authored the thesis is reductive; this 
one project suggests just how collaborative our scholarly processes are. Without 
our interactions (neither wholly my own understandings, nor wholly theirs), 
the thesis and this chapter would not be possible. I conclude by echoing Blythe 
(2007): “I hope that my arguments here may prompt some to begin redefining 
our sense of agency [authorship, ownership, writing, and possibility] as a highly 
situated, ecological construct” (p. 183). 
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NOTES
1. At this point, I assume there will be some confusion, as I noted that I 
attended IPFW, consulted a Purdue handbook for the copyright policy, and 
consulted an Indiana University guide for thesis-formatting requirements. This 
confusion is quite precisely my purpose. Navigating institutions is a complex 
activity, and the confusion a reader likely feels here should mimic the confu-
sion I felt when trying to come to understand the contexts in which I would 
have to defer to IU policy or PU policy as a member of an institution demon-
strating a confluence of both the IU and PU institutional systems. I clarify the 
confusion later in the chapter.
2. It is important to make the following delimitation regarding my thesis 
study and this chapter: IP constitutes works that can be protected through 
trademark, patent, and copyright protection. Generally speaking, most of the 
work that writing scholars and students produce falls under the protection of 
copyright, and thus the study only covers works that could be regarded as 
copyrightable. Computer programs are examples of works not addressed here, 
as they could protected by copyright and/or patent protection.
3. Galin (2007), writing on one of the most recent cases of faculty work for 
hire, Bosch v. Ball-Kell, told us that the court’s summary may suggest that “un-
less, there are explicit statements in letters of appointment or other university 
policies ... faculty may typically own copyrights in their teaching materials” 
and scholarship (p. 45). Moreover, as Galin reported, a number of documents 
were employed by the court (including the American Association of University 
Professors statement on copyright and a report from the university senate) in 
making this decision. This demonstrates the importance of weighing in within 
professional organizations and local contexts and producing documentation 
that supports a constructive political approach to changing policies.
4. In gathering and analyzing the policies, I did not conduct interviews of 
policy writers. Nor did I conduct interviews with members of the respective 
institutional IP offices. Yet, this seems a fruitful area for future research, and 
certainly would improve our understandings of how and why policies come to 
appear as they do. Additionally, I gathered the policies in 2007; in some cases, 
the policies have probably been updated, revised, and/or changed. I gathered 
policies; however, it is common for universities to have a number of other insti-
tutional IP documents that could be requested by courts in forming determina-
tions of legal authorship and ownership.
5. I can think of a number of explanations for the use of ambiguous lan-
guage in the policies: 1) Title 17 itself utilizes ambiguous terminology; policy 
writers may have applied this strategy; 2) policy writers may be writing a flex-
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ible, fail-safe policy that allows them to apply the policy to institutional authors 
who create texts that they would like to assert ownership for; and/or 3) the 
language may evidence “zones of ambiguity ... where change can take place 
because of the boundary instability they highlight” (Porter et al., 2000, p. 623). 
6. There are a number of reasons why universities may take a restrictive 
approach: 1) universities may have signed contracts with institutional mem-
bers allowing them to claim these works; 2) universities may be using poli-
cies to create binding standards that hold members to the policies; and/or 3) 
the universities may have adopted an approach allowing them to claim works 
when they deem appropriate. Moreover, that policy language is restrictive does 
not necessarily denote that these institutions enforce these policies. Interviews 
would be useful in determining how, why, when, and in which circumstances 
institutions enforce policies claiming ownership. Another issue that might be 
best addressed through interviews is if and when ownership disputes are settled 
in house, which may partially account for the lack of case law on academic 
work for hire. 
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4 SOUL REMEDY: TURNITIN 
AND THE VISUAL DESIGN 
OF END USER LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS
Barclay Barrios
I’d like to open by asking you to consider three questions:
1. Your students use an online peer revision tool provided by the publisher 
of your textbook. Can that publisher then take those student papers and 
make them available as sample work to other teachers at other schools?
2. You upload your assignments, handouts, and other class materials to 
your institution’s course management system. Can your institution 
claim ownership of those materials? Can the company that produces 
the software?
3. Your students upload papers to a central Web site service, which checks 
them for originality. Can that service then increase its profits by adding 
those papers to its proprietary database?
The answer to each of these questions may seem instinctively obvious to us 
as educators, yet the actual answers reside not in our guts or in common sense, 
but in the legal document governing the software in each case: the EULA.
You may not be familiar with the term, but if you’ve ever installed a piece of 
computer software or used a service on the Web you’ve certainly encountered 
one. EULAs—short for End User License Agreements—are the legal contracts 
that specify the rights and responsibilities of both the company offering the 
service or software and you, the end user. However, few people (myself includ-
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ed) ever stop to read the terms of these licenses (Gomulkiewicz, 2004), which 
are often written in long and dense legalese. Instead, we distractedly, hurried-
ly—perhaps even merrily—click “I Agree” where indicated in order to proceed, 
an act which explains the term “clickwrap” used to describe these contracts.1 
Usually, failure to read the EULA in a clickwrap license causes no harm, yet 
these contracts can often contain chilling elements such as agreements to be 
monitored while using the product or prohibitions against criticizing it while 
simultaneously limiting a user’s options for redress through forum-selection 
clauses and agreements to arbitrate (Davis, 2007; Newitz, 2005). Particularly 
troubling EULAs often make the news (Blass, 2006; Ricker, 2006), such as 
the one for Google’s Chrome Web browser, which included a clause granting 
Google “a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive 
license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate, publish, publicly perform, pub-
licly display and distribute any Content which you submit, post or display on 
or through, the Services” (Frucci, 2008).
EULAs undoubtedly feel far removed from our primary concerns in the 
writing classroom, as legal documents often do. Yet, as my opening questions 
might suggest, EULAs have serious implications for the intellectual property 
rights of instructors and students. Each time we use a Web service, each time 
we write or have students write in an online environment, EULAs are at play. 
Every EULA to which we assent is a contractual obligation and failure to pay 
attention to the terms of those contracts is akin to making a deal with the 
devil. Should problems arise, your sole/soul remedy is already proscribed by 
the contract.
For students in the writing classroom, the most troubling EULA may per-
haps be the one used by Turnitin, the online plagiarism-detection service of-
fered by the company iParadigms and used by schools around the world (see 
Ballentine, this volume). Students upload their papers to the Turnitin Web site, 
which then checks those papers against Web sources as well as a proprietary 
database of other student papers previously uploaded to the Turnitin Web site; 
in the process, each student paper uploaded is added to the database, a move 
that seems to violate student intellectual property rights to their own writing. 
However, before they can use the service, students must create an account, in 
the process agreeing to Turnitin’s EULA, which states in part: 
You hereby grant iParadigms a non-exclusive, royalty-free, 
perpetual, world-wide, irrevocable license to reproduce, trans-
mit, display, disclose, archive and otherwise use in connection 
with its Services any paper You submit to the Site whether or 
not originally submitted in connection with a specific class. 
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This license shall survive the termination of the User Agree-
ment. Any cessation of use of the Site shall not result in the 
termination of any license You grant herein to iParadigms. 
(iParadigms, 2008)
We would do well to keep in mind that, as instructors, we must also assent 
to a clickwrap to use the service, one granting similar rights to iParadigms for all 
communications we make to and through the site, such as our assignments. Tur-
nitin’s EULA thus represents a unique intersection of intellectual property rights 
for the writing classroom: student rights to their papers, iParadigms’ rights in its 
service, and the rights of other authors who may have been plagiarized.
Although both Turnitin’s EULA and EULAs in general define these rights 
without negotiation, they do not do so without challenge. Compositionists 
have frequently expressed their general unease with Turnitin; four high school 
students recently sued iParadigms for copyright infringement, claiming that 
the clickwrap agreement was void because the students were minors and agreed 
to the EULA under duress, specifically the threat of receiving a zero for an 
assignment if they did not use the service (Dames, 2008; Warnecke, 2008; 
Young, 2008). The court rejected the student claims of copyright infringe-
ment, claiming iParadigm’s use of their work was highly transformative, and 
rejected as well the claims of infancy and duress (A.V. v. iParadigms, 2008).
I am not ultimately interested in the legality of clickwrap agreements like 
those used by Turnitin; courts have continually affirmed their validity (Casa-
miquela, 2002; Dames, 2008; Davis, 2007; Gomulkiewicz, 2004). Instead, I 
am interested in how we as literacy educators can sensitize students to the seri-
ous intellectual property issues contained in EULAs and how we can prompt 
them to pay attention to and perhaps read the next clickwrap before clicking “I 
Agree.” Specifically, as a technorhetorician I am interested in the visual design of 
clickwrap agreements and the ways in which that design encourages or discour-
ages users from reviewing the document. Though this analysis could be applied 
to any number of clickwraps, Turnitin’s EULA provides an extremely relevant 
example for examination, one with three benefits for the writing classroom:
1. giving students practice in considering the relation between design and 
meaning;
2. encouraging students to read EULAs; and
3. exposing students to intellectual property issues through the intersec-
tion of their IP rights and the rights of iParadigms.
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After reviewing the history of clickwrap agreements and the role of design 
in questions of their legality, I will turn to an examination of Turnitin’s click-
wrap EULA design. By unwrapping this design, I hope to suggest strategies we 
can use in the writing classroom to teach students an awareness of these issues 
and their implications.
SHRINKWRAP, CLICKWRAP, BROWSEWRAP
Initially, software makers controlled rights to their property by printing End 
User License Agreements on paper and enclosing them in shrinkwrap around 
the product; end users agreed to the terms of these contracts when they re-
moved the shrinkwrap from the software. With the advent of the Web, shrink-
wrap became clickwrap or browsewrap, the former indicating EULAs such as 
Turnitin’s that require a user to click a button indicating assent before proceed-
ing and the latter indicating those situations in which the EULA is located on 
another webpage, reached by clicking on a hyperlink (Casamiquela, 2002). 
The legality of clickwrap was first confirmed in the 1996 case of ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg (Davis, 2007), in which ProCD’s software presented the EULA 
onscreen, requiring the defendant to indicate assent with a click before instal-
lation. Two years later this decision was validated in online contexts in Hotmail 
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie (1998). The defendant in that case created several Ho-
tmail email accounts to help with its spam-sending business; the court granted 
a preliminary injunction based on the fact that Hotmail would prevail on its 
breach of contract claims grounded in the clickwrap EULA for its service.
Since those cases, courts have continually upheld online clickwrap EULAs 
as long as two essential elements are present: the EULA is automatically pre-
sented to users, and assent (through clicking or checking a box, for example) 
is required before the user can proceed (Casamiquela, 2002). The fact that 
both elements are rarely present in browsewrap agreements, in which a link 
(often at the bottom of a page) directs users to the EULA, means that those 
license agreements have been successfully challenged, beginning in 2001 with 
the case of Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. (Davis, 2007). In this 
case, the plaintiffs sued Netscape claiming that Netscape’s Smart Download 
software violated federal law because it monitored users’ Internet use. Netscape 
attempted to compel arbitration based on its software EULA. But the link to 
that EULA was located at the bottom of the page and was only visible if a user 
scrolled all the way down; a simple “Download” button provided access to the 
software without compelling the user to read the license agreement. In reject-
ing Netscape’s claims, the court ruled in part that the “‘Download’ button, as 
Soul Remedy
83
contrasted with a button labeled ‘I assent,’ did not put the user on notice or 
indicate that he was entering into a binding contact” (Davis, 2007, p. 586).
As the Specht case suggests, design is an important issue in determining the 
enforceability of these agreements, an issue that Robert Gomulkiewicz (2004) 
argued has been inherited in part from their shrinkwrap predecessors:
Unfortunately, many EULAs come on a small paper card, on 
product packaging, or in a user manual. The EULA is printed 
in black and white using 10-point type or less. There is very 
little white space in and around the EULA, making the text 
very dense. Many EULAs today are presented in electronic 
form. These EULAs tend to look a lot like the paper version 
(or worse). (p. 697)
Looking worse than a print EULA impacts the validity of both clickwrap 
and browsewrap. Indeed, in his review of clickwrap and browsewrap enforce-
ability, Ryan Casamiquela (2002) suggested that design may be crucial when 
the dual elements of automatic presentation and clear assent are not both pres-
ent: “Courts may consider whether the vendor has the link underlined or in a 
distinguishable color, or if conditional language occupies the text of the link. 
A prominent, colorful link next to an ‘I Accept’ icon may prove sufficient for 
a finding of consumer assent” (pp. 486-487). Thus in Pollstar v. Gigmania 
(2000), for example, the court found the browsewrap EULA unenforceable be-
cause the link to it was “in small gray print on a gray background. In addition, 
the court noted that some blue colored links failed to function, perhaps caus-
ing consumers to assume that all colored links would also fail” (Casamiquela, 
2002, p. 485). Conversely, in Lawrence Feldman v. Google, Inc. (2007), the 
court found the clickwrap in question fully valid because of its design, specifi-
cally mentioning the use of bold font, the size of the font, and the visibility of 
the EULA above the “fold” of the screen/page. 
Design also specifically played a role in the recent suit against iParadigms. 
As part of their counterclaims, iParadigms claimed indemnification based on 
students’ agreement to the site’s Usage Policy. However, that policy was not 
available in the clickwrap; it existed on a separate page on the site. At the time 
of this writing, the link to that page is located below the fold in gray text (RGB 
code #999999) on a white background, while most of the other links on the 
page are blue. In dismissing this counterclaim, the court cited Register.com v. 
Verio, Inc. (2004), in which language pointing to the license was repeatedly 
and prominently displayed to the user, something that did not occur on the 
Turnitin site (Warnecke, 2008). Instead, Turnitin’s presentation of its Usage 
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Policy is more similar to the case of Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp 
(2001). As with Turnitin, the EULA in that case was reached only by a link 
located below the fold of the site (Casamiquela, 2002). As Michael Warnecke 
(2008) noted on his blog, “Even though Turnitin.com lost on the browsewrap 
point, it’s easy to see how a little more effort on Turnitin.com’s part could have 
produced a favorable outcome.” And part of that effort would have been in 
terms of design.
Although courts have primarily evaluated clickwrap and browsewrap li-
censes through considerations of factors such as unconscionability, public 
policy violation, and the preeminence of federal copyright protection (Davis, 
2007), design remains a factor in determining the validity of these contracts. 
Although Robert Gomulkiewicz (2004) found that the “unfriendly format of 
the EULA strongly suggests that the format was not chosen with readability in 
mind,” he also suggested that “software businesspeople and their legal counsel 
seldom cynically connive to create an impenetrable EULA. It just happens nat-
urally” (p. 697, 694). Seldom or not, users often suspect conniving is involved; 
perhaps more so when it comes to Turnitin.
COMPOSITION, PLAGIARISM, AND VISUAL DESIGN
The business of Turnitin is, on some level, suspicion. And composition-
ists have continually critiqued Turnitin and other plagiarism-detection services 
specifically for the ways in which they base pedagogical relationships in suspi-
cion. As Sean Zwagerman (2008) argued, “plagiarism detection treats writing 
as a product, grounds the student-teacher relationship in mistrust, and requires 
students to actively comply with a system that marks them as untrustworthy” 
(p. 692). Zwagerman examined the ideological load of plagiarism itself and the 
disciplining work of “integrity.” In his analysis, tools such as Turnitin are “the 
inevitable end point of the integrity scare: an efficient, perhaps even foolproof, 
technology of surveillance, a ‘panoptic schema’ (Foucault 206)” (p. 691). Zwa-
german’s title, “The Scarlet P: Plagiarism, Panopticism, and the Rhetoric of 
Academic Integrity,” points to the socially disciplining function of Turnitin’s 
panoptic technology. In this context, it is salient to recall Turnitin’s logo, which 
features a red “it” between gray colored “turn” and “in.” The “it” being turned 
in, of course, is the student paper, already marked scarlet.
Bronwyn Williams (2007–2008) found many of the same issues in plagia-
rism and the Turnitin service. Focusing on the emotional reactions of teachers 
who discover plagiarism, Williams discovered that “the use of such a service for 
student writers begins from a presumption of guilt” (p. 352). Rather than rest 
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in this construction of the student, with its attendant emotional reaction when 
teachers discover that guilt, Williams instead suggested that instances of pla-
giarism offer possibilities for teaching. In this analysis, Turnitin obscures that 
pedagogical moment. Echoing Zwagerman, Williams suggested that using 
Turnitin “creates a prison culture of guards and the guarded—a cat-and-mouse 
game of detection and mistrust” (p. 352).
Jennifer Jenson and Suzanne De Castell (2004) registered many of the same 
concerns; however, they situated those concerns as reflected in the design of 
Turnitin’s Web site. Using a semiotic analysis, they find that what
stands out in Turnitin’s web site, both iconographically and 
textually, is a consistent nostalgic return to the past, to the 
fifties, for the most part, using old photographs whose source, 
incidentally, is unacknowledged—the crisp black and white 
characters are emblematic of the clarity with which intellec-
tual integrity can be seen, can be scientifically and precisely 
“detected” (p. 318)
The visual design of the site, in other words, relies on retro images to sug-
gest “better, simpler and presumably more honest times” (Jenson & De Cas-
tell, p. 317), reflecting plagiarism’s evolving function in a knowledge system 
in which autonomy and originality are called into question. Bill Marsh (2004) 
also analyzed Turnitin’s Web site, reading the sample originality reports on the 
Web site as referential symbols that construct plagiarists as “pathological, de-
ceitful, diseased, and/or violent” while the site’s use of “photos of predominant-
ly White, short-haired men and boys betray[s] an obvious appeal to a foregone 
age (mid-50s perhaps) of educational order and congeniality” (p. 430, 434). 
Although (perhaps consciously) the Turnitin site no longer uses such retro im-
ages in its design, one might still continue analyses such as these, focusing, for 
example, on the logo of Turnitin’s related Web site, Plagiarism.org, which fea-
tures a magnifying glass over a fingerprint with digital ones and zeroes scroll-
ing through, reinforcing the links between identity, authenticity, deviance, and 
panoptic detection suggested by these critics.
Such analyses reinforce the ways in which design produces meaning, an axi-
omatic tenet in technorhetoric. Yet, as Anne Wysocki (1998) observed, design 
does more than create meaning; it also produces order. Wysocki argued that the 
design of webpages, framed with metaphors inherited from print literacy and 
art, produces a certain kind of order in users, akin to the disciplining functions 
observed by critics of Turnitin. At the same time, these metaphors of design 
efface themselves in order to become invisible and hence beyond discussion; vi-
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sual designs function as “expressions of and means for reproducing cultural and 
political structures,” simultaneously becoming invisible through their repeated 
and constant use. Wysocki’s analysis begs us to unravel designs in order to un-
pack the order they impose. Her argument also suggests one of the problems 
with EULAs in general: They have become so ubiquitous as to be automatically 
accepted and assented to.
Clickwraps themselves borrow from the kinds of print literacy forms 
Wysocki (1998) explored. More specifically, they remediate shrinkwrap 
EULAs. Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (1996) explained the process of 
remediation and the desire for transparency: “Since the electronic version justi-
fies itself by granting ... access to the older media, it wants to be transparent. 
The digital medium wants to erase itself, so that the viewer stands in the same 
relationship to the content as she would if she were confronting the original 
medium” (p. 45). In remediating shrinkwap, clickwrap tries “to absorb the 
older medium entirely, so that the discontinuities between the two are mini-
mized. The very act of remediation, however, ensures that the older medium 
cannot be entirely effaced” (Bolter & Grusin, p. 46). That remediation is an 
imperfect process means that the design in clickwrap cannot be made fully 
invisible. Bearing traces of its shrinkwrap predecessor, clickwrap—no matter 
how ubiquitous—opens itself to an unwrapping analysis that can reveal the 
strategies used to promote or inhibit reading. In turning to such an analysis, I 
am guided by Wysocki’s (1998) pointed question: “What order is reinforced by 
a design, and what designs give us chances to re-order?”
2005, 2006, 2008
Basing any analysis on a Web site’s design is a risky venture. For one thing, 
designs change. More problematically, when it comes to the Web, design and 
appearance are not necessarily the same, given the vagaries of browsers, plat-
forms, and screen resolutions. To mitigate these problems, I’d like to examine 
the clickwrap for the Turnitin EULA at three different moments in time, in 
three different browsers, at three different screen resolutions, and on two dif-
ferent platforms. Although the look of the clickwrap changes across all of these 
moments, certain design features remain consistent, features that discourage 
users from reviewing the terms of the EULA.
Figure 1 shows a screen shot of the Turnitin clickwrap from October 11, 
2005, as viewed in Mozilla Firefox on a computer running the Windows XP 
operating system at a screen resolution of 1280 x 1024. At that time, the site 
still used the retro images noted by Jenson and DeCastell (2004) and Marsh 
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(2004). Two striking features of the clickwrap design—its size and color—re-
inforce the disciplining effects noted by those critics and suggested by Wysocki 
(1998). Those design aspects also actively discourage reading the EULA. Al-
though the clickwrap has prominence on the page by being located above the 
fold—and, indeed, by being the only thing on the page—it is given relatively 
little space, both deemphasizing its importance and making the text it contains 
difficult to read. Judging from calculations made from the screen shot in im-
age-editing software, this box takes up about 5% of the available space on the 
screen. Just over eight lines of the EULA are initially visible but when the text 
of the full EULA is copied out of the box and into word-processing software, it 
takes up just over five pages in Times New Roman 12 point font. Thus, the first 
way in which users are discouraged from reading the EULA is through a strict 
control of readable space. Note as well that the EULA is in white text on a gray 
background (the RGB code for the background is #B0B0B0), two colors with 
minimal contrast—which makes any reading difficult. Color thus becomes a 
second strategy to discourage readability. No common HTML elements are 
used to make the text more readable—no bold or italics or headings. Rather 
than make use of these visual cues, the text uses ALL CAPS for certain sec-
Figure 1: Turnitin EULA, October 11, 2005.
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tions which, while perhaps common in some legal documents and thus point-
ing back to the remediation of shrinkwrap, is considered shouting in the online 
world; it is, too, more difficult to read.
I don’t want to claim that iParadigms intentionally obscured this EULA 
from users in the clickwrap, though certainly that temptation is there. And 
perhaps Gomulkiewicz (2004) is right in claiming that the impenetrability of 
EULAs happens “naturally.” But this particular EULA , the design of which 
is nearly impenetrable, contains particularly objectionable terms. The October 
2005 version of the EULA includes not only license to all content uploaded to 
the site, both papers and any other communications, but also clauses to limit 
liability, indemnification, warranty, arbitration, and jurisdiction.
By March 20, 2006, the clickwrap for Turnitin had changed to one offer-
ing better readability. Figure 2 shows the site as viewed in Microsoft Internet 
Explorer in Windows XP on a monitor with 800 x 600 screen resolution. Even 
with this much smaller screen resolution (which consequently makes every-
thing larger on the screen), the text box is allowed about 15% of available space 
on the page. While this does increase readability, users can still only read six 
to ten lines of text at a time, even though the revised EULA still takes up four 
pages in a word-processing file. The use of a white background with black text 
Figure 2: Turnitin EULA, March 20, 2006.
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is, however, a significant improvement as is the use of bold headings to separate 
sections of the text. 
This “liberalization” of the design is also reflected in a “liberalization” of 
the EULA itself. In agreeing to the 2005 EULA, users grant iParadigms “a 
non-exclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, world-wide, irrevocable license to repro-
duce, transmit, display, disclose, and otherwise use your Communications on 
the Site or elsewhere for [their] business purposes” (iParadigms, 2005). iPa-
radigms is free, moreover, “to use any ideas, concepts, techniques, know-how 
in your Communications for any purpose, including, but not limited to, the 
development and use of products and services based on the Communications.” 
The EULA does, at least, exclude personally identifiable information from 
students and actual student papers from its definition of “Communications”; 
instructor assignments, however, are offered no such protection. The revised 
EULA (2006), the more readable one, has no such objectionable provision. As 
the EULA has become less predatory of IP rights, it has been presented in ways 
that make it easier to read, or, conversely, the more unpalatable EULA is the 
one users are most discouraged from reading.
The third screen shot, Figure 3, is from October 23, 2008, and shows the 
EULA as viewed in Safari on a Macintosh computer running the operating 
Figure 3: Turnitin EULA, October 23, 2008.
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system OS X with a 1680 x 1050 screen resolution. The EULA no longer exists 
on a separate page of the site, but is now incorporated into the user account cre-
ation screen. It is, however, located below the fold on that page, meaning that 
it is not immediately visible to users. And it continues to be allocated minimal 
space on screen—a mere 6% of the available screen space. Although the black 
text against the white background is more readable, the EULA occupies eight 
text-only pages of Times New Roman 12 point text. Bold headings are again 
used and, additionally, bold text is used within sections to highlight particular 
clauses. Visually, users are encouraged to agree to the clickwrap with a large 
button indicating that agreement (located next to a small link for disagreeing).
The longest EULA continues to receive precious little screen space, but its 
increased length is not in itself a sign of increased infringement of IP rights. 
In part, the increased length reflects legal developments in a post-9/11 world; 
there is now a specific clause prohibiting download or export of the service 
“to any person or entity on the U.S. Treasury Department’s list of Specially 
Designated Nationals or the U.S. Commerce Department’s Table of Denial 
Orders or otherwise prohibited by United States export control laws” (iPara-
digms, 2008). The EULA has also grown in length to accommodate specific 
classes of users. The “sole remedy” of students and instructors dissatisfied with 
the service is to stop using it; the sole remedy for educational institutions is 
specified separately and is limited to what they have paid iParadigms. Most 
interestingly, though, the license granted to iParadigms by users now has a 
specific disclaimer, visually highlighted through the use of bold text: “This 
license does not include any right to use ideas set forth in papers submit-
ted to the site . Please note that papers submitted to the Site are not read or 
reviewed by any individuals, but rather are only analyzed using the Licensed 
Programs” (iParadigms, 2008).
Turnitin’s EULA itself, then, has continued to evolve in response to both 
legal challenges and the general political climate. Despite these changes, 
though, the design of the clickwrap continues to discourage readers from read-
ing the text of the license. In all three instances, the clickwrap is given minimal 
screen space. Each time, it is also presented through an inline frame, HTML 
tag <iframe>. Inline frames create windows within a page and, in doing so, 
activate a kind of hypermediacy in the process of remediating shrinkwrap. Ac-
cording to Bolter and Grusin (1996),
hypermediacy offers a heterogeneous space, in which repre-
sentation is conceived of not as a window onto the world, but 
rather as ‘windowed’ itself—with windows that open onto 
other representations or other media. The logic of hyperme-
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diacy calls for representations of the real that in fact multiply 
... the signs of mediation. (p. 329)
In making a window within the window of the browser, inline frames both 
suggest transparent access to the text through that window while simultane-
ously calling attention to the window itself, in this instance through a scroll bar 
and a thin 1-pixel border. They produce order—a limiting order based on rela-
tive size—yet they cannot do so without also calling attention to that produc-
tion. Because the order produced cannot be made invisible, we are especially 
welcome to imagine a re-ordering.
After all, though many clickwraps use inline frames, many also provide 
frames large enough to show significant amounts of text, thereby allowing (if 
not encouraging) users to read the license. Turnitin’s EULA is not the only 
configuration possible, and is, indeed, one of the worst. Apart from these is-
sues of design, Gomulkiewicz (2004) explored many options for creating more 
readable EULAs and clickwraps, including better training of law students and 
“plain language” legislation. He most strongly advocated, however, a Web-
based EULA non-governmental organization, suggesting that “an NGO could 
be a powerful vehicle for making licensing more user-friendly” through educa-
tion, forums, feedback, and best practices (p. 715). Although not mentioned by 
Gomulkiewicz, Creative Commons points in just such a direction. In creating 
a simplified licensing process that allows content creators to specify rights for 
users, Creative Commons has transformed what a EULA might be—and it has 
done so not just legally but visually as well. Figure 4 shows a sample Creative 
Commons license. The text is short and readable, and visual icons are used to 
emphasize the terms of the license; design and content both promote readabil-
ity. Although it is difficult to imagine such a streamlined EULA being adopted 
by companies such as iParadigms, the existence of Creative Commons options 
nevertheless allow us to imagine a different order for clickwraps.
TEACHERS, STUDENTS, ADMINISTRATORS
EULAs in the Writing Classroom
In incorporating an analysis of the visual designs of EULAs in the class-
room, we might consider three pedagogical goals. First, such an exercise might 
be consistent with local programmatic goals concerning critical thinking and 
close textual analysis; asking students to decode the EULA and its implica-
tions involves sustained attention to a complicated text while considering the 
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visual design of clickwraps expands student experience with electronic rhe-
torical forms. Second, such a pedagogical practice is consistent with Cynthia 
Selfe’s (1999) call for a critical technological literacy, which moves beyond in-
struction in merely how to use technology and towards an ability to “carefully 
analyze, to pay attention to, the technology–literacy link at both fundamental 
levels of conception and social practice” (p. 148). Rather than empowering 
students with a functional literacy in relation to electronic writing tools—the 
ability to use those tools—such a literacy asks students to consider the condi-
tions and implications of these tools themselves, for themselves and for the 
social relationships in which they participate. Finally, working on EULAs in 
the classroom can also help meet the Council of Writing Program Administra-
tors’ (2009) recommended outcomes for first-year composition by understand-
ing how genres (in this case clickwrap) shape meaning by promoting inquiry, 
and by exposing students to the relationships between language, knowledge, 
and power. In specifically using the clickwrap designs from Turnitin, these 
classroom activities are also consistent with the Council’s recommendations 
regarding plagiarism.
To meet such goals, we can invite students themselves to imagine a different 
order for clickwrap agreements. Such an exercise might start by asking them 
to perform the kind of visual analysis offered here, locating clickwraps and 
considering their design in relation to the text of the agreement. Students who 
Figure 4: Creative Commons license.
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spend any amount of time online will be able to find many different clickwraps 
and browsewraps at sites such as World of Warcraft, Facebook, or Flickr. 
Interestingly, many of these sites use a hybrid of the clickwrap and browse-
wrap forms, requiring assent by clicking a button to create an account as in a 
clickwrap, but containing the terms of the license on a separate page as in a 
browsewrap. Twitter, a site that allows for a kind of condensed, text-message-
like blogging, serves as a particularly interesting example, since its EULA is 
clearly presented in simple terms. Its section on copyright, for example, la-
beled “Copyright (What’s Yours is Yours),” not only maintains user IP rights 
but also encourages “users to contribute their creations to the public domain 
or consider progressive licensing terms” (Twitter, 2008). In analyzing the de-
sign of these pages, students can note the visual and rhetorical placement of 
the clickwrap/browsewrap, its size, the choice of colors and fonts, as well as 
the use of HTML elements that promote readability, such as bold text to de-
lineate sections.
Asking students to locate and unwrap EULAs also gives them practice 
in decoding the linkages between design and meaning. Such exercises also 
prompt students to read the terms of these licenses. As part of this exercise, stu-
dents might use the License Analyzer provided by SpywareGuide (http://www.
spywareguide.com/analyze/index.php). After pasting in the text of any EULA, 
students can obtain information not only on questionable clauses in the license 
(flagged by the analyzer) but also the overall readability of the text, noted by 
the number of words and sentences, the average words per sentence, and ratings 
on several different readability scales. Students can also use readability analysis 
tools, one of which claims that the Turnitin EULA requires a post-graduate 
education for comprehension; Twitter’s EULA, in contrast, requires at most a 
10th grade education.
Beyond these activities, teachers can invite students individually or in groups 
to design better clickwraps. Working within the same spatial constraints for 
webpages as corporate Web designers, students can consider the tradeoffs re-
quired to encourage readability while economizing design and screen space. In 
making these models, students can locate and compare a spectrum of EULA 
designs, such as the ones provided by Creative Commons. In Web design class-
es, students can consider whether or not to use inline frames as well as other 
HTML elements that can enhance readability. Even outside of classes explicitly 
covering webpage construction, students can design static mockups of more 
successful clickwrap designs.
Congruent with these practices, we as teachers should pay more attention 
to EULAs, an act consistent with Selfe’s (1999) goal to “pay attention” to ques-
tions of technology and its linkages to literacy. After all, students are not the 
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only ones whose IP rights are at stake in clickwrap agreements; most, such as 
Turnitin’s, do not distinguish between classes of users. Although there are sepa-
rate links for students, instructors, and teaching assistants to create accounts on 
the Turnitin site, the EULA is the same for all three. In creating an account, 
instructors agree that
any communications or material of any kind that You e-mail, 
post, or transmit through the Site (excluding personally iden-
tifiable Registration Data of Students, any papers submitted 
to the Site, and grades and assessment related information), 
including, questions, comments, suggestions, and other data 
and information (Your ‘Communications’) will be treated as 
non-confidential and non-proprietary
and thus any class materials you post become the property of iParadigms, 
which claims a 
non-exclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, world-wide, irrevocable 
license to reproduce, transmit, display, disclose, archive and 
otherwise use Your Communications on the Site or elsewhere 
for our business purposes. (iParadigms, 2008)
What’s more, the EULA for Turnitin places the responsibility for determin-
ing plagiarism squarely on the instructor’s shoulders:
You further agree to exercise Your independent professional 
judgment in, and to assume sole and exclusive responsibility 
for, determining the actual existence of plagiarism in a sub-
mitted paper with the acknowledgement and understanding 
that the Originality Reports are only tools for detecting textu-
al similarities between compared works and do not determine 
conclusively the existence of plagiarism, which determination 
is a matter of professional judgment of the Instructor and In-
stitution. (iParadigms, 2008)
These terms should certainly give us pause, but of course Turnitin is not 
the only EULA we will encounter. Many publishers now offer a variety of elec-
tronic resources in connection with their textbooks; we should consider the 
EULAs for those services carefully as well, along with the EULAs of online 
and local software.
Soul Remedy
95
EULAs and Writing Program Administrators
For me, the greatest challenge with the Turnitin clickwrap in particular 
comes from my role as the writing program administrator (WPA) at my in-
stitution. As the WPA, I see all suspected cases of “academic irregularity” (as 
plagiarism is termed at my school) and am forced to negotiate between my con-
cerns about IP rights and my responsibility to uphold my institution’s Honor 
Code which, as a state university policy, is also state law. From this institutional 
position, I am able to witness all of the concerns voiced by composition scholars 
about the general enterprise of plagiarism. In particular, I regularly encounter 
the kinds of emotional responses from instructors with cases of plagiarism that 
Williams (2007–2008) described. Teachers with such concerns in their class-
rooms often react, I find, like those who have found their lovers cheating on 
them. There are similar feelings of betrayal, anger, and vindictiveness. As a 
first response to any possible academic irregularity, then, I ask all teachers in 
my program to consult with me or another experienced instructor before even 
speaking to the student. Often having a second opinion can provide a rational 
perspective that can diffuse the emotional content of the situation.
More generally, however, though I can guide our program’s policy, I do 
not control those who teach within it; indeed, to do so would be to invert the 
disciplining systems surrounding plagiarism onto instructors themselves. As a 
program, we advocate against using Turnitin precisely because of the IP con-
cerns related to the service. In that way, we try to limit its use. Those teachers 
who wish to pursue charges of academic irregularity against a student using 
Turnitin are invited to send me the student’s paper. I use my account on Turni-
tin and upload only parts of the student paper to generate an originality report, 
limiting the risk to the IP rights of both the instructor and the student, and 
offering my own soul to the EULA. In conjunction with this limited use, we as 
a program work hard to provide students an understanding of plagiarism and 
its subtleties. Our program Web site, for example, contains an extensive set of 
Frequently Asked Questions about plagiarism, which is also presented in the 
supplemental text that we use with our writing courses.
However, WPAs might be uniquely empowered to create greater change in 
response to this situation. Although licenses for Turnitin are usually negotiated 
by institutions, and while we as faculty may participate in systems of institu-
tional governance that can influence those negotiations, the truth is that there 
is little we can do once an institution has subscribed to a service like Turni-
tin. However, there may be action we can take based on the economic power 
of writing programs and by the sheer number of students who move through 
the core writing courses offered by such program. While serving as a WPA at 
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my previous institution, just such a possibility emerged. At the time, we were 
considering a new handbook that included Turnitin in its support technology. 
After reading the terms of the EULA and the objectionable language concern-
ing the IP of both teachers and students, I immediately emailed our local sales 
representative to indicate we had no interest in this handbook. However, with 
a possible 11,000 handbooks at stake, a reply quickly followed. My concern 
was transmitted up through the corporate structure and soon the publisher was 
working with iParadigms to revise the language of the EULA. Because we did 
not end up adopting that handbook (for reasons unconnected to its inclusion 
of Turnitin), I am unable to say whether or not the license ultimately would 
have been revised. However, that experience offers a glimpse of the possibilities 
enabled by the economic leverage of writing programs.
CONCLUSION
All of these strategies are, at best, partial. As long as courts broadly sup-
port EULAs and as long as users rely upon software and digital services, the 
issues explored here will continue to be at play. Thus EULAs in general, and 
clickwraps specifically, should continue to be a point of advocacy for anyone 
interested in protecting IP rights in the digital age. In pursuing this agenda, we 
should keep in mind Wysocki’s (1998) observations about the ways in which 
the repetition of design makes the order it imposes invisible. For Wysocki, that 
which is not seen is not questioned. Given the designs of clickwrap agreements, 
we might extend her point: That which is not read is not questioned, either. 
By unwrapping the designs of EULAs, we can pay attention to their terms and 
through that attention we can question those terms. 
Without such attention, our sole remedies to infringement of IP rights in 
the electronic spaces of the writing classroom will continue to be specified by 
clickwrap or browsewrap EULAs. In taking the time to read EULAs and to 
consider their effects on our teaching and our students, we may instead be able 
to forge a soul remedy of our own in these deals with potential devils.
NOTE
1. Online licenses are termed either “clickwrap” or “browsewrap,” both 
of which are named after “shrinkwrap,” which was used to describe licenses 
printed on paper and shrink wrapped in plastic with the physical media for 
installing software. Removal of the plastic wrap indicated assent to the terms 
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of that license. For clickwrap, clicking a button such as “I Agree” indicates that 
assent; for “browsewrap,” the user is pointed to the license (usually on another 
webpage), but is not required to indicate acceptance of the license before pro-
ceeding.
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5 IMAGES, THE COMMONPLACE 
BOOK, AND DIGITAL SELF-
FASHIONING
Bob Whipple
The way we use, collect, and acquire digital images can be guided to some 
extent by an understanding of the late medieval and renaissance-through-mid-
19th-century concept of the commonplace book. As these earlier texts provided 
their collectors ways of constructing, altering, and mediating identity, so the 
ways that we collect visual images in digital–visual “commonplace books” may 
provide ways of self-definition and self-construction.
COMMONPLACE BOOKS AND SELF-CONSTRUCION
We know of the commonplace book as a handwritten artifact, popular 
among the literate in the late middle ages through parts of the 19th century, 
consisting of a bound blank book wherein a reader would hand-copy informa-
tion that struck him or her as interesting, useful, necessary for future use, or 
that simply sounded memorable. “In the strictest sense,” according to Earle Ha-
vens (2002), “the term commonplace book refers to a collection of well-known 
or personally-meaningful textual excerpts organized under individual thematic 
headings” (p. 8). Literacy historian Kenneth Lockridge (2001) extends and fo-
cuses this definition, asserting that “commonplace books are blank books in 
which genteel men and eventually women wrote down, and in some instances 
transformed, selections from their reading that they thought particularly inter-
esting or significant” (p. 337). 
While these descriptions are useful, perhaps more revelatory is another as-
sertion from Havens (2001) about manuscript commonplace books (as opposed 
to printed ones): 
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These more undisciplined and disorganized commonplace 
books appeared in every permutation and degree of sophis-
tication, and included nearly every imaginable type of text: 
lines of epic poetry, lofty quotations, and, just as often, medic-
inal and culinary recipes, ribald couplets, hermetical numeri-
cal tables, cartoons, monumental inscriptions, magical spells, 
bad jokes; in short, all the literary flotsam and jetsam of the 
more vigorous sort of reader. (pp. 9-10)
Thus the actual commonplace book as assembled by the compiler (and not 
cleaned up for printing, as were many commonplace books intended to serve 
as “examples” of what a commonplace book should be) are an unruly space, a 
space wherein the compiler can both record and try out. They are places where-
in the compiler sets down material for future use and reference, and catchalls 
for the miscellany of one’s determined knowledge. They are, in essence, places 
wherein the compiler begins a kind of making, a kind of building of intellect, 
of storing material that one keeps not for the simple sake of keeping but for the 
purpose of making the material part of one’s intellect and therefore construct-
ing part of one’s self. Why else, indeed, would one collect a miscellany of mate-
rial if not to improve oneself, to provide oneself with ready building material? 
“Manuscript commonplace books,” Havens (2002) wrote, “were essentially 
practical, written expressions of the larger enterprise of reading itself, in the 
legere sense of gathering selecting, and collecting.”1 They are, in effect, places 
of private self-fashioning. Commonplace books, as Lockridge (2000) stated, 
“often function as [arenas] for the shaping and consolation of a self” (p. 338)—
sites for individual identity formation, reinforcement, and negotiation. 
VISUAL COMMONPLACES
We can see this identity formation at work, but in a primarily non-textual 
way, in a mid-20th-century scrapbook collected and collated in the late 1930s. 
(see figures 1 and 2).2 This text shows a passion—one common in the 1930s, 
especially to boys3—for airplanes and their pilots, an exciting, relatively new, 
and contemporary technology, and the heroes who operated that technology. 
In this way, this portion of the book seems to identify a segment of what that 
compiler might want to be at some later point. Does the compiler have dis-
tinct plans to become a pilot? Join the Army Air Corps? We don’t know. Do 
airplanes make up a significant part of the compiler’s interest and focus? We 
can probably say a fairly strong “yes” to this. Through the use of deliberately 
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selected visual texts (often accompanied by alphabetic text in the form of cap-
tions), the collector has expressed a focus of importance, that, in its own way, is 
equally as indicative (if not more so) of the compiler’s ethos (in the word’s mean-
ing of essential or habitual element of character) as, for example, the copied text 
of an apothegm or pithy argument.
THE DIGITAL COMMONPLACE BOOK
The commonplace book is no longer a construct only of ink and paper. 
Jen Almjeld (2006), drawing on Kenneth Lockridge, crafted a persuasive con-
nection between the commonplace book tradition on the one hand and blogs 
on the other. Blogs, to Almjeld, can be knowledge storehouses, keeping-places 
for information and knowledge, in much the same way textual commonplace 
books served as repositories of information for future use.4
Almjeld (2006) also noted the use of blogs as commonplace book-like stor-
age spaces, as does Lucia Dacome (2004), who argued that “throughout the 
early modern period commonplace books provided repositories for arrang-
ing notes, excerpts, drawings, and objects” (p. 603; emphasis added). Thus the 
1930s airplane scrapbook is noteworthy because it is largely a collection—a set 
of commonplaces, if you will—of some text, but mostly, almost entirely, photos 
of airplanes and some pilots cut from the pages of contemporary magazines. It 
is a visual commonplace book of its compiler’s passion.
I’ve written elsewhere about what I believe might be a new kind of writing 
process—or, perhaps more accurately, a production process—for multimedia 
composing. I’ve noted that, in my multimedia composing process, I rely on a 
process of collection. In an earlier article (Whipple, 2008), I noted that
Figures 1 and 2: Images from a 1930s commonplace book.
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I find myself collecting media in a kind of semi-serendipitous 
“gleaning” process as I go through my days, collecting digital 
images and clips… that I may not need right then for the proj-
ect under construction, but might need later, or which seems, 
for lack of a better word, “useworthy.” I take more advantage 
of visual opportunities. Indeed, I find that I am keeping a 
commonplace… of… digital images…. as a medieval or re-
naissance scholar would keep a commonplace book in which 
to keep aphorisms, quotations, exercises, and ideas… I find 
myself keeping a video/still image commonplace book with 
the camera on my cell phone.
Almjeld (2006) reminds us that digital “storehouses” may be found not 
only in blogs, but also in “hard drives, memory sticks, and other storage de-
vices.” We can add to these storage places others such as built-in digital camera 
memories, and cell phone cards, as well as Flickr, Photobucket, Google’s Picasa, 
MSN Photo spaces, and other Web 2.0 storage entities. Indeed, my own digi-
tal commonplace book is scattered in several locations: the iPhoto archive on 
my MacBook, on a collection of flash drives in a pocket in my briefcase, on a 
card in my digital camera, and in the internal memory of my camera-equipped 
smartphone. While Kenneth Lockridge (2000) told us that individuals such 
as John Locke advocated complex and exhaustive systems of organizing com-
monplace books into personal knowledge systems (we might call them 17th- to 
18th-century content management systems), this just doesn’t work—at least for 
me, and perhaps for others. “People”, said Lockridge (2000), “simply do not 
use commonplace books the way Descartes or Locke want them to” (p. 338).
Not all of the pictures in my digital commonplace-book are ones I’ve gener-
ated myself; the right-click/copy afforded by most browsers offers an effortless 
way to collect pictures—to appropriate them from someone else to make them, 
even if only for purposes of reference and storage, one’s own. Consider, for ex-
ample, the pictures below.
What is the importance of these pictures, each of which lives in my afore-
mentioned storage spaces? To analyze each one in isolation is to lose sight of 
the context; an effective reading of my digital/visual commonplace book would 
involve the viewing of hundreds of pictures. The picture of the cat on the key-
board is a “taken for the moment” picture showing one of my cats in a favorite 
posture. Does this say something about me, how I wish to be perceived—or, 
since this is a private volume, how I perceive myself, beyond the fact that I like 
cute pictures of cats? Figure 4 is an “acquired” image, though I’ve had it for at 
least 10 years now, since I first began to construct webpages, and I have no idea 
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of its provenance. The last two are self-taken, one at an air show and the other 
in front of the window of a local clothing store. What can these say about me 
beyond the facile guess that I am a cat-loving airplane fancier with an apprecia-
tion for the silly and the incongruous?
Lockridge (2000) asserted that “if you know well the life of the keeper of a 
commonplace book, you soon find that the seemingly routine selections from 
his or her readings incorporated there, are startlingly revealing of that person’s 
crises or issues of identity” (p. 338). I’d hazard, then, that we collect visual im-
ages for some of the reasons we collect text in more traditional commonplace 
instantiations: because they are connected with our sense of what we are, or what 
we wish to become, or both. We may know what we will do with the pictures we 
take, keep, and acquire; we may not. We may acquire them for specific present 
or future projects, or because they seem interesting. What about the things that 
we acquire on impulse, feeling some inchoate need that we cannot easily ex-
press? What about the acquisition, collection, and preservation of visual knowl-
 Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6: Photos I have taken or collected.
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edge akin to the 18th-century reader’s writing down of the pithy apothegmata of 
his time? Lockridge would call this the “trying-on of bits and pieces” (p. 339) 
of the intellectual fashions of the time. Are not these digital commonplace 
books, then, private places “in which to construct and console the self?” 
For answers here, we may need to look at a common item found in com-
monplace books—sententiae, or the particularly memorable, well-stated line or 
passage. I suspect strongly that there is a bit of sententiae-collecting going on 
in my digital commonplace. If a phrase or sentence were collected because it is 
particularly well-put, then wouldn’t a visual image or object be selected for a 
similar reason? As not all items in a traditional commonplace book were neces-
sarily selected for immediate or near-immediate use in a text, why must digi-
visual items be collected only for immediate use? What, then, is the difference 
between a striking image that we collect or take simply because it is striking, 
and the sentence we write down because it is just as cool? In each case, there is 
an unspoken, and perhaps difficult-to-articulate, need to have the image.
Lockridge (2000) told us that commonplace books tell modern historians 
of literacy “what various forms of literacy did to the mentality of persons who 
acquired, possessed, and used” them (p. 337). Our visual, digital commonplace 
books inevitably perform the same function. They will turn out to be, as an 
anonymous 17th-century writer said, in penning yet another manual on orga-
nizing commonplace books, “a treasury (like that of an honest heart) where are 
good things stored up, both old and new, and a fair garment may be made of 
the shreds that are in such a repository” (Havens, 2002, p. 137).
NOTES
1. Havens (2001) earlier expressively defined legere as not only “the act of 
reading” but also to single out, select, extract, gather, collect, even to plunder 
and purloin. One did not merely encounter a text; one harvested it, separating 
the wheat from the tares in order to glean the pith and marrow. The term also 
signified a kind of rapine, even the violent confiscation of the fruits of another 
man’s tree. (p. 8)
2. Almjeld (2006) also provided photographic images of similar common-
place-book scrapbooks.
3. Although, much as we would like to guess, we do not know the gender 
of the compiler of the book, as there are no gender-indicative cues, such as a 
name, on it.
4. By the same token, we can add social bookmarking systems such as Digg, 
cite.u.like, and del.icio.us to the list of commonplace-like digital systems, in 
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that they allow us to save information in a “place” whence they may be re-
trieved.
REFERENCES
Almjeld, Jen. (2006). Making blogs produce: Using academic storehouses and 
factories. Computers and Composition Online. http://www.bgsu.edu/ccon-
line/almjeld/gradblogs.htm
Dacome, Lucia. (2004). Noting the mind: Commonplace books and the pur-
suit of the self in eighteenth-century Britain. Journal of the History of Ideas, 
65(4), 603-625.
Havens, Earle. (2001). Commonplace books: A history of manuscripts and printed 
books from antiquity to the twentieth century. New Haven, CT: Beinecke 
Library and the University Press of New England.
Havens, Earle. (2002). “Of common places, or memorial books”: An anony-
mous manuscript on commonplace books and the art of memory in seven-
teenth-century England. Yale University Library Gazette, 76(3/4), 136-153.
Lockridge, Kenneth. (2000). Individual literacy in commonplace books. Inter-
change, 2/3, 337-340. 
Whipple, Bob. (2008). Notes on a new writing process: Multimediation as per-
sonal change agent. Computers and Composition Online. http://www.bgsu.
edu/cconline/WhippleC&COnline/start.html

107
6 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 
IN MULTIMODAL 21st-
CENTURY COMPOSITION 
CLASSROOMS
Tharon W. Howard
In “Who ‘Owns’ Electronic Texts,” first published in 1996 (and for which 
I wrote a reflection in 2004), I described the commonplace view in the United 
States that the ownership of writing, images, music, animations, or videos is 
a “natural right” of the person who created them. Although this natural right 
view is far less pervasive among educators and students in other countries such 
as China or even the United Kingdom, here in the U.S., students and teach-
ers alike hold an unshakable, unimpeachable, and unexamined view that their 
creative works are, in actual fact, their “private property.” Because of popular 
metaphors like “giving birth” to an idea in their writing, many in the U.S. have 
been socialized to believe that they’re like the hero of an Ayn Rand novel, giv-
ing birth to works fathered by some kind of mysterious intercourse with their 
own inner genius. As a result, they don’t perceive that they owe anything in 
their creative process to the society that educated and nurtured them. So when 
the editors of the current collection asked me to reprise the often-anthologized 
“Who Owns Electronic Texts,” I was thrilled to do so, because I continue to 
find both students and colleagues laboring under some disabling ideas about 
who owns and, perhaps more importantly, who can make claims on the rights 
to copy and to use a created work. They lack an understanding of the history 
of copyright law; they lack an awareness of the intended purpose of the law; 
and—because they’ve only been exposed to metaphors about copyright—they 
lack the ability to distinguish between metaphor and actuality. As a result, they 
are ill-prepared to deal with intellectual property issues confronting them far 
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more frequently than in the past because of the demands for multimodal com-
posing in the 21st-century classroom. 
Today, as Pat Sullivan (1991) also observed, writers can no longer afford 
the luxury of just being a “good wordsmith” able to focus solely on the words 
on the page. The convergence of media in contemporary texts, particularly 
those of professional communicators in the workplace, requires that we teach 
students to integrate visual arguments, video demonstrations, and even audio 
illustrations into their verbal texts. The combination of media, our multimod-
al understanding of text, and students’ merely metaphorical understanding of 
copyrights has created an educational environment where students are danger-
ously vulnerable. Consider the following five scenarios—all of which are based 
on actual intellectual property questions my students have faced in the last 6 
months:
Scenario 1: Imagine you’re a student in a technical writing 
class, and you’ve been assigned to write a manual on Web 
design for other students at your school. You’re using icons, 
screen captures, and other visual elements from Adobe 
Dreamweaver, Adobe Photoshop, and Microsoft Word. You 
know your university has severe penalties for students who 
steal other people’s intellectual property and plagiarize in a 
class, but you’re not sure if you’re in that situation here. Can 
you legally use the visual elements you copied from these 
interfaces?
Scenario 2: Assume you’ve posted email messages to a public 
email discussion group for a couple of years. You discover 
that a graduate student is using the messages posted to the 
email group as part of her dissertation research on political 
correctness in email; however, you’ve never been contacted 
about whether your messages could be used as part of the re-
search. You’re not sure you want your messages used in what 
might be a potentially embarrassing way, but aren’t sure of 
your rights.
Scenario 3: You’ve given a conference presentation on user-
support systems, and it catches the attention of a software 
manufacturing company looking to revamp its documenta-
tion systems. They offer to pay you for the time it would 
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take you to expand on the work you’ve already done and to 
conduct a more extensive review of current approaches to 
documentation and delivery systems. You’d like to do the re-
view for them, but you also want to publish a journal article 
on the same subject; can you legally do both?
Scenario 4: You work for a Web design/consulting company, 
but on the side, you also maintain a personal blog where you 
publish tips and thoughts about the latest in Web design 
techniques. Your manager finds the blog and tells you to 
take the blog down or threatens to fire you.
Scenario 5: You’re taking a class called “Creative 21st-Cen-
tury Digital Publishing,” and one of the assignments in the 
class is to create a “cyberpoem” in Adobe Flash that takes a 
poem like Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken” and uses 
sound and animation to change its meaning. You want to 
use photos you found on Flickr.com and music from Nickel-
back to change the meaning, but you’re not sure using these 
are legal.
As these scenarios hopefully illustrate, writers need a much richer and more 
complete understanding of copyright laws than the “natural right” metaphor 
provides, and because professional communicators are dealing with a much 
wider range of media in their texts, they need to be able to apply that under-
standing to more than alphabetic texts. As these scenarios from my technical 
writing classes and professional communication seminars reveal, I can no lon-
ger afford to depend solely on a grammar handbook explanation of plagiarism 
and on discussions of when to quote someone’s work in an essay and when 
to summarize and cite it. Social media and other vast digital networks have 
complicated the intellectual property landscape in contemporary classrooms; 
writers must often have to differentiate plagiarism and copyright. As we know, 
the academically ethical citation of a source a student may have used doesn’t 
protect him or her from being sent a cease and desist letter from the Record-
ing Industry Association of America (RIAA) for violating a copyright. In the 
rest of this chapter, I describe some of the basic principles from the history of 
U.S. copyright laws I typically address in my classroom and then address how 
students and I use those principles to negotiate each of the scenarios introduced 
above.
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UNBALANCING THE NATURAL RIGHTS METAPHOR 
Back to Medieval Publishing
To get any traction with modern U.S. copyright and intellectual property 
law and the problems with the natural rights metaphor, it’s best to begin with 
an examination of the origins of copyright law in the 16th century and the 
publishing revolution created by the introduction of the printing press. Many 
people are shocked to learn that modern copyright law didn’t start from a desire 
to recognize and protect the natural rights of their authorial genius; instead, 
its origins lie in the “ignoble desire for censorship” and in the greedy lust to 
“protect profit by prohibiting unlicensed competition” (Beard, 1974, p. 383). 
Indeed, it took another 200 years after the first copyrights were granted to pub-
lishers before an author’s rights were really even considered. As Martha Wood-
mansee (1984) pointed out, it wasn’t until the 18th century that authors like 
Alexander Pope were able to begin to make claims on the right to profit from 
their work. In the 16th century, the purposes for granting copyrights were far 
more sordid and Machiavellian in nature than the protection of creative genius.
Prior to the introduction of the printing press, the technologies of medi-
eval publishing were such that copyright laws really weren’t needed. The cost 
of creating copies of what books were available virtually ensured that only the 
rich and powerful could afford to make copies. Peter Yu (2006) pointed out 
that “when Bishop Leofric took over Exeter Cathedral in 1050, he found only 
5 books in its library” and in 1424, “the Library of Cambridge University 
had a remarkable collection of 122 books” (p. 7). The physical materials alone 
of medieval publishing were cost-prohibitive. Because vellum was a favorite 
choice for books of the highest quality, and because vellum is made from ani-
mal skins, a single volume could easily require harvesting 200 farm animals—
or the equivalent of the entire annual output of a feudal lord’s estate. And this is 
merely what’s required to produce the raw material for the book. Extensive tan-
ning and other labor-intensive processing was required to prepare the vellum 
for use in a book. As a result, ownership of a book of any sort was an extraor-
dinary status symbol and a testimony to the wealth and power of the owner. 
Yet, beyond the extraordinary costs of the raw material needed to produce a 
copy of a book, the literacies needed to physically copy a text also helped ensure 
that capricious copying of “unimportant” texts did not occur. Literacy was es-
sentially controlled by the medieval church, and the scribes who did the labori-
ous and painstaking work of hand-copying words on the page underwent an 
ideologically saturated disciplining process as an essential part of the education 
necessary for their work. Indeed, so thorough was the disciplining of the aco-
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lyte that the penknife, nib, and other tools of the scriber’s craft all carried meta-
phorical significance so that, when the scribe used his penknife, he believed 
that he was providing a service to the Church by cutting through the ignorance 
of heresy. It should come as no great surprise then that few texts challenging 
the authority of either the Church or the State were copied. Only those with 
sufficient wealth could afford to produce copies, and their wealth almost cer-
tainly came from the support of the State; it’s thus unlikely the wealthy would 
wish to undermine the State by copying and disseminating “dangerous” ideas. 
Even if the wealthy were willing to do so, the disciplined copiers of the day 
would have censored the work (see Putnam, 1897, for a more thorough discus-
sion of the education and role of medieval scribes in knowledge production).
The Publishing Revolution and the Stationers’ Charter
Just as Internet technologies are revolutionizing and reshaping our modern 
world, the technologies of paper and the printing press changed the 16th cen-
tury. Even though books remained extraordinarily expensive by modern stan-
dards, the printing press did make book ownership possible for more than just 
the über-wealthy. The printing press made books affordable to new classes of 
people—people who wanted what had been status symbols for the super-rich 
and powerful. A new industry grew around the need for books. Enterprising 
publishers of the 16th century, called the “Stationers,” used new technologies 
to rapidly produce books for this new class of consumers. However, unlike the 
monk-scribes, the limners (or illustrators), book binders, and editors who made 
up the Stationers Company had undergone a different disciplining process and 
were motivated by profit before religion. They were happy to satisfy the new 
consumer demand for books dealing with secular rather than religious topics 
(Putnam, 1897), books for consumers who were not indebted to the State and 
thus were far less concerned with supporting the State than their predecessors. 
The convergence of these forces meant that books began to be produced 
that were no longer restricted by the interests of the State or the Church, and 
books that Mary Tudor and Phillip of Spain believed to be subversive appeared 
on the markets. So in 1556, Mary and Phillip granted the Stationers Company 
a royal charter that stated in its preamble that the charter was issued “to satisfy 
the desire of the Crown for an effective remedy against the publishing of sedi-
tious and heretical books” (Beard, 1974, p. 384). The Stationers’ royal charter 
co-opted publishers by playing on their desire to “protect profit by prohibiting 
unlicensed competition” (Beard, p. 383). The charter “limited most printing 
to members of that company and empowered the stationers to search out and 
destroy unlawful books” (Patterson & Lindberg, 1991, p. 23). In so doing, 
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the Stationers’ Charter effectively reestablished the State’s control over what 
books could be published. It gave the Stationers exclusive rights to copy and to 
profit from sanctioned texts in exchange for policing the publishing industry 
in much the same way that scribes had previously done. It turned the Stationers 
into agents of the State, and, more importantly, it did nothing to recognize or 
establish the rights of authors.
COPYRIGHT AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Of course, when I teach students this history, they are rarely surprised to 
learn that 16th-century monarchs engaged in censorship or that the monarchs 
exploited the greed of the merchants around them to advance their interests. 
That’s an old story we all have heard repeatedly in history classes. However, 
they are often stunned to learn that the U.S. Constitution is equally manipula-
tive when it comes to copyright and that, just as Mary and Phillip used copy-
rights to exploit the greedy profit motive of individuals to advance the interests 
of the State, the first article of the U.S. Constitution does essentially the same 
thing. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution states that
The Congress shall have the power ... to Promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.
Just as the Stationers’ Charter made clear that the purpose of government 
giving copyright privileges to the Stationers was to prevent the publication of 
seditious and heretical books, the Constitution makes clear that it is giving the 
legislative branch of the government authority to grant copyright privileges in 
order to improve the science and technology in the State. It does not say that 
“Authors and Inventors” have a natural right to “their respective Writings and 
Discoveries;” instead, it says that Congress has the authority to secure copy-
rights for authors. Furthermore, it also makes that authority conditional upon 
promoting scientific and technological discoveries and inventions that will 
improve living and economic conditions in society. In other words, Congress 
doesn’t have authority to grant copyrights or to create copyright legislation un-
less the purpose of that legislation improves society . Article 1, Section 8 doesn’t say 
anything about protecting authors’ rights for the sake of individual authors. In-
stead, it recognizes that, without a profit motive, authors and inventors will not 
have a reason to pursue new knowledge and new discoveries and thus publish 
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the sorts of books that the Founders wanted to see published. Consequently, 
just as the Stationers’ Charter gave the Stationers exclusive rights to profit from 
books the Crown thought were in the best interests of the State, the U.S. Con-
stitution gives Congress the authority to make the same deal with “Authors and 
Inventors.”
REPLACING NATURAL RIGHTS WITH 
THE LICENSE METAPHOR
Ownership of copyrights, as this brief history hopefully makes clear, is not 
a natural right. Copyrights are, instead, temporary privileges granted by the 
State to persons or organizations the State chooses, for purposes intended to 
benefit the people the government is supposed to serve. As members of a partic-
ipatory democracy, we can argue about whether modern copyright legislation 
has, in fact, benefited the people of the U.S. and whether modern congresses 
have failed to promote creativity and discovery to benefit our whole society 
(as the Constitution originally charged them). However, it’s important to ob-
serve here that U.S. copyright laws don’t protect the natural rights of authors 
or the corporations who employ them; instead, they actually limit the rights 
of copyright holders to profit by imposing time restrictions on the copyrights 
and by creating other conditions under which it is possible for members of a 
society to copy texts without having to pay for the privilege. It could be argued, 
in other words, that copyright legislation exists to protect society from greedy 
speculation by copyright holders. As Pierre Leval (1990) stated, “fair use is not 
a grudgingly tolerated exception to the copyright owner’s rights of private prop-
erty, but a fundamental policy of copyright law” (p. 1107).
However, once educators teach students that the U.S. Constitution doesn’t 
recognize the absolute, natural property rights of authors, they need to fill 
the vacuum this creates, or we run the risk of allowing future citizens to falla-
ciously conclude that, because the Constitution doesn’t recognize their natural 
rights, authors have no rights. The metaphor I have successfully used with col-
lege students is that of a driver’s license. In a society where the ability to operate 
a motor vehicle is almost universally expected, the analogy works particularly 
well. People who own vehicles and who consider their cars to be their private 
property tend to believe that they ought to have the right to operate and use 
their property in pretty much the same way that copyright owners tend to feel 
they ought to have the right to use their copyrights. However, as we all know, 
even though it’s conceivable that someone could own a car without a driver’s 
license, it is not legal to operate a vehicle without having obtained a license 
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from the state in which you live. Operating a vehicle on public roads isn’t a 
natural right of private property owners; rather, it is a limited privilege granted 
by the State for a temporary period and only under conditions established by 
the State. As citizens, we accept these licensing conditions and the limits im-
posed on our individual freedoms because they protect the public from abuse 
and because, in the long run, they ensure that society as a whole will benefit 
from the increased commerce and quality of life made possible by public roads 
(although, as I discuss later, many believe changes in copyright legislation since 
1990 have broken faith with this principle).
Although U.S. Code doesn’t require that authors take a test and obtain a 
license before they can benefit from copyright, many of the same rules of the 
road still apply so that copyright holders don’t crash into each other. For exam-
ple, copyrights do not give the creator of a text ownership of ideas in the text; 
it only protects the tangible expression of those ideas. This is critical—without 
it, someone could claim to own universal truths. Imagine the impact it would 
have on the pharmaceutical industry if, for example, every time during the 
course of a drug study, lab technicians had to calculate the value of 2+3, they 
had to pay a royalty to some copyright holder who claimed to own the rights to 
the idea that 2+3=5. The effect on our economy would be just as chaotic and 
debilitating as it would be if cars were no longer required to drive on the right 
side of the road and it was left up to individual drivers to decide where to take 
their half of the road. The effect of having to pay copyright owners for ideas 
rather than expressions would be analogous to the impact that increasing costs 
of energy has on an economy. As we saw when Hurricane Katrina shut down 
oil refineries on the gulf coast, sky-rocketing fuel prices threatened to plunge 
our economy into a catastrophic recession. And while energy costs are certainly 
pervasive in an economy, imagine the impact of having to pay for ideas like the 
effects of gravity every time you used gravity. Consequently, copyright laws 
don’t give Sir Isaac Newton or his estate the right to profit from the discovery 
of gravity beyond initially protecting his expression of the idea. Copyright laws 
allow him to recover and profit from the sales of books in which he described 
the discovery of gravity; they also protect our society and economy from the 
predatory and debilitating practice of attempting to charge for ideas. Indeed, 
in this pay-per-use scenario, it could be argued that Newton would never have 
discovered gravity in the first place because doing so would have required that 
he use mathematical equations that might have been “owned” by other math-
ematicians whom Newton could not have afforded to pay.
Copyright laws also both work against and protect society from abuses of 
the natural right metaphor. It recognizes that inventors and creators owe a debt 
to the society that nurtured and educated them and thereby enabled the cre-
Intellectual Properties
115
ation, discovery, or production of a new idea from which the creator seeks to 
profit. The fair use clause is another speed limit and rule of the road that the 
State uses to ensure public safety and to force copyright holders to recognize 
the debt which they owe to society. As discussed by other authors in this col-
lection, Statute 17, Section 107 of the U.S. Code grants the public the right to 
copy a work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” 
without having to pay for the privilege. However, composition students need to 
understand that just because they are students in an educational environment 
and fair use does grant the right to copy works for educational purposes, that 
does not give them the right to copy everything. Statute 17 states that the four 
factors have to be taken into consideration when attempting to copy under the 
Doctrine of Fair Use:
•	 the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
•	 the nature of the copyrighted work;
•	 the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
•	 the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. 
I have had writers create instructional videos in my technical writing classes 
and invariably several will attempt to use popular, copyrighted music as back-
ground audio with their digital videos to improve the quality of the produc-
tion and to add interest to what would otherwise by a dry and uninteresting 
video clip. They mistakenly believe that because they are producing the video 
for a writing class, the fair use education clause gives them the right to copy 
all or most of, say, “Let It Be” by the Beatles. However, even though it meets 
the purpose and character test because it’s being used for a non-commercial, 
educational purpose, copying the whole song into the video clip fails to meet 
the other three tests because “Let It Be” is copyrighted and sold for entertain-
ment purposes, because the entire song is used rather than just a portion, and 
because making the song available through a digital video that might be pub-
lished on YouTube means that potential consumers of the song wouldn’t have 
to buy it from the publisher. In conclusion, fair use is very much like imposing 
speed limits on drivers: It seeks to achieve a balance between allowing copy-
right holders to use their property in an expeditious fashion in the same way 
that one can use a car to go to work or transport goods to market. The speed 
limit lets them drive fast enough so that they arrive at their destination in a 
timely manner, but it also protects other drivers on the road from people who 
want to drive too fast and operate their vehicle in a dangerous way. Fair use 
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seeks to protect the rights of the property of an individual and the reasonable 
expectation that the creator of a work should be able to profit from the labor 
expended, while at the same time protecting the rights of society and the good 
of the whole. It is important to replace the natural right metaphor many bring 
into our classrooms with the more balanced metaphor of a driver’s license. 
COMPLEX COPYRIGHT SCENARIOS
Scenario 1: Screen Captures
For teachers in technical writing classes, this scenario is probably familiar, 
because many of us ask students to produce instruction manuals from readily 
available products such as popular software packages. However, what many of 
my colleagues find surprising and disturbing is that they might be encouraging 
students to violate copyright laws when they ask them to use screen captures 
from software and Web applications to produce their manuals. The practice of 
making screen captures and using them in training and documentation materi-
als is so commonplace and so easy to accomplish that many people never stop 
to consider whether it’s legal or not. Most people don’t realize that, from a legal 
perspective, screen captures are considered “derivative works.” According to 
the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, Section 101: 
A derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound record-
ing, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. 
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elabora-
tions, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.”
In this case, capturing a screen from a copyrighted piece of software is the 
same as taking a photograph of a famous work of art in a museum. It’s essen-
tially copying a protected work to produce a derivative. As such, copying an 
interface by making a screen capture would be a copyright infringement unless 
the production and use of the derivative work can be defended by fair use or 
some other legal precedent or defense. The idea of defense here is worth discuss-
ing before moving on to consider the possible legality of making and using 
screen captures. Copying a piece of copyright-protected work always exposes 
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the copyist to potential litigation. Fair use is a legal defense, but it doesn’t mean 
that the copyright owner doesn’t still have the right to sue in a civil case. In 
other words, it’s important to understand that using a derivative work, like a 
screen capture, even if it’s probably covered by fair use, doesn’t protect you from 
being contacted by a copyright owner and eventually from being sued if the 
copyright owner isn’t satisfied with your response once you’ve been contacted. 
Copyright owners have the right to challenge copying of their property, 
so short of securing documented permission from the copyright holder before 
creating a derivative work, there’s no absolute guarantee that you won’t get 
sued and then have to defend your use of copyrighted material in court. An 
example of a copyright holder attempting to protect their property in the case 
of screen captures can be seen by Apple Corporation’s attempt to protect its 
iPhone interface. In 1999, Apple sent cease and desist letters to webmasters who 
posted screen captures of Apple’s iPhone interface on their Web sites (“Apple 
Uses Copyright to Silence”). According to Chilling Effects (a joint project of 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, and other 
universities), Apple attempted to protect the look and feel of their interface and 
the iPhone experience by preventing other software companies from using their 
icons and interface design. As a result, they contacted any Web site that posted 
screen captures of the interface regardless of whether they had positive things 
to say about the interface or were offering critiques of it. The question here is 
whether the iPhone screen captures were being used for non-commercial criti-
cism, comment, or news reporting, because these uses would likely be defensi-
ble under fair use. Similarly, to return to our original scenario, if a student were 
to produce an instructional manual on how to use the iPhone interface to com-
plete some task and if they were to post their instruction manual on an elec-
tronic portfolio or on their Web site, it’s entirely possible that the student would 
be contacted by Apple and informed that they must stop using the screen cap-
tures in their work. In this case, the fact that Apple contacted the students does 
not, however, mean that students can’t legally use the screen captures. What it 
does mean is that the webmasters who posted the screen captures and the stu-
dents could potentially go to court and defend their use of the material or alter-
natively, they could comply with Apple’s potentially inappropriate request that 
they remove the material. Even though copyright holders have a right to sue, 
the costs of doing so make it unlikely that they would unless they were reason-
ably sure that they would win and realize a profit for doing so. Consequently, 
even though there’s never a guarantee that you won’t be sued, having a strong 
defense makes it extremely unlikely that the average person will be sued unless 
the copyright holder can show that they suffered sufficient damages to warrant 
bringing the case to court and sees a financial gain by bringing the suit. 
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Because there are no guarantees and it’s important to be able to be 
able to weigh the strengths of your defense for copying a piece, it’s im-
portant for students to be able to understand if they do have a strong 
defense. There are a number of defenses students can provide. One of the 
these is that many software companies actually do automatically grant 
their customers the right to use screen captures and visual elements in 
documentation. Apple Corporation, obviously, does not; however, Micro-
soft Corporation does allow the use of screen captures (but they do have 
requirements about the way their copyrighted visuals can be used). The 
following excerpt from Microsoft’s Terms of Use Web site describes how 
screen captures may be used:
You may use screen shots in advertising, in documentation 
(including educational brochures), in tutorial books, in video-
tapes, or on Web sites, provided you adhere to the following 
guidelines:
1. Your use may not be obscene or pornographic, and you 
may not be disparaging, defamatory, or libelous to Mi-
crosoft, any of its products, or any other person or entity.
2. Your use may not directly or indirectly imply Microsoft 
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your product 
or service.
3. You may not use the screen shot in a comparative adver-
tisement.
4. You may not alter the screen shot in any way except to 
resize the screen shot. You may not use portions of the 
screen shots, and you may not include portions of a screen 
shot in your product user interface.
5. You may not use screen shots from Microsoft beta prod-
ucts or other products that have not been commercially 
released by Microsoft.
6. You may not use screen shots that contain third-party 
content.
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7. You must include the following copyright attribution 
statement: “Microsoft product screen shot(s) reprinted 
with permission from Microsoft Corporation.”
8. If your use includes references to a Microsoft product, 
you must use the full name of the product.
9. When referencing any Microsoft trademarks, follow the 
General Microsoft Trademark Guidelines.
10. You may not use a screen shot that contains an image of 
an identifiable individual.
11. For screen shots of Xbox and Games For Windows games, 
please visit our Game Content Usage Rules. 
As item four above makes clear, students who wish to comply with Micro-
soft’s guidelines need to use the entire screen rather than a portion, and, as item 
seven makes clear, they need to give credit using the language provided. Other 
software vendors also provide similar permissions. And, naturally, students and 
educators who wish to avoid potential legal conflicts can choose to comply 
with the vendor’s guidelines. 
Not following a software vendor’s screen capture guidelines to the letter 
still, however, doesn’t mean that using screen captures is necessarily illegal or 
inappropriate. It’s safer and would probably be the recommended course of ac-
tion, but there are legal defenses that allow students to use screen captures in 
an instructional manual, or other works, produced for a course. Is the student 
making a profit? In this case, they’re not; they’re making it for a class. They’re 
not providing a copy of the entire software package; they’re only illustrating 
a portion of the software to help users complete tasks with it. In terms of the 
effect of the instruction manual on the software’s use or marketability, the 
manual is actually likely to increase the sales of the software, because an in-
struction manual that makes it easier to use is likely to encourage more people 
to purchase it. The use is potentially also defensible thanks to a precedent set 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. In this case, as Martine Courant Rife (2009) 
observed, the court ruled that if the use of an entire image, not just a part of 
the image, is transformative, then its use is permissible. In this particular case, 
Dorling Kindersley was producing a history of the Grateful Dead and wished 
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to use posters of Grateful Dead concerts in the book. The publisher contacted 
Bill Graham Archives (which held the copyright on the posters) and requested 
permission to reproduce the posters in the book. The Archives requested what 
the publishers perceived as “an unreasonable licensing fee” and, consequently, 
“permission agreements were never reached” (Rife). When the history was pub-
lished, the Archives sued the publisher for copyright infringement. The court 
ruled the publisher’s use of the visuals was fair use, even though they used the 
entire visual, and that “the use of the Grateful Dead images was transformative 
since the images were used in a time line and for historical purposes rather than 
for the poster’s original purposes of concert promotion” (Rife ). In our scenario 
it could be argued that, even though screen captures are considered derivative 
works and, therefore, are covered under copyright, a student using them in an 
instructional manual is a transformative, non-commercial use of the works for 
educational purposes that do not negatively impact the commercial viability of 
the product and is likely to be covered under fair use. Yet there’s no guarantee 
that a software company wouldn’t contact the student in spite of this defense, 
and thus it’s always best to check the software vendor’s Web sites to see if they 
give permission for screen captures and other uses.
Scenario 2: Public Email
This scenario asks you to imagine that you have posted email messages to 
a public email discussion group and you discover that your messages are being 
used by a graduate student as part of her dissertation research without having 
contacted you. It’s tempting to think that this is a copyright issue, because U.S. 
Code does grant an author copyrights as soon as a work is created. Thus, as the 
author of the email messages, you might assume that you have rights to control 
the use of those messages. If we were dealing with hard-copy letters and print 
personal correspondence, the issue would be far more clear; the courts have 
determined that the person who receives a letter owns the physical property 
(i.e., the letter itself), but the author continues to own the tangible expression 
of ideas in the letters and thus can still make claims on its use. 
Nevertheless, the lack of physical property and the situation of electronic 
messages on a system owned by another entity also complicates this scenario, 
as the 2005 case of Marine Lance Cpl. Justin Ellsworth illustrates. Ellsworth 
had a personal email account on Yahoo where copies of both his sent mes-
sages and received messages were stored. Ellsworth died attempting to defuse 
a bomb in Iraq, and his parents claimed that as next of kin they had right to 
his personal effects and thus sued Yahoo for access to Ellsworth’s account in 
a Michigan probate court. The terms of Yahoo’s service agreement, however, 
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made clear that individual accounts are non-transferable and are deleted if the 
account holder dies (Hsieh, 2006). The case was settled when the court or-
dered Yahoo to provide copies of Ellsworth’s messages to the parents (Olsen, 
2005). Although the Ellsworth case is not considered definitive and it is still 
Yahoo’s corporate policy that they are obligated to protect the privacy of both 
the deceased and of those individuals who may have sent email to the deceased 
account holder, the case certainly suggests that an author or an author’s estate 
can still assert some ownership claim over the expression of their texts.
In this scenario, however, as soon as the messages were posted to a public 
discussion group, the issue changes, because the information in the posts may 
be considered in the public domain and because the posting of the messages is 
somewhat analogous to surrendering copyright when you publish a book. Typi-
cally, and especially in academic publishing, once an author of a book signs a 
publishing contract with a book publisher, the author transfers the copyrights 
to that publisher and usually can no longer make claims on the copyright. This 
scenario is similar if the discussion group or forum where the messages were 
posted also treats the messages as publications and, to participate in the forum, 
the author has entered into a terms of use agreement granting the owners of the 
forum specific usage rights to the messages. An example of this would be, for 
example, messages posted to one of the online forums hosted by Adobe Corpo-
ration. By posting a message on one of these groups:
you grant Adobe a worldwide, royalty-free, nonexclusive, per-
petual, irrevocable, and fully sublicensable license to use, dis-
tribute, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, translate, publicly 
perform and publicly display Your Content (in whole or in 
part) and to incorporate Your Content into other Materials 
or works in any format or medium now known or later devel-
oped. (Adobe Systems Incorporated, 2008)
Consequently, even though Adobe doesn’t claim ownership of messages 
posted to their forums, if the messages in the scenario were published else-
where, the licensing agreement above would make it difficult for an author to 
complain about Adobe’s uses of messages posted there.
In our scenarios, if a graduate student is merely using material deliberate-
ly posted to a public site, if the email discussion group makes clear that the 
postings are “publications,” and if the student is not selling or profiting from 
the use of the material, then her use is probably defensible, and this question 
is probably not resolvable as a copyright issue. However, her use of the mate-
rial might still be considered inappropriate (but most likely not) because of the 
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federal guidelines governing empirical research conducted with human sub-
jects. Before any research project can be undertaken at a college or university, 
it must be approved by the school’s institutional review board (IRB) to ensure 
that the research complies with federal guidelines regarding the use of human 
subjects in research studies. One critical component of empirical research IRBs 
take into consideration is the principle of “informed consent” that requires 
that researchers obtain the voluntary consent of people to participant in the 
study before collecting data from them. Because the graduate student had not 
contacted posters to the list and obtained consent and voluntary agreement to 
participate in the study, you would be within your rights to contact the IRB 
at the student’s school to discover if the research study had been approved and 
to learn what (if any) precautions were being taken to protect your privacy and 
other rights (see Frankel & Siang, 2009). 
Scenario 3: Work for Hire
This scenario asks you to assume that you’re a faculty member at a col-
lege and that you’ve been contacted by a company wishing to sponsor research 
you will conduct on their behalf to help them better understand the future of 
documentation. In other words, you’re entering into a contract to write a re-
port for the company in exchange for remuneration from the company. This is 
known as a work-for-hire agreement, and, typically, even though you may be 
the sole author of the report you are producing for the company, the agreement 
stipulates that you must surrender any claim you might make on the copyright 
to the company sponsoring the research. This means that you’re transferring 
your rights to tangible expression of the ideas to the company and giving up 
the right to publish significant portions of the report in a trade magazine or 
journal. Even though you wrote the research report, you couldn’t use the same 
expressions used in the research report in a future article because the company 
would own “your words” and those expressions at that point (see Amidon, this 
volume, for an extended discussion of work for hire).
Of course, because academics live in a publish-or-peril world, this arrange-
ment usually isn’t in our best interests. The long-term benefits obtained from 
the impact publication has on tenure and promotion are usually worth far more 
than the short-term remuneration a company might offer in a work-for-hire 
agreement. Consequently it’s useful for academics to know that it’s not nec-
essary to accept the traditional work-for-hire agreement and to surrender all 
copyright privileges to a company. One can, for instance, stipulate in the con-
tract the right to publish some or all of the material developed in a research 
report. Often companies will agree to this stipulation if you’ll also compromise 
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by further stipulating that you won’t publish the material in a peer-reviewed 
journal or other publication for 6 months or a year or some other period of time 
sufficient to allow them to develop a competitive advantage using the informa-
tion you provide. Companies are also usually sensitive to revealing informa-
tion about trade secrets, manufacturing processes, or other confidential and 
proprietary information its competitors might be able to use. Therefore, you 
may also have to negotiate a compromise that allows the company the right to 
review the article before it is submitted for publication to ensure that it doesn’t 
reveal information the company feels is confidential or of a proprietary nature. 
If you have graduate students collaborating with you on the project, you also 
need to make sure that the work-for-hire agreement doesn’t in any way prevent 
you or the graduate students from publishing in the future. Some work-for-hire 
agreements can be so rigid and exclusive that they can put entire subject areas 
off limits. This was the case for me when I was working on usability testing 
research on three-dimensional interfaces sponsored by a technology company I 
can’t name in this article. Because I didn’t specify a time limit in the contract 
that would allow me to publish on the topic, both the graduate students who 
worked on the project and I are still legally obligated not to publish or reveal in-
formation to which we were privy as part of that project without the expressed 
written consent of the company’s legal department. 
The point to be made here is that work-for-hire agreements don’t necessarily 
preclude publication and don’t necessarily mean the surrender of all copyright 
claims. If you’re careful, and are able to successfully negotiate with the funder, 
it may be possible to publish sponsored research in public venues. That said, 
it’s also your responsibility to make sure that when you do publish sponsored 
research in a public venue that you notify the editors, publishers, and peer re-
viewers of the fact that the work had been produced with sponsorship. 
Scenario 4: Non-disclosure Agreements
In this scenario, the question is whether or not an employer has the right 
to terminate employment for maintaining a blog. Although it’s repugnant and 
potentially scary to many, in fact, it may be the case that an employer does have 
the right to impose limits on the information you can make publicly accessible. 
Employment in a Web consulting company typically involves a work-for-hire 
agreement, and an employer probably required a signed contract outlining the 
scope of information you have the authority to reveal. As a condition of your 
employment, you probably also signed a non-disclosure agreement (commonly 
known as an NDA) that prevents you from publishing information the com-
pany considers proprietary in nature. Consequently, if we assume that you are 
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operating under this NDA, and if we assume that you revealed proprietary in-
formation about the processes or business practices of the consulting firm for 
which you work, then your employer does have the right to require that you re-
move that information from the blog. The information is copyrighted and pro-
prietary, and you are only privy to it because of your employment; hence, your 
employers are perfectly within their rights to ask you to remove it. If you refuse 
to do so, they may terminate your employment and even bring suit against you.
However, your employer probably does not have the right to require that 
you completely take down your blog and cannot order you not to maintain 
a blog on your own time using your own computer equipment and network 
access. The company can prevent you from using equipment and Internet ac-
cess they provide, but they don’t have a right to tell you what to do with your 
own resources on your own time as long as you aren’t violating your NDA or 
some other aspect of your contract with them. They have copyrights you need 
to respect, but you also have free speech rights they are also legally obligated 
to respect. As was the case with the work-for-hire agreements in the previous 
scenario, what is and is not permissible and copy-protected by an NDA de-
pends largely on the nature of the agreement, and it’s important that teachers 
help students understand that they have rights and that they need to carefully 
review and potentially even negotiate the limitations a potential employer may 
attempt to impose on them.
Scenario 5: Remixes
In this scenario, a student is asked to change the meaning of Robert Frost’s 
poem “A Road Not Taken” through the use of Flash animations and audio 
clips. The first question that needs to be addressed is whether or not the stu-
dent can use Frost’s poem without having to pay royalty to the copyright holder 
of Frost’s poem. Because the assignment asks for the creation of a parody of and 
thus a transformation of the meaning of the poem, the student is actually creat-
ing a new work. Because the student’s use of Frost’s poem is deliberately trans-
formative and because it is being used as an educational, not-for-profit exercise 
intended to teach the power of animation, this transformative use is defensible. 
Creating a parody or remix of the poem might cover the student’s use of Frost’s 
poem, but in this case the student is creating a multimodal composition and 
also wishes to use photos from Flickr and a song by Nickelback.
A key factor in determining use would depend, for example, on how much 
of the photograph the student was using and how much was being changed. 
In the case of the poem, because the meaning is deliberately being changed for 
parodic purposes, its use is covered (see Hall, Gossett, & Vincelette, this vol-
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ume, for an extended discussion of parody). However, the student is probably 
using the images without significant transformation, so the copyrights for the 
photographs are still the property of the photographer—even though they were 
taken from Flickr, which is a social-networking site that encourages people to 
share their photos with other Flickr users. Unless the photographer gave per-
mission for Flickr users to use the images royalty free, then the student should 
probably be advised to contact the photographer and request permission to use 
the photographs for the course assignment. Of course, even when they obtain 
permission to use the images, students should give credit to the photographers 
whose images they used (see the licensing structure of Flickr) by citing the 
works in the credits. As has been stated previously, citing sources isn’t a condi-
tion of fair use, but it is the ethical thing to do and is nearly always required by 
an educational institution’s anti-plagiarism policies.
Regarding the Nickelback songs, once again, the question is how much 
of the song is being used and for what purpose. It is typically the case when 
students complete this assignment in my class that the student uses all or a sig-
nificant portion of the song without any audio editing (such as changing the 
tempo, adding reverb, or creating distortion of any kind), and the student is 
typically using the lyrics to convey the meaning as the artist intended. The use 
is often an attempt to give the audience the same experience of the music that 
they would hear on the radio; it’s not transformative and may not be defensible 
under fair use. What’s more, if the student is putting the unmediated music on 
the Web, where the audio can be copied by others in a way that might allow 
them not to have to purchase the song from the music publisher, and because 
the music industry has been aggressively and vociferously defending its copy-
rights, the student would be advised to find royalty-free music clips or to record 
music rather than ripping audio from a commercial CD. On the other hand, 
if the student is only using a short excerpt from the song and using it in a way 
that would be considered transformative and somehow changes the meaning of 
the work in the same ways that a parody would change the work, then its use 
would be covered by fair use. 
CONCLUSION
Obviously, as these scenarios show, the issues here are very complex and 
require a fairly sophisticated understanding of copyright laws and potential 
defenses for the acceptable uses of copyrighted works. We need to provide this 
understanding to students, because the consequences of copyright infringe-
ment are far more damaging than has ever been the case in the history of U.S. 
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copyright legislation. Unfortunately, since the 1990s, modern copyright law 
has changed more dramatically and more in favor of natural rights than it has 
since the Statutes of Queen Anne. Today, both educators and students are at 
greater risk of suffering from copyright infringement, litigation, and capital 
expenditure than ever in our history. The five scenarios are all based on actual 
situations encountered in a mere 6-month period, and what I hope they il-
lustrate is that 21st-century composition students live in a far more dangerous 
world than they did in 1996. Today, teachers must prepare them for a world:
•	 where they can be attacked by Apple Corporation for using a screen 
capture in a manual intended to help other students use their iPhones; 
•	 where they may not be able to conduct basic research on ethical email 
communication practices in public forums without prior permission 
from a federal oversight board;
•	 where they can be fired or be prosecuted for posting messages to their 
blogs or for publishing an article about an idea they learned while 
working as lab assistant in a university research lab; and 
•	 where they may face criminal prosecution for using a song to enhance 
the meaning of a poem in a multimodal composition. 
Writers of the future can’t afford to learn about copyright by trial and error 
in the corporate world. The lesson that world teaches is that it is the natural 
right of Walt Disney’s inheritors to continue to make us pay for pictures he 
drew over 75 years ago; the lesson is that the society that educated and nur-
tured Walt Disney and the economy that supported and enabled his company 
to grow and to become successful don’t deserve some rights to use the cultural 
icons we helped create. The lesson this world wants to teach today’s students is 
that using pictures of cultural icons like Mickey Mouse and King Kong with-
out paying Disney and Paramount makes them criminals who deserve to have 
records of their federal offenses follow them for the rest of their lives. In 1996, 
a student violating a copyright in a class project like that in scenario 5 meant 
that her copyright infringements were limited to civil courts. Pretty much the 
worst that could happen was that the copyright owner could sue for damages. 
The risk to students and educators of infringing on a copyright was relatively 
small compared to today. But the introduction in 1997 of the No Electronic 
Theft (NET) Act changed all of that by making copyright infringement a 
criminal offense even for non-commercial infringement. Thus, the student in 
Scenario 5 who knowingly and “willfully” used a Nickelback song and who 
makes it available for copy “by the reproduction or distribution, including by 
electronic means, during any 180-day period” (17 USC Section 506a) can now 
be imprisoned for up to 5 years for the first offense and 10 years for a second 
(18 USC Section 2319b).
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Those of us who teach composition owe it to students to make them 
aware of the copyright infringement risks they will encounter when they 
produce works for class and for future employers. We need to prepare them 
to work in a world where the incredible reproduction and distribution power 
of the Internet magnifies the impact of their actions in ways that may have 
significant financial consequences for them personally or for the companies 
employing them if they lack a sophisticated understanding of copyright laws 
and principles.
However, I would also argue that teachers and writers have a responsibility 
to do more than merely become aware of the risks and consequences of copy-
right infringements. Writers need to be more than good self-governing employ-
ees who won’t get themselves or their companies in trouble. They also need to 
function as informed citizens in a participatory democracy. We need citizens 
who do not suffer from the foundationalist mythology that tells them truths 
are discovered by geniuses rather than socially constructed by a society—a 
mythology that tells them that copyrights are “natural rights” belonging to au-
thors or inventors and their estates forever and for all time. 
Citizens of a participatory democracy need to know that the original 
length of time a creator could benefit from a copyright was 7 years. The Stat-
ute of Queen Anne increased it to 14 years, and it has steadily increased in 
length. Thanks to the activities of corporate lobbyists in Congress throughout 
the 1990s, in the United States today, works created on or after January 1, 
1978, have copyright protection for the life of the author plus 70 or 95 years 
from the date of publication for works produced under work-for-hire agree-
ments. We need citizens who realize that congressional legislation of this sort 
runs counter to the purposes for copyright authorized by the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The Constitution gave legislators the authority to create copyright laws 
that stimulate creativity in the arts and that encourage originality in scientific 
investigation and technological inventions. We need educated citizens who 
can ask their legislators if allowing an artist and the inheritors of the author’s 
estate to profit from a work for the entire life of the author plus 70 years is 
consistent with the kind of creativity the Constitution sought to stimulate. We 
need writers who question whether or not laws like the NET Act encourage 
creativity and protect society’s right to use works for non-commercial pur-
poses. We need students who, once they graduate and become future legisla-
tors and corporate executives, have had the kind of educational experiences 
that allow them to ask if it is really in the best interests of “Promoting the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts” in society to threaten students who create 
Web-based multimodal compositions or employees who maintain blogs with 
criminal prosecution.
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7 IS DIGITAL THE NEW 
DIGITAL? PEDAGOGICAL 
FRAMES OF REFERENCE AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Robert Dornsife
The very concept of “the copy” comes into play first in all that relates the 
digital to the analog, and second in all that defines the digital, per se. As com-
position teachers, we have been generous to our inherited analog forms—such 
as “the paper.” We have allowed—even required—that the analog form (“the 
paper”) continue to exist digitally. To the same extent, we have allowed our 
analog aesthetic and its concerns with plagiarism and the like to be “copied” 
into the digital realm. That we should “do more” is an old argument. What is 
not so old is that perhaps we as teachers should see that analog content—even 
“mediated” digitally from the beginning—doesn’t work and doesn’t fit as well 
as forms that are impossible to imagine, create, or experience in forms other 
than digital. 
Thus far in the thinking of our discipline, the question of computer compo-
sition has proceeded in the following direction: Shouldn’t we allow the digital 
text its place, too? Drawing on my personal experience with popular technolo-
gies, in part one of this chapter I explore whether the question should not now 
be asked from the other direction; that is, we might ask whether or not it is 
okay to allow or require (or whatever we do as teachers) the analog form to 
exist at all. The process of moving our classrooms to a place where digitalness 
begins no longer as a complement to or copy of the analog but instead as its 
own whole and unapologetic frame of reference carries with it the obligation to 
revise analog definitions of the copy. In part two, I discuss the central obstacle 
to the full embrace of the digital as its own frame, arguing that analog defini-
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tions and implications of the copy do not hold or apply within a digital frame, 
and I engage the implications that extend from such a new frame. I conclude 
by offering some practical pedagogy as regards inhabiting the digital paradigm 
via a discussion of “artistic license.” 
IS DIGITAL THE NEW DIGITAL?
My undergraduate poetry professor, John Taggart, invited me over to listen 
to some records. His stereo had Magneplanar speakers the size of doors—about 
as tall and as wide and as thick. His turntable’s cartridge had its own ampli-
fier, and the turntable itself offered a vacuum that ensured the flatness of the 
vinyl. A few months before, I had heard my first compact disc—the emerging 
notes of Rush’s “Red Barchetta” coming out of the silence—from a CD player 
that had a futuristic font on its front panel announcing the player was “digital.” 
When I asked Dr. Taggart about CDs, he responded that they didn’t sound 
good and that vinyl was superior. I had recently heard that a digitally outputted 
signal was a digitally outputted signal. As it was described to me by the sales-
man, “there is not a whole lot of difference between the least expensive CD 
player and the most expensive.” So—believing that—as naïve as digitalness 
was new, I concluded that maybe my mentor was a little concerned about his 
investment. That, perhaps, his vinyl and its system were in danger of becoming 
less exclusive or even extinct, and that such fears motivated his discrediting of 
this background-noiseless sound I had heard via my friend’s digital CD player. 
I even adopted my own smug counter-attitude, something like “if you prefer 
the clips and pops of vinyl, that is your choice.”
Six years earlier, I saw Star Wars at the local dollar movie theater, as an 
analog, celluloid, film. The film was badly scratched and worn. My own Super 
8mm copy—titled, also, Star Wars—was 12 minutes of silent excerpts in black 
and white. Still, though, the neighborhood kids paid their quarters to watch it 
again and again, as it was “Star Wars” in my basement after all. My attempts to 
freeze frame the most fantastic moments resulted in my projector bulb burning 
the film in many key places. 
The first time I saw high-definition television was in a large chain store. It 
was a basketball game being piped clearly into those televisions via some sort of 
high-end signal. For the first time, I could read the t-shirts of the people in the 
crowd and see the holes in the mesh of the players’ jerseys. A high-definition 
DVD format holds about 25 gigs of data. To capture every nuance of the “film” 
would require exponentially more capacity than that. But the grain of the film 
is random and so film’s apparent clarity is therefore compromised. 
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I remember Stevie Nicks talking about hearing Fleetwood Mac’s album 
Rumours in high-resolution 5.1 surround channel audio for the first time. She 
reported that the experience so closely replicated what she heard while mak-
ing the album decades earlier that she broke into tears. So Stevie Nicks moved 
me. A friend had assembled a 5.1 channel audio system in his living room. We 
listened to Rumours. Six speakers do something that two cannot. Vinyl doesn’t 
offer six channels; this higher-resolution disc did. Then I saw the “oldest” Star 
Wars movie (episode IV) on his high-definition television. It was the best ver-
sion of the film I had ever seen—I exclaimed that I was, in fact, seeing it for 
the first time. 
At that point, having heard Rumours in the way that made Nicks cry over 
its moving accuracy and having seen Star Wars with a clarity previously un-
available to me, I began to wonder about vinyl and film. Both were and were 
not nostalgic. I was engaging texts from my youth, after all—but not the same 
texts. These were better, except for the fact that, for example, my dad might 
have popped his head in back in 1977 in a way that would not happen in 2009. 
So I missed that version of the experience of the text. But, now, Rumours had 
six channels and I was closer to where Stevie and the band had been. There 
were parts of the arrangement that I could not hear in stereo, but which I now 
heard—I was now in the midst of them, with detail and space and moments 
not possible in analog. I value nostalgia as much as the next person—maybe 
more. But Rumours sounded better and Star Wars looked better; since my ex-
perience with this version of the movie and this version of the album, digital 
moved past being the new analog. It was, then, free to move beyond copying 
the analog. New digital became the new digital.
But the potential to be free of the copy had another step—a step that at 
once furthers and undermines just how good Star Wars looks, remastered. My 
friend’s high-definition television is still forced to deal with non-high defini-
tion, so called “standard definition,” material. And if you ever saw that, you 
would have noticed how the image of, for example, the newscasters does not 
look as good as the logos and so forth that introduce and share the screen with 
them. The logos and all such apparatus are digitally made. And, as good as 
Star Wars looks, visually—in the technical sense—300 looks better; 300 looks 
almost three-dimensional, with clarity and detail the likes of which I had not 
seen previously. I watched 300 as a result of a student’s insistence; it is among, 
for the moment, a small number of films to employ a digital backlot. A digital 
or virtual backlot describes sets that do not have genuine locations on sound 
stages. They are, to some extent, simulacra constructed on a blank background 
or green screen. An artificial environment—a computer-created “location”—is 
added in post-production. Similarly, Sting’s Brand New Day, which, unlike 
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Rumours, was mastered originally in the digital and exists in a high-resolution 
surround format, sounds in a way very similar to the way 300 looks: pristine, 
detailed, deliberate. 
I submit that digitally captured content that has always been digital con-
tent—in other words, that has not been remastered from the analog—is “bet-
ter” (that is, more faithful) when mediated via a digital medium. It is better 
still than remastered content that is now digital but was once analog. The act 
of having to copy the original condition is a fraught act of translation that 
announces itself as presenting the primary space in which to observe degrada-
tion: As the analog is converted to the digital, there is risk. The risk is less pro-
nounced, and at once ideally and possibly negated, as analog mediates analog 
and digital digital. Going from two channels to six channels from an analog 
master at once faces some of the same challenges, but offers something new—
not primarily a copy but an extension of the analog into a new, digitally pos-
sible text. In sum, then: originally digital content is more faithfully mediated 
when mediated digitally than originally analog content remastered into digital 
is. The 5.1 high-resolution surround format of Rumours—necessarily mediated 
digitally—might be seen as more faithful than the two-channel vinyl version 
via even its native analog mediation because it is not a copy as regards the stereo 
master. The obligation is one of faithfully serving the master, be it the master 
tape, the voices at play within the studio space, or the analog or digital meta-
phor that underlies the aesthetic. 
Jay David Bolter (2001) articulated how the digital writing space is limited 
by the way culture understands it as a place for writing that remains subservi-
ent to the analog:
The space of electronic writing is both the computer screen, 
where text is displayed, and the electronic memory, in which 
text is stored. Our culture has chosen to fashion these tech-
nologies into a writing space that is animated, visually com-
plex, and malleable in the hands of both writer and reader. In 
this late age of print, however, writers and readers still often 
conceive of text as located in the space of a printed book, and 
they conceive of the electronic writing space as a refashioning 
of the older space of print. (p. 13)
This chapter calls for an examination of this seemingly inherent connec-
tion between the digital and the analog in an attempt to realize the resulting 
implications if they are understood distinctly, allowing each to manifest within 
its own framework and according to its own rules. The analog, remediated 
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digitally, may strive to preserve the analog aesthetic—including its rules—but 
does so at the risk of remaining less faithful to its own possibilities. Bolter ar-
gued that “the very fact that electronic writing must confront the tradition of 
print makes electronic writing different from print; it means that our culture 
will have at least some different uses for electronic texts” (p. 45). We must iden-
tify these differences so that the analog and the digital can be distinguished 
and utilized knowingly, emphasizing the benefit of each within its respective 
framework. 
When the widescreen 16:9 format first appeared on televisions in stores 
and in a few early-adopting homes, service centers were bombarded with calls 
about “the bars on the screen.” These bars, or dead spaces, resulted from 16:9 
texts being played on the then-standard 4:3 screens. Conversely, those who 
purchased 16:9 screens were forced to deal with the translation of 4:3 content. 
Many viewers elected to squash the 4:3 picture down so that it filled the 
widescreen—even though the image was flattened and distorted in a striking 
way. Had an analog television suddenly started to squash the image in a way 
that it is now chosen to be squashed by 16:9 screen owners, many of these same 
viewers may very well have looked to correct the problem. In one sense we are 
maximizing the provided digital screen space—and in that sense the image 
does fit, but it is squashed and in that sense it does not fit or is a bad fit.
Composition teachers and scholars who continue to work with (or against) 
digitalness by attempting to house the digital within an analog frame may, 
too, be pursuing a bad fit. Seeing new digital not as new digital but as obliged 
to “copy” the analog is not allowing the digital, in practice and in theory, its 
due potential. (I address the implications of this bad fit specifically as regards 
plagiarism and the copy later in this chapter.) Generally, a bad fit may result 
if we do not consider how students’ daily interactions with rapidly changing 
technologies compose their working, public, and personal lives, an impact ex-
plored by the New London Group (2000), which argued that “pedagogy now 
must account for the burgeoning variety of text forms associated with informa-
tion and multimedia technologies” (p. 9). For example, I wonder if I am doing 
the best I can when I so much as allow a paper to be written on the computer. 
The question has to this point proceeded in the direction of asking whether 
or not we should allow the digital text its place. Of course students can still 
compose and print papers, but let’s also allow and explore this. Let’s allow for 
a certain amount of this other, digital thing. We even talk of composing an 
analog paper, via computer, as though it were a meaningfully digital act. But, 
as I mentioned earlier, I wonder whether the question should not now be asked 
from the other direction: Should we allow or require the analog form to exist 
at all? Should we not abandon any obligation to the analog copy? After all, 
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our obligation is to students, as articulated by the WIDE Research Collective 
(2009) in their “Why Teach Digital Writing?”: “If we want to teach writing 
or help students learn how to write more effectively, then we have to be with 
them where they write. Networks are classrooms.” I felt a strange discomfort as 
I watched Star Wars. I felt I was behind. 
Once, in a first-year composition course, each group chose an art form 
(sculpture, poetry, dance, etc.) and the goal was to push on these forms until we 
could get at the essential compositional processes of each. As we concluded on 
the second day, we found that the compositional mechanisms were themselves 
all the same: contour, rhythm, emphasis, organization and so forth. So these 
compositional concerns as such may carry across media and space. But I think 
I might do better to change the direction—at least, for example, to include 
writing prose words in the longer list of compositional ends. As soon as I think 
this, though, I immediately fear that I am including a “dead” form—a form 
that I am preserving for reasons that may not hold up to much scrutiny. Should 
we not allow students to engage writing prose words as such? Progress—even in 
the examined, deliberate sense—might tempt us in this direction, but, instead, 
I think our question might be: What do prose words do better and under what 
circumstances than competing, digital, mediations? To what meaning is prose 
a better channel than music? Toward what texture is prose at least the equal 
option and ideally the only option? I think in engaging such questions we may 
finally shift the direction of our consideration. Such a shift requires that we 
engage our analog frameworks with an eye toward revision.
COMING TO TERMS WITH DIGITAL AS THE 
NEW DIGITAL: THE COPY AS OBSTACLE
To the extent that Rumours, Star Wars, and high-definition and high-reso-
lution formats have prompted composition to consider a starting point that is 
not analog per se, there has been one obstacle with which we are still coming to 
terms. A December 2008 article offers this representative report:
A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away, when people wanted 
to see a film, they went to a movie theater. They never enter-
tained the idea of copying a movie, mainly because of all the 
industrial chemistry involved. Then videotape came along—
followed by attorneys. Now we have the latest dust up in the 
long battle of the technical ability to copy movies vs. a little 
thing called copyright. 
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The article then outlines this latest manifestation of the argument, this 
time as regards a certain DVD-copying software and the large legal battles it 
faces. Nowhere is there a greater difference between the analog and the digital 
than as regards the copy. 
First, as regards the vinyl album, there was no technology commercial-
ly available to reproduce its contents on another vinyl album; to copy, while 
remaining within the same vinyl medium, was not possible. The album an-
nounced itself as the standard in part because the listener needed to acquire the 
actual album to have access to the album as album. Thus, the trip to the record 
store was a one-sided trip—a trip to a place where one could only consume, 
once removed, at least, from the medium being engaged. Although plenty of 
listeners may have dreamed of making it to the other side of this one-way medi-
ation, few had the capacity to do so, as home-recording studios able to produce 
a product on vinyl were rare or non-existent. The act itself of “making it” onto 
vinyl marked a step toward legitimacy, in part because access to this medium 
was a rare access. 
The copy introduced itself primarily via magnetic tape. Anyone who owned 
one of the once-ubiquitous portable audio cassette tape players/recorders that 
offered two decks or anyone who has copied from, for example, the television 
to VHS tape or from VHS tape to VHS tape will probably have experienced 
the nature of the analog copy. It is marked as copy by its degradation in con-
trast to the original. Other analog systems of value make manifest this deg-
radation and the resulting determination of worth. For example, bootlegged 
tapes, both VHS and audio cassette, were valued by how far removed from the 
master they were. This concept of generation determined the value of the tape. 
For example, a second-generation tape, which usually referred to a copy from 
the copy that had been made from the master, would be worth more than a 
fifth-generation tape. Later generation tapes, priced far less, were often listed 
with the warning “collectors only” or some other notice signaling that the tape 
was so many generations from the master that it was hard to make out the 
content, and was thus only of any value to the completist collector. The extent 
of the generational degradation depended, but only relatively, on the quality 
of the equipment used to facilitate the reproduction. The nature of the analog 
tape is such that even a fully analog signal chain will result in loss and distor-
tion with each successive generation. 
Similarly, analog reproductive technologies resulted in wear with each en-
gagement. The claim that “I listened to that vinyl album so many times that 
I wore it out” was, in fact, the truth, as the contact between the (usually) dia-
mond stylus and the vinyl was a microscopically violent one, resulting in the 
paring away of the vinyl itself with each engagement. Again, the extent of 
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such reduction depended, but only relatively, on the quality of the equipment 
used—a heavier, commercial tone arm did more damage than a finely balanced 
one. But the nature of the friction between diamond and plastic, or between 
analog magnetic tape and the metal tape head, resulted in loss. In cases where 
vinyl albums were repeatedly subjected to heavy tone arms, the album could 
even visibly change its appearance from glossy to matted and could wear out. 
Even in less severe cases, the state of wear of the analog medium was visibly or 
sonically apparent and contributed to the devaluing of the analog object. 
Generational degradation and wear defined analog media so that the most 
valuable analog medium was the one that was unplayed. For example, the still 
sealed vinyl album—sealed against wear, and most likely not to be generation-
ally compromised—commanded and still commands the highest price. Still 
sealed vinyl (especially unrecycled so-called virgin vinyl) remains a gold stan-
dard. Regarding analog, virgin and otherwise: the less play, the more value.
Similarly, consider the quality of the photographs of great-grandparents or 
their own great-grandparents. Those that existed and survived will be marked 
not only as different from more recent photography, but seen as degraded com-
pared to the photograph when first produced. A picture of my own grandfather 
that is cherished because he is a young man in his twenties is at once a valuable 
artifact and a badly decayed artifact. The image—about 2” by 4”—is badly 
cracked. To discern its original shading of whatever sort is impossible, as it has 
faded. It is washed out and its only hues are of a brown that does not appear to 
be a native part of the summer baseball field on which is playing. In short, the 
photograph began its existence as wholly marked by the capacities of its own 
mediation and declined markedly from that point. Were I not to have known 
its subject, he would be unrecognizable. As the decades pass, this photo con-
tinues to degrade.
Digital is different. By way of focusing this analogy I offer the following 
two scenarios. Imagine first a series of analog tape player/recorders. The second 
in the series records the first, the third records the second, and so on down 
the line, always remaining in the analog domain. The degeneration would be 
successive, and, eventually, reach a point where there may be little if any re-
semblance between the first generation and, say, the thousandth. In the second 
scenario, the first in the series is digital, as are the rest in the series. The second 
records the first, the third records the second, and so on down the line, always 
remaining in the digital domain. There exists a state of such technology that 
the thousandth such digital rendition would not be a lot like the first; it would 
be the first, just as the second would be the first, the first the second, and the 
twentieth the fourth. The implications here extend into all aspects of digital as 
the new digital.
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I submit, then, that the very concept of the copy is an analog concept, borne 
from the material conditions of analog technology. The concept of the original 
is simultaneously constructed and marked. The differences between the analog 
and the digital as regards copy and original can be illustrated by way of an en-
gagement of the central values at play. 
Within an analog metaphor, the value of the original is attained as a result 
of the fact that the copy is by definition a degraded rendition. The person seek-
ing to hear the content of a vinyl album with as little distortion as possible as 
regards the recorded content of the album will be best served by obtaining the 
album, preferably still sealed. The magnetic tape recorded from the album may 
or may not, depending on the equipment used, be a relatively excellent, faith-
ful copy, as copy. But, again, of and through analog circumstances, the term 
copy itself marks the rendition as once removed, while the technology is prone 
to manifest itself into a taped rendition that represents some loss as regards its 
“original” source. The greater value of the undegraded version is not without 
cause; again, remember that the goal is to get as close to the content of the 
album as possible, which necessitates an absence of loss as regards said content 
as content, including the loss that accompanies the introduction of distortion. 
The VHS tape would offer another such example: The copy of the VHS tape 
would be marked as copy as a result of being defined and announced as once 
removed, and all subsequent generational copies would exhibit that much more 
such degradational distance. Therefore, to the person seeking the uncorrupted 
content of the analog tape, the still-sealed, non-copied, non-played version of 
the tape offers the best such opportunity. Such a version may be reasonably 
seen as of greater value and worth, such are its material conditions. 
Digitalness does not offer the same conditions and as a result does not pro-
vide for the value system of the analog. Bit-by-bit copying exists. Thus, the 
person seeking to hear the content of a compact disc with as little distortion as 
possible as regards the recorded content of the compact disc will have limitless 
options. Theoretically and, depending on whom is asked, practically, the origi-
nal is available from many quarters. Rarity is not at play digitally, and thus the 
values attendant to rarity do not apply. There is no digital text that is necessarily 
rare, as it can be reproduced in a way that does not mark it as in any way differ-
ent as such. An analog painting, such an oil on canvas, cannot be reproduced 
faithfully and is thus valued for its being rare, indeed unique: It may be housed 
so that we might view it, with all proper security at play, and any attempt to 
cross the velvet rope and revise the text may very well be a criminal act. Similar 
consequences may result from the engagement of the counterfeit or forgery. The 
image constructed digitally can be reproduced faithfully, ad infinitum. To the 
extent that its value might depend on its singular existence, it has no such value. 
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This is not to say that there are not degraded digital copies. In fact, many 
elect to degrade the digital text via “lossy” compression schemes, exposure to 
digital-to-analog conversion and perhaps back, inferior equipment of various 
sorts, and the like. The reasons for such degradation may be ignorance, or, for 
example, convenience-motivated choice. But the technology exists so that the 
digital rendition need not be degraded. And, where it does not yet exist, it is the 
realizable goal. For example, newer high-definition DVD soundtrack data is to 
be not like the theatrical version, but is to be the theatrical version. The media-
tion that results in the presentation of this data is a variable. One may not elect 
to have the same sort of playback technology within a home as is encountered 
in the theater, but the same data is there and available for processing. Similarly, 
one may not have the same sort of processor or screen on which to view the 
digital image, but the same data is available, thus allowing the same data to be 
engaged, and, when the mediating technologies are the same as those engaged 
by the person from whom the image was created and sent, both the original 
data and the reproduction artifact are indiscernible, generationally. 
COMPOSING THE DIGITAL TEXT: DIGITAL VALUE(S)
I argued above that digitally captured content that has always been digital 
content—in other words, that has not been remastered from the analog—is 
more faithful when mediated via a digital medium. I also suggested earlier that 
an analog painting, such an oil on canvas, cannot be reproduced faithfully. In 
terms of composition, then, the digital text is only fairly engaged via digital 
rules. Given that the digital text can be replicated without degradation, the at-
tendant values are best digital values, fundamentally different from analog val-
ues. Jay David Bolter (1992) conveyed this point by emphasizing that we must 
acknowledge the opportunity that exists within digitalizing text:
Wherever and however we use computers, we are turning the 
world into a digital text, we are textualizing the world. All the 
computer can ever do is to read and write text, if we take the 
word text to mean in the largest sense all systems of discrete 
symbols. I find this an exciting prospect because it places our 
work with computers and writing at the center of the com-
puter revolution. We as humanists know and care about read-
ing and writing, and it is therefore our responsibility to help 
make sense and to make good use of this new technology of 
literacy. (p. 42)
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As with other texts, the analog text copyright exists most comfortably 
within its native analog terms. When considered against all the values and 
mechanisms thus far outlined here, copyright must come to new terms or be 
abandoned altogether. The value of the original oil on canvas extends in part 
from the impossibility of exactly reproducing the given oil and canvas onto an-
other oil and canvas. Thus, such a text is in a specific sense unique and, even 
when considered along with those in its family or genre, rare or limited. Rarity 
contributes to value. (I often use the example in my courses that if limestone 
were as rare as diamond, we might marvel at the engagement ring using a fun-
damentally different set of qualifications: “Oh—the stone is so opaque—look 
at how it absorbs the light” and so forth.) Extending from such dynamics, copy-
right is further expressly concerned with authorial credit. This credit itself may 
not be unrelated to rarity. But it is also motivated by fair remuneration for the 
creator. The “original author” of the “original text” expects, via copyright, to 
receive recognition, expressed via attribution and, in many cases, via monetary 
payment. Any attempts to claim the text without such attribution is an act of 
theft. 
The nature of digitalness argues against such a value system. Without an 
(analog) original, the concept of the originator becomes slippery. One such 
argument notes how “additional concerns develop when composing with mul-
tiple media that are borrowed, reformed, and recast into compositions. Consid-
erable work has been done and continues to develop in the realms of intellectual 
property and copyright” (WIDE Research Collective, 2009). As the nature of 
the copy and the original are changed digitally, so are the natures of originator, 
creator, author, and the like. One way to measure the tensions associated with 
these fundamental shifts is to observe the volume of attention paid to the ana-
log notions of plagiarism. Such concerns are often expressed in terms of what 
digital mediation seems to provide for. Such potential, however, is, instead of 
being seen as new and with its own positive and creative potential, often seen 
as a threat to the old. That fundamental shifts in commercial dynamics hap-
pen slowly and are marked by transitional compromises is nothing new. At a 
certain point, anyone whose livelihood depends on a set of soon-to-be extinct 
conditions has a set of choices. For example, as the kerosene lantern was being 
replaced by the electric light bulb, the lantern makers may very well have faced 
a genuine dilemma. One can imagine they could argue against the new tech-
nology and for the superiority of the kerosene lantern, they could re-tool their 
shops so as to make electric filament, they could elect to sell their wares to a 
smaller cult of users, or they could cease their businesses as such. These or some 
transitional combinations of these might well be the primary choices presented 
to many industries faced with fundamental paradigm shifts in their business 
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modes and models. Further, such strategic options and responses would also 
no doubt be informed by the political clout of those involved. It is not hard to 
imagine attempts to make the “new threat” itself into an illegality, thus allow-
ing for the status quo to be preserved. Such an act of criminalization would be 
one example of how those dependent on the threatened technology might seek 
to indict producers, users, or anyone else involved with the “crime.” 
Ours is an age of CDs, DVDs, the Web, digitally mediated satellite com-
munication, digital cameras, iPods, iPads, email, computers in our homes and 
on our laps. As a result of the (mandated) switch to digital broadcasting regu-
lations, local television stations run public service announcements as to how 
to discard analog televisions in an environmentally sound way. In practical 
terms, the digital paradigm is already engaged. These shifts have already oc-
curred and continue to grow and expand. But allowing digital to be the new 
digital obliges us to allow the attendant theoretical frameworks to catch up 
to the ubiquitous practical engagement. These theoretical frameworks may be 
legal, compositional, pedagogical, or other. The analog rules regarding copy-
right, plagiarism, and the like are one such site for a necessary reconsideration. 
Defined by concepts no longer at play in the same ways, new definitions that 
respond to digital as the new digital should find a better fit if and when they 
are permitted to exist in on and through their own native terms. I offer own-
ership, stewardship, and artistic license as ways to begin to engage digital as 
the new digital.
First, I suggest that, within our digital paradigm, the concept of owner-
ship be replaced by something we might call stewardship. Stewardship suggests 
much of what ownership suggests, except that the steward recognizes that her 
relation to the artifact is not permanent—that she is in a line of stewards who 
will at one point or another in the artifact’s existence be responsible for the ar-
tifact. Jay David Bolter (1989) explained the dynamic interaction that occurs 
among this line of stewards:
As a technology for writing, the computer promises to rede-
fine the relationship between author, reader and writing space 
... Unlike printing, which lends fixity and monumentality to 
the text, electronic writing is a radically unstable and imper-
manent form, in which the text exists only from moment to 
moment and in which the reader joins with the writer in con-
stituting the text. (p. 129)
When transferred to the digital paradigm, the steward does well to recog-
nize that many will own—and thereby none will own—and that her work with 
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the text is not necessarily part of a linear sequence but is instead a part of a col-
lage already engaged with the text. 
Digital stewardship is at once—especially as regards its analog tradition—
a two-way street and, ultimately, a whole community of roads and paths and 
dead-ends and cul-de-sacs. In the short term, the digital composer might learn 
to compose with the idea of his work being open to such stewardship. Whether 
or not this consideration changes the way he composes will of course be up to 
him, within that moment. In the same way, stewards have a set of obligations as 
well, although they are not traditional. Stewards might see their engagement of 
the text as transitory, as they become the steward of their engagement with an 
appreciation of the dynamics that will subsequently engage their compositions. 
An awareness of the analog implications of copy may help spur this shift in un-
derstanding on the parts of readers, composers, and ultimately reader–compos-
ers. Such a shift is necessary to engage the digital on its own, non-copying, terms.
There may be within this web—a web with no beginning or end—a place 
for the recognition of the steward from whom there appears to be an influence. 
Such recognition, however, will be defined digitally—that is, it will recognize 
the absence of the original, the copy, the copyright, and will instead proceed 
more from what we might think of as artistic license. Composition teachers 
may very well already recognize composition as art or as an art. But the cir-
cumstances in which we teach often seem to work against us as we make any 
claims toward art—toward us teaching art and students producing art. We can 
speculate as to why such challenges arise. For instance, since elementary school, 
writing and art have been separate. We go to art, to the art room. We have an 
arts and crafts area or at least a time of the day that we devote to art. Seldom in 
such spaces were we expected to primarily engage just the written word, unless 
as part of a more colorful art project. 
Later, art is arguably in popular and even curricular terms most commonly 
attached to (analog) painting. Although sculpture, music, dance, and poet-
ry could lay a relatively easy claim to being art, composition papers would, I 
think, have a harder time making any such claim. As teachers in the digital 
age, we know that so-called multimedia compositions by definition replace 
any such disciplinary lines. And, yet, as of today, even the teacher whose course 
is titled “Multimedia Composition” or “Computer Composition” or any such 
variant would encounter strangeness if, upon being asked what she teaches, she 
were to respond “art.” 
I am not sure what term best explains any such tension. But whatever that 
term is, I think it applies to our administrators and more importantly to our stu-
dents as well, since such deeply entrenched analog traditions are slow to evolve; 
that is our challenge. Seldom do students come into my digital composition class 
Robert Dornsife
144
with an understanding that different rules apply—that the better or more useful 
parts of artistic license might be at play, both in my expectations and in their lati-
tude toward responding to the course. For example, even my repeated insistence 
as regards their compositions that form must follow from meaning—which I ex-
emplify by saying that if you want to mean a high C played on a flute it may be at 
least harder to convey that meaning via a drum—is as of mid-2010 met by at best 
a quick re-orientation and at worse by a feeling of my somehow having betrayed 
the agreement that the student and I allegedly undertook when she signed up for 
my composition course. This is not to say that students are not computer literate, 
of course. Only that, at least as regards my students, most still enter, for example, 
“Freshman Composition” apparently expecting something mostly analog-based. 
It seems as though most have engaged “computer composition,” but have not 
fully engaged the digital rules that should accompany such composition. The 
idea that the flute sound, digitally sampled itself, better or at least differently 
conveys the meaning of the flute sound than, say, a prose description of the sound 
seems to fall beyond student understanding of the “fair parameters” of digital 
composition. Thus, as contributing stewards, we and our students might look to 
the notion of artistic license as a way to expand these parameters. 
Here, as representative of what Wikipedia might offer by way of definition, 
is the (current) Wikipedia entry on “artistic license:”
Artistic license or license (also known as dramatic license, 
poetic license, narrative license, licentia poetica, or simply 
license) is a colloquial term used to denote the distortion or 
complete ignorance of fact, or the changing of an established 
work that an artist may undertake in the name of art—for ex-
ample, if an artist decided it was more artistically “correct” to 
portray St. Paul’s Cathedral next to the Houses of Parliament 
in a scene of London, even though in reality they are not close 
together, that would be artistic license.... 
In summary, artistic license is:
•	 Entirely at the artist’s discretion 
•	 Intended to be tolerated by the viewer (cf. “willing sus-
pension of disbelief”) 
•	 Neither “good” nor “bad” 
•	 Useful for filling in gaps, whether they be factual, com-
positional, historical or other gaps 
•	 Used consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or unin-
tentionally or in tandem 
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Artistic license often provokes controversy by offending those 
who resent the reinterpretation of cherished beliefs or previ-
ous works. Artists often respond to these criticisms by point-
ing out that their work was not intended to be a verbatim 
portrayal of something previous and should be judged only 
on artistic merit. Artistic license is a generally accepted prac-
tice, particularly when the result is widely acclaimed. William 
Shakespeare’s historical plays, for example, are gross distor-
tions of historical fact but are nevertheless lauded as outstand-
ing literary works.
If the first step toward making art is building the art museum, then we as dig-
ital composition teachers might do well to start to do that, it seems to me. There 
will of course be challenges as we move toward teaching and evaluating art. Such 
challenges extend from the Wikipedia definitions, as enacted, and are already 
well known by, among others, our creative writing colleagues. Such an argument 
might be: “Well, if you are requiring me to produce ‘art’ and we are invoking my 
‘artistic license’ to do so, then by default your evaluation must be accepting, since 
to evaluate otherwise would endanger the manifestations of my prerogatives as an 
artist.” In other words, as we may have heard, “my poem is good because I say it 
is and by definition as an art you are not qualified to suggest otherwise.” 
The best definition of coddling that I can craft is that coddling refers to the 
“reinforcement of the sentiment that no change need occur on the part (of the 
coddled).” And it seems that we might be at some risk of introducing—simulta-
neously—art and coddling. At least there may be some tension between students’ 
felt claims toward artistic license and our roles as evaluators, even as art critics. 
So if we are interested in taking advantage of digital options under the name of 
art—and if we are aware that doing so may be accompanied by some tensions in 
our classrooms—how might we begin to address such tensions? I suggest three 
things we may want to think about as we continue to inhabit the digital para-
digm. 
INHABITING THE DIGITAL PARADIGM
To begin to address some of the tensions described above, first, we must 
make our aesthetics—in part at least as requirements or expectations—as 
transparent as is productively possible but with the realization that they will 
not be wholly transparent. I think a good introduction to a course—via syl-
labus or spoken—strives to be an honest and forthright reflection of what the 
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student might expect in the course. But “honest and forthright” need not mean 
mathematically defensible, and it need not appeal to any sort of objectivity. 
Imagine, instead, something like this to describe an A: “An A composition is 
marked as excellent in part by its being different in positive ways from more 
typical coursework. An A project is exceptional. It allows form to follow from 
meaning and engages its meanings with deliberateness. It shows evidence of an 
awareness of stewardship both in response and in contribution.” To imagine 
a student saying “I read your description of an A—it doesn’t say anything” is 
easy and, in certain quantifiable senses, all but fair. But what such a description 
does say, I think, is that less of this sort of math or formula is at play—that in 
this course we move into the perilous waters of art and that the student–reader 
will need to look elsewhere toward producing excellent work.
Second, and closely related, is our obligation to establish trust with stu-
dents, which will work to reinforce the fact that our aesthetic expectations, 
though never able to be represented in formulaic and/or wholly transparent 
terms, are not being applied arbitrarily. In other words, while our expecta-
tions may be expressly “mysterious” they will not be applied in an ad hominem 
way. Establishing such trust is hard and gets at broader issues of our classroom 
ethos. But, specifically, one such site may be in our responses to drafts of the 
projects—responses that may invoke the need for the engagement of a higher-
powered microscope or for more of a push, but to some extent allow almost all 
of the choices therein—or certain sorts of choices—to be made by the student. 
To me, our endnotes to student work are where we first make the case. Prior 
to these endnotes, in many cases, our expectations could be read as hypotheti-
cal. So our endnotes offer proof that we mean it. In short, then, if we follow 
through on our stated expectations, we can build trust through reliability (es-
pecially in comparison to those who, for example, talk of risk only to deduct x 
points for some petty structural concern). 
Third, and finally, I think we need to trust our instincts. We need to be 
comfortable within the part of the expectations that we cannot make transpar-
ent—we need to inhabit that uncertain, even wordless digital space with the 
certainty that it is a space that does right by our students and their arts, and 
that values our roles as stewards engaging stewards, free from an obligation to 
copy our analog inheritance, and to move toward our own new digital spaces.
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8 RESPONSE TO PART 
I—“AN ACT FOR THE 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF 
LEARNING” VS. COPYRIGHT 
2.0
John Logie
COPYRIGHT 1.0
On May 31, 1790, President George Washington signed into law an act 
passed by the first United States Congress in its second session. The title of the 
act reads as follows:
An ACT for the ENCOURAGEMENT of LEARNING by 
securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Au-
thors and Proprietors of such Copies during the Times therein 
mentioned. (p. xx)
This is, of course, the United States’ first copyright law. Although the title’s 
language, which describes the Act as “for the encouragement of learning,” is 
taken directly from the title of the United Kingdom’s 1710 copyright law, the 
Statute of Anne, the two laws are markedly different. The Statute of Anne ad-
dresses learning only briefly, within a larger discussion of the problems caused 
by unauthorized copying. Such copying was—according to the Statute—oc-
curring “without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books and 
Writings, to their very great Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and 
their Families” (p. xx). Against this backdrop, the Statute of Anne announced 
itself as a means “for the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and 
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Write useful Books” (p. xx). By so doing, the Statute conflated “encouraging 
learning” with the protection of (and compensation for) copyrighted works. O
 But United States law does not. 
 The 1790 Copyright Act does not contain a rationale; it does not decry the 
depredations of unauthorized copying. Rather, it moves directly to the tech-
nical details of the law, specifying the rights of the author and outlining the 
penalties for violations of those rights. Because the Act itself does not articulate 
the motivating factors that led to its existence, we now understand it in tandem 
with the Constitutional clause stating that Congress shall have the power “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” (Art. I, sec. 8). Against this backdrop, the description of copyright 
as “an act for the encouragement of learning” takes on new meaning. 
Unlike the Statute of Anne, the United States’ first copyright law was di-
rected at promoting progress in science. The specification of limited times for 
the copyright term strongly implied that this encouragement was directed 
not only at encouraging authors to avail themselves of this limited monopoly 
right, but also at those who could—at the end of the then-14-year copyright 
term—make fuller use of texts as they moved into the public domain. If we 
assume—as is the current fashion—that our founding fathers were both wise 
and serious-minded, this assumption necessarily implies that they were serious 
about hardwiring the promotion of learning into the first United States copy-
right law.
And, yet, this collection is filled with accounts of committed educators 
struggling to manage the complexities and apparent contradictions of copyright 
laws in the 21st century. In the preceding pages, Timothy Amidon recounts his 
experience of being vaulted down the rabbit hole when he asks, simply, whether 
he might employ a Creative Commons license (rather than the traditional, re-
strictive copyright notice) for his master’s thesis. Rob Dornsife illuminates the 
degree to which the concept of the copy itself is a functional obstacle to student 
pursuit of the full range of possibilities within digital composing spaces. Bar-
clay Barrios examines end user license agreements and concludes that “every 
EULA to which we assent is a contractual obligation and failure to pay atten-
tion to the terms of those contracts is akin to making a deal with the devil.” 
As readers of this volume know all too well, those deals are made hundreds of 
thousands of times each day in our institutions of higher learning. Barrios is 
not exaggerating when he suggests that the souls of educators are at stake when 
we are placed in circumstances where language—like the impenetrable legalese 
of most “clickthrough” licenses—is deployed as a functional obstacle to clarity 
and understanding.
Response to Part I 
151
In perhaps the saddest of these engagements with current law, Tharon 
Howard surveys the copyright landscape with a particular eye toward the im-
plications of copyright for educators and concludes (rightly) that: 
The consequences of copyright infringement are far more 
damaging than has ever been the case in the history of U.S. 
copyright legislation. Unfortunately, since the 1990s, mod-
ern copyright law has changed more dramatically and more 
in favor of “natural rights” than it has since the Statutes of 
Queen Anne. Today, both educators and students are at great-
er risk of suffering from copyright infringement, litigation, 
and capital expenditure than ever in our history. 
Which leads us to an important question ... Just what the hell happened?
Our forefathers, 220 years or so ago, spoke with clarity about the way copy-
right should work in our then-newborn nation. While directly considering the 
language of the Statute of Anne as a model, they rejected those sections that 
were situated as a response to the apparently pitiable circumstances of authors 
and publishers in the United Kingdom at the dawn of the 18th century. The 
first Congress wrote an act for the encouragement of education grounded not 
in a presumed “natural right” of authors to their words, but in a public grant 
(via elected representatives) of a limited monopoly right. Where the Statute of 
Anne presented authorial (or publisher) ownership as the default circumstance 
for any given text, the Copyright Act of 1790—when paired with the Consti-
tution’s language—points toward the public domain as the default status for 
texts. The limited monopoly granted by the law was an exception to the more 
general (and preferred) circumstance in which no monopoly right would in-
here. 
U.S. Copyright Law’s bias toward learning was maintained for at least the 
nation’s first two centuries. The 1976 Copyright Act—a comprehensive revi-
sion of copyright law in toto—codified the common law principle of fair use. 
The four-factor fair use “test” imposed by this Act begins with a determination 
as to whether the use is “of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes,” with non-profit educational uses pointing strongly toward a deter-
mination that the use in question is fair. Additionally, the initial paragraph de-
scribing fair use states “the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright” 
(p. xx). Thus, for most of our nation’s history, the United States adhered to the 
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principle that the use of copyrighted material for educational purposes was likely 
not an infringement of copyright.
 But that time is gone. 
COPYRIGHT 2.0
Between 1997 and 2002, the United States Congress passed four acts 
that—taken together—effectively revised copyright law in ways that consti-
tuted a decisive break with the founders’ “act to encourage education.” Not all 
of the elements of these laws were problematic. Indeed, given the rise of the 
public Internet (in the form or the World Wide Web) in the early 1990s, the 
legislators were wise to revisit and reexamine copyright. But each of these four 
laws did contain egregious violations of the spirit and principles of laws prior to 
that point. Here are some of the lowlights: 
•	 The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, November 1997—After passage 
of this act, for the first time in U.S. history, copyright infringements 
could prompt criminal (rather than civil) penalties. Even non-commer-
cial infringements could trigger criminal penalties of up to 5 years in 
prison and $250,000 in fines. The NET Act detached the calculus for 
mitigating infringements from the demonstrable or potential financial 
harm experienced by the copyright holder. 
•	 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, October 1998—
The CTEA added 20 years of additional copyright protection to exist-
ing terms (moving, for example, the base term for single-authored texts 
from the life of the author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 
years). Notably, the law was constructed to apply not just prospectively 
but retroactively. This had the effect of “freezing” the cut-off point for 
works entering the public domain at 1922, where it will remain until 
2018, barring no further term extensions. As a result, research on ma-
terials from 1923 forward, which would have been freely available, has 
been delayed owing to the possibility of copyright entanglements. 
•	 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, October 1998—The 
DMCA criminalized circumvention of digital rights management 
(DRM) systems without significant attention to whether the use 
prompting that circumvention should qualify as a fair use of the under-
lying text. Putting the DMCA to test, Wendy Seltzer, lawyer, teacher, 
and founder of Chilling Effects, snipped the NFL copyright notice 
during the 2007 Super Bowl and posted it on YouTube. The television 
notice includes a voiceover: “This telecast is copyrighted by the NFL 
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for the private use of our audience. Any other use of this telecast or of 
any pictures, descriptions, or accounts of the game without the NFL’s 
consent, is prohibited.” Within 5 days, Seltzer received a YouTube no-
tice that the copyright notice clip had, ironically, been removed due 
to a DMCA copyright violation reported by the NFL. Seltzer sent a 
counter-notice and argued that the clip was being fairly used for teach-
ing purposes. The clip was re-posted, but then removed again after the 
NFL sent YouTube a second takedown notice (see Cheng, 2007; Seltzer, 
2007).
•	 The Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization 
(TEACH) Act, November 2002—While purportedly directed at 
expanding opportunities for use of copyrighted materials in distance 
learning environments, the TEACH Act offers a cumbersome and re-
strictive set of rules that place both instructors and their home institu-
tions at considerable risk for practices once considered unremarkable 
in classroom settings. If, for example, an instructor in a face-to-face 
classroom chooses to screen the University library’s copy of Charlie 
Chaplin’s 1923 short The Pilgrim to prompt a discussion of Chaplin’s 
depiction of the Mexican border at that time, that use is widely un-
derstood as acceptable, reasonable, and fair. Under the TEACH Act, 
screening the same film in a distance-learning classroom would be cur-
tailed, as only “reasonable and limited portions” of dramatic, literary, 
or audiovisual works are allowed (p. xx).
The aggregate effect of these laws is the replacement of our founders’ ap-
proach to copyright with a more restrictive copyright regime—a regime that 
might fairly be described as “Copyright 2.0” were it not for the implicit sug-
gestion that version 2.0 of any given concept is an improvement upon what is 
retroactively thought of as version 1.0. 
In 1994, in the early days of public access to the World Wide Web, John 
Perry Barlow famously wrote, “intellectual property law cannot be patched, 
retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized expression any more than real 
estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum.” 
But Copyright 2.0 is a regime of patching and retrofitting. Copyright 2.0 stub-
bornly clings to print practices as the model for how we are to interact with 
and understand digital media. Meanwhile, in his classrooms, Rob Dornsife is 
working to help his students unthink the printed page and all of the baggage 
associated with it before they commence writing. Dornsife embraces the notion 
that in the 21st century, ideas are “born digital” and need not map onto the 
conventions and demands of print. Copyright 2.0 stubbornly demands print-
based patterns of “ownership,” where Dornsife calls for digital “stewardship.”
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COPYRIGHT 3.0?
Ironically, Copyright 2.0’s restrictive and criminalizing policies were so-
lidified and stabilized just prior to the recognition of a generational shift in 
the social use and functionality of the Internet’s core applications, commonly 
referred to as “Web 2.0.” While the Web was filled with people leveraging its 
potential for networking and publishing, the United States Congress was busy 
drafting laws that sharply curtailed the use, appropriation, and even critique of 
copyrighted materials in Internet spaces. In his article for this volume, Jeffrey 
Galin argues that “corporate interests have achieved a decided advantage” in 
a running debate over the limits of fair use. Galin also cites Carol Silberberg’s 
assessment that restrictive trends now in place “will eventually eliminate fair 
use for schools, colleges, and universities” altogether. On a bad day, I might be 
persuaded that Silberberg is right.
I have long argued that academics are the canaries in the coal mine of copy-
right jurisprudence. In particular, teachers of writing and composition—given 
the nature of their work—develop a particularly keen sense of both the oppor-
tunities and obligations facing composers when they wish to build upon oth-
ers’ ideas. Like Russel Wiebe, many compositionists have had to struggle with 
the apparent tension between their endorsement of works like Sherrie Levine’s 
allegedly “plagiaristic” appropriations of Edward Weston’s photographs and in-
stitutional demands for the policing of plagiarism. And many of us have felt 
the air grow by turns thin and foul when we have engaged with the practical 
realities of 21st-century copyright laws. 
But I have tired of the “canary in the coal mine” analogy, and here’s why: 
My colleagues are not helpless little birdies in tiny cages, singing their little 
lungs out, blissfully unaware of the fact that their singing serves only to protect 
those who are carrying them into danger.
Although much of the work in this volume is diagnostic, much of it is also 
directed at action. Some of this action can be as personal as Bob Whipple’s re-
visitation of the function and meaning of the commonplace book as the genre 
is ported to digital spaces. But some of it is overtly political, including many 
of the efforts of the Intellectual Property Caucus of the Conference on Col-
lege Composition and Communication (CCCC-IP) and the work of Creative 
Commons to stabilize functional alternatives to copyright’s business-as-usual 
approaches. These efforts are staving off the most egregious excesses of Copy-
right 2.0 and educating a generation of students to the range of possibilities in-
herent in the circulation, use, and appropriation of scholarly and creative work.
In the process of letting go of my analogy, I briefly considered (and quickly 
rejected) reinventing that metaphoric canary as a bird tough enough to con-
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tend with the challenges of the current Copyright 2.0 landscape. My search 
for a “tough” canary eventually led me (perhaps inevitably) to the webpage 
for a Seattle band calling itself “Killer Canary” (http://www.killercanary.net). 
The band’s site features an array of MP3 files freely distributed by the band 
for downloading if the visitor to the site so chooses. Among five tracks from 
a recent show, I recognized the title of one, “Aneurysm,” and clicked on the 
band’s cover of a well-known song from Nirvana. While Copyright 2.0 would 
demand that Killer Canary seek permissions and licensing from Nirvana, the 
practical realities of Web 2.0 have prompted Killer Canary to put the song on-
line and to assume the risk of what will—at worst—probably be a cease-and-
desist letter from legal counsel .
But is that what should happen in such a case? Here, a Seattle band posts 
a considerable amount of original music online, for free. Then, as a showcase 
of the band’s skills, the band includes a cover of a song by perhaps the best-
known Seattle band ever. This is, in addition to appropriation of Nirvana’s 
song, a form of tribute. And Killer Canary, by making this song available via 
the Internet for free, will not receive any compensation for this use of Nirvana’s 
composition. Do we, as a culture, want Killer Canary treated—even momen-
tarily—as criminal? And if I, for my own purposes, take this unauthorized 
cover song and place it in my own digital commonplace book, what is the worst 
that should happen to me? 
I wish the answers were clear and obvious, but in each of these cases Copy-
right 2.0 leaves a tiny measure of possible legal threat hovering over these banal 
acts of use and appropriation. 
We don’t yet know what “Web 3.0” will look and feel like, though it is a 
good bet that it will be faster and depend on greatly increased storage space. 
However Web 3.0 unfolds, I am confident that the use and circulation of ap-
propriated works will be a big part of how the next generation of the Web is 
structured. And I worry (as do some of my colleagues herein) about the in-
creasingly panoptic levels of surveillance that might be cheap and easy in the 
coming years. 
So what ought we do? 
Clearly, the Killer Canary approach is at odds with our various obliga-
tions. But we do have a special understanding of what it means to compose 
texts and of ways to plan for how those texts might circulate and in turn be 
used and appropriated to make new texts. So it falls to us, in part, to help 
craft the practices and policies that will ideally form the backbone of “Copy-
right 3.0.” This volume’s measured and insightful accounts of where we are, 
where we could be, and where we should be will help to point the way for-
ward. 
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9 WHAT WE TALK ABOUT 
WHEN WE TALK ABOUT FAIR 
USE: CONVERSATIONS ON 
WRITING PEDAGOGY, NEW 
MEDIA, AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Steve Westbrook
I have not even completed the opening sentence of this chapter and I may 
have already committed an act of theft. T.S. Eliot (1920) said that “mature 
poets steal” (p. 5); Roland Barthes (1977) suggested that all writers—mature or 
immature—cannot help but steal, because every text is inevitably unoriginal, a 
“tissue of quotations” (p. 146) drawn from the ready-made dictionary of a cul-
ture’s common language. By fashioning the title of this chapter after the title 
of a famous short story by Raymond Carver, I may have taken something that, 
perhaps, was not my property, or I may have simply and innocently harnessed 
the technique available to me, according to Barthes, “to mix writings” (p. 146). 
In either case, I have done what all writers ultimately do: appropriate and trans-
form material. Theoretically, because we rely on a shared system of language 
with (at any particular moment in history) a finite number of words, we would 
be unable to write or talk without “stealing” words from one another, whether 
off of the page or out of one another’s mouths. In less accusatory language, I 
might say we “share” words in order to communicate. But there is sharing and 
then there is sharing—borrowing a number of words necessarily versus borrow-
ing exact syntaxes for entire pages. Luckily, my little act of appropriation does 
not make me guilty of any crime, as far as I know, except perhaps the writerly 
crime of making a rather dull change to a perfectly good title. In my defense, 
although the subject of fair use might not be as grandiose or romantic as love, 
it appears to be at least as complicated, especially at this particular moment in 
history when copyright law—an idea designed largely to protect entire books 
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from being pirated in the print culture of early 18th-century England—is being 
applied to bits of language, sounds, and pixels from contemporary electronic 
texts and the multimedia, hypertextual cultures of the Internet. 
In Carver’s short story, four characters sit around a table drinking gin. As 
they drink, they struggle to define love—what it is, how it affects their think-
ing and their lives—often in relation to what love is not, according to conven-
tional thought: namely, abuse. Mel and Terry argue over whether and how it 
might be possible to discern if seemingly abusive behavior contains evidence 
of something called love, and as the characters talk and drink, it becomes clear 
that Carver’s story will not offer a resolution to the debate, nor will it concern 
itself with any particular outcome to any particular plot or sequence of events. 
The story is simply about a conversation taking place. In a sense, then, it is 
purely academic. 
This chapter is about an academic conversation taking place, albeit a quite 
different one. Usually, we are far too sober when we gather around a table 
or linger in our department’s hallways, talking about intellectual property in 
composition studies and trying to understand just what separates, or should 
separate, fair use from infringement and, further, how the distinction between 
these terms affects us and the writers we teach. The subject of our conversation 
may not be as ephemeral or exalted a subject as love; nevertheless, the substance 
of our talk is vital to our daily practices. It is usually motivated by a genuine 
love for freedom of speech and an accompanying desire to understand and pro-
tect fair use for ourselves and for students. It is in this spirit that I turn to the 
characters’ speech within our own story and examine the rhetoric of our con-
versation—what exactly we are saying about fair use and how we are saying it.
THE STORY WE’VE BEGUN
Our conversation has been taking place for some time now, at least since the 
founding of the Conference on College Composition and Communication’s 
Intellectual Property Caucus in 1994. Since then, as Lisa Dush (2009) suggest-
ed, this conversation might be characterized by three movements or “waves.” 
The scholarship of the first wave tends to focus on how legal policy concerning 
the World Wide Web reflects the commercial interests of the content industries 
and, in doing so, often subscribes to antiquated, Romantic notions of solitary 
authorship that do not support cultural and compositional norms of collabora-
tive practice. The second wave tends to provide a deeper inquiry into “theories 
of the public domain, fair use, and the rhetorical systems surrounding text 
ownership” (p. 114). Dush likened the tone of the conversations taking place in 
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first- and second-wave scholarship to a “wake-up call,” as compositionists tend 
to issue alarms or warnings of what might happen to both the field and prac-
tice of composition if those of us teaching writing do not keep abreast of legal 
changes, understand how proprietary biases might stifle writers’ freedoms, and 
protect our own and our students’ right to fair use. Dush suggested that within 
the current third wave of scholarship, compositionists have just begun moving 
beyond the wake-up call and turning toward the subject of pedagogy. It is this 
pedagogical turn in our conversation—“the question of how we talk with stu-
dents about copyright and IP issues” (p. 115, Dush’s emphasis)—that deserves 
further address.
The turn Dush described has come about for a number of reasons, all of 
which have to do with the changing nature of student texts and the contexts 
of their distribution; to some degree, the turn is a result of practical necessity. 
Today, students often compose new media texts by appropriating sounds, im-
ages, and hypertext from the work of others, and they often distribute these 
texts in both academic and public spheres. Students in my classes, for instance, 
have brought their new media compositions into the classroom for purposes of 
evaluation and also posted them on Web sites or blogs for purposes of public 
communication. As a discipline, we have not been entirely correct in assuming 
that we and students may appropriate material fairly within academic environ-
ments; we have, however, worked rather successfully under this assumption. 
Also, we have been able to remain largely immune to the problem of infringe-
ment when we confine the circulation of texts to the classroom. In this case, 
texts simply do not reach a wider audience and do not participate in external 
economic markets: In short, because virtually no one sees them, virtually no 
one is aware of whether they might infringe on copyright. However, when texts 
traverse academic and public arenas, they radically complicate the question of 
fair use; this is especially true for non-print genres that rely on appropriated 
images or audio clips. For instance, while I might be able to appropriate eight 
words from Raymond Carver’s short story within the context of this print essay, 
I might not be able to appropriate the same number of words within the con-
text of a song or a multimedia text published on the Internet. 
In fact, the economic value of sampled language within the entertainment 
industry has made it seemingly difficult to appropriate even a small number of 
words without facing threats of litigation. In the landmark case Grand Upright 
v. Warner (1991), Gilbert O’Sullivan sued rapper Biz Markie for appropriat-
ing three words (“alone again naturally”) and a small portion of music from 
one of his songs. Although Markie’s song “Alone Again” repeats only these 
three words—all of the other lyrics are original—and samples only a portion 
of O’Sullivan’s melody, this instance was found to be one of copyright infringe-
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ment. Without recognizing any sense of irony, the judge who heard the case, 
Kevin Thomas Duffy, began his opinion by appropriating four words from Exo-
dus 20:15—“Thou shalt not steal”—and proceeded to claim that Biz Markie 
was not using material fairly; Markie was, in fact, guilty of theft. Although I do 
not have the time or space here to address what exactly makes Biz Markie’s use 
of appropriated language “theft” and Judge Duffy’s appropriated language “quo-
tation,” I find it important to note, for the moment, the complications and con-
fusions in determining fair use and the particular legacy of this case. Since the 
ruling, which led to the development of the clearance industry within the music 
business, the process of sampling language—whether melodic or verbal—has 
become increasingly expensive. According to attorney Alan Korn (2007), major 
record companies now seek a flat fee of $100–5000 per sample or $.01–.07 in 
royalties per sale. Lucky for me, I am not singing the title of this chapter. 
Although not as expensive as music samples, appropriations from visual 
images can carry a significant price tag and, when not officially permitted, 
can lead to accusations of infringement. Martine Courant Rife (2009) cited 
four recent trials concerned with the use of copyrighted visual images: Mattel 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions aka Tom Forsythe (2003); Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp. (2003); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. 
(2003); and Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley (2006). The subjects 
of these cases range from the display of Barbie dolls in fine art photography 
to the reproduction of Grateful Dead posters in a coffee table book. The out-
comes of the trials vary. Regardless, all of them point to the unique problem of 
visual images within copyright law. While the music business has its clearance 
industry, the fields of art, art history, and publishing have permissions clauses 
and chases. For instance, while art publishers rarely require authors to obtain 
permission to quote from other writers in their texts (except in the case of whole 
works or very lengthy quotations), they have defaulted to the practice requiring 
authors to obtain permissions for reproducing artworks they comment upon. 
Seeking and paying for rights to visual reproduction have become enormous 
problems. The College Art Association’s Committee on Intellectual Property 
(2004) has described these processes as overly “complex, painstaking, and fi-
nancially onerous” (p. 4), and publishers have actually begun suggesting that 
art historians avoid using images altogether because they have become “impos-
sibly expensive” (Bielstein, 2006, p. 101). Relying on an animated icon from 
popular culture, Jonathan Lethem described the general problem of attempting 
to use visual images instead of words this way:
the truth is I could write a whole book ... describing [Homer 
Simpson’s] yellow skin and protuberant eyes, and no one 
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would ever be able to block my choice as an artist there, or 
make it too expensive for me to do it. But if a visual artist or 
a filmmaker or a digital montage maker tried to capture that 
image, which is just part of a visual language that is floating 
around, they wouldn’t have my freedom. (Benfer, 2007)
By citing these examples, I don’t mean to suggest that students are in a posi-
tion equivalent to that of established musicians and artists within the publish-
ing and entertainment industries (although some of them, in fact, are), but I do 
mean to suggest that when their work enters a public forum, it is subject to the 
same laws and perceptions of law, which largely favor the content industries. 
Given this complication, let me return to Dush’s question: How are we talk-
ing with students about copyright and IP issues? More specifically, what are we 
saying about fair use to 21st-century writers who have already moved beyond 
the confines of traditional print technology to appropriate images, sounds, or 
electronic text in Web writing and new media projects?
WHAT OUR TEXTBOOKS TELL US
Although textbooks and handbooks may not offer the most accurate re-
flections of how individual teachers discuss fair use in their classrooms, they 
remain the most widely available pedagogical materials for study and, as such, 
offer insight to our discipline’s larger conversation with students. To an extent, 
they reveal our field’s assumptions about what students do and do not need to 
know about fair use in an era of new media.
One of the most common assumptions found in our pedagogical materi-
als—one that I think most of us subscribe to and support—is that students’ 
experience of writing instruction should be relevant to their public lives; more-
over, the texts they produce should be designed for use inside and outside of 
the classroom. In Seeing and Writing 3, a visual rhetoric textbook that offers 
some opportunity for new media production, Donald McQuade and Christine 
McQuade (2006) articulated one of their goals as cultivating “skills identified 
with both verbal and visual literacy” that will “enable [students] to learn, recog-
nize, understand, and create compelling and convincing messages for audienc-
es within and beyond the halls of higher education” (p. 4). This is a fine goal. 
Of course, if this is our goal, and if students are already producing texts that 
circulate in academic and public spheres, then their work is subject to the prob-
lems associated with copyright law that I have described above. It is somewhat 
surprising, then, that McQuade and McQuade’s textbook, which concerns the 
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appropriation and integration of visual images, does not mention issues of in-
fringement or fair use, and perhaps even more surprising that this absence is 
not particular to their textbook. Rather, it is indicative of our conversation as a 
whole: If we talk about fair use at all, we don’t talk much.
Citing Sources
Our pedagogical materials reveal three approaches to discussing the subject 
with students, the first two of which address fair use only tacitly. In the first 
approach, textbook authors do not mention fair use or permissions explicitly, 
but rely on the incorrect assumption that source materials—mainly visual im-
ages—are being used fairly if they are cited according to prevailing academic 
conventions. For instance, in Writing in a Visual Age, Lee Odell and Susan 
Katz (2006) tell students that “all visuals copied from another source should be 
cited, either in the caption or in the text, according to the documentation style 
you are using” (p. 623). Although Odell and Katz position students to write 
brochures and newsletters for public consumption, they do not introduce the 
subject of permissions or reveal to students that the conditions for determining 
fair use are independent of documentation: That is, in public contexts, new 
media writers might cite a source with utmost accuracy but might still infringe 
on copyright if they have not acquired permissions, depending upon the pur-
pose, nature, amount, and effect of their appropriative compositions. Biz Mar-
kie cited his source; he was found guilty of infringement. 
A number of visual rhetoric textbooks rely on the misconception that stu-
dents need only be concerned with accurate documentation of visual images, 
including Design, Compose, Advocate (Wysocki & Lynch, 2007) and Beyond 
Words (Ruszkiewicz, Anderson, & Friend, 2006). In the latter text, Ruskiewicz 
et al. exaggerate writers’ liberties. When offering students advice for beginning 
a visual collage of images downloaded from the Web, they state that “you can 
find images for your collage just about anywhere ... Use Google or another 
online search engine ... and remember to save citation information” (2006, p. 
145). They do not suggest to students that they may need not only to cite their 
sources but also to acquire permissions for the images they download. Although 
the authors’ underlying assumption might be that the use of appropriated im-
ages for this project is so radically transformative (within the context of a col-
lage) that it clearly qualifies as fair use, this logic remains tacit, and the entire 
subject of fair use and permissions goes unmentioned. Further, while assuming 
that citing appropriated images is enough, the authors misdirect students by 
suggesting they use images from “just about anywhere”—a step toward poten-
tial copyright infringement—rather than leading them toward freely available 
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resources like Creative Commons, where they might find images that are des-
ignated as clearly appropriable under specified conditions. While encouraging 
students to engage in public, multimedia composition, these textbook authors 
revert to the discipline’s default-treatment of student writing as if it were iso-
lated to the classroom; they misapply academic standards to public writing. I 
suspect this is the case because they are mired in the ideology of our field: They 
don’t readily consider the prospect that student writing—which, historically 
within composition and rhetoric, has served mostly as disposable evidence for 
evaluation—might have consequences in the public sphere. 
Silencing Potential Conversations
If the first approach to our conversation with students errs on the side of 
attributing writers too much freedom, the second errs on allowing too little. 
Rather than present the question of fair use as contextual and subject to de-
bate, textbook authors subscribing to this second approach inform students 
that seeking permissions for appropriated material is mandatory. This assump-
tion can be found in a number of our pedagogical materials, including Pictur-
ing Texts (Faigley, George, Palchik, & Selfe, 2004), Everything’s an Argument 
(Lunsford & Ruszkiewicz, 2004), The McGraw-Hill Guide (Roen, Glau, & 
Maid, 2009), and Designing Documents and Understanding Visuals (Munger, 
2008). In this last text—a handbook for students engaged in visual produc-
tion—Roger Munger (2008) presents the problem of appropriation this way: 
“If you include copyrighted visuals in a document you intend to publish (in 
print or on the Web), you must credit your source and obtain written permis-
sion from the copyright holder” (p. v-31). The language of this imperative is 
echoed elsewhere: “if you are going to disseminate your work beyond your 
classroom—especially by publishing it online—you must ask permission for 
any material you borrow from an Internet source” (Lunsford & Ruskiewicz, p. 
408); “if your writing will be made available to an audience beyond your class-
room ... you will need to ask permission to use any visual from a source that 
you include” (Roen et al., p. 822); “if you use someone else’s images, including 
those you find on the Web, you need to obtain permission from the owner” 
(Faigley et al., p. 455). Although this rhetoric acknowledges the very real prob-
lem of permissions in the public sphere, it oversimplifies the complexity of this 
problem by reverting to the language of mandates; here, students “must” and 
“need to” seek permissions, even though—according to the law—this may not 
be the case. The very concept of fair use is designed to provide writers and 
artists the liberty not to seek permissions in cases where they are, for example, 
working toward the cultural and intellectual advancement of society, using 
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material for educational or journalistic purposes, or asserting their protected 
right to free speech. Practically speaking, Heartfield, Duchamp, Picasso, War-
hol, Rauschenberg, and many more modern artists would not have been able 
to produce art if they had always sought to obtain permissions. More recently, 
pictures of Abu Ghraib would not have been seen by the American public if 
reporters had heeded the mandates for permission seeking listed above.
The problem I see in this approach to discussing the appropriation of copy-
righted materials is that its permission-seeking imperative obfuscates or even 
erases the concept of fair use, which disappears from the conversation before a 
productive dialogue can even get started. When permission seeking is treated as 
mandatory, the authority for determining whether appropriated materials may 
be used is placed entirely outside of the borrowing writer’s purview; the writer 
is thus stripped of her agency and ability to participate in a complex process of 
decision-making. Instead, the permission granter is free to say “no” to a request 
for reproduction, and the permission seeker is beholden to this decision. Recog-
nizing this problem, fair use advocates have begun waging a campaign against 
unnecessary permission chases. In her scholarship on the issue, Rife (2009) sug-
gested to teachers and students quite plainly that “we should not ask permissions 
every time” we seek to use copyrighted material (p. 148). When discussing the 
reproduction of visual images in his recent book, Peers, Pirates, and Persuasion, 
John Logie (2006) stated that: “while I have done my best to identify and ac-
knowledge the copyright holders for these images, I have determined not to seek 
permissions for these obviously fair uses” (p. 149). The logic of this determination 
works to deny ultimate power to holders of derivative rights, to recover a sense 
of agency and authority for the writer who relies on appropriative practices, and 
to counter abuses of copyright law that scholar-activists like Logie feel are too 
proprietary in nature. In short, Logie has made the decision to assert his right to 
fair use to protect this very right from disappearing; the motive underlying Rife’s 
advice fulfills a similar purpose. Of course, both Logie and Rife make their asser-
tions from positions of expertise: they are obviously familiar with the four factors 
used to determine fair use according to U.S. Code and they have been exposed 
to four-factor analyses (the decision-making process that the law relies upon to 
distinguish fair use from infringement). It is this very step—exposure to defini-
tions of fair use and four-factor analysis—that has been left out of the textbooks 
surveyed above and the majority of those produced with our discipline. 
Engaging Fair Use
The third approach to discussing fair use is the rarest; it is also the most 
important, for it exposes students to the four factors of fair use and attributes 
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to them the agency to decide whether permission-seeking is necessary. This 
approach takes two forms. The first, as exemplified by Designing Writing 
(Palmquist, 2005), does not reproduce the four factors but asks students to 
consider “copyright and fair use regarding the use of digital illustrations, such 
as photographs and other images, audio clips, video clips, and animations” (p. 
28) and refers them to the law itself by way of a URL that contains the actual 
text of the fair use provision as articulated in Title 17. In the second form, 
textbook authors reproduce and discuss the four factors by way of questions 
students may ask themselves about the use of copyrighted materials. Somewhat 
paradoxically—and I have no good explanation for this—the handbook that 
includes the most robust discussion of fair use is one designed largely for print 
culture and contains only limited discussions of new media composition. In A 
Writer’s Resource, Elaine Maimon, Janice Peritz, and Kathleen Yancey (2008) 
offer students exposure to four-factor analysis during one of their brief discus-
sions of new media and Internet technology. I reproduce their advice in full: 
The popularity of the World Wide Web has led to increased 
concerns about the fair use of copyrighted material. Before 
you post your paper on the Web or produce a multimedia 
presentation that includes audio, video, and graphic elements 
coped from a Web site, make sure that you have used copy-
righted material fairly. The following four criteria are used to 
determine if copyrighted material has been used fairly:
•	 What is the purpose of the use? Educational, nonprof-
it, and personal use are more likely to be considered fair 
than is commercial use. 
•	 What is the nature of the work being used? In most 
cases, imaginative and unpublished materials can be used 
only if you have the permission of the copyright holder.
•	 How much of the copyrighted work is being used? If 
a writer uses a small portion of a text for academic pur-
poses, this use is more likely to be considered fair than if 
he or she uses a whole work for commercial purposes. 
•	 What effect would the use have on the market for the 
original? The use of a work is usually considered unfair 
if it would hurt sales of the original. (p. 269)
The language here echoes the fair use provision in Section 107 of Title 17, 
and mimics the kind of analysis practiced regularly by professional artists, li-
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brarians, writers, and legal experts alike. It approximates the sort of analytical 
questioning judges engage in when making decisions on copyright cases. 
Here, as well as in Designing Writing, textbook authors move away from the 
language of imperative. Maimon and colleagues (2008) do not suggest that 
students “must seek permissions” but that they should “make sure” they have 
“used copyrighted materials fairly,” and Palmquist (2005) states that students 
“might need to request permission” (p. 28, my emphasis). While the differ-
ence between “must” and “might” may seem negligible, it represents a dramatic 
change in constructions of student identities and understandings of copyright 
law. The more nuanced language of ambiguity invites students to participate 
in larger processes of analysis and negotiation, to which they should be exposed 
if they are being treated professionally as writers in a new media culture and 
as citizens in a democracy. Rather than hide the complications of determining 
fair use in a strangely paternal fashion, it exposes them to these complications 
and, in doing so, positions them to be agents responsible both for their deci-
sions as critical thinkers and for the consequences of these decisions within 
public culture. 
WHAT MIGHT WE SAY? A CASE IN POINT
The introduction of four-factor analysis within the pedagogical materials of 
our field is, of course, only a preliminary stage in engendering a larger conver-
sation about writing and fair use. In the remainder of this chapter, I build upon 
the discussion of fair use initiated by Palmquist (2005) and by Maimon et al. 
(2008). More specifically, I draw from one case study to suggest how and why 
we might further pursue this conversation in our classrooms so that we better 
prepare students to conduct fair use analysis within the contexts of their own 
textual production and its online dissemination. 
In 2003, thousands of internal emails from Diebold, the largest manufac-
turer of electronic voting machines, were leaked and spread across the Inter-
net. Because these emails revealed serious flaws in the reliability of Diebold’s 
voting machines—which had been used in national elections—and exposed 
their vulnerability to hacking, Diebold sought to immediately contain their 
dissemination. The company did so by invoking copyright law, specifically a 
provision from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. They sent a flurry of 
cease and desist letters not simply to Internet users who were displaying this 
material on their Web sites but to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who were 
hosting these Web sites. In one instance, when Diebold discovered that Nelson 
Pavlosky and Luke Smith, Internet users and students at Swarthmore College, 
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were displaying contents from the email archive on their Web site, they sent 
cease and desist letters to three parties associated with the allegedly infringing 
Web site: Swarthmore College, the students’ ISP; Online Policy Group, the ISP 
for an IndyMedia Web site that contained a hyperlink to Pavlosky and Smith’s 
site; and Hurricane Electric, Online Policy Group’s upstream provider. In their 
letter to Swarthmore, attorneys for Diebold stated the following: 
The website you are hosting infringes Diebold’s copyrights 
because Diebold Property was placed on this website without 
Diebold’s consent. The purpose of this letter is to advise you 
of our clients’ rights and to seek your agreement to the fol-
lowing: (1) to remove and destroy the Diebold Property con-
tained at the web site identified in the attached chart and (2) 
to destroy any backup copies of the Diebold Property in your 
possession or under your control. (Cohn & Seltzer, 2004, p. 
6)
Faced with the threat of litigation, most individuals and ISPs who received 
cease and desist letters from Diebold removed the allegedly infringing material 
and/or hyperlinks to this material immediately. Swarthmore College was no 
exception. The institution succumbed to pressure from Diebold and stopped 
hosting Pavlosky and Smith’s site even though it was related to an academic 
study of electronic voting authored in preparation for an academic conference, 
“Choosing Clarity: A Symposium on Voting Transparency.”
 Although their site was removed by Swarthmore, Pavlosky and Smith re-
fused to accept Diebold’s claim of infringement, for they considered the use of 
the appropriated material journalistic, fair, and protected under their constitu-
tional rights. In the words of Pavlosky, Diebold’s tactic of invoking copyright 
law effectively to censor access to materials of public interest represented ‘‘a 
perfect example of how copyright law can be and is abused by corporations” to 
prevent freedom of speech (Schwartz, 2003, p. 1). The students joined forces 
with Online Policy Group, which had refuted Diebold’s cease and desist let-
ter through claims of fair use and, further, had refused to stop hosting In-
dyMedia’s Web site or remove its hyperlink to the email archive in question. 
Together, Pavlosky, Smith, and Online Policy group sued Diebold, asserting 
the company’s accusation of infringement “was based on knowing material 
misrepresentation,” an actionable claim under a provision of the DMCA (17 
U.S.C. 512(f)) and, furthermore, “interfered with [the] contractual relations” 
between the students and their Internet service providers (Online, 2004, p. 2). 
As is now widely known, they were successful in court; the judge hearing the 
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case found that Online Policy Group, Pavlosky, and Smith had all used mate-
rial fairly and that Diebold had, indeed, abused the tenets of copyright law for 
its own self-interest, essentially as a public relations effort to remove material 
damaging to its reputation. 
Luckily, when faced with a censorial copyright claim, Pavlosky and Smith 
did not acquiesce to Diebold’s or Swarthmore’s decisions or heed the advice of 
composition textbooks that suggest writers must have permission to use copy-
righted material; if they had not asserted their agency to publish their appro-
priated material, the Diebold scandal may have been effectively covered up 
through the misuse of copyright law as a censoring mechanism. The problems 
of electronic voting and questionable election results may not have been ex-
posed to public scrutiny, and the California legislation that banned the use of 
Diebold’s faulty voting machines may not have been developed. In short, these 
students’ ability to conscientiously resist seeking permissions mattered; it had 
economic, political, cultural, and legal consequences in the public sphere. Of 
course, in this story, the students were not the ideal, docile subjects constructed 
by most composition textbooks.
The story of their case, Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., is important 
here for two reasons. First, it suggests the need to develop our conversations 
with students in ways that better acknowledge how contested appropriations 
of new media can be in the public sphere, what sort of censorial pressures con-
temporary writers can face, and what sort of issues are at stake when rights to 
fair use are determined or asserted. In this example, two writers reproduced 
appropriated material and created a hyperlink to this material, which led to a 
significant contestation of authorial agency, control, and power. Further, this 
contestation was characterized by the sort of hegemonic and counter hegemonic 
positioning that, according to Rosemary Coombe (1998), “is operative when 
threats of legal action are made as well as when they are acted upon” (p. 9). In 
light of this reality, it becomes clear that willful ignorance of fair use or simple 
acquiescence to copyright holders’ demands—the trends of our textbooks—
are not sufficient for students, and our conversation needs to move well beyond 
these norms. Second, the case reveals how we might develop conversations with 
students by examining the very process of fair use analysis.
In his decision in favor of the Online Policy Group, Pavlosky, and Smith, 
Judge Fogel claimed that “Diebold knowingly materially misrepresented that 
Plaintiffs infringed Diebold’s copyright interest, at least with respect to the 
portions of the email archive clearly subject to the fair use exception” (Online, 
2004, p. 7). Pivotal to the overall decision on material misrepresentation was 
the right to fair use, which Fogel concluded was applicable to the students’ 
appropriative composing practices. In his determination of whether their use 
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of material was indeed fair, Fogel quoted Section 107 of Title 17 (the fair use 
provision) in its entirety and engaged in the sort of four-factor analysis that 
Maimon et al. (2008) approximated (on a much smaller scale) in A Writer’s Re-
source. In his summary judgment, he analyzed each of the four factors: (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
When discussing the first of the four factors, legal experts often address the 
key questions of whether appropriations of copyrighted material are used for 
commercial, nonprofit, or educational purposes, and whether the function of 
the use is transformative (i.e., beyond mere reproduction). In his discussion of 
this factor, Judge Fogel concluded that the primary purpose of the use in ques-
tion was to inform the public through a form of journalistic criticism. In this 
sense, the use was both noncommercial and transformative. None of the parties 
involved sought to profit from the publication of the email archive (it was not 
being sold) and the archive itself was transformed within its new publication 
context. Fogel stated, “Plaintiff ’s and IndyMedia’s use was transformative: they 
used the email archive to support criticism that is in the public interest, not 
to develop electronic voting technology” (Online, 2004, p. 6). In other words, 
the content of the emails was no longer being used to communicate problems 
with voting machines (for the purpose of improving the machines and making 
them a more saleable product); rather, it had been “reframed,” as the plaintiff ’s 
attorneys had suggested, “as part of a political discussion about the mechanics 
of democratic elections” (Cohn & Seltzer, 2004, p. 10). For these reasons—and 
emphatically because the appropriated material was used “in the public inter-
est,” a phrase Fogel deployed several times in his judgment—factor 1 was found 
to weigh in favor of fair use. 
Decisions on factor 2 tend to hinge on questions of whether copyrighted 
material is creative or factual in nature and whether it is published or unpub-
lished at the time of appropriation. When analyzing the second factor, Judge 
Fogel argued that because the material under question was, indeed, factual and 
not creative, the plaintiff ’s use of it was not infringing. In his summary judg-
ment, he claimed, “copyright law protects only creative works, not facts” (On-
line, 2004, p. 3). Although it is arguable whether emails might be considered 
“creative” (akin to “imaginative” genres like fiction or poetry), it appears that 
in this instance, the emails under examination—which consisted of “questions 
and answers from Diebold support staff, feature reports, bug reports, update 
notes” (Cohn and Seltzer, 2004, p. 11)—were used to communicate factual 
information within a business setting, and, further, were not defined by the 
kind of marketable potential that “imaginative” literature possesses. Although 
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fair use determinations tend to favor published over unpublished works, Fogel 
asserted that the unpublished status of Diebold’s archive was “not dispositive.” 
In this particular case, he claimed, “the fact that the email archive was unpub-
lished does not obviate application of the fair use doctrine,” largely because 
Diebold never intended to publish (and thereby seek profit from) the archive. 
(Online, p. 6). For these reasons, Fogel determined that analysis of factor 2 sup-
ported fair use. 
The third factor is concerned with how large a portion of a copyrighted 
work is used and how crucial or central the appropriated portion is to the 
original work. Under Fogel’s analysis, the third factor revealed particular 
complications. The plaintiffs appropriated or linked to an entire archive of 
Diebold employee email; however, as the plaintiff ’s attorneys argued in their 
request for summary judgment, this archive represented only a small fraction 
of Diebold’s total email correspondence. Furthermore, according to Pavlosky 
and Smith, they were required to post the whole archive for reasons of jour-
nalistic integrity after Diebold accused them in news reports of “taking indi-
vidual emails out of context” (Online, 2004, p. 6). Recognizing these issues, 
Fogel turned to the question of whether crucial information was reproduced. 
Diebold’s attorneys had argued that the emails contained proprietary infor-
mation “as well as Diebold trade secret information, and even employees’ per-
sonal information” (Mittelstaedt, 2004, p. 9). While Justice Fogel suggested 
that the reproduction of emails that contain proprietary code might be in-
fringing—as contended by attorneys for Diebold—he noted the defendants’ 
failure to “identify which of the more than thirteen thousand emails support 
its argument,” that is, to prove that certain emails did, in fact, contain “trade 
secrets” or strictly private, proprietary information (Online, p. 6). Given this 
failure, Judge Fogel suggested that factor 3 tended to weigh in favor of fair 
use. 
When discussing the fourth factor, Fogel contended that Pavlosky and 
Smith’s use of Diebold’s copyrighted materials had no effect on the market 
for or value of these materials. According to Fogel, the defendants could not 
prove that the appropriated email archive had any particular marketability or 
economic value in the first place: 
Diebold has identified no specific commercial purpose or in-
terest affected by the publication of the email archive ... Pub-
lishing or hyperlinking to the email archive did not prevent 
Diebold from making a profit from the content of the archive 
because there is no evidence that Diebold itself intended to or 
could profit from such content. (Online, p. 6) 
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Fogel then moved beyond the issue of the emails’ potential profitability to 
briefly acknowledge the overall economic effect of the archive’s publication on 
the company as a whole. Although he consented that Pavlosky and Smith’s use 
of materials could have a negative economic impact on Diebold—because it 
raised consumer awareness of serious flaws in their products—he found this 
to be a moot point. He stated that the use of material might have “reduced 
Diebold’s profits because it helped inform potential customers of problems 
with the machines” but concluded that “copyright law is not designed to pre-
vent such an outcome” (Online, p. 6). In his judgment, then, Fogel drew a clear 
line between the potential profitability of the appropriated material itself (the 
emails) and the result of the plaintiff ’s journalistic critique (negative publicity 
for Diebold). He clearly asserted that although copyright law might apply to 
the former, it should not be applied to the latter: That is, the law should not be 
misused or abused, as it was by Diebold, to suppress the sort of informed criti-
cal commentary characteristic of investigative reporting. 
TALKING OUTSIDE OF COURT TRANSCRIPTS 
AND COMPOSITION TEXTBOOKS
I have described Judge Fogel’s decision-making process at length here be-
cause I believe it represents exactly the sort of analytical practice we should 
expose students to and also ask them to perform. As Brian Ballentine (2009), 
Rife (2009), and others have already suggested, we would do students a great 
service by moving the four-factor analysis out of the courtroom and into the 
classroom. We should provide opportunities, particularly for those composing 
for the Internet or in new media, to understand how four-factor analysis might 
apply to existing texts (by examining cases such as the one described above) 
and to their own in-process works so that they can be in better command of 
the work they produce for both academic and pubic audiences. As Rife (2009) 
recommended, developing a fair use heuristic or techne based on judges’ fair use 
determinations would enable us and our students to create “probable knowl-
edge when determining whether a use ... is likely a fair use” (p. 135). As Bal-
lentine (2009) suggested, examining four-factor analysis within the rulings of 
foundational cases such as Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios 
and MGM v. Grokster might be used for assignments and class discussion or 
debate so that they become a definitive part of the curriculum. 
The purpose of the sort of inclusion Rife (2009) and Ballentine (2009) 
recommended is not by any means to create a canon of cases or to produce 
lawyers-in-training, but, as I see it, to fulfill three goals. First, the process of 
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familiarizing students with four-factor analysis works to protect the right to fair 
use in an increasingly proprietary culture. The more people who understand 
their right to fair use, the more people who may assert this right and thereby 
influence culture and law (as Pavlosky and Smith did in the example above). 
In short, raising student awareness of the relationship between fair use and 
freedom of speech has the potential to influence policy on a broad scale. As 
Rife (2009) suggested, we are currently working within a crucial timeframe, in 
which “we still have a space to shape law by practice” (p. 150). Second, review-
ing four factors in legal cases may help foster an understanding of the ethics of 
appropriation and the struggles for power involved in this process. By examin-
ing cases, students might better understand how writing is situated within the 
public, legal, and cultural contexts that define the terms of its reception. With 
student work brought out of isolation, they may be better prepared to negoti-
ate these contexts successfully. Third, and most importantly, familiarity with 
four-factor analysis might help increase student agency as writers in at least two 
particular ways. 
First, it may influence their capacity for rhetorical decision-making and 
sharpen their critical thinking skills. Four-factor analysis is, by nature, rhetori-
cal; for instead of relying on any sort of transcendent rules, it utilizes criteria 
that are radically contingent upon context. As suggested above, each decision 
about fair use is made on a case-by-case basis, and each factor used to deter-
mine this decision is weighed within a specific context of use. In other words, 
one cannot make the kind of overarching determination that would insist, for 
example, that works reproducing 60% of copyrighted material are infringing 
while works reproducing 59% are not. Instead, one would have to analyze the 
third factor—the amount of material copied—by examining situational phe-
nomena: how text is produced and reproduced within sets of particular circum-
stances. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., the reproduction of an entire 
email archive was found fair; in Grand Upright v. Warner the reproduction of 
three words and several notes was found infringing. This sort of analysis, then, 
situates decisions and decision-making as always within the realm of argument; 
it requires students not to offer ultimately correct answers, but to participate 
critically and actively in cultural and textual debate while asking questions re-
lated to context, genre, and power. 
Second, four-factor analysis might increase student agency by making them 
more cognizant of their rights as writers. As Rife (2007) suggested, students are 
often uninformed about fair use and misunderstand its relevance to their work. 
Rife cited the example of a student who unnecessarily “purchased every image 
she used when creating new media class assignments” to insure the avoidance 
of infringement (p. 156). Teaching four-factor analysis, Rife argued, encour-
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ages students to make more informed composing choices and improves their 
information literacy. Applying the factors to their own work, students may 
better determine when, why, and how to appropriate and integrate material 
from sources and whether to seek permissions; they may be better armed to 
make their own informed decisions about whether to risk accusations of in-
fringement; and they may more thoroughly understand what Rife called the 
economic, social, and legal “infrastructure” that affects composing practices. 
Ultimately, Rife insisted that students “need to know what their options are 
in order to act responsibly and within their own political, social, spiritual, and 
personal beliefs” and she suggested that teaching the four factors provides them 
“a high level of knowledge coupled with a high level of agency” (p. 172). 
I find the issue of agency—the radical notion of allowing students respon-
sibility for their decisions—perhaps the most compelling reason for talking 
more substantially about fair use and introducing four-factor analysis. As writ-
ing teachers, we are responsible for helping students make informed composi-
tional choices;, ultimately we are not in charge of deciding whether they can 
or cannot appropriate and reproduce images, sounds, or portions of hypertext 
in work that crosses academic and public boundaries. It is not our job to offer 
them imperatives about whether they must seek permissions when they borrow 
material or whether they must remove allegedly infringing material from their 
compositions upon receipt of a cease and desist letter. It is high time we move 
beyond such mandates, and, as Ballentine (2009) suggested, facilitate class-
room discussion that is “informative without being prescriptive” (p. 86), that 
is, discussion that provides students knowledge of concepts and consequences 
by exposing them to the factors at play. I recommend we talk with students 
about fair use in a way that enables them, as Rife (2009) suggested, to “in-
sert themselves into larger conversations” about writing, culture, power, and 
law, and, within these conversations, to develop their own theories about their 
work. In short, discussing four-factor analysis in its rhetorical complexity is a 
complicated task, but students should be exposed to—not protected from—
this complication. 
It may seem difficult to sacrifice precious class time to discussing fair use 
analysis, but it is imperative to do so. In fact, it is not a sacrifice at all. As the 
case of the two Swarthmore students demonstrates, in an era in which the 
technology of writing is changing rapidly and private and public audiences are 
collapsing, the consequences of understanding the fair use provision affect our 
basic practices as writers, our right to free expression, and—I am not being hy-
perbolic here—the very foundations of our democracy. Although conversations 
about fair use may take up class time, they may also help writers make some of 
the most significant decisions facing them today, particularly as composers of 
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new media. Frankly, I cannot think of any subject more worth talking about 
with contemporary writers—except, perhaps, love.
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10 PARODY, PENALTY, AND 
PEDAGOGY
E. Ashley Hall, Kathie Gossett,  
and Elizabeth Vincelette
INTRODUCTION 
Plagiarism has long been a central concern for the field of English and par-
ticularly for those of us specializing in rhetoric and composition. In some ways, 
this conversation can be traced back to traditional concerns in the field over au-
thorship, invention, and the value placed on a writer’s original contributions in 
a new text. But a central problem with starting a conversation about copyright 
from this point is that it foregrounds a reliance on the printed text and academ-
ic citation conventions in the equation of plagiarism with theft or copyright 
violation. With the turn to the visual in our field, and a large body of work 
emerging around multimedia and multimodal text, this frame is no longer ap-
propriate in all instances. Recently, there has been a swell in the research and 
scholarship within the field arguing that copyright matters to literacy and to 
our work as compositionists (Logie, 1998, 2006; Rife, 2006, 2007; Westbrook, 
2006, 2009). Like many of the scholars working in the field, we recognize that 
the way in which copyright matters is varied and contextual. The emergent 
focus on intellectual property represents a shift from research predominantly 
on plagiarism to a more expansive conception including the nexus of issues that 
arise with multimedia and multimodal composing. These contributions echo 
some possibilities and concerns from other fields such as legal studies, media 
studies, Web design, and information architecture, helping us push our think-
ing beyond the linear connection between copyright and plagiarism in our 
scholarship (DeVoss & Webb, 2008; Johnson-Eilola & Selber, 2007). 
There seems to be a growing consensus that copyright matters ever more in 
this late age of print and the new media that comes with it. We agree, and we 
E. Ashley Hall, Kathie Gossett, and Elizabeth Vincelette
180
accept this position as a starting point for this chapter. But, we also acknowl-
edge that the ways in which copyright matters exist on a continuum represent-
ing the interests of diverse and often opposing parties in intricate and complex 
ways. By focusing on non-alphabetic text, we hope to illuminate one of the 
ways in which the context, materiality, and modes of composition all matter 
a great deal when our agenda is to explore copyright in meaningful ways that 
move beyond reductive oversimplifications, ones which assume that any time 
another person’s work is used without proper academic citation or prior copy-
right clearance, it must be morally wrong, is likely legally inappropriate, or is at 
least academically prohibited. We think this is particularly true in the context 
of a multiliteracies pedagogy that accepts non-traditional texts circulating in 
Web 2.0 spaces as legitimate and valuable workspaces for analysis and produc-
tion. Although we agree that copyright is important, we do not intend for this 
chapter to lament the immoral and unconscionable actions of students. Doing 
this would simply bolster the agenda and interests of certain powerful parties 
in the larger debate over copyright in a variety of legal and commercial con-
texts. It would also reinforce the very position we want to push against: that 
which insists on equating plagiarism in print with other modes of intertextual 
borrowing and sampling online without regard for the change in materialities 
and purpose. Moreover, simply lamenting the dangers involved with this type 
of composing would devalue some student work by implicitly deeming them 
illegitimate or outside the scope of our interest or inquiry, and perhaps even by 
implying that these texts are illegal. 
Instead, we envision this chapter as one way of pushing the conversation 
forward by arguing that we should augment the scope of inquiry into copyright 
across our field by addressing online video in the context of YouTube. Doing 
this is a way of responding to the belief that “it is time for more of us in rheto-
ric and composition, and computers and writing specifically, to have a louder 
voice and a more persuasive say in the intellectual property debates going on 
in our culture and in our world” (DigiRhet, 2008). Yet, while this chapter is a 
response to this position, it is not simply an echo. We believe this is important 
because we see online video—especially on YouTube, as it is an increasing area 
of textual consumption and production by and for students—as remaining 
largely on the periphery of our field. Grounded in the widely held belief that 
writing is inherently social, this decision to focus specifically and exclusively 
on YouTube’s content is sensitive to the ways students are engaging with and 
responding to their peers, their culture, and even corporate America in what is 
seen predominantly as a social or leisure activity. To accomplish this goal, we 
examine the interface of YouTube, a particular Web 2.0 site that provides the 
context through which we open the conversation about how copyright matters 
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to online video texts. Using the design of the interface to begin the conversa-
tion, we address online parody videos. We have chosen to focus on parody vid-
eos in particular because they foreground practices of sampling, remixing, and 
appropriation in the composing process. The meaning-making processes in-
volved in understanding and constructing parody videos naturally rub against 
our traditional print-based notions of authorship and originality, thus inviting 
discussions related to copyright. 
To help distinguish how context is critical to this endeavor, we define what 
we mean when we employ the term “Web 2.0”and why we believe YouTube 
qualifies as a Web 2.0 site. We explore how this context changes the conver-
sation about copyright infringement—moving beyond theft and simple file 
sharing to a more nuanced understanding, revealing the complicated motives 
and decisions made in these spaces. We use the case study of “Condi Rice 
Raps,” a particular parody video, to examine parody as a genre of online video 
dependent on this nuance and complication to demonstrate the distinction be-
tween earlier appropriation practices that are highly publicized and criticized 
for being illicit. We also use this case study to illustrate what we see as a grow-
ing form of expression that intentionally relies on appropriation to recompose 
new meaning in online video. 
Finally, we tie this phenomenon back to the central mission of producing 
powerful communicators capable of critically consuming a range of texts and 
producing texts in which the communicators move out of defensive postures 
concerning copyright and into roles in which they actively recognize the sig-
nificance of their practices and thoughtfully engage in discourses that promote 
and promulgate the value of these practices. This ultimately allows us to re-
spond to the call issued by DigiRhet (2008) to support technological literacies 
in our classes and help cultivate students who realize, understand, and value 
a wide range of digital composing strategies, who are sensitive to the ways in 
which copyright connects with these strategies, and who can articulate and 
communicate why these strategies are important, meaningful, and legal.
WEB 2.0: FROM TEXT TO CONTEXT 
Materiality and Variegated Composing Practices
Materiality matters, and in a range of ways (DeVoss & Porter, 2006; Hay-
les, 2000; Reid, 2007; Wysocki, 2004). It matters to writing in general, but it 
takes an even more central position of importance when our writing/compos-
ing bumps against copyright issues (DeVoss & Webb, 2008). Stealing is wrong; 
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there are few who would disagree with the moral, ethical, or legal validity of 
this claim, save for the minority who choose to defy our existing conventions 
and codes out of deliberate choice, basic necessity, or ignorance. Yet, despite 
our willingness to accept the importance of materiality to a host of compo-
sition questions, we tend to forget about it when it comes to copyright and 
new media, where we heavy-handedly equate many of the appropriation prac-
tices used in new media composition with outright plagiarism in a printed 
document. In other words, as we move beyond alphabetic text into the realm 
of sound, visual, and especially online video-composing practices in Web 2.0 
spaces, we move from text to context. As rhetoricians comfortable and familiar 
with the importance of context, materiality (and, increasingly, immateriality) 
of new media compositions changes the nature of the debate we are engaged in 
concerning copyright.
We hold a basic assumption that one of our primary goals as rhetoric and 
composition specialists is to expand the literacies students bring to the class-
room and to help develop new literacies in critical, analytical ways. Indeed, this 
tenet is central to a multiliteracies pedagogy that places value on the composing 
practices our students engage in outside of the standard curriculum, inviting 
them to bring these practices into the classroom as a way of expanding their 
existing literacies and giving them valuable strategies to return to their every-
day discourse communities (Cope & Kalantzis, 2000; Selber, 2004). However, 
when some of these practices seem to cross the line between legal and illegal by 
involving copyrighted content in multimodal compositions distributed to large 
public audiences, we are presented with a set of unique challenges that force 
us to heighten our development of media literacy and technological literacy so 
we can respond appropriately and guide students responsibly. To cultivate a 
classroom of technoliterates, mere alphabetic literacy on our part is no longer 
sufficient. Instead, we need to be keenly aware of the nuances and subtleties 
involved in the variegated composing practices that we now encompass and 
facilitate in the composition classroom—ranging from the savvy and critical 
analysis of the texts circulating in popular online spaces to the production of 
multimodal texts that students can (and often will) circulate and make public 
in Web 2.0 settings.
The Digital Copyright War becomes Guerrilla Warfare
When we use Web 2.0 to describe YouTube, we do so with the awareness 
that this term is both new and disputed. Critics of using the term claim that 
the technologies and functionalities used on sites described as 2.0 have been 
around since the earliest days of the World Wide Web and, therefore, implies a 
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false sense of revision or versioning characteristic of software applications that 
use numerical naming conventions to distinguish more recent releases from 
earlier ones. The counter argument to this claim is that, although technically 
true that the functionality is not new, the uses of the spaces and sites are. Ad-
vocates of the term explain that there are two clearly different philosophies 
to architecting Web sites today; the philosophy described as Web 2.0 is fun-
damentally different from the one commonly found on Web sites in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. What makes 2.0 sites different is that the site creators 
build the architecture and the interface but do not produce the content; in-
stead, user-generated-content populates the sites. YouTube fits this model, as 
do many popular social-networking sites such as Facebook, and other types of 
media-sharing sites, such as Flickr and Delicious. This places Web 2.0 sites in 
square opposition to a traditional media Web site (think of msn.com or cnn.
com) in which the company that owns and builds the site is also the primary 
producer of content for the site. In other words, the owners of a Web 2.0 site 
produce little-to-no original content, and instead depend entirely on users to 
upload and share files to produce content and aggregate an audience. This 
clear distinction between professional, corporate authorship of content on a 
traditional media Web site and the de-professionalized prosumer authorship of 
content on a user-generated site (Anderson, 2003; Jenkins, 2006) is the basis 
for our decision to adopt the term. 
It is important to understand that when students engage in the diverse set 
of composing practices used to generate content for these sites, they often do 
so with a disregard for the fact that what they are doing is a contested form of 
composition. Certainly they don’t call it this or discuss it in these terms. But 
more importantly, they don’t conceive of it in the same ways that other interest-
ed parties do—namely the copyright holders and corporate entities interested 
in controlling the flows and uses of the material they own rights to. Perhaps 
this is the legacy we are left with in what Dànielle Nicole DeVoss and Jim Por-
ter (2006) called the post-Napster era, a period recognizing the lasting effects 
of the values embodied in the file-sharing practices characteristic to Napster 
and other similar network spaces. It is possible that this logic was so quickly ad-
opted that it became invisible in the same ways that the interface of Microsoft 
Word (and the social, economic, political, and cultural baggage that come with 
it) became invisible to us with constant use. After all, the original Napster ap-
plication was only distributed to a mere 30 people by Shawn Fanning in 1999, 
but had been downloaded by 15,000 people within a week, culminating with 
an estimated 60–80 million users at the pinnacle and decisive period in 2001 
when the site was shut down after being challenged for willful and knowing 
abetment of copyright infringement (DeVoss & Porter, 2006). The Napster 
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interface gave users the opportunity to “share” files across vast, open networks. 
The question remains: How many of the original 15,000 users really under-
stood that they were violating copyright laws, and how many of them simply 
took advantage of the affordances of the interface? 
Interestingly, though, it seems to be students who are the most implicitly 
aware of how the (im)materiality of the texts circulating in online spaces dis-
connects from our traditional conceptions of intellectual property and even 
authorship or invention. The materiality of earlier forms of artistic and intel-
lectual labor—from bound manuscripts to painted portraits to sculpted stone 
statues—were largely one-of-a-kind objects and therefore existed as rivalrous 
goods as Lawrence Lessig (2001) used the term: If I own the original, no one else 
can own it and I can easily control access to it. This materiality helps to justify tra-
ditional copyright regulations that privilege the original work of a single creator 
and recognize the intentionality and effort related to manufacturing replicas 
of the artifact in question. The physical qualities of analog productions help 
maintain the battle lines between sides jousting over copyright and intellectual 
property in offline settings. 
Yet, copyright is not synonymous with control; in fact, quite the opposite 
is true. One of the important purposes of copyright, as interpreted by Sandra 
Day O’Connor in the 1991 decision of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co., is to spur progress in the arts and sciences by making possible 
new works based on another’s “original expression.” Her decision explained 
that ideally copyright “encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.” This notion of freely using others’ content 
to create new works can be found readily in many Web 2.0 spaces where users 
can quickly and easily see, hear, experience, and then save, edit, and reuse 
digital texts. The inherent immateriality of digital texts and their concomitant 
affordances change a traditional text-based dynamic; physical manufacturing 
is no longer required, and the distribution of one copy or one thousand copies 
requires the same degree of skill and exertion, often without any loss of quality 
in comparison to the original (see Dornsife in this volume). The appropriation 
and remixing practices we see flourishing on Web 2.0 sites underscore both 
the difference in materiality and in context between these and other forms of 
composing that present copyright questions. 
In the case of online video, then, as one form of new media that intersects 
the copyright debate, the ways composers go about building freely upon other 
people’s work complicate our existing understandings and applications of copy-
right. Lev Manovich’s (2002) definition of new media includes texts that are 
necessarily digital, existing as numeric representations that can be reproduced 
and manipulated freely and easily using the appropriate hardware and soft-
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ware to interact with the files.1 The infinite reproduction and manipulation of 
digital text, Manovich argued, forces us beyond the conception of the single-
author-genius and into a new context in which the author participates inter/ac-
tively with the audience in meaning-making processes. This ultimately led him 
to propose that the logic of new media is in direct opposition to the logic of art 
in the romantic sense. This is a logic that seems instinctual, if albeit implicit, 
to the digital natives (Prensky, 2001; if we accept the term natives) of the post-
Napster era and to the work they produce and circulate on Web 2.0 sites. Yet, 
despite the soundness of this bifurcated logic grounded in the materiality of the 
text, frequently the (attempted) application of copyright disavows this impor-
tant distinction—insisting instead on the romantic conceptualization of the 
primacy of the original author (and thus often serving the agenda of powerful 
media elites). This is problematic when we recognize that copyright is not only 
important to us as educators because it is rhetorical; it is also important because 
it is highly contested in legal disputes that extend into the lives and spaces 
our students inhabit. Using the metaphor of war, DeVoss and Porter (2006) 
explained that the “cultural and ethical battles lines have been clearly drawn” 
(p. 185), situating the copyright “skirmishes” in this complicated and ongoing 
war as not just confined to courtrooms and boardrooms, but also on university 
campuses. This realization makes the case for exploring the relevance of You-
Tube videos to the copyright debate even more exigent for us. One important 
consideration that emerges is whether or not students realize their campus is a 
war zone, or that they are the perceived aggressors in this war—or even that 
they are participants in the war to begin with.
In the past (even the recent past), many appropriations of intellectual con-
tent, including those forms distributed over networks, required a cognizant 
and deliberate set of actions including the physical modification of pre-existing 
hardware and network connections typically configured by professional in-
stallers. Stealing cable is an example of this process. The tools required for this 
type of illicit activity are not sophisticated, but the sheer fact that one must 
explicitly choose to employ this set of tools to accomplish the task helps fore-
ground the act of theft. It would be difficult to suggest that someone could get 
caught up in this type of theft without realizing it. But, as more and more Web 
sites such as YouTube remediate earlier media forms by creating hybrid spaces 
that combine the structure of a webpage, a message board, a blog, and televi-
sion into a single integrated platform, user access to illegally posted copyright-
ed content increases. At the same moment, the steps a user must go through to 
access, appropriate, and reuse this content diminish. Further, casually brows-
ing or searching YouTube can often and easily lead to the consumption of ille-
gally posted copyrighted content. This concept of the (im)materiality of digital 
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works that can be easily and flawlessly reproduced and then distributed to 
large audiences is in part what leads DeVoss and Porter (2006) to describe the 
particular historical and cultural post-Napster moment as a “paradigm shift” 
(p. 188). In this transitional moment, we find that students’ ability to create, 
produce and distribute sophisticated new media texts in the form of YouTube 
videos incorporating other people’s original work is surpassing their awareness 
of the debate they are entering.
While this entire scope of activity invites a discussion concerning copyright 
and the violations and complications that arise as we witness the dominance of 
Web 2.0 sites, which increasingly rely on user-generated content, we composi-
tion instructors are particularly concerned with the instances when students 
engage in the illegal consumption and production of copyrighted content with-
out a critical awareness of their actions. Therefore, it is this aspect of the larger 
conversation that we take up in the remainder of this chapter: Exploring the 
appropriation of copyrighted content in Web 2.0 spaces to re/compose and 
respond to both specific texts, and responding to larger discourses circulating 
in the popular sphere. We begin by interrogating the nature of the interface as 
it connects directly to both the consumption and production of texts in these 
spaces, in many ways structuring the very nature of the discourse that tran-
spires on such sites. 
THE INTERFACE
If YouTube’s users aren’t primarily trying to beat the system by watching 
videos for free that they should have to pay for, then what are they doing? How 
is this different from simply downloading music? And why does it matter to 
writing? Examining the interface of YouTube can help us answer these ques-
tions.
In 1994, long before YouTube was conceived, Cynthia Selfe and Richard 
Selfe argued that the interfaces we invite into the classroom are often politically 
motivated whether we realize and accept it or not.2 Therefore, if we choose to 
invite online video into the classroom as part of a multiliteracies pedagogy, 
we must examine how the interface can be used to reveal seemingly seamless 
embedded political or legal assumptions related to copyright. Selfe and Selfe’s 
work urges rigorous reflection on our uses of interfaces in composition class-
rooms and how these uses can produce a range of outcomes spanning from 
reification of existing power distributions to renegotiation of such structures. 
Selfe and Selfe suggest that considering the role of the Web 2.0 interface and 
related metaphors might offer us a more critical and reflective understanding 
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of how informed decisions about selection and use of particular interfaces can 
help us enact and articulate the forms of social change required to engage with 
copyright issues. To employ the interface in this manner, we must make visible 
some of the dominant features of the interface itself that have become so famil-
iar to many Web users who see certain icons and buttons repeated so ubiquitous-
ly that they have become invisible.3 Then, once we have made these elements 
visible, we must develop technoliterate strategies to translate awareness into ac-
tion that promotes and protects the values that support our copyright agenda by 
making informed choices about the features embodied in the interface.
Although YouTube isn’t exactly a social-networking site in the same way as 
Facebook or MySpace, it does borrow from the conventions of this genre and 
situating it as such helps to foreground the social nature of the practices the site 
fosters. Users create accounts, entering personal information into form fields 
to represent themselves to the public and to connect with other users. Users 
don’t simply post, share, and consume files on YouTube for personal use; they 
circulate these texts in social practices, interacting with them in multiple ways 
presented within (and authorized by) the interface. These social practices are 
an important facet of the site that helps to distinguish it from other file-sharing 
sites such as Napster or LimeWire. Moreover, the idea that the texts circulating 
on YouTube are social in nature helps us link the composing practices users are 
engaged in back to our widely held belief in the field of rhetoric and composi-
tion that all writing—even user-generated videos posted and shared on You-
Tube—is inherently social.
YouTube could be used for the illegal file-sharing activities that have capti-
vated corporate attention and media coverage and that situated Napster users as 
villains who pirated copyrighted music and threatened the massive enterprises 
of the recording industries with their illicit behavior. But, importantly, that is 
not what happens most of the time on YouTube. Yes, YouTube has been chal-
lenged for acting as a facilitator of widespread copyright infringement from 
national and international corporations claiming damages. As we mentioned 
earlier, one need not look too long or hard to find copyrighted content illegally 
posted to the site. However, the motivations, practices, and uses of this copy-
righted content is often distinctly different from other forms of appropriation 
in other spaces, which have typically formed the basis of concerns over pirating 
and plagiarism. As Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart Selber (2007) persua-
sively argued, not all forms of appropriation are equal, nor are they all illicit; 
Johnson-Eilola and Selber cite as a primary example our academic peer-to-peer 
file-sharing of syllabi and plagiarism policies. Asserting that some forms of 
appropriation and reuse are consensual and understood practices in certain 
discourse communities such as Web design and architecture, Johnson-Eilola 
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and Selber’s claims can help us identify the agenda behind certain aspects of 
YouTube’s interface.
It would be logical to assume that the same threats Napster (supposed-
ly) presented to the music recording industry by allowing users to download 
copyrighted music for free would be repeated with television shows and per-
haps even full-length movies on a file-sharing site devoted to video. And some 
of the copyright suits brought against YouTube certainly rely on the extension 
of this line of reasoning. Yet examining key elements of the interface reveal 
that this is not the primary agenda of the site; the maximum length of a video 
uploaded to YouTube is 10 minutes, significantly shorter than either a movie 
or television show. If YouTube’s intention was to facilitate distribution of en-
tire television shows, the minimum time limit on a video would have to be 
at least 20 minutes (the typical length of a half-hour television show, minus 
commercials). YouTube’s interface also reveals a logic informed by the cultural 
values of the post-Napster era; every video plays on a page that presents the 
user with various ways to redistribute the content, with sharing features such 
as emailing a link, sharing via Facebook and Twitter, and embed code so that 
the video can be separated from the original context of YouTube itself and be 
integrated into a blog post or other web page. If we accept that the design of an 
interface can and often does contain metaphors that embody cultural values 
and, therefore, can be seen as advancing particular agendas, relying on Selfe 
and Selfe’s (1994) observation that, “in general, computer interfaces present 
reality as framed in the perspective of modern capitalism, thus, orienting tech-
nology along an existing axis of class privilege” (p. 486), then we can un-
derstand these affordances as communicating a willing consent to share and 
circulate freely the content appearing on YouTube. This would seem to be in 
line with the logic Justice Sandra Day O’Connor articulated in her important 
1991 decision, and also with the tendencies of the post-Napster generation of 
digital natives, liking interaction with texts of all sorts, including online vid-
eos they watch and make. 
INTERFACING THE SOCIAL AND CONTEXTUAL
These interface characteristics can help us establish a clear connection be-
tween the interface of YouTube and issues related to copyright. Users who post 
videos to YouTube are inserting their content into a setting that allows others to 
quickly and easily circulate the content in a variety of ways and contexts. The 
very decision to post video content to YouTube reveals a new cultural logic, 
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one that says “go ahead, take my video and post it to your blog, put it on your 
Facebook wall.” 
Turning to the broader organization and arrangement of the interface, 
several key features reveal that each video is at once social and contextual. 
The video player is certainly the dominant feature on the page, attracting 
the viewer’s attention with the sound and motion that begin to play as soon 
as the page loads. But all around the player are design elements that put the 
video into context. The box to the right of the video indicates the date the 
video was posted and provides the username of the author along with a tex-
tual description of the video. Below are two containers that put the video 
into context by displaying the thumbnail image, title, and number of views 
in two categories: 1) “other videos posted by this user” and 2) “related videos” 
or videos posted by other users identified algorithmically by YouTube as simi-
lar. These features of the interface are also important to authorship and the 
establishment of ethos on a site where a user’s identity can be (and often is) 
concealed and where peer review of material is informal. As such, the number 
of times a video is played, its appearance on YouTube’s “featured” list, and 
the frequency and content of responses from other users become a measure of 
credibility. This underlying logic is in stark contrast to print-based academic 
traditions where an author uses a bibliography to build credibility, or when a 
writer uses citation conventions to “showcase the author’s knowledge of re-
lated texts and to allow the author to speak to those texts he or she embraces 
or rejects” (Hess, 2006, p. 284). Therefore, when average users load Michael 
Wesch’s video “A Vision of Students Today,” for example, even if they don’t 
know who “mwesch” is, they can see that he has nine other videos that ap-
pear in the “more from: mwesch” container on the page. In addition, they can 
easily see that the top video has received over 10.9 million plays (as of June 
2010). This gives viewers a good idea—even if they don’t know that Wesch is 
a well-known professor at Kansas State University—that mwesch is an active 
participant on the site and that he creates very popular videos, thereby giving 
him higher credibility than other less active or less popular users. The viewer 
can also discern that mwesch’s videos are very effective at sparking conversa-
tion. This observation highlights a number of other key interface elements 
and returns us to the issue of copyright. 
INTERFACING COPYRIGHT
The commentary section below the video is the space where conversation 
transpires in the form of alphabetic text posted as comments and video respons-
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es. The video mentioned above, for example, has received 8,859 text comments 
and 75 video responses to date (June 2010). The 500 maximum character limit 
imposed on the text comments can, arguably, limit complications related to 
copyright matters. The video responses, however, are a different matter; instead 
of using a bibliography to account for an awareness of the ongoing conversation 
to which a composer is responding, the video functionality affords users the 
opportunity to respond in a high-context fashion, reliant on the ability of other 
users to understand the site and the connection between the source video and 
the response. This aspect of the interface design, then, reinforces the notion 
that a new and different cultural logic is at play throughout the site, one that, 
in many ways, opposes the systems and conventions we are comfortable and 
familiar with when working with print sources.
One particular scenario in which complications related to copyright come 
to the forefront is when the response video takes the form of parody; parody 
provides a lens for us to look at the connections between authorship and copy-
right because parody demands the use of someone else’s original content in the 
creation of new meaning. Using this lens affords a way to engage students in 
the serious treatment of these concepts. Moving these issues to the center of our 
pedagogy pushes us into a new and sometimes uncomfortable space, especially 
when it comes to teaching argumentation strategies, but it is precisely this move 
where we see the most opportunity. 
PARODY, AUTHORSHIP, AND PEDAGOGY
Definitions of parody and authorship inform our stance on copyright and 
parody video. Student inclinations to seek out and consume parodic content 
provides an ideal gateway for delving into working with source texts to un-
derstand how authors and composers of parody alter an original work when 
they create a new, and often subversive, message. Parody “both legitimizes and 
subverts that which it parodies” (Hutcheon, 1989, p. 117) because it requires 
the deconstruction of existing texts and (re)construction of new ones. This in-
herent duality of purpose is exactly why parody is so valuable. It requires us to 
acknowledge texts as separate and distinct, while at the same time it requires 
us to understand that the existence of an intertextual relationship; the parody 
is an offspring of the original, but it is still intrinsically tied to it. This insepa-
rable relationship between the two texts situates parody squarely in the center 
of the ongoing debate surrounding intellectual property when remixed and re-
purposed content is used to create a new work. Parody videos manifest a form 
of multimodal pastiche, reflecting infinite possibilities of reflexivity and repro-
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duction—the same qualities that cause parodies in general to conflict with no-
tions of copyright and ownership, especially when we are uncertain about how 
much copying is “too much.”
Using parody helps us reframe the conversation by moving away from tra-
ditional and simplistic treatments of copyright that equate it solely with pla-
giarism; the classroom can become a transformative space where students can 
be “social critics” (Selber, 2004, p. 95). Instead of being passively engaged with 
the texts picked for them by instructors or publishers, in which they may have 
little-to-no interest, students bring their experiences with popular video into 
the classroom, positioning themselves as stakeholders in the selection of course 
content. Ultimately, this leads to a higher level of engagement with copyright 
and its relevance to students’ everyday lives. Rather than simply laughing at a 
funny parody video, students can begin to uncover how the composer made it 
funny and then use this newfound understanding to create complex arguments 
that take the form of parodic social criticism. This moves us into the realm of 
an activist pedagogy concerned with copyright.
Invoking Awareness Rather than Inciting Fear
Instead of being taught that copyright is a cut-and-dry issue that positions 
copyright holders as the interested and powerful parties in the debate, stu-
dents can take a more informed and active role by questioning their positions 
in relation to the copyright holders, their multimodal composing practices 
mediating this encounter. All too often, we feel, copyright is understated or 
oversimplified in most of our existing pedagogical texts and approaches (see 
Westbrook in this volume, for an analysis of copyright-related textbook con-
tent). There is certainly a tremendous amount of effort and capital expended 
by corporate entities interested in perpetuating or advancing this tone con-
cerning copyright. And our campuses are not immune to the influence of 
corporate giants who would rather terrify students about what might happen 
to them if they are caught using copyrighted material inappropriately than 
educate them on how to use content effectively and legally. On our campus, 
for example, there are mouse pads in most of the computer labs with remind-
ers about illegal downloading and appropriation of copyrighted content. The 
intent of these reminders is to invoke awareness and even fear in students. 
Fear is not a productive pedagogical approach when dealing with issues as 
complicated and nuanced as copyright and fair use, especially in this particu-
lar historical moment, when many of the rules about how these practices and 
policies relate to multimodal composing remain largely undecided in both 
legal and academic realms.
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Reticence to action regarding copyright pedagogy certainly exists; this 
reticence became starkly apparent in a course discussion focusing on intel-
lectual property, copyright, and fair use in a spring 2009 graduate pedagogy 
seminar at Old Dominion University. During the discussion, the students, 
all of whom had experience teaching composition at the secondary or post-
secondary level, willingly acknowledged that when copyright does come up 
in their classrooms, they either shy away from the conversation with a sense 
that copyright and fair use issues are too complex and legalistic for them to 
delve into, or they treat them in a prescriptive manner by issuing a set of rules 
and consequences (usually related to grade penalties if the rules are broken). 
Unfortunately, these prescriptions were based on little more than hearsay and 
word-of-mouth guidelines (e.g., students could sample up to 30 seconds of 
video or audio material and still be “legal”). This is a critical moment—one 
in which our professional responsibilities, as scholars, preclude us from sim-
ply ignoring the gravity of these issues or assuming that our classrooms are 
insulated from their reach. Students will encounter more and more of these 
remixed texts; we must equip students with the literacy and agency to manip-
ulate the technologically saturated landscape they will continue to encounter 
on a perpetual and daily basis.
Composing as Technoliterates
Moving from a broad and theoretically based inquiry about new media 
authorship to a more specific investigation focused on a particular author’s 
choices when composing a video affords a prime opportunity for using parody 
videos as a scaffold for student learning. The requisite assemblage of original 
and borrowed or imitated content inherent to the parody genre allows for a 
rich exploration of concepts related to fair use and copyright. When we move 
into the area of using a new genre and a new medium, such as parody videos 
on YouTube, matters become complicated; this complication, however, is a 
positive outcome. If our end goal is to invest students with the agency to par-
ticipate in copyright debates and to produce media for digital spaces, the fact 
that matters remain unsettled might compel them even further, especially 
if they embrace their position as interested stakeholders with the potential 
to help shape the outcome of popular composing practices and the legal ac-
ceptance of these practices. This is what we envision as the embodiment of 
technoliteracy—composers who make choices intentionally and grounded in 
purposeful decisions about the rhetorical efficacy of those choices to (re)use 
copyrighted content parodically, as social criticism, and who have the capac-
ity to respond to challenges about the legality of their choices. But even for 
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those rhetoric and composition instructors who accept this as an ideal posi-
tion for students, the jump from discussing use and citation conventions of 
traditional print texts to online parody videos may at first seem like a chasm 
too wide to span. This is a challenge, certainly, but not one that is impossible 
to accomplish.
ANNE FRANCES WYSOCKI, MEET CONDI RAPS
Using existing and effective pedagogical approaches can help us in creating 
this bridge. The turn to the visual and acceptance of new media, multimedia, 
and multimodal compositions as legitimate artifacts for study in our field has 
laid the foundation for our work with parody videos on YouTube. This recent, 
but rich, tradition has offered us many possibilities and points of departure. 
We find that using Anne Frances Wysocki’s (2004) rhetorical approach for 
working with new media texts is particularly effective. Writing in 2004, before 
YouTube even existed, Wysocki anticipated many of the potentials realized on 
the site including “more, larger and smoother video to watch and analyze on 
screen” (p. 136). And while her approach—intended to cover a wide range of 
new media texts ranging from webpages to computer games—does not address 
YouTube directly as the focal site for analysis, we find that many of Wysocki’s 
techniques support our work. We envision our application of her approach as a 
model that can be adapted for use with other videos, other Web 2.0 platforms, 
or for other purposes related to working with online video. As such, we offer a 
case study of a particular parody video, “Condi Rice Raps” (volgkarate, 2007), 
illustrating how the approach might be effectively applied in an analysis of a 
parody video. 
EXAMINING VIDEO AND AUDIO
For an effective close reading of multimodal texts, Wysocki suggested that 
we break the text into parts. She provides a framework for how to do this in a 
series of steps, beginning with the visual:
1. Name the visual elements in the text. (This might include 
static images, video clips, or moving textual titles or static 
frames of text).
2. Name the designed relationships among those elements.
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3. Consider how the elements and relations connect with differ-
ent audiences, contexts, and arguments. (p. 137)
These steps can then be repeated with the audio parts of the video:
1. Name the auditory elements in the text. (This might include distinct 
sounds, a music track, vocals that are sung, spoken or rapped, or any 
combination of these elements).
2. Name the designed relationships among those elements.
3. Consider how the elements and relations connect with different audi-
ences, contexts, and arguments.
Wysocki underscored the importance of including sound in the analysis 
process by suggesting we watch “MTV without the music to hone your sense 
of what sound and visual strategies bring to texts together and separately” (p. 
137). The “Condi Rice Raps” video, which draws from the MTV tradition by 
using Fergi’s song “Fergalicious” as the basis for the parody, is a prime example 
of this concept in action. Watching the video with muted sound changes the 
viewing experience entirely and significantly impacts viewers’ ability to recog-
nize the video as a parody. For example, while watching the video on mute, 
viewers can detect that the visual part of the video contains multiple layers, 
some sampled and some original, but because viewers can’t hear the dialogue 
or the music, there is little else to help them figure out that what they are see-
ing is the intro to a parody video using C-SPAN footage and a popular song/
music video as social criticism of a political leader. Turning the sound back 
on, just nine seconds into the video, drum beats are audible, layered over the 
audio tracks that mash C-SPAN audio with original audio spoken or rapped 
by actors. 
When all three audio elements work in unison with the visual elements, it 
is clear that the whole composition is an entertaining critique of former Sec-
retary of State Condoleezza Rice. Without the sound, viewers must watch 24 
seconds of material that combines sampled and original video footage until the 
first indicator of the music video genre appears in the form of actors dancing in 
front of a marquee reading “Condoleezza.” Viewers familiar with the “Fergali-
cious” video would finally be able to recognize the parody, but not until much 
later than is possible when the audio and visual parts are played simultaneously. 
Going through this process makes apparent the deliberate and rhetorical 
changes the author employed when composing the parody. Using Wysocki’s 
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Figure 1: “Condi Rice Raps” video begins with CSPAN footage depicting 
Senator Barbara Boxer.
Figure 2: Senator Barbara Boxer is quickly replaced with the Condoleeza par-
ody figure. 
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(2004) framework helps viewers move from passive roles of consumers to 
active roles as investigators. Instead of simply smiling or laughing at the un-
usual depiction of a serious political figure who assumes the role of a highly 
sexualized rap artist in the video, viewers may be prompted to ask more spe-
cific questions about the author’s choices when selecting specific elements 
and arranging them in a particular fashion. For example, when analyzing 
the audio elements of “Condi Rice Raps,” the music is easily recognized as 
“Fergalicious” because the underlying audio track has been sampled from 
the song, but, importantly, it is not taken wholesale. Listening closely reveals 
that small fragments of the original music are cut, and then looped in a way 
that resembles the original so that it can be recognized, but is still different 
from the original in both its arrangement and composition. Once again, is-
sues of copyright demand questions about the legality of these appropriation 
practices. Without remixing the audio in this way, the parody might still be 
funny, but it would not be able to rely on the “Fergalicious” video as strongly 
for the basis of the parody and it may be less effective as a result. Therefore, it 
is possible to conclude that the decisions made by the author in this instance 
were rhetorically sound and strategic towards the creation of a specific pa-
rodic argument. 
Figure 3: “Condoleeza” marquee.
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ANALYZING COMPLEX LAYERS
Ordinarily, if our only purpose was to be entertained by a particular video 
such as the one we have chosen to study, we might notice the layers occasional-
ly, but our focus would be on the complete whole—the different parts blended 
together working as a unified text. This is precisely the author’s intention. The 
audience must be able to recognize the video as a parody and therefore be able 
to pick up on the references to the original. Yet, to be effective, the audience 
must also be able to easily identify the differences, the elements that have been 
modified to create a new meaning in the act of social critique. These modifica-
tions might exist in any or all of the layers and they might occur in sequence or 
simultaneously. Therefore, using Wysocki’s (2004) approach—which requires 
viewers to slow down or pause the video during analysis and examine each layer 
independently—can help shed light on the myriad choices the author made to 
construct each of the layers and better understand how each of the layers plays 
an essential role in the formation of a larger argument that says something new, 
funny, and critical. This approach can also help viewers classify the elements 
found in each layer into one of two very important categories: original and 
borrowed/remixed.4 We see tremendous value in completing a rhetorical read-
ing/viewing when analyzing parody videos because of their complexity and 
intentional blending of elements, layers, and modes. Using a series of work-
sheets or rubrics during this analytic process can be helpful; we have included 
several in the appendix. This type of analysis can help students gain a deeper 
understanding of parody and copyright by rhetorically analyzing the decisions 
authors make when composing parody videos and the implications these deci-
sions have for copyright matters.
Composing as Technoliterates
Once the analytical foundation has been established, students will have 
a strong basis upon which they can build when moving from analytic work 
into production. As students participate with increasing frequency in Web 2.0 
publishing outside of the classroom, they insert themselves into spaces that 
may appear harmless and safe. However, as the “peers” or “friends” comprising 
social networks grow to include politicians, artists, and corporations, students 
may quickly find themselves in adversarial encounters vis-à-vis these copyright 
holders, who may feel their rights have been infringed. In such instances, the 
battlefield, to borrow a metaphor often applied to the copyright debate by legal 
scholars such as Jessica Litman (2001), is extremely uneven. However, students 
who can draw from the theoretical understanding they have developed when 
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studying other composers and use it to articulate why their choices are rhetori-
cally effective, strategic, and, most importantly, legal will find themselves in a 
much better position than others who lack this ability.
To achieve this, activities that build upon the analysis techniques adapted 
from Wysocki (2004) can be used to help students as they begin to plan, or-
ganize and produce their own parody videos. One approach would be to ask 
students to find a video they feel invites a strong response based on the ele-
ments they can now easily identify and track when critically viewing online 
videos. Allowing students to chose their own videos rather than prescribing a 
single video for the entire class encourages further investment in the student-
as-stakeholder role. Starting from this motivated position, students can begin 
to work with their source, making decisions about what to sample and what 
to leave out with a new-found emphasis on the rhetorical nature of these deci-
sions. Then, students might be required to decide how much of the original 
needs to be altered and what other visual and audio elements they need to 
complete these alterations. As they search for and collect these elements, they 
can re-use the rubrics (included in the appendix of this chapter) to help them 
keep track of their sources and their decision-making process about why each 
source was chosen and how it is rhetorically effective in the larger composition. 
This process of moving back and forth between analysis and production and 
writing and video breaks down the often assumed bifurcation between these 
two activities. As Maria Lovett, James Purdy, Kathie Gossett, Carrie Lamanna, 
and Joseph Squier (2010) argued, “writing and video can serve to reinforce and 
strengthen an overarching intellectual journey whose end result is video, but 
whose process is writing-intensive. The goal [here] is to present video produc-
tion and writing as a creative and intellectually rigorous symbiotic process” (p. 
288). Armed with scholarly analytic methods and grounded in rigorous inves-
tigation and purposeful production, students become composers with agency 
to navigate a broad range of composing contexts while making informed deci-
sions during their research and composing processes.
CONCLUSION
If students have a sound understanding of how parody works, and that the 
choices made in remixing content to produce a parody are deliberate and rhe-
torical, they will be better positioned to intelligently engage with a copyright 
holder who might challenge their composing practices, whether they are creat-
ed for an academic assignment or for sheer entertainment as part of their leisure 
activities in a peer-to-peer online environment, such as YouTube.
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We encourage using this approach even when working with a wider range 
of new media compositions—whether understanding parody and copyright 
in the context of online video are central learning goals or not. Neither social 
criticism itself nor parody as a form of social criticism is new—but the shapes, 
forms, and practices of parody as social criticism found on YouTube power-
fully demonstrate the expansion of multimodal composing practices in popu-
lar culture. Integrating online video into the composition curriculum under a 
multiliteracies framework allows a deeper understanding of the author–text–
audience relationship. It also fulfils an appeal issued by Johnson-Eilola (2004), 
who observed that “despite the realization that our culture increasingly values 
texts that are broken down, rearranged, recombined, we rarely teach forms of 
writing that support such production” (p. 209). We view the analysis and pro-
duction of parody videos like those found on YouTube as a ripe opportunity for 
this endeavor—an ambitious process involving risk and care. We believe such 
work is valuable and even necessary as a means of expanding literacy in ways 
that are relevant to the lived experiences of students. At the moment, when 
many of our familiar print-based conventions are beginning to fail us, we must 
be prepared to negotiate murky boundaries carefully, often with little or no 
legal or academic framework delineating the rules of engagement. We believe 
that the field can no longer abdicate this responsibility; doing so would be a 
disservice to students that could lead to the devaluation of their work with un-
necessary restrictions and penalties hampering their creative and intellectual 
expressions of social criticism.
NOTES
1. We recognize that Manovich’s definition of new media has been criti-
cized as being too narrow, with Wysocki as one of his primary challengers 
contending that new media does not have to be digital. We accept that this is 
an ongoing debate, but choose to incorporate Manovich’s definition to help 
draw the contrast between copyright applied to unique material artifacts and 
copyright applied to digital compositions. 
2. Within the virtual space represented by these interfaces, and elsewhere 
within computer systems, the values of our culture—ideological, political, 
economic, educational—are mapped both implicitly and explicitly, consti-
tuting a complex set of material relations among culture, technology, and 
technology users. In effect, interfaces are cultural maps of computer systems, 
and as Denis Wood (1992) pointed out, such maps are never ideologically 
innocent or inert. 
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3. See Selfe and Selfe (1994) for a discussion of how the borders repre-
sented in interfaces have become so familiar that they have become invisible; 
also see Manovich (2002) for a discussion of how particular interfaces and 
the metaphors they use have become so familiar that they have also become 
invisible. 
4. Wysocki did not include this classification step in her initial approach 
because her focus was much broader and not concerned specifically with paro-
dy or copyright. Because ours is, we propose this addition that illustrates how 
an existing rhetorical approach can easily be scaffolded and applied to working 
with online parody videos.
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APPENDIX
Rubric for Video Analysis
Video Title: 
User/Author Name: 
Visual Elements, Relationships among Elements, and Audience
Name each visual element that you see and classify each 
one as original or borrowed.
Classification
Original Borrowed
Element 1:
Element 2:
Element 3:
Element 4:
Element 5:
Review the classifications you made above. For each item you marked as borrowed, 
explain why you think the author would make that change to form a parodic argument.
Element 1:
Element 2:
Element 3:
Element 4:
Element 5:
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Audio Elements, Relationships among Elements, and Audience
Name each audio element that you hear and classify 
each one as original or borrowed.
Classification
Original Borrowed
Element 1:
Element 2:
Element 3:
Element 4:
Element 5:
Review the classifications you made above. For each item you marked as borrowed, 
explain why you think the author would make that change to form a parodic argument.
Element 1:
Element 2:
Element 3:
Element 4:
Element 5:
Relationships between Audio, Visual, and Peripheral Elements and Audience
Descriptors
Title What implications does the title have? What expectation does 
it create? How do the visual elements conform to or disrupt the 
expectations set by the title?
Rationale Does the video offer a rationale for its content or design, either 
in the video or in an introduction or other information on the 
web page?
Genre Do the design elements of the video suggest a particular genre? 
Does it copy a certain genre, like a music video or comedy skit? 
Which of the YouTube categories has the author chosen to use 
to categorize the video? How do the tags the author has added 
relate to the chosen category?
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Authorship
Institutional, 
individual, etc.
Is there one author or multiple authors? Was the video directed 
by a university, company, or other organization? Does the 
author identify him/herself? If so, how?
Contact 
information
Does the author provide an email address and/or other contact 
information?
Ethos How does the author establish credibility? What else gives this 
author credibility (e.g., number of views for the video, number 
of times video has been “favorited,” number of sites linking to 
this video, etc.)?
Content
Emphasis Is the emphasis on one text or many? Is the emphasis on the 
context or content of documents, or on both?
Theoretical 
approach
Is there an overt theoretical point of view, such as feminist, 
Marxist, or postcolonial? How can you tell? Does the video 
directly state its theoretical stance?
Audience
Intended 
audience
Can you determine who the intended audience is? How?
Intertextuality What source texts would the audience have to be familiar with 
to understand the parody? Why is this important?
Interactivity Is this video a response to another video? Does the author invite 
a response from viewers? Has the video generated any textual 
or video responses? 
Adapted from Anne Frances Wysocki (2004). 
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11 COPY-RIGHTS AND COPY-
WRONG: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE 
CLASSROOM REVISITED
Janice R. Walker
THAT WAS THEN
Sometime in the mid-1990s, part of my graduate assistantship entailed pro-
viding support for teaching assistants introducing the Internet, including Web 
authoring, into their courses. I walked into class prepared to help an instructor 
teach students to right-click on images they found online so they could include 
them in their Web publications. My graduate research at this time had been 
centering on citation of electronic sources, which led me directly to consider-
ations of authorship—and hence to concerns about intellectual property. Yet, it 
had never occurred to me that these images belonged to someone. After all, they 
were just there. The new technologies that allowed such easy access to informa-
tion, images, and so much more, also made it very easy to save this information 
and re-use it. Suddenly, however, I realized I was standing in front of a class of 
24 undergraduate students preparing to teach them to... steal. 
In 1998, Computers and Composition published a special issue on intellec-
tual property. Guest editors Laura Gurak and Johndan Johnson-Eilola (1998) 
saw a distinct need for this focus, arguing that “few of us truly understand 
copyright, fair use, or the implications that new technologies and new legis-
lation will have on future legal decisions in our classrooms, our Universities, 
and the World at large” (p. 121). John Logie (1998) agreed: “Whenever com-
position instructors use computer technology within their classrooms, they 
raise exponentially the likelihood that the work completed within their classes 
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will run afoul of current intellectual property laws” (p. 201). Kairos: A Jour-
nal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy also published a special issue on IP 
issues during the same year, with articles addressing citation and plagiarism, 
legal issues, and issues surrounding the effect of IP legislation on scholarly 
publishing. In the special issue, Tyanna K. Herrington (1998) debunked some 
popular myths about the reach of IP laws and argued that “current law does 
apply to digital communication” (emphasis in original). Thus, she concluded, 
“the public is granted both constitutional and explicit statutory rights to use 
copyrighted intellectual property, despite common blanket claims from own-
ers that it is illegal to do so.”
However, based on my experiences in the classroom, I argued then—and 
now—that without some clear-cut guidelines for students (and for scholars) 
as to what constitutes educational use and without teaching students to care-
fully consider the issues raised for both online and print sources, we may find 
ourselves more and more limited as to what material we are allowed to cite as 
legislators debate how to protect the economic value of intellectual property. 
These two special issues and the conversation on the topic in such venues as 
the Conference on College Composition and Communication’s (CCCC) Cau-
cus on Intellectual Property, as well as the many questions raised by students, 
teachers, authors, editors, publishers, and others in those closing years of the 
last century were, of course, an important point for the 21st-century classroom, 
as more and more of our work is now at least mediated online and shared pro-
lifically via blogs and wikis, RSS feeds, Facebook, Twitter, or any number of a 
multitude of other digital means.
The More Things Change... 
Much has changed since those days, of course. More and more courses have 
moved online, often into course-management systems, both commercial and 
home-grown. Many publishers have developed proprietary content for these 
spaces or software of their own. Even traditional composition handbooks often 
incorporate at least some information on conducting online research, produc-
ing multimedia projects, or writing for the Web. Students in brick-and-mortar, 
hybrid, and online classrooms are not only encouraged to include graphics in 
their print assignments or to write hypertextual documents for Web publica-
tion, they are now sometimes tasked with creating mash-ups and “rip-mix-
burn” multimedia offerings, with music, video, graphics, and text borrowed 
or adapted from multiple sources as well. It seems blogs and social-networking 
sites have sprung up overnight and entered our classrooms in a myriad of ways. 
Yet, I am struck by how much has remained the same. 
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...the More They Remain the Same
In 1998, I noted that although “students often use graphics, as well as text, 
borrowed from published sources in their written reports for the classroom” 
(p. 245; emphasis in original), few textbooks and style guides included “any 
prescriptions to students regarding the need for acquiring permission” (p. 245) 
to do so (see Westbrook in this volume for an extended discussion and spe-
cific examples). Nearly a decade later, Alexander Reid (2007) noted that “copy-
right and plagiarism may seem tangential to the issues of new media rhetoric... 
but their centrality in public discourses regarding composition and technol-
ogy requires that they be addressed.” That is, he said, because “copyright and 
plagiarism are the primary cultural domains where new media compositional 
practices are being defined, they are issues that cannot be ignored” (p. 127). 
It is still true, however, that few of our textbooks and style guides provide ad-
equate guidelines or discussion of the ramifications of intellectual property 
legislation on new media compositions we are teaching students to produce 
beyond discussions of avoiding plagiarism. Even while lawyers and legislators 
are debating issues that directly affect the work of new media compositionists 
and the lives of many students—both in and out of the classroom—few of our 
textbooks offer much in the way of guidance.
The MLA Style Manual (2008) does a good job presenting the history of 
intellectual property law and the intricacies of some of the issues involved, 
devoting approximately 24 pages to legal issues: a brief history of copyright, 
an overview of the subject matter it covers, ownership issues (including work-
for-hire), and the difference between owning a material object and owning 
the rights to the content of that object. Also briefly covered are issues of copy-
right registration, notice and transfer or termination of rights, fair use, permis-
sion requests, damages for infringement, and international copyright issues. 
Although the manual does err on the side of caution, recommending that “au-
thors who plan to use another’s work but doubt whether they have the right to 
do so should refer the question to copyright counsel” (p. 38), given its intended 
audience as a “guide to scholarly publishing,” such caution might make sense. 
Contrast the extended presentation of copyright issues in the MLA Style 
Manual, however, with that of the MLA Handbook (2009), which is much 
more widely used by teachers and students in composition classrooms (or at 
least is more widely referenced by authors of textbooks used in such classes). 
The handbook summarizes all of these issues in one lonely paragraph, basi-
cally stipulating only that even if a source is acknowledged, using entire docu-
ments or significant portions thereof “is an infringement of copyright law and 
a legal offense” (p. 60). Most of our handbooks do even less, with some notable 
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exceptions. For example, The Brief McGraw-Hill Guide includes a section on 
“Using Visuals Responsibly” (Roen, Glau, & Maid, 2008, pp. 822−824). Mike 
Palmquist’s (2009) The Bedford Researcher discusses fair use and permissions 
and includes a sample letter that students can modify to request permission to 
use copyrighted material (pp. 92−93). Jim Lester (2010) includes a section on 
“Seeking Permission to Publish Materials on your Web Site” in the most re-
cent edition of Writing Research Papers. However, none of the handbooks and 
rhetorics I have perused provide sufficient context for students (or teachers) to 
understand the often complicated conversations about fair use of copyrighted 
work in the classroom, nor do they explain how to cite multimedia elements 
not included in a works cited or references list.
SHIFT HAPPENS
According to Tom Reedy (1998), “some of the most successful paradigm 
shifts have occurred by building on previous knowledge.” Indeed, as noted 
elsewhere in this volume, the stated purpose of copyright legislation is to allow 
for just this kind of knowledge building. Unfortunately, as TyAnna Herrington 
(1998) argued, “misperceptions and inaccuracies regarding intellectual prop-
erty law are both extreme and ubiquitous in this age of digital communica-
tion, when ease of access, copying, and dissemination of copyrighted materials 
has created a backlash of fear against public access to information.” Nowhere 
was this more apparent than in the brouhaha surrounding Napster and its ilk, 
when the RIAA thought it desirable to sue even grandparents and 12-year-
olds. Unfortunately, many students still seem to believe that material must be 
formally registered with the U.S. Copyright Office to be protected, something 
that has not been required for more than 30 years now. Moreover, many of my 
students believe that sans the once-required visual notification of copyright—
the symbol © or the word or abbreviation for copyright (copy., copyr., copr., or 
even just c.)—a work is not protected, which is, of course, just plain wrong. 
Thus, students tell me, they believe that most material on the Internet is not 
copyrighted, since most of the material they encounter is not “marked.” And, 
of course, music, they argue, should be free (their justification for this is that 
performers, they believe, make their money from concerts and not CD sales). 
YouTube has now made it exceptionally easy to embed videos, with single-click 
links to post to social-networking sites, a “share” link for emailing videos, and 
source code to copy and paste into blogs or webpages. Because most people do 
not understand—or indeed care—that the videos are in fact linked, not down-
loaded and re-published, it’s no wonder they are confused. 
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In the midst of this confusion, it is requisite that we consider the ramifi-
cations of intellectual property law and its effects on new media composing 
beyond issues of access, citation, and plagiarism. Beyond the confusion (or 
perhaps at least partly as a result of it) are threats to the very principles that 
copyright was designed to protect in the first place, as included in the U.S. 
Constitution: “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries” (U.S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8., cl. 8). That is, not merely 
access to information (threatened by the ever-lengthening term of copyright 
protection and the subsequent dwindling of the public domain), but also use in 
other works (derivative or otherwise) is now being threatened. How does one 
“quote” from a picture or musical score, for example? If we teach students to 
re-purpose a copyrighted musical work as a soundtrack for a YouTube video or 
mash-up, will students be at risk of being sued for copyright violation? Existing 
fair use policies just do not adequately address new media configurations, and 
most books and Web sites discussing these issues are addressed to teachers and 
their use of materials in the classroom. 
TEACH
Teach: The Movie?
The Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2001 
(S. 487), fondly known as the TEACH Act, was signed into law in 2002. It 
provides a set of guidelines for educational use of certain copyrighted material, 
specifically “performances or displays for educational uses” (S. 487 ES). Condi-
tions for use required under the TEACH Act include the following:
•	 Use is limited to works that are performed (such as reading a play or 
showing a video) or displayed (such as a digital version of a map or 
a painting) during class activities. The TEACH Act does not apply 
to materials for students’ independent use and retention, such as text-
books or articles from journals.
•	 The materials to be used cannot include those primarily marketed for 
the purposes of distance education (i.e., an electronic textbook or a 
multimedia tutorial).
•	 Use of materials must occur “under the actual supervision of an instructor”.
•	 Materials must be used “as an integral part of a class session.”
•	 Use must occur as a “regular part of the systematic mediated instruc-
tional activities.” 
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•	 Students must be informed that the materials they access are protected 
by copyright. (Reyman, 2006, pp. 33−34)
Further, it remains incumbent on faculty and/or administrators to ensure 
that the following restrictions are adhered to:
•	 limiting access to material to only those students enrolled in the 
class;
•	 ensuring that digital versions are created from analog works only if a 
digital version of the work is not already available;
•	 employing technological measures to “reasonably prevent” retention of 
the work “for longer than the class session”;
•	 developing copyright policies on the educational use of materials; and
•	 providing informational resources for faculty, students, and staff that 
“accurately describe, and promote compliance with, the laws of the 
United States relating to copyright.” (Reyman, 2006, p. 35)
Much of this use is already allowed under fair use guidelines, and this 
Act in no way is meant to limit such use. However, although the TEACH 
Act may make some educators and administrators feel a bit more com-
fortable including copyrighted work in their online or face-to-face classes, 
it might also serve to stif le uses that many would argue fall under the 
doctrine of fair use even if they are not stipulated therein. The Emerging 
Technology Center at Georgia Southern University, for example, helps fac-
ulty digitize and stream media for the classroom (face-to-face or online), 
specifically excludes “fented, purchased, or borrowed media with copy-
right or DRM protection,” and warns that “all media to be streamed must 
meet with the GSU Campus Attorney’s approval for copyright restrictions” 
(Georgia Southern University). 
However, these guidelines are not sufficient to help teach students what is 
proper for them to use in our classrooms. That is, as “The Code of Best Practic-
es in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education” (Center for Social Media, 2008) 
noted, we need to
explore with students the distinction between material that 
should be licensed, material that is in the public domain or 
otherwise openly available, and copyrighted material that is 
subject to fair use. The ethical obligation to provide proper 
attribution also should be examined. And students should be 
encouraged to understand how their distribution of a work 
raises other ethical and social issues, including the privacy of 
the subjects involved in the media production. (p. 14)
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Teach: The Verb?
In 1998, I called for clear-cut guidelines for the classroom. Although this 
may seem to fly in the face of my (and others’) understanding of fair use, I still 
contend that such guidelines can be a way of helping students enter the conver-
sation, especially because students’ digital lives are so intimately involved in the 
outcomes of these conversations. 
The distinctions between educational use of material for teaching and stu-
dent use of copyrighted media are not inconsequential ones, but thus far, there 
is little direction for students. And, of course, students need to be taught not 
only what and how they can use information in the classroom, but how such 
work may (or may not) play out in their lives beyond it. Students really do want 
to know, but many faculty themselves do not understand copyright and fair 
use, complicating the teaching environment still further (see Nguyen in this 
volume for research findings on teacher and student perspectives). This fact 
was recently brought home during the 2008 Georgia Conference on Informa-
tion Literacy. Carol Simpson’s keynote address presented some fairly basic in-
formation about copyright and fair use. Even so, much of the information she 
presented was new to her audience, consisting of librarians, media specialists, 
and instructors from kindergarten through college levels. A lawsuit filed on 
behalf of Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, and Sage Pub-
lications speaks to this lack of knowledge: The suit alleged that Georgia State 
University “systematically facilitated access to a significant volume of copy-
righted works online without paying the proper licensing fees or even seeking 
to do so” (Guess, 2008). It is likely that faculty believed they were well within 
the confines of educational fair use, even though we are now in an era when 
the very definition of “classroom” is up for grabs. Truthfully, I have heard 
numerous (and often fallacious) arguments from otherwise intelligent faculty 
who believe that almost anything goes in the name of “educational” use—
from re-recording movies to show in the classroom to including musical sound 
tracks in YouTube videos to capturing screen shots from webpages to include 
in conference presentation slideshows or in published articles. And, of course, 
many of the editors of our learned journals are just as confused as the rest of 
us. Notably, commercial publishers—those responsible for our textbooks—are 
much more knowledgeable in this realm; however, because textbook authors 
are responsible for any unlawful use of copyrighted material, sometimes even 
these works allow a few questionable bits or bytes to slip through.
Our university attorneys are sometimes hesitant to address these issues as 
well, often preferring to counsel faculty to seek permission (and pay royalties) 
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for use of copyrighted material that would seem to clearly fall within the realm 
of fair use. And, of course, in this post-Napster era, it is difficult for any of us 
to understand what we can and cannot use without culpability. Nonetheless, 
as I argued previously, 
suggestions that authors request permission to quote portions 
of online sources that, in print, would fall within fair-use 
guidelines (such as portions of logs published online, pub-
lically disseminated e-mail messages, and public meetings 
in synchronous communication sites) can only lend force to 
those who would eliminate the doctrine of fair use altogether 
and make it difficult or impossible to carry on the work of 
scholars—inside or outside the classroom. (Walker, 1998, p. 
246)
Heidi McKee (2008) agreed, stating that “if as instructors and research-
ers, we adhere to a strict acceptance of copyright maximalists’ expectations for 
copyright, we could be contributing to the erosion of the Fair Use Doctrine” 
(p. 118; italics in original). As Lawrence Lessig (2004) argued in Free Culture, 
“for the first time in our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals cre-
ate and share culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which 
has expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and creativity 
that it never reached before” (p. 8). Unfortunately, relying solely on Creative 
Commons licensing, CopyLeft arguments, or whatever other options we may 
turn to, or arguing taking the stance that “information wants to be free”1 is 
also playing into this same dichotomy. 
Although it is important to protect our right to fair use of material, at the 
same time we must ensure that we protect students as they go out into the 
workplace. That is, if we believe the use is fair, then we should go ahead and 
use it, regardless of what the legal pundits argue. On the other hand, we also 
need to be careful that, in so doing, we are not modeling behavior that puts 
students at risk of legal retribution. By failing to teach students about adher-
ence to the law—even though I agree we also need to teach them why the law 
may need to change in light of changing technologies and cultures—we may be 
placing ourselves as well as students in an untenable position. As McKee (2008) 
argued, her own “failure to discuss copyright with students was inappropriate 
as a teacher because it was not helping to prepare students for considering the 
complicated issues of copyright” (p. 118). Furthermore, these same students 
may soon be in positions to affect these laws (for good or ill), so we should 
make sure they are privy to these important conversations.
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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
As educators in a digital age, we have a responsibility to students, to our 
field, to our institutions, and to the public at large to continually upgrade our 
knowledge and skills in the areas in which we teach. Today, for composition 
teachers, that may require a considerable investment of time in learning how to 
use new technologies or at least in learning about the impact of new technolo-
gies on what it means to compose. And, of course, we need to be aware of the 
conversations taking place regarding issues of copyright and intellectual prop-
erty law as these conversations impact our use as well as student uses within 
(or without) the classroom. Those of you reading this collection are in the 
forefront, then, as, admittedly, many of our institutions do not adequately sup-
port and reward such professional development efforts—neither by awarding 
sufficient time and money, nor by adequate recognition of such work at tenure-
and-promotion time. However, we can no longer pretend that classrooms are a 
“safe space”—a haven into which these issues do not reach. We can no longer 
continue to teach as we always have. 
Teach All Students the Basics of Copyright
Beginning with first-year students and, indeed, in all of our classes, we need 
to teach students the basics of copyright and intellectual property law. In 1998, 
I presented the following guidelines for the classroom. Primarily targeting use 
of online resources, I developed this page in response to the dearth of materials 
available to help introduce students in the composition classroom to this com-
plex topic. Revised in 2007, this list is still far from complete, but it is nonethe-
less a useful starting point for conversations with students (or others) on the 
intricacies of intellectual property laws and the use of multimedia in student 
compositions. On the webpage on which this material is published, I include a 
brief history of copyright and an admittedly all-too-brief explanation of what 
copyright was designed to protect, (mostly as a way of introducing students to 
the conversation), before offering students the following guidelines to consider 
for their use of the intellectual property of others: 
1. Follow guidelines already established for published (i.e., print) sources, 
if possible. For print, generally the polite convention has been that 
use of 10% or less of a work constitutes fair use.2 For online sources, 
we should continue to abide by this same guideline. We should also 
give as much information as possible to allow readers to access the 
original source. For projects that will be used only in the classroom, 
Janice R. Walker
214
you may not need to actually obtain permissions for use, however, 
you should be aware of the steps necessary to do so and should 
try to locate the information necessary. For work to be distributed 
outside the classroom (for instance, to be published on the World 
Wide Web), it is imperative you at least make an attempt to acquire 
permission.
2. Point to (i.e., link to) images, audio, and video files rather than download-
ing them, if possible. Some sites offer graphic images or other multimedia 
files to users at no charge and may specifically request that users down-
load them; requests such as these should be honored. However, graph-
ics, audio, or video files should not be downloaded without permission. 
Users may instead point to images and other types of files rather than 
downloading them. Of course, courtesy may require that users request 
permission even to link to an image or file, because this may entail ad-
ditional traffic on the file server where the file is stored. Additionally, 
pointing to such files may cause problems as files may move or change 
without notice or routes between sites may become jammed. However, 
without specific permission to download files and publish them on the 
user’s file server, doing so constitutes a clear violation of copyright law.
3. Always cite sources carefully, giving as much information as possible to al-
low the user to relocate the source. In addition to citing the source of 
text, any graphics, audio, or video files included should include proper 
citation as well. The elements of citation for electronic sources should 
include the name of the person responsible (i.e., the author, creator, or 
maintainer of the site); the title of the individual work and the title of 
any larger body of work of which it may be a part; the date of publica-
tion or creation; the protocol and address3 along with any directories 
or commands necessary to access the work; and the date of access. It 
may often take a bit of detective work to locate important elements of 
citation for Web files, but it is important to try and find as much infor-
mation as possible. Where some of the information is missing, include 
as much information as possible.
4. If in doubt, ask. If it is unclear whether or not a given use is permitted, 
ask the owner or author of the site, if possible, explaining the nature of 
the intended use and noting the portion or portions of the work to be 
included. If unable to locate information, include as much information 
as possible along with, perhaps, a note explaining that the work is being 
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used without permission of the owner. If asked by a copyright owner to 
remove material, be prepared to do so promptly. (Walker, 2007)
Of course, as Dànielle Nicole DeVoss and Suzanne Webb (2008) argued, 
if we teach students to ask for permission to fairly use media 
work in their educational endeavors, we risk pushing them 
into a wall—a wall that they likely will not be able to climb 
and conquer within the 15-week semesters in which we typi-
cally teach. It is phenomenally difficult—and deliberately 
so—to find out who actually holds the copyright to a work. 
(p. 95)
Susan M. Bielstein (2006) agreed, noting that “it is becoming harder and 
harder and impossibly expensive to include illustrations in books” (p. 9). Thus, 
Bielstein eventually concluded, “if you don’t need illustrations to make a point, 
don’t use them” (p. 101). I provide students with information about how to re-
quest permission, as well as links from my webpage to an eHow article, “How 
to Get Permission to Use Copyrighted Material” and links to sample copyright 
permission letters, but most students prefer to avoid the issue, either by creating 
images, searching the commons for free media, or by circumventing the prob-
lem entirely and simply including “stolen from” or “used without permission” 
in citations. Once again, I am teaching students to steal.
Unfortunately, too, many of the uses students make of multimedia in their 
compositions are not adequately addressed by our style manuals. Although 
they do present guidelines for a variety of multimedia cited in a “paper,” style 
manuals do not usually address how to cite such files when they are included in 
a work without being referenced in the text. In The Columbia Guide to Online 
Style (2006), an alternative to MLA and APA and other documentation styles 
for citation of electronic and electronically accessed work, Todd Taylor and I 
(2006) argued that “it is usually not necessary to include multimedia files in 
the list of works cited unless you are referring to them in your text. That is, 
if graphics or other types of multimedia files are used merely for decorative 
purposes, then the source information in the label or credits is sufficient” (pp. 
72-73). Students need to know how to include such a source line or credits page 
for images or other multimedia files they include in their papers, their mash-
ups, or whatever form their compositions may take. Jim Kalmbach’s (2003) 
“Giving Credit for Use of Images or Other Material” is still one of the best 
sites I have found for quick examples. I have also created a tutorial for students 
on “Citing Sources in Presentations,” which demonstrates uses of material in 
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non-traditional projects. Of course, citing the source of a graphic image in a 
paper or webpage project or even in an electronic presentation may be quite 
straightforward, but demonstrating how to credit audio or video files in other 
types of multimedia work may be a bit more complex. Nonetheless, here, too, 
we need to do much more than we do currently. Most of our style manuals and 
textbooks are focused on helping students avoid plagiarism. Thus, although 
these resources may stipulate that authors include the source of information in 
a label for tables, images, and graphics, they provide little if any information 
that addresses the uses many students are now making of multimedia files in 
their work. 
Teach Other Faculty about Copyright
I believe it is incumbent on those actively involved in considering these 
issues to help other faculty understand them so that they, in turn, can help 
students. We need to start discussions or participate in ones already under-
way about the issues. We need to provide lists of resources, attend conference 
presentations, and invite people from other departments to participate in the 
discussions. As “The Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Media Literacy 
Education” (Center for Social Media, 2008) argued,
this is an area in which educators themselves should be lead-
ers rather than followers .... More generally, educators should 
share their knowledge of fair use rights with library and media 
specialists, technology specialists, and other school leaders to 
assure that their fair use rights are put into institutional prac-
tice. (p. 8) 
We need to do what we can to present opportunities for discussion about 
copyright to faculty and administrators at our institutions. We can recom-
mend bringing people to our campuses or conferences to speak on these topics; 
we can share readings; and we can raise questions. For example, my institu-
tion, like so many, is encouraging faculty to teach more courses online (in our 
case, that usually means through a course-management system). Our Emerg-
ing Technology Center (ETC) works with faculty to develop course material, 
but, as I mentioned earlier, specifically excludes streaming copyrighted movies, 
even though the TEACH Act would seem to allow this use. When I mentioned 
this to ETC staff, however, they were not impressed; they have a rule, and 
they are sticking to it. But we can (and should) broach this with our univer-
sity counsel to get that rule changed. Faculty might also want to question how 
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intellectual property laws might affect ownership of their teaching materials 
when they use university resources to develop them and make them available 
in their online courses (see Amidon in this volume for an extended discussion 
of work-for-hire). 
Graduate student work is also at stake. The College of Graduate Studies at 
Georgia Southern University, for example, no longer accepts paper theses and 
dissertations; instead, we have moved to electronic theses and dissertations. In 
the instructions, students are warned:
It is the student’s responsibility to ensure that the copyrights 
of documents used in the preparation of the thesis or disser-
tation are protected and adequately cited, and that all neces-
sary permissions and/or copyright releases are obtained from 
copyright holders. (Georgia Southern University, 2008, p. 3)
Students must include signed copyright permission forms for any copy-
righted materials they may include. But few of our courses actually instruct 
students in how to do any of this; therefore, it often falls on the staff in the 
College of Graduate Studies to instruct students and answer their questions, 
usually after the thesis or dissertation has been accepted and approved by the 
student’s committee. And of course, as my university, like so many others, 
moves toward developing an e-portfolio mandate for both faculty and students, 
we need to make sure that we understand the possible consequences of includ-
ing copyrighted material—our own or that of others.
Keep Abreast of the Conversations
Finally, it is incumbent upon all of us to continue following the conversa-
tions that affect our professional (and perhaps personal) lives in so many ways. 
We need to be aware of the ramifications of the continued attacks on fair use 
and the public domain; of asking for permission where, perhaps, we should not; 
and of allowing those with a vested interest in protecting intellectual property 
qua property to make the decisions for us. That is, do we really want the Re-
cording Industry Association of America (which insists on filing suits for theft 
of property that may or may not be “real”), Disney (which refuses to allow 
Mickey Mouse to age gracefully and retire to the public domain), and McDon-
ald’s Corporation (for which the “Golden Arches” are sacrosanct) to determine 
what we can use and how we can use it? 
Of course, it is equally important that, as scholars and educators, we ensure 
the ethical and fair use of the work of others by employing adequate citations 
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and credits, and that we respect the moral and ethical values that we purport 
to hold dear. And, of course, we need to remember that 
the World Wide Web is an international publishing space. As 
such, many of the images, texts, and other files may fall under 
the copyright laws of other nations, whose attitude toward 
ownership of intellectual property may be far different from 
our own. Thus, a key word in our own consideration of intel-
lectual property should be respect, including respect for the 
moral and ethical as well as economic rights of authors, cre-
ators, and publishers. (Walker, 2007)
Admittedly, in some countries, those “moral and ethical” rights sometimes 
work against criticisms of the work of others, but, then, the United States’ focus 
on economic rights may soon mitigate any and all use of copyrighted materi-
als—to the point that the Constitutional objective of promoting progress be-
comes, if not an anachronism, at least an idyllic dream. Indeed, followed to its 
apogee, we may find ourselves fulfilling Theodor Nelson’s 1960 vision of the 
“docuverse” (see Nelson, 2003), wherein “‘published’ materials are available to 
anyone, yielding a royalty to the owners” (p. 460), creating, in effect, the Inter-
net as a “vending machine” of information. 
THIS IS NOW
Now it is nearing the end of the first decade of the 21st century, and I am 
in a tenured faculty position, chairing my department’s Teaching, Technology, 
and Writing Committee. As such, I am often asked by other faculty to help 
them with “techie” stuff. So when a colleague showed me her public wiki page 
with articles she had printed, scanned, and posted for student access, proud 
of her newly acquired digital skills, I took a deep breath. The articles were all 
freely available on the Internet, she said; like the images I had taught students 
how to “steal” almost 15 years ago, they were just there. 
I could have gone into my rant about how some sites that make information 
available for free sell advertising on their sites and charge based on the number 
of page hits. So when she posts the information to her site, that means traffic 
might be directed to her site to read the information rather than to the original 
site, hence potentially costing the copyright holder and/or publisher money.
I could have gone into my rant about copyright being the right to make 
copies. By making copies herself, and “publishing” those copies (i.e., by mak-
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ing them available to the public on her webpage), without asking permission of 
the copyright owner and barring any possibly transformative or “value-added” 
use, she is breaking the law. 
Or I could have gone into my rant about fair use, Creative Commons 
licensing, copyleft, digital civil disobedience, or any of the other standard 
“rants” I have on hand (or can come up with).
By now, of course, my colleague’s eyes would have glazed over. She just 
wants to know what to do—and she wants it to be easy, as it was in the days 
only a few years ago when she would have photocopied these articles and 
handed them out to her students in class without a second thought.
In this case, there are two “easy” answers: 1) simply link to the articles, 
or 2) ask our library staff to make the information available through their 
online course reserve service—and let them worry about copyright issues. Be-
cause access to the online course reserve materials is limited to patrons, such 
copying will often fall under fair use.4 
But as I walked away, I realized I wanted to rant. I needed to rant. I 
wanted my colleague to understand the issues, and, in turn, I wanted her to 
help students understand. Later, I slip a copy of the “The Code of Best Prac-
tices in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education” onto the mail room counter, 
hoping someone might pick it up. I continue to offer workshops and brown 
bag discussions for faculty in my department, and I am preparing to teach 
a course on intellectual property issues for undergraduate writing majors as 
well as for students from a variety of programs who might be interested. And, 
of course, I continue to try to keep up with and understand the proliferating 
conversations in this area myself, admittedly a daunting task. In the mean-
time, students will continue to make use of “stolen” work if they so choose, 
so long as they make it clear to me they understand that what they are doing 
is defined by many as stealing. That way, I am at least protecting myself (the 
students’ citations “prove” that I have taught them that what they are doing 
might be in violation of copyright law), even if I allow students to take these 
risks.
In other words, the more things have changed, the more they remain 
the same. Thus, although I do provide students with guidelines to follow, I 
hope that I provide students with an entry into the conversations about the 
legal and ethical ramifications of their choices as well—both their choices 
to adhere to the guidelines as well as their choices not to. At the end of the 
20th century, I taught students to steal, without realizing it. So, now, at the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century, I am teaching students that, as 
long as they cite their source, “stealing” might sometimes be the ethical 
thing to do.
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NOTES
1. According to Wikipedia, “the expression is first recorded as pronounced 
by Stewart Brand at the first Hackers’ Conference in 1984.” Although prob-
ably not Brand’s original intent, the expression has come to be used to ar-
gue for the “right” to download (music, software, text) without regard to 
copyright or ownership. As Wikipedia notes: “Under this line of thinking, 
hackers, crackers, and phreakers are liberators of information which is being 
held hostage by agents demanding money for its release. Other participants 
in this network include Cypherpunks who educate people to use public-
key cryptography to protect the privacy of their messages from corporate or 
governmental snooping and programmers who write free software and open 
source code.”
2. Fair use guidelines do not actually stipulate a 10% rule, although many 
people seem to think this is a safe amount; instead, fair use is predicated 
upon a four-factor consideration (see Galin and Westbrook, this volume, for 
a detailed discussion of such analysis).
3. Unfortunately, the third edition of the MLA Style Manual and Guide 
to Scholarly Publishing (2008) now recommends omitting the URL for online 
sources: “Inclusion of URLs has proved to have limited value,” they argued. 
Instead, they contended, that “readers are now more likely to find resources 
on the Web by searching for titles and authors’ names than by typing URLs” 
(p. 212). Although I believe this “google-ization” of research documentation 
is a dangerous practice (see my “MLA Rant” at http://mywabbit.blogspot.
com/2008/09/mla-rant.html), the seventh edition of the MLA Handbook 
(and thus most of our composition handbooks) now follows suit. 
4. As I am putting the finishing touches to this article, the University 
System of Georgia has announced a new copyright policy, putting the onus 
of determining fair use on individual faculty members for electronic reserves 
or online course materials. Faculty are asked to complete a “checklist for each 
‘fair use’ of a copyrighted work” to be submitted along with the material, 
with a copy to be retained by the faculty member “to establish a ‘reasonable 
and good faith’ attempt at applying fair use, should any dispute regarding 
such use arise” (University of Southern Georgia Copyright Policy). 
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12 RHETORICAL VELOCITY 
AND COPYRIGHT: A CASE 
STUDY ON STRATEGIES OF 
RHETORICAL DELIVERY
Jim Ridolfo and Martine Courant Rife
In this chapter, we examine a case concerning a Michigan State University 
student (Maggie) whose image, taken in 2005 on university grounds during 
a student protest for fair trade apparel, was unknowingly appropriated and 
remixed by the university in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. We argue that the 
appropriation of her image raises serious questions for rhetorical strategies of 
delivery, as well as emerging issues of intellectual property and copyright. Mag-
gie’s case poses a question to legal studies and to rhetoric and composition; in 
this case, there are no immediate or easy answers, but we argue that the case ex-
ample itself may serve as a useful pedagogical tool. First, we describe Maggie’s 
case, provide an overview of rhetorical velocity and remix, and then address 
intersections between copyright, rhetorical velocity, and the commons. Next, 
we overview legal issues arising from Maggie’s case—issues of free speech, pri-
vacy, orphan works, the role of the institution as parent, publicity/contractual 
rights, and fair use. We conclude with a discussion of how composing for re-
composition relates to the legal concept of the commons, as well as a discussion 
of pedagogical implications. 
THE MAGGIE CASE
As part of a national effort by United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), 
Movimiento Estudiantil Xicano de Aztlan (MEXA), and Students for Eco-
nomic Justice (SEJ, a local affiliate of USAS), student activists at Michigan 
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State University (MSU) participated in a social justice campaign from fall 
2000 to spring 2005. During this period, they tried to convince the MSU ad-
ministration to join the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), a fair labor moni-
toring body that investigates and certifies college apparel as sweatshop free.
In spring 2005, the SEJ and MEXA anti-sweatshop campaign at MSU un-
derwent a major shift in tactics and strategy due to a change in university 
leadership. From fall 2000 to spring 2005, the students were unsuccessful in 
their efforts to convince the MSU administration, led by then-president Peter 
McPherson, into joining the WRC, and by 2004 the campaign was in a com-
plete deadlock. As a result, from 2004 to 2005, the campaign tactics shifted 
to event disruption and other forms of direct action that included actions such 
as dressing up as waiters to surreptitiously attend alumni events and hand out 
“sweatshop menus” to hungry university donors.
Once President Peter McPherson resigned in spring 2005 and a more re-
sponsive and progressive leader, Lou Anna K. Simon, assumed the presidential 
position, however, the SEJ and MEXA student activists changed their strategy 
and tactics to better address the new rhetorical situation. On March 3, 2005, 
the first of approximately half a dozen large, media-centered protests took 
place. These actions were designed to be what scholar Kevin DeLuca (1999) 
described as an “image event”—a particular action designed to achieve media 
coverage through visual display. In this case, the SEJ and MEXA activists’ pri-
mary strategic objective for the protest was to obtain broadcast coverage and to 
continue their strategy of maintaining a consistent presence in the local news. 
Consequently, they attempted to use the media to continue to exert public 
pressure on the MSU administration.1 
Maggie Ryan, one of the activists involved in planning the protest, recalls 
that the action, which took place in front of the MSU Administration Building 
(a prominent space on central campus), moved the campaign in a new, more 
creative direction. She explains: 
we were .... trying to integrate new ideas because just having 
a bunch of people gather with signs was getting a little boring 
and the media wasn’t really paying very much attention when 
there was like fifteen students with a sign—[but] the media 
started paying more attention when there was like fifteen stu-
dents doing something way different. 
The March 3 actions included a far more creative and visual rhetorical ap-
peal, one that moved beyond the simple stand-with-signs protest. In the group’s 
attempt to involve more activists as well as more media, they took a new ap-
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Figure 2: First instance of university appropriation, main webpage (March 2, 
2006).
Figure 1: Corresponding broadcast and Web news coverage (March 8, 2005).
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proach—writing with the tools that winter provided, snow itself. as Maggie re-
calls: “We got dye to write things in the snow and we wrote with our footprints 
very large in the snow ‘W. R. C’ so it was visible from very high up.” Arguably, 
both the broader campaign and this specific action were a complete success, and 
the rhetorical goals Maggie and the others intended to achieve were reached. 
Due to a constant and steady stream of protests, media, and publicity, the stu-
dent activists’ objective was achieved on April 8, 2005, when MEXA and SEJ 
learned that President Lou Anna K. Simon intended to join the WRC. By the 
end of the summer, President Simon had kept her promise, and the university 
formally joined the WRC. 
But that is not the end of the story, at least not for one participant in the 
WRC spring 2005 campaign. In November of 2006, the university used an 
image of Maggie from the March 2005 protest for advertising purposes (see 
Figures 1 and 2). According to Maggie, this appropriation wasn’t something she 
had anticipated when the action was initially conceived. She describes how the 
image was captured during the action: 
I was wearing like a sweatshirt and some other people in Stu-
dents for Economic Justice were playing in a snowball fight 
and there was a photographer during the snow fight who was 
really kind of sketchy scaling up the buildings to take pictures 
and it was really weird. And then about maybe eight months 
later the picture appeared on maybe the front page of the 
Michigan State University and the title of it was “students hav-
ing fun in the snow.” 
Although the protest itself was far from serious, there is no doubt for Maggie 
what the political intentions of the assembly were. Despite the lack of serious-
ness associated with the action, the appropriation of Maggie’s image (see Figures 
2, 3, 4, 5) without her consent is indeed a strange and unanticipated occurrence 
with serious consequences.
Maggie Ryan’s image was first used as the main focal point on the MSU 
Web site in 2006 (see Figures 2 and 3), but this would not be the last time the 
university would use her image. Even after Jim Ridolfo conducted his interview 
with Maggie Ryan in 2007, an additional example of appropriation took place 
in 2008, when the university used her image as part of a major bulk mailing 
effort (see Figure 5). 
Maggie Ryan’s case exemplifies the surprising distance that possible strate-
gies for delivery can travel. Although the desired press coverage of the March 
3 action was achieved (see Figure 2), Maggie had no way of anticipating how 
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Figure 3: Sub-page of main webpage (March 2, 2006).
Figure 4: Department of Student Life main webpage (October 24, 2007).
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the university would later use an image of her from the event to promote the 
Department of Student Life and the university itself. In addition to directly 
appropriating her image, the university also remixed her image. In Figure 2, 
it’s clear that not only did the Web team (staffed primarily by employees of the 
University Relations department) take a picture of Maggie out of context but 
they also repurposed it by adding the caption “winter fun learn more.” In Fig-
ure 1, they also cropped Maggie out of the less-scenic background of the MSU 
Administration Building, and put her image on a more picturesque and iconic 
backdrop of a recognizable campus landmark. When Maggie talked about the 
action after these first two acts of appropriation and remixing had taken place, 
she called attention to the way the university used her image without any at-
tempt to attribute it to her:
They [the university] didn’t contact me. Nobody ever got my 
name. Nobody ever asked anything. The reporters I don’t think 
even got it but university officials definitely didn’t. They didn’t 
get my name or the name of the other person in the picture. 
And I was like the main person, focal point of the picture.
Although Maggie never consented to or approved of the university using 
her image for these large-scale advertising purposes, she talked about what she 
could have done differently to curtail the appropriation of her image. She says 
that it might have been “a good idea to have more prominent posters or things 
with you or have things with you so people know what’s going on.” In articu-
lating the options she didn’t initially exercise, Maggie strategized how to resist 
certain forms of appropriation. These examples raise serious questions about 
the limitations of how far one can inductively anticipate future recomposition. 
RHETORICAL VELOCITY: COMPOSING 
FOR STRATEGIC RECOMPOSITION
Ridolfo and Dànielle Nicole DeVoss (2009) explored the intersections of 
rhetorical velocity and theories of remixing. Ridolfo, drawing on his research in 
rhetorical delivery (see Ridolfo, 2005), and DeVoss, working from her knowl-
edge of remixing and digital delivery, theorized that today’s digital delivery is 
different because:
A new element, however, enters the mix when we situate 
remix in today’s digital culture; more elements and oth-
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ers’ elements become much more readily available to mix, 
mash, and merge. And, in fact, processes of mixing are val-
ued across these spaces, where savvy mixers are recognized 
as their YouTube channels hit the top ten and as their videos 
become streamed across hundreds of servers. What is obvi-
ous here is that composing in the digital age is different than 
traditional practices of composing. Rhetorical practices in a 
digital age are different than traditionally conceived. Elec-
tronic copying-and-pasting, downloading, and networked 
filesharing change the dynamics of writing and, important-
ly, of delivery.
We want to expand on this conversation of examining “mix, mash, and 
merge” by exploring how elements of rhetorical delivery intersect with copy-
right concerns. 
In the protest plans related to the Maggie example, there was a consider-
able degree of concern for how the action might be picked up by the press. The 
event was designed by the student activists to produce other texts; the objective 
was to facilitate the composition of news coverage. This strategic concern for 
delivery is best described by the concept of rhetorical velocity (Ridolfo, 2005; 
Ridolfo & DeVoss, 2009). Rhetorical velocity is a strategic concept of delivery 
in which a rhetor theorizes the possibilities for the recomposition of a text (e.g., 
a media release) based on how s/he anticipates how the text might later be used. 
The rhetorician theorizes how certain newspapers, blogs, or television stations 
may recompose and re-distribute the release both as and in other media. In 
thinking about re-composition and re-distribution as a complex multimodal 
strategy, the rhetorician also considers how the release may be recomposed in 
ways advantageous or disadvantageous to the rhetor’s goals and objectives. For 
example, how might moving from one media to another affect the message? 
How might the text of the release be remixed in ways that might harm the 
rhetor’s goals? If the rhetor composes and distributes a video release, what is the 
optimum format to encourage strategic remixing?2 
In Maggie’s example, she worked with other student activists to design a 
visually intensive protest to achieve a particular type of broadcast press cover-
age. Even though the protest and activist campaign were ultimately successful, 
in the years that followed, a series of images were used in ways neither Maggie 
nor the other activists could have plausibly predicted. Although the activists 
succeeded in their rhetorical goal of achieving third-party media coverage for 
their campaign, Maggie’s ethos was drawn into the spotlight in questionable 
ways for years after the initial events took place. 
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Clearly, ethical questions of group rhe-
torical strategy in the digital age emerge from 
this case. In the age of remix, to what extent 
should groups theorize visually intensive cam-
paigns in terms of the potential impact on fu-
ture ethos for individual participants? To what 
extent should participants in visually intensive 
protests be conscious of how the images they 
co-produce may be used in the future? Should 
the university have asked Maggie for permis-
sion before making her a sort of poster child 
for the university? Should the Department of 
Student Life have asked Maggie’s permission 
before using her image? Should the Admissions 
Office have asked Maggie’s permission before 
mailing her image out as a recruiting tool? How 
could Maggie have realistically anticipated this 
latent reappropriation of her work, if at all? 
THE LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES  
RELATED TO THE MAGGIE CASE
In this section, we untangle some of the legal, ethical, and conceptual is-
sues regarding the use of Maggie’s image by the university. How should one 
“anticipate” the rhetorical appropriation of their work, and what role should 
knowledge of copyright play? When leveraging the tenants of Ridolfo’s theory 
of rhetorical velocity, what laws, concepts, or set of ethical considerations might 
arise as one imagines one’s creations, images, or cultural properties being ap-
propriated by others?
The Appropriation of Images and Bodies
To give specific context to our discussion, we need to define exactly what 
was appropriated by the university: a digital image of Maggie, more broadly 
speaking, an image of a human body. Admittedly, a concrete and well-defined 
understanding of propertied ownership is likely unattainable in this instance. 
Human bodies, as well as products derived from those bodies (such as digital 
images like the one of Maggie) 
Figure 5: Panel from print 
bulk recruitment mailing 
(February–March, 2008).
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evade ownership in any traditional sense; on the one hand, the 
question of property rights in the human body lacks a clear 
answer. On the other hand, the question is over-determined 
in legal theory: there is a plethora of conceptual and legal 
regimes that seek to analyze and regulate the function and 
meaning of “ownership” in this area. (Flessas, 2008, p. 388)
Tatiana Flessas discussed some of the complicated issues surrounding claims 
to ownership of aboriginal bones (see also Holder & Flessas, 2008). We draw 
from her work although we admit that the digital image of Maggie and aborigi-
nal bones are in some ways quite dissimilar. However, Flessas’s analysis of the 
various arguments on the ownership of human bones, we think, is very use-
ful for shedding new light in the area of rhetorical velocity, copyright, and the 
digital image of Maggie.3 Flessas states that “‘indigeneity’ is an ongoing discus-
sion about common values and common identity and a strategy for ownership 
claims” (p. 402). For the purposes of this chapter, we draw on the notion of 
radical symmetry from actor-network theory (Latour, 1998, 2005; Law, 1992), 
and posit that the image of Maggie and human bones are in some respects sym-
metrical: both are bodies over which allegations of appropriation and claims to 
ownership have arisen. In turn, these allegations of appropriation also invoke 
issues of free speech and privacy. 
Free Speech and Right to Privacy
As TyAnna Herrington (1998) noted, copyright and first amendment is-
sues are intertwined. Issues of free speech arise in Maggie’s case, but not in the 
way that such issues are normally considered. Of course, at a public university, 
Maggie has a first amendment right to free speech on campus as she works to-
wards raising awareness of the WRC cause; that’s not disputed here. The right 
to privacy problem in this case arises from tensions between Maggie’s right to 
privacy and the institution’s right to free speech. 
When someone appears in a public space, as Maggie did, the general legal 
standard asks whether or not a reasonable person would have a right to privacy 
in such a space (Rife, 2007)—this is the rationale that photojournalists rely on 
to report the news. When Maggie engaged in a protest in a public space—a 
physical commons, open to public view at a public institution—the argument 
is very strong that she had little right to privacy. Because Maggie was aware of 
the photographer’s presence and continued with her activities nonetheless, the 
argument that she had any reasonable expectation of privacy would be weak. 
Furthermore, an argument against the institution’s appropriation based on a 
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legal right to privacy would likely fail, while an argument supporting the insti-
tution’s right to “free speech” has some plausible support in this context. The 
institution’s free speech argument is especially strong in the context of the ini-
tial appropriation if the intent was to document the protest. 
In fact, an argument based on privacy rights and asserted by Maggie con-
flicts with the purpose of the protest, which was to draw attention to the WRC 
campaign. As activists, this group of students tried to design their discourse 
so that it would be appropriated to call attention to the political issue in which 
they were involved. The problem here is that their discourse was appropriated 
in unanticipated ways. In this sense, a rhetorical understanding of the possibili-
ties for appropriation are complimentary to the legal understanding. 
Copyright and Orphan Works
A recently proposed copyright law, the Orphan Works Act of 2008 (S. 
2913: Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008), was introduced in 2008, 
and passed the Senate later that year; however, a House vote did not occur. 
(Bills that have not passed during a session of Congress are cleared; however, it 
is likely the bill will be reintroduced in the future.) Testimony to the house sub-
committee regarding this law took place on March 13, 2008, and is a continua-
tion of a study the U.S. Copyright Office began in 2005. The study examined 
“issues raised by ‘orphan works’—copyrighted works whose owners may be 
impossible to identify and locate” (Peters, 2009). Because of concern about 
possible copyright liability, subsequent creators and users like libraries are dis-
couraged from appropriating such orphan works; the fear keeps potential users 
from making orphan works available to the public. 
This proposed law, if ever adopted, attempts to wrangle with some of the 
issues presented in Maggie’s case and provides another example of how prob-
lematic it is when a creation becomes disconnected from its origins, which is 
exactly what happened here. In Maggie’s case, she was protesting in the WRC 
campaign, against the institution, but instead of the protest image event travel-
ing solely in the way she intended, it was appropriated by the institution and 
subsequently inverted in order for the institution to promote itself in ways di-
rectly contrary to the protest’s purpose. 
The proposed Orphan Works Act, if adopted, will make it easier for users 
to appropriate texts, images, and sounds that have no owner. Technically they 
have no creator because their creator cannot be found (Curtis, 2008; Zimmer-
man, 2009). The concept of orphan works acknowledges that things people 
make can detach from their creators and take on meaning and power that was 
never anticipated. The idea that artifacts like Maggie’s picture are orphans, and 
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how such an idea might intersect with our rhetorical theories of production 
and appropriation, is something worthy of further research and examination in 
composition and rhetoric. In the case of Maggie’s political activity, her photo-
graph was taken. As a simple action, the image taking was a goal of her political 
activity. There was a desire of the student protestors that their activity would 
receive media attention to further their cause. However, at some point after 
the picture was taken and then moved from camera to computer, Maggie lost 
control in a very real way. And, so, the agency—the power that she engaged in 
her political protest—was undermined, inverted, and her image took on a life 
of its own. It became, in a sense, an orphan. (These issues are worthy of further 
discussion in our field, but due to the limitations of space in this chapter, and 
the breadth of ideas we wish to cover, here we can only issue a call to others for 
further exploration in this area.)
In Loco Parentis
One cannot conjure up the image of orphans without conjuring up the 
image of parents. JoAnne Podis and Leonard Podis (2007) might describe the 
university’s actions here as evidence of the lingering presence of in loco parentis. 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary (1979), the term means “in the place of 
a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent’s rights, du-
ties, and responsibilities” (p. 708). Podis and Podis localized the term, usually 
discussed at the broad institutional level, and discussed the possibilities of its 
presence in the composition classroom:
we argue that pedagogical in loco parentis is a deeply embed-
ded but often overlooked principle within the teaching of 
composition, one that merits more attention than it has re-
ceived, especially since, in one form or another, it is likely to 
remain an influential pedagogical model. (p. 122)
Although many scholars thought the concept was abandoned during the 
1960s, Podis and Podis cited a number of sources invoking the parental author-
ity of the institution with respect to residential life, and argued that the “killing 
[of] student freedom” (p. 122) is experiencing a resurgence. Prior to the coun-
terculture revolution, academic institutions exerted a parental-like authority by 
having curfews, regulating dorm visitation, instituting dress codes, etc. More 
recently, this authority surfaces as regulations or actions related to eliminating 
binge drinking and illegal substance abuse and regulating student speech, in-
cluding “hate speech.” Podis and Podis focused on how this parental authority 
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can influence power relations in the writing classroom with respect to form and 
content of writing. Our concern is with the possibility of an even more subtle 
exercise of the parental “rights” of the institution. We sense a casual attitude by 
the university in its appropriation of Maggie’s image, something akin to, “she’s 
ours—of course we can do whatever we want with her picture.” This is a simi-
lar attitude to the kind we imagine parents have when taking and circulating 
pictures of their child. Of course they can do this; this child is “theirs.” 
The ownership of such images of the human body is something we think 
writing students should take a critical view of, and Maggie’s case study provides 
fertile ground for discussion. Ownership and control of such images relate to 
copyright law and the appropriation of Maggie’s image, because copyright law 
makes intellectual creations “property” with assignable rights, similar to the 
“rights” parents have over their children. It is undeniable that in the U.S. children 
are propertied. This becomes extremely visible when a child’s married parents di-
vorce, when parental rights are terminated, or in any kind of custody dispute. In 
such cases, U.S. courts have to decide who “owns” the child. Let’s say that when 
these kinds of issues involving children arise, the state’s propertied interest in 
that child also arises—thus the state ultimately gets to be the arbiter of how the 
“property” of the child is assigned (in terms of, for instance, visitation rights, tax 
deductions, primary custodianship, and health insurance). These ownership is-
sues in the case of the child and the case of Maggie’s image drive the relationship 
between the creation and its owner, and so, ultimately, what such an examina-
tion of appropriation entails is an examination of institutional relationships. In 
this case, the institution has a special relationship with Maggie, because she is its 
student, and so the appropriation must be understood in that context. 
Right to Publicity and Contractual Rights
How can the institution be permitted to take Maggie’s image without her 
consent and then use that image for profit? According to Lloyd Rich (2008), 
“The right of publicity is generally defined as an individual’s right to control 
and profit from the commercial use of his/her name, likeness and persona.” 
The right of publicity is a matter of state law. The purpose is to protect some-
one like Maggie from losing the commercial value of her likeness due to an 
unauthorized appropriation. Cases like this are usually seen in the context of 
celebrities such as sports stars, whose images are appropriated without autho-
rization by companies in order to sell a particular item. Although the institu-
tion’s appropriation of Maggie’s image was unauthorized, because Maggie is 
not a celebrity it would be difficult to argue that she is losing money due to the 
institution’s appropriation. The institution’s argument is stronger here because 
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it features Maggie as “any female student” rather than as “Maggie.” In some of 
the images her identity is not the rhetorical focus—the focus is instead on any 
female student playing in the snow.
The level and types of protection in this area vary from state to state. Michi-
gan is the only sixth circuit state that does not have a right of publicity stat-
ute (Richardson, 2007). The root of the right of publicity is privacy law, and 
although Michigan has no statute, the courts developed some rights for the 
citizens of Michigan. Yet, without a clear statute, the probability of litigation 
around these matters is great in the event a conflict arises. The development 
of the right of publicity can be traced in Michigan by tracing its major cases 
in this area. In 1899, in Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., Colonel John Atkinson’s 
widow brought suit because a company produced and distributed cigars with 
her deceased husband’s likeness attached. At that time, the Michigan Supreme 
Court stated “it is one of the ills that, under the law, cannot be redressed” 
(Richardson, 2007, p. 27). In a case more similar to Maggie’s, in 1948, Pallas v. 
Crowley, a retail establishment selling cosmetics used a young woman’s portrait 
photograph. The woman had not given her consent for the publication of her 
photograph. In this case, the court did recognize a legal claim in that the use of 
the woman’s photograph might be considered “as an invasion of such person’s 
right of privacy” (Richardson, p. 27). 
An illustration of how the right of publicity often arises when celebrity names 
or likenesses are used without permission is the 1983 Michigan case of Carson v. 
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. In this case, the court recognized that John-
ny Carson’s persona was being used without his permission, and, subsequently, 
“Carson’s right of publicity was invaded because appellee intentionally appropri-
ated his identity for commercial exploitation” (Richardson, 2007, p. 27). Due 
to space constraints of this chapter, we will not delve into a deeper analysis of 
Michigan’s right of publicity law, but we raise these issues as worthy of further 
exploration in our field, especially with the turn to digital writing, remix, and 
the power of the Internet to disseminate appropriated images instantly. 
We might contextualize Maggie’s political activity as one worthy of a news 
story, because that was its intent. And with respect to the intersecting consider-
ations of privacy, free speech, and the right to publicity, in news stories, as long 
as there is a relationship between the image used and the story, the newsmaker 
will be protected. As Rich (2000) argued: “An individual cannot use the right 
of publicity to claim a property right in his/her likeness as reflected in photo-
graphs that were taken in a public place to illustrate a newsworthy story.” We 
imagine, then, that the university could plausibly argue that its use of Maggie’s 
image was not to make a profit, but was instead to illustrate the joys and expe-
riences of campus life.
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Students may agree to specific, certain, yet often fine-print clauses when 
they sign various admission forms for entering a specific college. When stu-
dents enroll in college, they also commit to institutional policies such as aca-
demic honesty, residence hall regulations, regulations for student groups, and 
university ordinances. A contract is a legal agreement and does not have to be 
strictly labeled “contract” to be enforceable; as Herrington (2003) informed 
us, “if you have bought a car, rented a house, or even rented a video, you have 
entered into a contract” (p. 53). Further, contracts do not have to be written. In 
the Maggie case, what must be explored is whether students, upon enrollment 
and agreement to institutional policies, give some type of blanket consent to 
have their photographs taken for institutional use. Upon examination of the 
136-page Michigan State University (2009) Student Life Handbook and Re-
source Guide, we did not locate any contractual agreement that Maggie implic-
itly agreed to that might provide the institution the legal right to take images of 
Maggie and use those images in promotional materials. However, this is some-
thing to take into consideration when examining practices at other institutions, 
both public and private, and when discussing these issues with students who 
will be or are employed. It is possible that their internship, on-campus, or off-
campus employment contracts give the employer explicit rights to take pictures 
and use those pictures in promotional materials. 
Section 107 Fair Use
As is evident, the issues that arise regarding this case go far beyond the issue 
of copyright; copyright is, however, a factor here. U.S. copyright law protects 
items that are fixed and original, but that fixation must be authorized. To de-
termine whether the institution has the copyright in Maggie’s image, in this 
case the “fixation” was not authorized by her. It might thus occur that any 
person or entity could re-appropriate Maggie’s image, as the institution did for 
promotional materials. If the institution objected to this use, it, in turn, could 
argue that something about this particular photograph is original and, subse-
quently, the institution could (ironically, in this case) attempt to stop others 
from using Maggie’s image. The institution could argue it took this image out 
of the commons, if we think of the commons as a place where what is or once 
was owned can be re-owned by another. 
The founder of Creative Commons, a Web site that provides pre-drafted 
licenses for creators to attach to their work in an attempt to control how their 
work is appropriated by others (in the spirit of rhetorical velocity), Lawrence 
Lessig (2005) characterized the legal battles over copyright law’s reach to Web 
spaces to be a battle between old and new. If information is locked down, he ar-
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gued, creativity is stifled: “Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open 
for others to build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours 
was a free culture. It is becoming much less so” (p. 30). To illustrate his points, 
Lessig listed 17 movies where Disney, Inc. took stories in the public domain, or 
the commons: “In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped creativity 
from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his own extraordinary 
talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of his culture” (p. 24). In Mag-
gie’s case study, the institution stands in the place of Disney: an appropriator 
of another’s creativity, in this case an innovative protest. Like Disney, the insti-
tution took another’s creativity and locked it down in the form of a variety of 
broadly disseminated promotional materials. 
Although it might appear that the institution’s use of Maggie’s image is a 
fair use, that section of Title 17 does not really apply, because Maggie didn’t 
create the photograph of herself. In the case of Disney, its use of stories in the 
public domain were not technically a fair use, because those stories were not 
copyright protected; the uses were legal, but that is because the stories were in 
the commons. It would be different if Maggie had taken the picture of herself 
and then the institution appropriated the image Maggie took. Section 107 ap-
plies to items that are copyright protected and, in situations like this, human 
bodies are not considered original and fixed in the sense that texts and artifacts 
are. Other laws, such as privacy laws and laws around rights to publicity, pro-
tect individuals from having their images appropriated.
But let’s say for the sake of argument that fair use did come into play here. 
The university could potentially have fair use allowance because of its non-prof-
it status; this is part of its institutional or organizational identity. The master 
narrative surrounding universities contextualize these institutions as bettering 
human kind, of promoting good citizenship, and as doing good generally not 
for profit, but as a good steward in the larger society. Yet, we all know that 
dollars matter a great deal to universities, like any revenue-reliant business. At 
the university, profitable ventures are sought after and appreciated just like in 
any other for-profit corporate structure. But we think, perhaps, universities-as-
organizations sometimes “get away” with appropriating the work or image of 
others—in this case a student—because of their standing in the larger culture 
as not-for-profit. Rhetorical analysis and examination of the narrative around 
non-profit organizations in general—an examination containing a more criti-
cal stance than that which generally exists in our field—is in order. Research 
is needed in this area; here, however, we simply provide one small step in the 
effort to unpack how an organization, like an educational institution, can slide 
by while appropriating the image of a student and inverting the original mean-
ing of that image.
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Deciding What is in the Commons
In the context of illicit trafficking of cultural artifacts, Claudia Caruthers 
(1998) asserted that the commons provides a unique lens with which to under-
stand the “increasingly inefficient conceptual framework of cultural property 
protection in this area” (Caruthers qtd. in Flessas, 2008, p. 392). None of the 
legal or conceptual frameworks we have set forth above fully address the right 
and wrong of the institution’s appropriation. Flessas (2008) correctly asserted 
that the aspect of Caruthers’s argument based on aligning cultural properties 
with natural resources is flawed, because cultural properties—unlike natural 
resources—are not exhaustible, and in fact depend upon appropriation to sur-
vive. But, Caruthers’ idea that the commons debate can only be resolved by 
norm driven models that “employ a strategy of ethical imperatives and exhorta-
tions” rings true (qtd. in Flessas, p. 393). When rhetorical velocity and copyright 
converge, one has to define the commons, because designing documents or dis-
course to be appropriated ultimately means placing creations in the commons, 
which is a place reliant on the appropriation of things with no owners (i.e., or-
phaned work) and of things previously owned (as in the case of human bones). 
The term appropriation then needs unpacking, and here we rely on Flessas’ 
(2008) use of the Lockean concept of labour-mixing, because Maggie’s image, 
as an object, will have rights somewhere at the intersection of property-based 
rights and knowledge-based rights (p. 394). Maggie’s image can be an artifact, 
a religious relic, an ancestor, a documentation of a student protest, an object 
of scientific study, a political icon, or a representation of the good life on a col-
lege campus. Whether her image is in the commons such that the institution’s 
appropriation is entirely acceptable is a context-specific, norm-driven, value 
judgment. When the photographer took the picture, s/he mixed labor with the 
natural, the purpose of which was use. This is the basis for the Lockean under-
standing of private property as valorized in U.S. law:
This raises the question of commonality generally, and pro-
poses that cultural property analysis, like intellectual property 
analysis, occurs on a field of endlessly shifting and reforming 
“commons.” (Flessas, p. 394)
Seeking common values—in this case, the common values between the 
student protesters and the institution—is crucial in articulating the commons 
in this case. The commons, as defined in this situation, will depend on how 
the participants in this debate decide to set the boundaries of the commons, 
a place of re-appropriation (and this re-appropriation could take place infi-
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nitely). Creative commons licensing, for example, composes a commons with 
clearly marked boundaries defined by those who implement these licenses in 
their creations, and, subsequently, this defined commons offers artifacts that 
can be appropriated infinitely by others. As Flessas pointed out, the discourse 
of the commons can be used to argue either for protection of resources or for 
the legitimate taking of resources. For example, the discourse around creative 
commons asserts that this regime is needed to protect creativity and the pub-
lic domain. In contrast, the discourse of the commons is used by museums to 
argue for the taking of indigenous bones. Ultimately then, when designing dis-
course in the spirit of rhetorical velocity or when designing for appropriation, 
the answer to the question of whether or not the institution acceptably appro-
priated Maggie’s image will, in effect, define the commons. As we discuss in 
the last section, we think this kind of analysis—with all of its complexities and 
entanglements—proves useful in the composition classroom.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY
We see Maggie’s story as one that invites students to interrogate issues of 
appropriation and copyright with a 360-degree view of major ethical, cultural, 
and other issues in copyright, intellectual property, and rhetoric. Maggie’s story 
is rich with possibilities for classroom activities and discussion. Here we offer 
a few suggestions for leveraging Maggie’s case study in the writing classroom. 
Some questions for classroom activities and inquiry—which we invite others to 
remix, use, and build upon—include:
•	 If Maggie wanted the university to stop using her image, what action 
could she take and when? After collaborating and researching this is-
sue, write a document in the proper genre, addressed to the proper 
university official, requesting that the university stop using the image.
•	 In her interview, Maggie states that “in innovative actions it might be 
a good idea to have more prominent posters or things with you.” What 
could Maggie have done differently when designing this protest that 
would have possibly prevented the university’s appropriation of her im-
age? Design either a protest plan or one document that Maggie could 
have used to effectuate this change.
•	 Imagine that Maggie asks the university to stop using her image and 
they refuse. List one to three legal actions Maggie could take to cause 
the university to stop using her image. If you decide that she could in-
stitute a lawsuit, for instance, be specific about what legal grounds she 
could use to make her argument. Write a short argument based on one 
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action you think Maggie could take. Be sure to include an outcome as 
far as whether you think Maggie would be successful in her argument 
or not.
•	 From a moral or ethical perspective, do you think what the university 
did was wrong or right? Why or why not? Write a short discussion set-
ting forth your stance as well as your reasons.
•	 Based on Maggie’s case as well as class discussions and readings, how 
would you define the commons? Explain your answers and provide 
concrete examples of items that are definitely in or not in the commons.
•	 How should short-term rhetorical concerns (in this case, the campaign 
goals) be weighed against long-term, more distant, rhetorical concerns 
of Maggie’s ethos over time?
•	 In Maggie’s case, which genres of writing are in use? How does each 
genre cross medium? How does medium relate to genre? 
•	 How do economics and economies of value factor into Maggie’s process 
of delivery? How do the short-term economic interests of the media 
relate to the long-term economic interests of the university? \
Studying case examples of intellectual property and rhetorical delivery as 
situated, local practices is conducive to both areas of study. In the same way 
lawyers study case law, we advocate for the study of rhetorical delivery as a form 
of case law, a key question being: How do practitioner examples overlap, com-
pliment, or contradict the legal and rhetorical concerns of all parties involved? 
This combination of concerns is increasingly important for students, teachers, 
and practitioners to consider. In addition, the legal delimitations of the com-
mons are learnable and will become an increasingly strategic site for rhetors to 
compose and deliver into. 
CONCLUSION: RHETORICAL VELOCITY REVISITED
Ridolfo and DeVoss (2009) defined rhetorical velocity as “the strategic the-
orizing for how a text might be recomposed (and why it might be recomposed) 
by third parties, and how this recomposing may be useful or not to the short- or 
long-term rhetorical objectives of the rhetorician.” In Maggie Ryan’s example, 
even though the protest and activist campaign were ultimately successful, in 
the years that followed, a series of Maggie’s images were used in ways that nei-
ther Maggie nor the other activists could have plausibly predicted. Although 
the activists succeeded in their rhetorical goal of achieving third-party media 
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coverage for their campaign, Maggie Ryan’s ethos was affected undesirably well 
after the initial events took place.
The rhetorical implications for a case such as this one are complex because 
they necessarily include the legal realm; equally complex, however, are con-
siderations of how legal concerns will increasingly figure into a rhetor’s fu-
ture practice. The intellectual property implications for Maggie are directly 
connected to the practice of a rhetorical theory of delivery, and both areas of 
study have something significant to say to the other. Putting into conversation 
the intellectual property implications of texts, broadly speaking, and rhetorical 
theory, particularly stories such as Maggie’s, has the potential to provide more 
illustrative examples, but also more theoretically rich examples for researchers, 
students, and policy makers. 
Such practitioner examples are able to more acutely explain how the com-
mons may be rhetorically theorized as strategic. In other words, we need to 
stop thinking about copyright law in terms of what isn’t possible, but also in 
terms of what is possible—that is, how rhetors can strategically compose for 
the recomposition of their own intellectual property. Conversely, for intellec-
tual property law, these examples of how rhetorical practice and intellectual 
property connect are deeply important examples not only for teaching the 
potentialities of the commons to students, but also for arguing for better so-
cial and legal policy around the commons. A story such as Maggie’s has the 
potential to function as a scary story; the pedagogical challenge for rhetorical 
theory is to teach these complex legal and rhetorical issues without alarming 
people so much that they’re unable to act (in this case, chilled so much that 
they might be unable to move activist meeting agendas forward). Rather, we 
might focused on facilitating informed action. We thus argue that such case 
examples have the ability to argue lucidly for how copyright can function as 
a vehicle for strategic rhetorical use, and not simply as pejorative protection 
against public use.
Although we think that connecting copyright law and its implications to 
the anticipation element of rhetorical velocity is an important connection for 
scholars of both areas, we also argue for something we think is more method-
ologically significant for research and the classroom. The study of rhetorical 
delivery needs to be more closely connected to the stories and work of prac-
titioners, not simply because such a study produces more illustrative, tangible 
examples, but also because it presents delivery as a situated practitioner strategy 
and not simply as an ecology or rhizome of texts. The challenge for rhetoric 
researchers is to find additional practitioner stories of delivery and longitudinal 
circulation; we need more contrasting stories to teach. 
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NOTES
1. An earlier version of this summary appeared in Sheridan, Michel, and 
Ridolfo (2009).
2. Rhetorical velocity also means anticipating strategic remixing—that is, 
theorizing how the media (e.g., a video) might be remixed by others in ways 
ultimately advantageous to the rhetor’s goals and objectives. Rhetorical velocity 
also means theorizing how to release a image (e.g., with a watermark) to curtail 
the future appropriation of the image.
3. The repatriation debate is filled with arguments developed over many 
years by indigenous peoples worldwide, and we want to first acknowledge the 
importance of this issue in general, but also state that our use of Flessas’s and 
others’ theories on repatriation are not meant in any way to minimize the im-
portance of the plight of indigenous peoples with respect to retrieving cultural 
artifacts.
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13 FOLLOWING THE FRAMERS: 
CHOOSING PEDAGOGY TO 
FURTHER FAIR USE AND FREE 
SPEECH
TyAnna Herrington
Previously I have written that fair use and free speech are interdependent 
and necessarily work together to support the functions of the democratic pro-
cess (Herrington, 1998). In this chapter, I broaden my argument that fair use 
makes free speech possible and assert that there also exists an interdependency 
among the precepts of fair use, the First Amendment, and transactional peda-
gogy in composition classrooms. James Berlin’s (1987) philosophical inquiries, 
extended by Fred Kemp (1984), make clear that this pedagogy can be enacted. 
Fair use is a legal mechanism within the U.S. copyright statute that reflects 
the constitutional support of public access to knowledge, allowing individu-
als to use other creators’ materials for certain purposes without legal violation, 
even when those materials are copyrighted and would be otherwise unavailable 
for use. Fair use makes free speech possible, because fair use allows access to 
the information that embodies the content with which to engage. Although the 
fair use doctrine, as included in the 1976 Copyright Act, speaks directly to use 
rather than access to authored works, support for access to intellectual products 
is implied in that an individual cannot make use of a work without accessing it. 
I expand this reasoning when I argue that the ability to access content is neces-
sary if a nation’s citizens are to participate in democratic endeavors. 
My treatment of access in this chapter does not explicitly include discus-
sion of “fair access,” and its growing support among those who argue that new 
laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act should provide fair access 
provisions that would allow users to reverse engineer digital work protected 
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by encryption code. I do not explicitly address other facets of access, such as 
those regarding limitations on viewing digital work controlled by a third-party 
provider. Although these and other complex concerns regarding access beg for 
arguments that support the Framers’ intention to maintain a robust public 
domain, addressing these matters requires extensive treatment more appropri-
ate to a separate work outside the focus of this chapter. My intention here is, 
nevertheless, to underscore the importance of access, even in its more generic 
sense, to cultural content in its multiple formats. In this chapter, I further ex-
plore the importance of pedagogical choice as a means to support or inhibit 
a world view that enables free speech and the fair use that accompanies it. I 
contend that pedagogy supporting fair use goals can be significant both for 
preparing students to meet the challenges of an information society, and, more 
important, for helping them develop skills for participating in democratic pro-
cesses. I examine these hypotheses: Some pedagogical choices foster a learning 
atmosphere that supports free speech rights provided by the Constitution; stu-
dents who learn within these pedagogical spaces have greater opportunity to 
find their voices, learn to interact in democratic processes, and prepare to make 
well-considered choices regarding intellectual property issues. While Berlin 
(1987) explained the value of a transactional belief system for supporting a ne-
gotiated, socially developed knowledge base, rhetorically situated in the midst 
of interactions among those in dialogue, I argue that without access to the in-
formation that is the subject of dialogue, a democratic, egalitarian interaction 
would be impossible. The inhibition of access to knowledge and information 
by way of protectionist interpretation and application of intellectual property 
law hinders and could even eliminate the democratic dialogue made possible by 
fair use and free speech. Kemp (1984) pointed out that a social constructionist 
pedagogy is consistent with a transactional ideology; choosing a transactional 
pedagogy that underscores student legal use of copyrighted work and supports 
free speech is, I argue, consistent with the general goals of preparing students 
for engaged citizenship in a democratic society.
Examining the intricacies of the law to connect between free speech and ac-
cess of intellectual products shows that there can exist a conflict between copy-
right and the First Amendment (Patterson, 1987; Yen, 1989). Further, fair use 
has, at times, been employed as a limiting structure to what the constitutional 
provision creates (Herrington, 1998). Regardless, fair use implies a structure 
that supports public access to copyrighted work (Lemley, 2000; Travis, 2000) 
and as the law is developing today, interpretation and application of fair use 
are strengthening it as a force to provide information access (note Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Inc. and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.). I use the 
term fair use to denote an enabling force for access to copyrighted work. In ad-
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dition, because most of the intellectual products that composition instructors 
and their students use and create is copyrighted, and because fair use applies 
only to copyrighted work, I focus on copyright. 
I begin by explaining how the constitutional intellectual property provi-
sion provides a foundation for free speech, learning, and access to democratic 
dialogue. I then provide two summaries: One of the interdependency of fair 
use and the First Amendment; the other of the interdependency of ideology 
and pedagogy. Building from this base, the section that follows illustrates how 
choices in pedagogy and ideology can affect student patterns of learning and 
interaction, some of which are consistent with constitutional goals enabled by 
fair use and the First Amendment. I argue that the constitutional intellectual 
property provision, unique to U.S. law, forms the base for democratic activi-
ties. I conclude with an argument that fair use, the First Amendment, and 
pedagogy can be interdependent, and can support student interaction in the 
democratic process. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROVISION: THE FOUNDATION FOR FAIR USE
Before widespread use of digital communication structures became part of 
everyday life, intellectual property law was virtually ignored by the average citi-
zen and even by many lawyers and legislators. In the past, intellectual property 
law had more direct impact on commercial entities than on individuals. But 
even before the general public began to understand its importance in affecting 
interchanges through public and semi-public Web communication venues, the 
intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution, when interpreted in favor 
of the constitutional intent and support for free speech, provided a solid foun-
dation in policy for the lifeblood of democracy. The constitutional intellectual 
property provision, unique to U.S. law, ensures public access to information 
with the explicit goal of advancing learning by supporting a public domain of 
information from which to draw. On this basis, democracy is made possible. At 
the core of the democratic effort are the rights to free speech, egalitarian access 
to the democratic process, and the support of self-actualization that enables the 
pursuit of happiness. 
The Framers, in the intellectual property provision, made the benefit to an 
author secondary to and merely supportive of the primary goal that benefits 
the public—to advance learning. American law prioritizes society’s goals of 
educational advancement and the correlative need for democratic access to in-
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formation. To help ensure that society would have a public domain to further 
knowledge advancement, the Framers fashioned a means to motivate authors 
by providing an incentive to benefit from the work they create. But the Fram-
ers also mandated a time limit on authors’ right to control their work, and, as a 
result, fashioned a limited monopoly for managing creative products. The pro-
vision allows creators to benefit from the work, but also provides public access 
to the work by means of the time limitation. 
To enter a discourse community, members of the public must have access 
to the information that constructs their world—in essence, their reality. With-
out that information, free speech would be impossible because there would be 
no basis from which to draw to enable it. As L. Ray Patterson (1987) argued, 
“learning requires access to the work in which the ideas to be learned are em-
bodied. Because there can be no access without distribution, encouraging dis-
tribution is vitally important” (p. 7). 
Students who wish to engage with the materials and ideas that shape their 
world must be supported in their use of these materials. My students have cre-
ated interesting statements based on others’ original work, and of these, many 
have made clear and important cultural commentary. A former student, Yury 
Gitman (1998), used an image of Joseph Stalin depicted on a bookplate as 
“Boekbinder Stalin” in a parody in which he repurposed the image to depict 
Stalin “writing” a different reality than that which was shown in the origi-
nal. Gitman added the statement, “10 million killed, 130 million wounded” 
in his version of the work. He pointed out in his textual explanation that he 
understood the original image of Stalin as a bookbinder with power to create 
the printed word, where his recontextualized version depicts Stalin as one who 
“binds reality” and “binds the fate of hundreds of millions of people.” 
Another former student, Leah Mickens, used the premise of L. Frank 
Baum’s version of The Wizard of Oz to parody the Walt Disney Company’s 
aggressive protectionist stances in treating intellectual property issues, in part, 
by appropriating Baum’s work. She created the character of Oswald the Lucky 
Rabbit, whose adventures almost led to his being held captive in a protectionist 
land called “Disneyana.” Other students have used and written about digital 
video materials, music, art, and other forms of communication and supplied 
portions of these works as a basis for criticism, illustration, and other forms of 
parody. And students have also used original work in more standard ways—for 
instance, as a basis of research from which to develop ideas, to support argu-
ments, and to counter the claims of original authors. 
These students’ creative contributions were dependent upon the cultural 
statements made by the original creators of the works they used. Their use and 
treatment of these original works as a basis for making new statements about 
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related cultural interests allowed them to converse with the authors of the origi-
nals; the students used the original authors’ work as a means to enter the cul-
tural discussion, to participate in its conversation. They created new knowledge 
based on that which came before. The summary below provides the foundation 
for a structure of learning, using, and speaking about information. 
Summary: Interdependency of Fair Use and the First Amendment
Examining the interdependency of fair use and the First Amendment leads 
to many avenues of complex analysis; this intricate subject is treated at length 
in other sources. For purposes of this work, which shares a legal and peda-
gogical emphasis, I summarize the relationship between fair use and the First 
Amendment. (For more detailed treatment, please see Herrington, 1998; Pat-
terson, 1987; Patterson & Birch, 1996.) 
The First Amendment free speech clause is well known to most Americans: 
“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.” Although legal interpretation of free speech is complex and arguments 
about what free speech is and what it encompasses are broad, most Ameri-
cans understand that free speech rights are essential to our ability to define 
ourselves, to shape the course of our country’s direction, and to enable us to 
participate in democracy. Fewer Americans understand the impact of the Con-
stitution’s intellectual property provision, reflected in the fair use language of 
the Copyright Act of 1976. Fair use is the political core of the support of teach-
ing; it grants access to intellectual work that forms the basis for creating new 
knowledge.
Fair use is an affirmative defense promulgated in the Copyright Act of 
1976. A user who employs the fair use defense would admit to using a copy-
righted work, but claim the excuse of fair use under guidelines laid out in 
the doctrine. Much like the support provided for free speech, commonly al-
lowed fair uses include news reporting, critical commentary, parody, research 
and education, and scholarship. Fair use enables public access to subjects of 
national dialogue; in turn, the public has a means to speak about the con-
tent that it accesses. The Supreme Court has supported fair use and free 
speech in recent cases in which creators have used parody to comment on 
those whose works form the base of their own. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co. (2001) dealt with Ann Randall, who created a parody of Marga-
ret Mitchell’s classic Gone With the Wind. Her version, The Wind Done Gone, 
depicted the slaves’ point of view of life at Tara and the “Old South” during 
the Civil War. In Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records (2003), the Court allowed the 
rock band Aqua to parody Mattel’s Barbie brand in their song “Barbie Girl,” 
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 which depicted Barbie in what Mattel claimed was an unfavorable light. The 
Supreme Court also allowed the rap group 2 Live Crew to use Roy Orbison’s 
song “Pretty Woman” as a basis for their version that, through changed lyrics 
and musical delivery, provides critical commentary of a banal white society and 
the music used to represent it (Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 1994). 
Like fair use, the First Amendment provides no monetary benefit, but in-
stead underwrites the advantages of self-actualization and participation in the 
cultural construction of the nation. Similarly, although it is possible to benefit 
monetarily by creating a work that extends from a copyrighted work (a deriva-
tive work), the policy benefits intended by the Framers are not economic in na-
ture. Access provided for by the intellectual property provision and by fair use 
creates a benefit in non-monetary terms—support of and access to knowledge, 
leading to the ability to participate in the democratic system. When copy-
righted works “constitute the expression of ideas presented to the public, they 
become part of the stream of information whose unimpeded flow is critical to 
a free society” (Patterson, 1987, p. 5). The First Amendment and fair use work 
together, Patterson argued, where “the promotion of learning is inherently an-
tithetical to censorship” (p. 13). Hannibal Travis (2000), extended Patterson’s 
arguments by noting that 
the Framers explicitly sanctioned judicial suspicion of laws 
that inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights to free ex-
pression. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that these 
“choicest privileges,” first and “transcendent” among all our 
natural rights in the American tradition, are not to be “sacri-
ficed ... for too speculative a gain.” (p. 846)
Both the First Amendment and fair use make democratic dialogue possible 
within a society dependent upon information. Both promote self-realization, 
knowledgeable participation in self-government, and societal advancement; the 
former, by creating possibility for people to speak, the latter, by enabling access 
to cultural content people may want to speak about. Without fair use, there 
would be no free speech because access to cultural content would be limited. 
Of course, some materials and information are available in the public domain 
and do not require fair use for access. Mostly, these include non-current ma-
terials and government works. In addition, some copyright holders choose to 
provide open licenses to their works. And, where possible, users may obtain 
releases or licenses for use of others’ work. But the great majority of materi-
als likely to be significant and meaningful as a basis for critical commentary 
require fair use by those who desire to enter public dialogue. Public domain 
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materials provide only a portion of information important for understanding 
issues as a whole. For dialogue to occur, access to copyrighted work as well as 
to work in the public domain is necessary. Generally speaking, fair use allows a 
reach to materials that would otherwise be unavailable for speaking meaning-
fully to timely and significant issues. 
Individuals’ epistemological frameworks can influence whether they will 
accept or reject a law that allows access to copyrighted work or one that sup-
ports greater control over works by creators. Instructors making pedagogical 
choices can influence the efficacy of those choices in their pairing of pedagogy 
with epistemology. By extension, some epistemologies and pedagogies are sup-
portive of fair use and free speech goals, while others are not. In the following 
section, I summarize Berlin’s (1987) and Kemp’s (1984) assessments of episte-
mology and pedagogy as a basis for relating them to the interdependency of fair 
use and the First Amendment. 
Summary: Interdependency of Epistemology and Pedagogy
Berlin (1987) and Kemp (1984) provide a useful basis for understanding 
how epistemological framing, combined with pedagogical choice, can have 
broad effects on student learning processes. Berlin outlined a set of epistemolo-
gies that form a base for truth-seeking among composition instructors and 
students. I focus on three that I find most applicable to this chapter: the objec-
tive, subjective, and transactional. Berlin explained that those who follow an 
objective epistemology believe that truth exists prior to knowledge—that it is 
determined inductively, exists outside the individual, and is certain. For those 
who follow a subjective epistemology, truth is located within the individual or 
within a realm that s/he understands internally; truth transcends the material 
world, resisting expression. For subjective epistemology adherents, truth can 
be represented only by metaphor because it cannot exist materially; it must 
be discovered by the individual in a private act. Alternatively, subscribers to 
transactional epistemology believe that truth arises from rhetorically situated 
interactions—that it is contingent, must be negotiated, and is always subject to 
change. Truth does not exist in an absolute, objective form within the transac-
tional epistemology.
Kemp (1984) applied these epistemological structures to pedagogical 
choice. He explained that when pedagogical preference is consistent with epis-
temological choice, a composition instructor is able to support student learning 
effectively. He describes a structure of consistent pairings: current traditional, 
foundational teaching supports an objective worldview; expressivist structures 
support subjective epistemology; and social constructionist actions are consis-
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tent with the transactional epistemology. Kemp asserted that when instructors 
use pedagogies inconsistent with epistemological beliefs, their choices can be 
counterproductive and lead to breakdown in the learning process. For instance, 
if an instructor’s intent is that students learn rote information and provide a 
set of correct answers to an exam (an objectivist-oriented activity), then ask-
ing them to learn through interaction in blogs and class discussion promot-
ing negotiation of ideas (transactional processes) would likely debilitate the 
instructor’s goals. Or, if an instructor intends that students learn introspection 
in a search for truth and to express themselves in poetry or creative prose (a 
subjectivist goal), then using a current–traditional lecture format to provide 
students with facts (objectivist) rather than letting them explore introspectively 
would be counterproductive (for further application of Berlin and Kemp, see 
Herrington, 2005). 
Here I focus on transactional pedagogy because it most appropriately sup-
ports free speech and fair use goals; I do not, however, discount that there can 
be an appropriate time and place for each of the other pedagogical choices I 
described above. I do not intend to claim that other pedagogical choices are 
not useful, but, instead, I focus on social constructionist pedagogy because 
it is particularly supportive of fair use and free speech goals. Epistemological 
and pedagogical choices can be supportive or destructive of the constitutional 
intellectual property provision and fair use goals; pedagogical choice can either 
support or inhibit instructors’ intent for student learning as it relates to intel-
lectual property issues. 
ANALYSIS: EPISTEMOLOGY, FAIR USE, AND PEDAGOGY
Some pedagogical choices can broaden and deepen learning by encourag-
ing students to use and understand fair use, and, in turn, the learning process 
can help build a foundation that enables free speech. By supporting speech and 
access, these choices can also sustain the intent of the Framers in their develop-
ment of the Constitution’s intellectual property provision. Other pedagogical 
choices, in contrast, can hinder fair use as a base for free speech, can inhibit 
or limit learning processes, and can create a model that encourages students to 
accept static knowledge rather than pursing a process of learning that enables 
them to synthesize information and make new knowledge—the primary goal 
of the constitutional intellectual property provision. 
The Framers’ objectives of supporting a public domain, knowledge ad-
vancement, and egalitarian access to a democratic process are made possible at 
the intersection of the First Amendment and fair use. These goals—based on 
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the ideals furthered by dialogue, free speech, and access—are supported by a 
transactional epistemology. The transactional epistemology mandates interac-
tion in dialogic processes. The copyright clause, reflected in fair use, makes 
interaction possible by enabling the right to use information and ensuring that 
free speech about that information is supported. Composition students who 
learn by way of transactional or social constructionist pedagogy, effective as 
a means to extend a transactional worldview, are supported in their dialogic 
interactions. Fair use extends their interactions beyond the classroom when it 
allows them to use and respond to source materials that might otherwise be 
outside their realm of access. Their communicated responses in the forms of 
class papers, blogs, digital films or art, music, and more can also be bolstered 
by the First Amendment and, in turn, responded to by others who could em-
ploy fair use and their own supported speech as a way to further interact. 
Employing a contrary structure (such as a current–traditional pedagogy, 
which is consistent with objective epistemology) would support a culture that 
does not prize fair use and free speech, but instead intends to organize its citi-
zens through control of information and their access to information; this peda-
gogy could inhibit processes of seeking truth. For example, a government of 
dominance would do well to employ an objective epistemology. An authoritar-
ian source would impart “truth” by demanding that its citizens believe what 
the government desires. The pedagogical choices required for supporting this 
kind of structure are clear; students would prepare rote answers in line with 
expectations, relayed by their instructors. There would be no room or sup-
port for negotiated searches for truth/s or for democratic interaction within the 
learning process, because these activities would most likely lead to “wrong” or 
disallowed answers. As a result, there would also be no need for students to seek 
new knowledge or pursue free speech efforts. 
Although an expressivist pedagogy would support introspection and would 
allow individuals the freedom to search for truth that could lead to a form of 
self-realization, it does little to further the democratic interaction reflecting 
U.S. goals of free speech, the constitutional intellectual property provision, 
and fair use. In fact, consistent with the subjective epistemology would be a 
protectionist viewpoint of intellectual property law. As noted above, U.S. intel-
lectual property law encourages educational advancement (and access to the 
democratic process) as its primary goal. But a focus on expressivist truth leads 
to a Romantic concept of authorship more consistent with a European “moral 
rights” view of intellectual property protection, which supports the author’s 
rights to intellectual products as a primary interest (see Howard, this volume). 
A moral rights approach would lead to a structure in which authors maintain 
near absolute control of creative works (or, more precisely, one in which pub-
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lishers—who hold authors’ copyright licenses—would have greatest control of 
creative works). This configuration would do little to support the interactive 
use and response to cultural information that the U.S. intellectual property 
provision and fair use allow and that is required for pursuing a democratic 
enterprise.
Clearly, a transactional epistemology, furthered by a social constructionist 
pedagogy, would most closely align with the Constitution’s intellectual proper-
ty provision and fair use. These concepts can be pragmatically applied in three 
broad forms: teaching about fair use and free speech as a content area in itself, 
bolstering access to and use of copyrighted work, and providing pedagogical 
support for fair use and free speech development within composition class-
rooms. In particular, instructors may use copyrighted materials in educational 
settings to advance learning, and students may make use of copyrighted work 
to develop creative products. In addition, instructors and students may also use 
student work to support activities that develop free speech tendencies among 
participants within composition classrooms. 
PRAGMATIC CONCERNS
Communication, teaching, and intellectual property concerns are often 
pragmatic in nature; this section offers suggestions for how composition in-
structors might incorporate more practical activities involved with fair use and 
First Amendment issues in the classroom. 
Teaching Access, Fair Use, and Free Speech
Composition instructors do not expect and are not expected to teach legal 
content as regular course material. To avoid potential problems stemming from 
misuse or inhibition of use of copyrighted work, instructors would be aided by 
understanding basic issues in copyright—just as they are by understanding is-
sues in plagiarism (see Rife, 2007). In the same vein, explaining basic expecta-
tions of students as they work with copyrighted materials could facilitate efforts 
in the composition classroom. Instructors use copyrighted work in their class-
rooms to support student work, and most research using others’ intellectual 
products. As well, students use copyrighted work in their research and should 
understand their choices in treating copyrighted work to develop a sense of 
their expected behaviors as students. 
Current pedagogical practice incorporates activities that encourage stu-
dents to combine multiple sources and modes of communication in their as-
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signments. Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart Selber (2007) described their 
process of “putting two rather conventional terms—plagiarism and original-
ity—into conversation with a third, potentially controversial term—assem-
blage—in order to comment on the nature of writing in a remix culture” (p. 
380), noting that the term assemblage can also be substituted with “remix,” 
and “collage.” In a parallel move, Dànielle Nicole DeVoss and Suzanne Webb 
(2008) described an actively synthetic means of communication in pursuing 
prosumer practices where information consumers are engaged in both the de-
sign and creation processes of works they consume. Mathew Barton (2005) 
noted that composition instructors are regularly embracing the use of blogs, 
wikis, and online discussion boards, all of which can involve using digital tools 
to synthesize texts, visuals, audio, and more elements. Even with text materi-
als, as Rebecca Moore Howard (2007) noted, “if both writers and readers have 
ready access to the same set of texts, textual culture has suddenly become a 
much more shared phenomenon” (p. 5). These stances are clear acknowledge-
ments that instructional goals should reflect the developing nature of source 
and idea remix as a basis for composition. Those who remix, incorporate, re-
spond to, and synthesize materials from sources must understand intellectual 
property law to avoid non-supported uses—and more importantly for the ad-
vancement of knowledge—to find support in fair use and free speech for the 
communicative actions they undertake. 
Compositionists have long called for content-area materials treating intel-
lectual property, noting that reviewing and discussing basic tenets of intellectu-
al property law could be helpful both for instructors and students (Herrington, 
2001; Rife, 2007). This call is of particular importance in light of developing 
research by Martine Courant Rife and William Hart-Davidson (2006), which 
indicates that students misunderstand copyright law. Among issues of impor-
tance as a basis of instruction are:
•	 The constitutional basis for intellectual property law is the goal to ad-
vance learning.
•	 Creators are granted rights to their work as an incentive to encourage 
innovation and knowledge advancement.
•	 Without a balance between the public need for access and creators’ 
needs for control of their work, the system will fail.
•	 Students do have copyrights in their work, even without copyright reg-
istration.
•	 Students and instructors should respect the copyrights of others.
•	 Notwithstanding the tenets above, students and instructors can access 
otherwise protected work when supported by fair use, personal use, and 
the First Amendment.
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•	 Copyright and plagiarism are not the same thing, and must not be 
conflated.
•	 Without access to cultural information that makes up society, free 
speech and engagement in the democratic process would be impossible. 
Granted, learning about and understanding the intricacies of the issues 
noted above is not easy. But knowing about intellectual property and its effects 
can be important as well as interesting for composition instructors and students. 
Sources for learning about the tenets above are plentiful today. The Con-
ference of College Composition and Communication’s (CCCC) Intellectual 
Property Caucus Web site and email list provide up-to-date treatment of intel-
lectual property issues that affect composition instructors, and the Intellectual 
Property Committee that advises the body of the National Council of Teachers 
of English examines issues of interest in intellectual property and educates the 
NCTE constituency. In addition, Web-based sources such as Lawrence Les-
sig’s Creative Commons blog, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) site, 
and the Chilling Effect Web site provide broad resources. Beyond these, there 
is a growing number of helpful books and articles directed to composition and 
technical communication. 
Using, Not Abusing, Copyrighted Work
Fair use can allow instructors to employ copyrighted work both for teach-
ing and research purposes, and can advance student learning processes. If in-
structors are afraid to use materials that can be used legally as provided by fair 
use and the First Amendment, not only could they inhibit the potential for 
learning in their classrooms, but they might, for example, discourage students 
from making use of materials that would otherwise be legally allowed. It is no 
minor issue that laws that grant benefits, if unused, are interpreted eventually 
as prohibitive in nature, at worst, and, at best, fail to function as a basis for pro-
viding rights and privileges. When these rights and privileges are so important 
that they form the basis for democratic interaction, the “use it or lose it” man-
date is particularly significant. 
Although access to information forms a foundation for education and free 
speech, students also benefit from understanding the limitations on using 
copyrighted or otherwise protected intellectual products. The more they un-
derstand the balance and the goals within the constitutional provision and 
fair use, the better they will be able to make judgments regarding their use of 
others’ works, the circumstances under which their use is likely to be support-
ed, and the potential societal impact of choices they make. The composition 
classroom provides a valuable venue for considering the ways that intellectual 
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products reflect the characters and efforts of their creators. Although a “moral 
rights” treatment of intellectual products protects creators beyond the extent 
that U.S. law provides in support of our democratic system, students who learn 
the conceptual base could take a step toward understanding the ways that their 
work represents them as individuals and could draw from that base to value 
their work as an embodiment of who they are. Students who learn experien-
tially, in this way, to assimilate the concept of authorship, might be more likely 
to accept a vision of the importance for avoiding plagiarism and might consider 
carefully the potential to violate copyright as well. 
In many instances, neither students nor their professors and academic ad-
ministrators are aware of or acknowledge that students retain copyrights to 
their work. Some professors and administrators, thinking that the quality of 
student work is lower than the work of others at the institution, misunder-
stand copyright law and treat the work as if it is not copyrightable. Others are 
unaware that since the Copyright Act of 1976, there is no need to register a 
copyright to obtain and retain it. Because composition courses, by their nature, 
demand that students develop copyrightable products, consideration of these 
aspects of copyright are particularly helpful. (Although this issue is of great im-
portance as students are authoring a wide variety of copyright-protected work, 
both in hard copy and digital forms, the detail required to explain it is outside 
the scope of this chapter. For detailed treatment of students’ rights and respon-
sibilities in regard to intellectual property, see Herrington, iProp.) 
CONCLUSION: THE INTERDEPENDENCY OF  
PEDAGOGY, FAIR USE, AND FREE SPEECH
Composition classrooms can be powerful forums that allow students to exer-
cise speech rights; learn to voice their ideas; interact with the ideas of others; and 
read and examine issues with critical, analytical insight. The broader inquiry is 
how epistemological choice and the pedagogy that accompanies it can foster a 
means to support the Constitution’s goals for the country, extended through 
fair use and free speech structures that support democratic development. The 
clear directive is a social constructionist pedagogy that supports these efforts 
most pointedly. This kind of pedagogy—which focuses on student-based in-
teractions, highlights student choices, and validates their work—creates a kind 
of participatory pedagogy. Pedagogues such as Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger 
(1991) and Seymore Papert and Idit Harel (1991) have supported teaching prac-
tices that allow students to learn experientially, assimilating learning as a partici-
patory event. When students are learning not only communication and writing 
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skills, but practicing interaction in a dialogic process that eventually leads to 
competence in participatory democracy, the classroom becomes a powerful 
forum for supporting the goals of the U.S. Constitution. 
Once instructors choose a pedagogy that focuses on student learning, they 
must have the strength to see it through—participatory pedagogy is not easy 
and does not hold immediate or clear rewards for the instructor. But this peda-
gogy’s ability to foster and use fair use and free speech goals as a way to fur-
ther pedagogical intention only underscores efforts in the very activities that 
form the base for constitutional goals and a democratic effort. Employing fair 
use—and especially teaching fair use principles to composition students—can 
help to support dialogic interaction within writing classrooms, and thus affect 
students’ experiential understanding of the dialogic value of their communica-
tive expressions in participatory government. Shuba Ghosh (2003) noted that 
“the hallmark of democracy is the liberalization of the arts and a movement 
away from the promotion of a national, uniform culture as in the former Soviet 
Union or Nazi Germany” (p. 390). And, as noted above, remix of sources and 
communicative interactions forms a basis for truly interactive democratic prac-
tice. Ghosh provided a scenario to explain the benefits of interaction:
Many cultural products are valuable precisely because they are 
consumed by other people. While I may enjoy reading Thom-
as Pynchon or Margaret Atwood by myself, I benefit from 
knowing that others have also read their works. These ben-
efits include the ability to converse about the works to gain 
deeper insights, and the possibility of communicating new 
insights and understandings that I may have missed in my 
private reading. Sharing does not mean that there is a unity of 
interest or understanding; my reading of Gravity’s Rainbow or 
The Blind Assassin may be radically different from yours. It is 
the communal aspects of reading and consumption that cre-
ate important values for cultural products. (p. 409)
Information is valuable capital and fair use allows access to it—but free 
speech is a means by which to use information and reflects what is even more 
valuable than information capital. That is the skills to use information along 
with the ability to think, to synthesize, and to adapt to a changing world. Com-
position instructors can potentially shape the future with the choices they make. 
We have a choice of pedagogy; we can choose one that supports free speech and 
fair use, or we can choose another that inhibits it. The power of language and 
rhetoric to create reality—particularly in a digital world—can be of extreme 
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importance in communication classrooms. To prepare students to interact in a 
remix culture requires a pedagogy that allows interaction, encourages fair use, 
and supports free speech. Teaching from this perspective is effectively support-
able by a social constructionist pedagogy and transactional worldview. 
Instructors do not only teach, but also provide opportunities and guidance; 
in doing so, they also participate in creating a future, not just for the students 
themselves, but for the country in which they interact. This is particularly 
important today, as we use digital prosumer creations that effectively merge 
use and speech into one creative product. In these situations, more than ever, 
speech and use become mixed activities and are tied closely together—in a 
remix of ideas and sources that help enable participatory democracy. Employ-
ing a pedagogy that encourages students to learn within the realm of participa-
tory democracy allows instructors to support a training ground, of sorts, for the 
country’s future, as well. 
If we are to prepare students to face the challenges of the 21st century, we 
cannot ask them to engage only in rote memorization of static “facts,” especial-
ly when knowledge keeps changing at an ever-quickening pace. The Framers’ 
genius was in creating a set of goals for advancing democracy through learning 
and access to the dialogic process by reflecting these goals in an intellectual 
property provision that creates the base of our ability to interact. Democracy 
requires creativity and innovation; these are made possible through free speech, 
fair use, and a pedagogy that supports their use. Our democracy is not static, 
but thrives on fluidity, accommodating change to allow a country that can 
grow and develop, hopefully, into a smarter, more innovative, more inclusive 
union. Choosing an appropriate pedagogy to support the mechanisms of fair 
use in free speech can go a long way to prepare students to engage in participa-
tory democracy and thus to influence the shape of the country. 
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14 RESPONSE TO PART II—
BEING RHETORICAL WHEN 
WE TEACH INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND FAIR USE
James E. Porter
Let’s start with the obvious: Language is a shared resource. 
I wrote that five-word phrase—“language is a shared resource”—all by my-
self. I swear I did, or I thought I did. But then I did a phrase search in Google 
and discovered that the phrase is not original! It was said before, in a 2002 
book by Tor Nørretranders called The Generous Man. Well, that’s not quite 
true—actually, the phrase is the English translation by Jonathan Sydenham of 
a phrase Nørretranders expressed in Danish. The English phrase also appeared 
in a 2006 article by J.C. Spender in a business journal, so he must have plagia-
rized it from Nørretranders—or, rather, Sydenham. What a trail of deceit; it’s 
all very dense and confusing.
Things get even worse. The more egregious act of plagiarism in paragraph 
one is actually the phrase “let’s start with the obvious,” a journalistic cliché of 
the first rank. Don’t even bother to Google search that one—it’s ubiquitous in 
sports and entertainment features, in editorials, in advertising.
I thought what I wrote as paragraph one was my own, but clearly it is not. I 
must have plagiarized it, the entire first two sentences of my paper. The textual 
evidence is conclusive, incontrovertible, damning. Am I to be charged with 
academic dishonesty, along with Steve Westbrook, who admits to stealing a 
phrase from Raymond Carver for the title of his chapter? Or else ... 
Maybe I’m just unoriginal. Maybe I think in clichés. Maybe I am prone to 
ignorantly parroting phrases from my linguistic discourse community—like 
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Thomas Jefferson did when he wrote the Declaration of Independence, which 
repeated verbatim 
traces from a First Continental Congress resolution, a Massa-
chusetts Council declaration, George Mason’s “Declaration of 
Rights for Virginia,” a political pamphlet of James Otis, and 
a variety of other sources, including a colonial play. The over-
all form of the Declaration (theoretical argument followed by 
list of grievances) strongly resembles, ironically, the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689, in which Parliament lists the abuses 
of James II and declares new powers for itself. Several of the 
abuses in the Declaration seem to have been taken, more or 
less verbatim, from a Pennsylvania Evening Post article. And 
the most memorable phrases in the Declaration seem to be 
least Jefferson’s: “That all men are created equal” is a sen-
timent from Euripides which Jefferson copied in his literary 
commonplace book as a boy; “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of 
Happiness” was a cliché of the times, appearing in numerous 
political documents. (Porter, 1986, p. 36)
Thomas Jefferson is a plagiarist, too, and one of the worst ever! Or else... 
Perhaps most of what we say, in speech and writing, is “plagiarized” in the 
sense that it echoes, it reproduces, verisimultitudinously, phrases that we have 
read, heard, or felt somewhere else before. But plagiarism is such a negative 
term. Let’s call it intertextuality, as Steve Westbrook does: The texts we create, 
in speech or in writing, are always comprised of others’ texts—because fun-
damentally language is a shared resource and because fundamentally we are 
always speaking and writing in conversation with others, which often entails 
reproducing their speech/writing, even when we do not always explicitly ac-
knowledge those piracies. 
We might go further, in fact, and say that reproducing other people’s speak-
ing and writing—without attribution—is the most effective kind of rhetoric, 
because echoing what others think, feel, believe, and say is a legitimate rhetori-
cal strategy for establishing rhetorical common ground with an audience. The 
power of the Declaration of Independence came about precisely because it was 
an assemblage—to use a key term from TyAnna Herrington’s chapter—of exist-
ing political phrases, beliefs, attitudes, and ideas of the time. Assemblage is not 
plagiarism, because it involves strategically collecting and organizing phrases 
into new configurations for a new context and audience—a process that in 
classical rhetoric was called compilatio. We might also call it re-mixing—and 
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this act is fundamental to how rhetoric works, not just in the digital age but in 
all ages (DeVoss & Porter, 2006).
The contributing authors to Part II of this collection recognize that inter-
textuality and assemblage, so fundamental to literacy production, raise impor-
tant questions about intellectual property and fair use. It is impossible to write 
without doing some unattributed copying. We can’t get through our day with-
out it. We “plagiarize” all the time, in the sense that we are borrowing bits and 
pieces of language from other sources and repeating these fragments, echoing 
them, inserting them in new contexts, appropriating them, and redistributing 
them. And, of course, this is not always plagiarism. 
And, of course, sometimes it is. Understanding that dividing line between 
“sharing” and “stealing”—to borrow Westbrook’s language—is critical to ethi-
cal (as well as legal) composing. 
The Part II essays address this all-important distinction between sharing 
and stealing and offer strategies for helping student writers understand the 
difference, make smart decisions, and become wise and ethical users of others’ 
language—“language” defined broadly to include audio, video, and graphic, 
as well as textual language (speech and writing). These essays emphasize the 
importance of teaching intellectual property and fair use, and overall I could 
not agree with the authors more: We absolutely need to be teaching copy-
right issues as an integral part of all composition courses, but particularly in 
first-year composition. I agree with Ashley Hall, Kathie Gossett, and Elizabeth 
Vincelette that our focus as instructors should not be “lament[ing] ... the im-
moral and unconscionable actions of our students.” Rather, our focus should 
be on teaching the ethics and politics of copyright and on teaching students to 
be advocates of fair use as well as of copyright. So, we all agree, we should be 
teaching students about intellectual property. The tougher question, though, is 
the how question: How should we teach intellectual property and fair use ac-
curately, responsibly, effectively? 
Thus far, we composition teachers haven’t done a very good job teaching 
copyright accurately. Both Janice Walker and Steve Westbrook point out that 
many textbooks and style guides in our field still misrepresent copyright issues 
and/or do an inadequate job of explaining their intricacies and nuances (e.g., 
Walker’s discussion of the 2009 MLA Handbook). TyAnna Herrington says 
that “misperceptions and inaccuracies regarding intellectual property law are 
both extreme and ubiquitous in this age of digital communication.” Alas, espe-
cially among composition teachers, it seems.
Westbrook points to some confusions in our composition textbooks—in-
cluding in some big-name, big-selling textbooks; textbooks often do not ac-
knowledge that “the conditions for determining fair use are independent of 
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documentation.” This is a key distinction, and one that our field has not fully 
addressed. Citing the authors of a work may satisfy the conditions for academic 
integrity, but that is not the same as satisfying the conditions for fair use. West-
brook suggests that composition teachers themselves need to understand these 
realms better than they do. 
Sometimes when we teach intellectual property and fair use, we slip into 
fallacies of oversimplification. One fallacy that Westbrook discusses errs on 
the side of excessive liberty—that is, the assumption that merely citing your 
sources is good enough. That fallacy confuses the realm of academic integrity 
and citation practices with the realm of copyright. But another fallacy exists in 
excessive constraint: The guideline that insists we should “always ask permis-
sion” is bad advice, too. As Westbrook says, “it oversimplifies the complexity” 
of how fair use operates and has the secondary effect of “obfuscat[ing] or even 
eras[ing] the concept of fair use.” “Always ask permission” is a bad guideline be-
cause it contributes to the erosion of the Fair Use doctrine—and this also can 
impede our First Amendment rights as well. Powerful interests have used the 
threat of copyright infringement as a way to block the exercise of free speech, 
as both Herrington and Westbrook discuss. Westbrook cites the example of 
how Diebold used the threat of copyright infringement to stifle journalistic 
information about the unreliability of Diebold voting machines. This is a great 
example, first, because it highlights the importance of protecting the Fair Use 
provision of U.S. Copyright Law as integral to First Amendment rights, but 
also because Judge Fogel’s decision in the case (Online Policy Group v. Diebold, 
Inc., 2004) models the kind of step-by-step reasoning that is fundamental for 
writers making a fair use determination. As Westbrook says, it is that form of 
reasoning and analysis we should be teaching in composition. 
So, first, we need to recognize that there are two different systems in play 
here: the realm of intellectual property/infringement and the realm of academic 
integrity/plagiarism. The first is a legal realm, the second an ethical realm. If a 
student buys a research paper from a term paper mill and submits it as his own, 
that is pretty clearly an act of academic dishonesty (plagiarism), but probably not 
a copyright infringement (if the paper purchased has been licensed for reuse). 
Conversely, if a student makes a YouTube video using music and images from 
copyrighted sources, she can uphold the standards of academic integrity (and 
avoid the charge of plagiarism) by citing those sources in her video. But that has 
nothing to do with the question of copyright: the student’s academically appro-
priate video could still infringe upon copyright. We need to be teaching both 
realms—explaining their differences and identifying their points of overlap.
Second, in talking about the realm of intellectual property, we need to 
make sure to teach that realm as having two sides—a fundamental tension be-
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Figure 1: The ethics of using others’ texts—the simplistic view.
tween “the property side” (the author’s or creator’s side) and “the use side” (the 
user’s side, the social good side):
Copyright law ... is essentially characterized by a balance: be-
tween (a) creating a system of incentive by rewarding the au-
thor’s labor and (b) encouraging benefits to society from the 
flow of information that can stimulate new ideas, inventions, 
and creations. (DeVoss & Porter, 2006, p. 185) 
Questions of intellectual property always involve balancing the rights of 
the creator with the rights of the user (and the rights of society at large). So 
in talking about this realm, I believe we should refer to it not just one-sided-
ly as “intellectual property” or “copyright,”1 but rather we should be sure to 
acknowledge the duality in our description: Let’s always label it “intellectual 
property and fair use”—a binary phrase that acknowledges the tension funda-
mental to the area. Give both sides their due.
Third, we need to teach that this realm is not a simple binary, black-and-
white world of clear rights and wrongs (as Figure 1 represents).
Rather, the realm consists of some cases and practices that are clearly ac-
ceptable, others that are clearly not acceptable, and a whole host of practices 
and uses of others’ material where the decision is complicated, uncertain, un-
clear, and gray. In short, the realm is contextually complicated (as Figure 2 
represents).
As writers, we face complicated decisions regularly—probably every day. 
For the really important stuff, we should seek expert advice. But because we 
can’t afford to email our IP lawyers about every decision, we typically answer 
Figure 2: The ethics of using others’ texts—the rhetorically complicated view.
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these questions on our own and decide upon some reasonable course of ac-
tion. We assess the circumstances and make a judgment call. Hopefully, an 
informed call. 
Jim Ridolfo and Martine Rife provide an interesting case that falls within 
the gray area, I would say: Michigan State University’s appropriation of Mag-
gie Ryan’s image for their own marketing purposes. As Ridolfo and Rife say, 
“none of the legal/conceptual frameworks we have set forth ... fully address the 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ of the institution’s appropriation.” Exactly. What their de-
tailed analysis shows is the complexity of copyright law vis-à-vis privacy consid-
erations and the vital importance of context in determining right and wrong. 
Here is where rhetoric has much to contribute to copyright law: That is, rhet-
oric understands the complexity of language use vis-à-vis context, audience, 
and purpose. Rhetoric “as the productive art of creating effective discourse ... 
is highly attuned to audience and context—that is, to the particular circum-
stances of a scene or situation” (McKee & Porter, 2009, p. 25).
I understand that most people would prefer a world in which there are clear 
answers, clear villains and heroes, tried-and-true guidelines, and a world where 
sharing and stealing, and right and wrong are firmly determined. But that is 
not the world of intellectual property, and that is why I am worried about Jan-
ice Walker’s list of “clear-cut guidelines.” Yes, I can accept that list as guidelines, 
but I worry that they will be used as—and become—rules. And that would be 
dangerous.
For instance, Walker proposes: “For print, generally the rule of thumb has 
been that use of ten percent or less of a work constitutes fair use.” The so-called 
“10% guideline” is an example of a copyright guideline that has been promul-
gated by publishers, has been widely adopted by libraries, and has received a 
kind of formal authorization through the CONFU (1996) process. Yes, it is an 
established guideline. But it does not have a basis in copyright law and it should 
not function as a legal standard. As the U.S. Copyright Office (2009) tells us:
There are no legal rules permitting the use of a specific num-
ber of words, a certain number of musical notes, or percent-
age of a work. Whether a particular use qualifies as fair use 
depends on all the circumstances. 
Although I understand the desire for clear-cut quantitative guidelines, they 
don’t exist—particularly not in regards to quantity of copying. (As Westbrook 
points out, in these litigious days, even minimal sampling of a piece of copy-
righted music can be considered infringement.) Likewise, for another guideline, 
Walker cites: “For work to be distributed outside the classroom (for instance, 
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to be published on the World Wide Web), it is imperative you at least make 
an attempt to acquire permission.” No, it is not required that you do so—and 
doing so may have the unintended consequence of eroding fair use, for the rea-
sons Westbrook discusses. Another guideline from Walker: “graphics, audio, 
or video files should not be downloaded without permission.” Again, no, I 
disagree heartily with that advice: Always seeking permission is a practice that 
further contributes to the erosion of fair use. Publishers and content creators 
would like us to believe they have that level of control over their copyrighted 
works; in actual law, they don’t and they shouldn’t. Users (writers) have rights.
Ultimately, an algorithmic approach to copyright issues doesn’t help writers 
because (a) “the law” is not a clear or firmly established entity, but is rather a 
messy, moving target; and (b) every application of law requires understanding 
the circumstances of a particular composing context (involving the purpose of 
the use, the quantity of material used, etc.). Further, we need to recognize that 
U.S. Copyright Law is not the only or highest authority in this realm; we need 
to avoid being U.S.-centric in our approach to intellectual property. When 
students borrow material from the Internet and then post their own creations 
to the Internet, they may or may not be under the authority of U.S. Copyright 
Law. Their writing may be governed by the copyright policies of another na-
tion, or may fall into the vastly gray area of international copyright treaties and 
policies (see McKee & Porter, 2010).
So don’t try to teach “the law.” What is needed, I would argue, is a rhetori-
cal frame of thinking about context and a heuristic methodology—that is, a 
critical procedure for making ethical and legal judgments about the use of oth-
ers’ intellectual property. This type of ethical reasoning is what Aristotle called 
phronesis, or the art of practical judgment. Such an approach would include 
some broad principles and guidelines, some heuristic questions, and some case 
examples—of clear-cut fair uses, clear-cut infringements, and the vast gray area 
in between.
In a sense, then, we have to teach students some basic legal reasoning—
which is also a kind of rhetorical reasoning. We should teach not just (a) what 
the law says or what guidelines tell us, but also (b) how law has been or could 
be applied in particular cases, so that (c) students can learn a form of reasoning 
useful to making their own prudent judgments about intellectual property and 
fair use. We should resist the urge to promulgate publisher folklore or “clear-cut 
guidelines” such as “the 10% rule” or “always ask permission.” 
A more promising pedagogical approach is to examine and discuss prob-
lematic cases, and in this regard I very much like Westbrook’s discussion of 
Judge Fogel’s legal reasoning in the Diebold case and Ridolfo and Rife’s analy-
sis of the Maggie case (i.e., Michigan State University’s continued use of Mag-
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gie’s image for marketing purposes, without her permission). Cases can be 
elaborate, detailed, and lengthy—like the two just mentioned—or they can 
be short and simple examples. Here are several mini-cases I use to get students 
discussing and pondering the intellectual property implications of their writ-
ing practices, to help them understand the difference between the realms of 
academic integrity and intellectual property, and to help them think critically 
about context of use:
Heping, a graduating Miami University senior, pastes a ver-
sion of the Miami University logo as a graphic on his resume 
(both the print version and the electronic version), which he 
sends out to potential employers. Is this an intellectual prop-
erty infringement and/or an act of academic dishonesty?
Jim, a graduate student in English, recycles his senior under-
graduate thesis paper for use in a graduate course. The origi-
nal paper was his own work; Jim, however, submits the paper 
in nearly its original form, with only minor editorial revisions. 
Is this academic dishonesty?
A teacher asks students to create a web page of annotated 
sources on a given historical topic. Jane locates a web page 
with an interesting and distinctive layout and uses that web 
page as a template for her own assignment. She collects and 
annotates the historical sources on her own, but she “borrows” 
the HTML coding for the format and typography of the page. 
Is this plagiarism? What if she did the same thing in a web-
authoring course?
In their chapter, Hall, Gossett, and Vincelette focus on YouTube videos—
and that is a great example case because YouTube and similar sites represent 
an increasingly important venue for multimedia writing. Producing remixed 
multimedia writing and posting such creations to sites like YouTube is an ac-
tivity rich with intellectual property implications. However, Hall, Gossett, and 
Vincelette focus on the genre of parody, which is one of the more highly pro-
tected forms of fair use, especially if the parody is political. Parody is more 
likely to represent a stronger transformative effect and, therefore, is more likely 
to be protected under fair use (see Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 1994, and Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 2001). For pedagogical purposes, I wish that Hall et 
al. had addressed a different genre, or a wider variety of genres.2 What if, say, a 
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student uses video clips from a television show for a promotional video posted 
on YouTube for a non-profit organization? 
As we contemplate how to teach issues of intellectual property and fair 
use, we also have to reflect humbly on our limitations. What credibility do we 
have—as rhetoricians and composition instructors—speculating about intel-
lectual property and fair use? That’s a legal area; shouldn’t we leave it to IP law-
yers? Of course some of us, like Rife and Herrington, have the requisite legal 
credentials, but the rest of us are, well, amateurs in this realm. 
This activity—the act of making fundamental decisions about copyright 
... literally, the right to copy something, to repeat it, to use it (with or without 
attribution)—is fundamental to literacy production and to composition. And 
so, like it or not, it falls to us, as writing teachers, to address the matter in our 
composition classes. However, we must take care to delineate our area of ex-
pertise. We should not be teaching intellectual property and fair use as if we 
were lawyers or law professors—even if we were capable of that. Our job is to 
teach copyright issues from the point of view of the writer who must make 
these decisions regularly, daily, and repeatedly in the ordinary course of com-
posing—and without recourse to legal opinion. Our job is not to teach Fair 
Use (upper case), as if we were teaching law students. Rather, our job is to teach 
fair and ethical use (lower case) of others’ work to help student writers develop 
critical consciousness of the issues and a pragmatic heuristic inquiry procedure 
they can apply across different contexts to make prudent judgments. We should 
teach rhetorical, case-based reasoning as it applies to the practice of borrowing, 
reproducing, and redistributing others’ material. In this regard, the essays in 
Part II of this collection, indeed the entire collection, represent an important 
contribution to our pedagogical efforts.
NOTES
1. We need to recognize, too, that “intellectual property” and “copyright” 
are not synonymous. Copyright is one facet of the larger realm of intellectual 
property law, which also includes other matters (such as trademark and patent 
law).
2. The focus on YouTube does allow Hall, Gossett, and Vincelette to devel-
op the argument—a compelling one—that YouTube exists primarily for social 
purposes, not for infringement purposes. Their argument is that YouTube falls 
into the category of Web 2.0 publication, where a “new and different cultural 
logic is at play.” This is a very interesting argument about genre and context 
that merits further consideration regarding intellectual property issues.
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15 TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF 
FAIR USE FOR MULTIMEDIA 
COMPOSITION
Renee Hobbs and Katie Donnelly
These days, it’s inevitable: writing and composition teachers are becom-
ing media literacy teachers. As the Internet and computing technologies have 
created new forms of expression and communication that are multivocal, 
multimodal, collaborative, public, instantaneously accessible, and sometimes 
anonymously authored, anyone in the business of helping students develop the 
capacity for self-expression and communication bumps into key concepts of 
media literacy education. As Brian Morrison (qtd. in Yancey, 2004) pointed 
out, in the 21st century, composition is “the thoughtful gathering, construction 
or reconstruction of a literate act in any given media” (p. 315). Writing teachers, 
typically tuned in to issues of identity, voice, and power, require sensitivity to 
how form and content interact when symbolic forms include not only printed 
language, but also sound, including the spoken word and music to name only 
a few, and still and moving images. These messages come to us through diverse 
forms that are variously commodified or non-commodified in an increasingly 
dense digital environment where economic, political, and social contexts shape 
both the creation and reception of messages. 
Composition educators recognize the rapidly shifting tectonic plates we are 
now facing in education. Kathleen Yancey (2004) recommended that writing 
and composition educators must develop a new curriculum for the 21st cen-
tury, one that expands beyond its roots in the intense and personal tutorial 
relationship between the teacher and the writer. According to Yancey, students 
need to consider how their compositions relate to “real world” genres; what 
the best medium and best delivery might be and so create and share different 
forms of communication via different media to divergent audiences; and how 
to adapt ideas across different media genres and technological forms. Within 
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this changing landscape, as forms of expression make use of appropriation and 
sampling, and as authorship becomes increasingly collaborative, issues con-
cerning ownership and intellectual property arise. 
People now use multiple forms of representation to convey ideas, using “cut-
ting and pasting, drawing, talking, playing, audio tracks, video interfaces and 
other media to achieve different perspectives on their world, solve problems, 
make plans, and communicate with others” (Tierney, 2008, p. 101). These 
multimedia environments enable literacy practices to easily travel across space 
and time, in and out of school. Through the use of do-it-yourself practices that 
enable (almost) anyone to be an author in a socially situated context, Doreen 
Piano (2008) found that those who create zines and other alternative publica-
tions rely on the “innovative uses of scraps and cutouts from discarded newspa-
pers and magazines” in ways that demonstrate how popular culture contributes 
to literacy practices that move beyond basic, functional skills to ones “invested 
in personal, familial and communal meaning” (p. 315).
Many educators—at all levels and in many disciplines—rely on the ability 
to use copyrighted materials to help students develop the skills and knowledge 
to understand, analyze, and create multimodal texts. Although some educa-
tors tend to conceptualize video and multimedia compositions differently from 
print ones, there are important parallels between traditional compositions and 
21st-century multimodal texts (Bruce, 2008). Media literacy education ap-
plies concepts such as purpose, genre, audience, tone, and point of view to 
strengthen critical thinking and communication skills, particularly in response 
to mass media and popular culture. Students learn through both close read-
ing and analysis activities as well as creative composition practices (Costanzo, 
2007). Just as it is important for students to share their print compositions, 
students need to be able to share their digital and multimedia compositions 
with authentic audiences to deepen their reflection on their editorial and cre-
ative choices. Because students and teachers need to use, quote from, and share 
copyrighted digital texts as part of media literacy education, we need a robust 
interpretation of fair use. 
But old paradigms die hard. Consider the case of the college professor at 
a school of education, involved in preparing young people to be high school 
English teachers. In the course, students develop activities and lessons that help 
demonstrate the connection between media literacy, language arts and litera-
ture. As part of this work, students create a short video production, working 
in teams to develop a compelling message using images, language, and sound. 
The professor usually puts together a DVD of student media work at the end 
of each semester, but he doesn’t feel comfortable screening these works or shar-
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ing them with colleagues at professional conferences. He would never think 
of posting them online. Why? He’s concerned that he may face legal risks, be-
cause some of his students make use of copyrighted images found on Google, 
as well as excerpts from popular films, television programs, and You Tube vid-
eos. Many students use samples from popular music in their productions. 
What is the impact of this kind of fear on the development of multimedia 
composition? Because our colleagues rarely see the quality of work that stu-
dents can produce using multimedia texts and tools, they’re sometimes not too 
interested in adopting innovative approaches to teaching pre-service English 
teachers. The uncertainty and doubt this professor experiences stems in part 
from a lack of knowledge and lack of confidence in understanding how copy-
right and fair use applies to the practice of media literacy education. Copyright 
confusion—a widespread misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of copy-
right law and a lack of understanding of the doctrine of fair use—is a situation 
created in part by the various outdated “educational use guidelines” misunder-
stood as law (Crews, 2001). 
With the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Founda-
tion, the media literacy community recently attempted to reduce copyright 
confusion through the development of a code of best practices. As part of this 
larger project, we first conducted long-form interviews with 63 educators from 
K–12 institutions, universities, and with leaders in the youth media commu-
nity, resulting in the report, The Cost of Copyright Confusion for Media Literacy 
(Hobbs, Jaszi, & Aufderheide, 2007).1 Following this, we held 4-hour-long 
focus group meetings with 150 individuals in ten cities across the U.S. to ex-
plore various hypothetical situations regarding the use of copyrighted materi-
als for media literacy education, looking for evidence of consensus and shared 
norms. This work resulted in the development of the “Code of Best Practices 
in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education” (Center for Social Media, 2008). In 
this chapter, we examine the ongoing dialogue among educators about fair use 
as it applies to the practice of media literacy education, with particular atten-
tion to student media production and multimedia composition activities. We 
begin by presenting evidence about core values among educators concerning 
copyright and fair use, collected through intensive interviews with educators 
in the first phase of developing the code. Then we consider how remix prac-
tices support the goals of media literacy education and examine how copyright 
and fair use apply. Finally, we discuss the views of educators concerning in-
structional practices that specifically relate to student multimedia composi-
tion: student use of copyrighted materials in their creative work and the types 
of sharing with authentic audiences part of the teaching and learning process.2
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CORE VALUES ABOUT COPYRIGHT AND EDUCATION
Educators share a set of core beliefs about the use of copyrighted materi-
als for teaching and learning. In our interviews with educators, the following 
themes emerged: 
Cultural criticism is essential to democracy. 
Media literacy educators value cultural criticism as an essential tool for 
self-actualization and democracy. “A literate citizenship cannot be created if 
the people who control images don’t allow them to be used,” one educator 
explained. Another teacher said that “it’s important that users of media par-
ticipate in it and don’t just receive it.” In contemporary culture, students are 
trained to be consumers of media, and as another teacher explained, that is why 
“it’s important to go beyond this role.”
Mass and digital media are the heart of the cultural environment. 
Media literacy educators see mass media and popular culture as part of the 
cultural landscape, deeply connected to students’ sense of personal and social 
identity. “Copyrighted materials are like our cultural landscape—you need to 
be able to use and analyze media,” said one teacher. Sharing our interpretations 
and understandings of the diverse works of expression and communication 
around us is an important part of learning to make sense of the world. Digital 
media is a part of our lives in a way that it wasn’t 20 or 30 years ago, pointed 
out a media educator and video artist: “We should have access to our culture 
and be able to talk about it and comment on the world around us. If we don’t 
comment on it, then it feels like information is being controlled.”
Effective use of copyrighted materials enhances the teaching and learn-
ing process.
 
A college professor who teaches pre-service teachers talked about the impor-
tance of using copyrighted works in educational settings because they provide 
more current examples than offered in most textbooks. Contemporary mass 
media materials hook attention and interest, and help teachers connect new 
ideas to students’ existing knowledge. “Teaching is just better when we can 
pull from a lot of different sources,” said one teacher. A number of educators 
pointed out the value of modeling as a tool in the learning process. “Imitation 
is a way to learn,” explained one teacher, “so if students can’t take and use the 
Fair Use for Multimedia Composition
279
most highly developed messages that society creates, it’s a handicap for them 
and the whole society.”
Appropriation of cultural materials promotes creativity and learning. 
Teachers believe that there is significant educational value in the process of 
juxtaposition and recombination of existing materials. A number of educators 
described the process of creating mashups, where existing copyrighted works 
are juxtaposed and recombined with original materials to create new works. 
One teacher described the work of an art teacher who asks students to select 
a famous painting of the 17th or 18th century and use image-manipulation 
software to “put themselves into the image.” The assignment engages student 
learning because it connects learning about art to learning about technology to 
reflection on personal and social identity. Appropriation is a powerful instruc-
tional tool for student learning. As one teacher explained, “mashups are an op-
portunity for students to really look at the media they consume—to take it and 
give it their own spin. It helps show kids how they can present their own point 
of view.” However, a number of teachers talked about the limits of appropria-
tion, pointing out that “it shouldn’t be a free-for-all, but a thoughtful process” 
in which students take material they can re-contextualize and make their own. 
MEDIA LITERACY, REMIX, AND FAIR USE
Educators from many fields and disciplines depend on fair use, but media 
literacy educators perhaps have the most acute appreciation of fair use because 
of their reliance on copyrighted materials produced by the major corporations 
that control the production of mass media news, entertainment, and popular 
culture. In reflecting on the dominance of media and technology as a cultural 
force, media literacy educators are often motivated by their awareness of the 
well-funded and highly choreographed cultural production system, where au-
diences are constructed to be passive and ritualistic in their consumption of 
media messages. The mass media’s role in constituting the public sphere has 
been widely criticized for narrowing the range of ideas presented, concentrat-
ing ownership in the hands of a few, and the tendency of advertising-supported 
media to reduce quality by focusing on ratings and advertising revenue (Git-
lin, 2001). As a result, “concentrated media must structure most ‘participants’ 
in the debate as passive recipients of finished messages and images” (Benkler, 
2007, p. 209). However, the rise of digital media has contributed to greater 
levels of awareness and sensitivity because “the practice of making one’s own 
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music, movie or essay makes one a more self-conscious user of the cultural arti-
facts of others,” as media literacy education is part of a broad practice of learn-
ing by doing that “makes the entire society more effective readers and writers 
of their own culture” (Benkler, p. 299). 
Increasingly, composition educators have begun to incorporate media liter-
acy concepts into their educational practices. William Costanzo (2008) point-
ed out that there are many similarities between writing and producing other 
media: 
Filmmakers, television producers and web designers, like writ-
ers, must make decisions about purpose, audience, content, 
format, arrangement and style. They follow codes and con-
ventions, observe time-honored rhetorical strategies and cre-
ate visual texts for many of the purposes that motivate writers: 
to recollect the past, describe the present, make proposals for 
the future, investigate issues, or take a stand. (p. xix)
Just as students quote from other authors in their written text, they need 
to be able to use, sample from, and manipulate copyrighted works in learning 
various skills associated with media literacy, including exploring image–lan-
guage relationships, considering point of view, and analyzing framing aspects. 
In particular, remix is a dimension of teaching media literacy that depends 
upon student ability to transform the meaning of an existing text by manipu-
lating the form, structure, and/or content to explore how meaning is shaped 
through symbol systems that operate in a complex cultural, historical, political, 
and economic context (Jenkins, 2006). 
In their survey of young online remixers, Patricia Aufderheide and Peter 
Jaszi (2007) found that video creators believed integrating various copyrighted 
materials into their own work was part of the creative process: “I think part of 
our generation is that we take and mix things together,” one respondent said. 
“We’re very much a mixed-media generation.” Interviewees reported making 
use of copyrighted materials in new and creative ways, for instance, by setting 
slides of original art to popular music and incorporating television clips into 
original online sketch comedy shows. As Aufderheide and Jaszi maintained, 
“They regard existing popular culture as available raw material for new work” 
(p. 5). There is a clear social component to remixing as well: respondents in 
Aufderheide and Jaszi’s study felt that the shared experience of popular culture 
inspired them to build upon and remix existing copyrighted works.
Appreciation of remix practices is developing among educators, but it is 
still contested among those who fear that it promotes shallowness and a lack 
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of creativity. Composition educators have long conceptualized writers as lone 
creators of original texts: Anything that is not originally produced is typically 
devalued, and relying too heavily on others’ resources is considered plagiarism. 
But the act of remixing existing materials is in itself educationally valuable, 
because when “students are encouraged to make explicit their borrowings and 
appropriations,” it can stretch their ability to address specific issues, readers, 
and students (Johnson-Eilola & Selber, 2007, p. 380). Johndan Johnson-Eilola 
and Stuart Selber explained that, for composition educators, remixing “inhab-
its a contested terrain of creativity, intellectual property, authorship, corporate 
ownership and power” (p. 392). In this view, remix cannot supplant traditional 
composition, but it can complement it. 
When it comes to considering legal issues, many of the instructional pro-
cesses, curricula and multimedia products now at the very core of media lit-
eracy education fall under the provisions of the doctrine of fair use. When 
assessing whether a particular use of copyrighted materials is a fair use, lawyers 
and judges always consider the expectations and practices within a creative 
community (Madison, 2006). In weighing the balance at the heart of fair use 
analysis, judges refer to four types of considerations mentioned in the law: the 
nature of the use, the nature of the work used, the extent of the use, and its 
economic effect (referred to collectively as the “four factors”). This still leaves 
much room for interpretation, especially because the law is clear that these 
are not the only necessary considerations. In reviewing the history of fair use 
litigation, judges return again and again to two key questions: First, did the 
unlicensed use “transform” the material taken from the copyrighted work by 
using it for a different purpose than that of the original, or did it just repeat the 
work for the same intent and value as the original? And, second, was the mate-
rial taken appropriate in kind and amount, considering the nature of the copy-
righted work and the use? (Joyce, Leaffer, Jaszi, Ochoa, & 2003). Of course, 
transformativeness is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use. But the 
creation of transformative works directly supports the purpose of copyright as 
stated in the U.S. Constitution, which is to promote the spread of knowledge 
and creativity.
The “Code of Best Practices for Fair Use in Media Literacy Education,” a 
project (as described earlier in this article) funded by the John D. and Cath-
erine T. MacArthur Foundation (Center for Social Media, Media Education 
Lab at Temple University, Washington College of Law, American Universi-
ty, 2008) was created by gathering and synthesizing the beliefs of the media 
literacy community about how fair use applies to five common instructional 
practices. In this process, 150 participants in ten cities across the United States 
discussed hypothetical scenarios involving the uses of copyrighted materials in 
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media literacy education to identify the principles and limitations articulated 
in the Code. Following this, the Code was reviewed by a committee of legal 
scholars and lawyers with expertise in copyright and fair use. 
The Code identifies five principles, each with limitations, representing 
the community’s current consensus about acceptable practices for the fair use 
of copyrighted materials. As stated in the Code, educators can, under some 
circumstances, (1) make copies of newspaper articles, TV shows, and other 
copyrighted works, and use and keep them for educational use. They can (2) 
create curriculum materials and scholarship with copyrighted materials em-
bedded. Educators can (3) share, sell, and distribute curriculum materials with 
copyrighted materials embedded. Learners can, under some circumstances, (4) 
use copyrighted works in creating new material. They can (5) distribute their 
works digitally if they meet the transformativeness standard. In the next sec-
tion, we review the perspective of educators concerning the two principles that 
address student use of copyrighted materials and the sharing of that work with 
authentic audiences. 
STUDENT USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS 
FOR MEDIA COMPOSITION
In both K–12 and university settings, student media compositions are un-
dertaken for a wide variety of purposes. Some of these purposes might not 
qualify as ”composition” as understood by composition educators. For exam-
ple, most readers know that it is now common to document student public 
speaking or athletic activities on video to provide students with opportunities 
for sustained feedback and review. In many high schools and colleges, students 
may take a video-production course where they learn to create news, documen-
tary or talk show programs about local community events and issues (Hobbs, 
2006). In some of these courses, the purpose of media production activities is 
to learn concrete skills associated with the use of the technology. These courses 
often use a step-by-step approach that emphasizes the gradual accretion of a 
fixed repertoire of skills and techniques (Buckingham, 2003). In other courses, 
there is more explicit focus on the process of multimedia composition, with an 
emphasis on the creative and collaborative skills associated with open-ended 
exploration and self-expression. In these courses, media tools are often seen as 
simply a wider palette for “conveying the ‘authentic voice’ of young people” 
(Buckingham, p. 131).
Because the current generation of young people has grown up with digital 
and video cameras and rapid technological advances, media composition ac-
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tivities are beginning to be more widely used as “alternative” assignments in 
secondary English education (Hobbs, 2007), where English teachers do not 
explicitly teach production practices but offer creative project-based learning 
assignments that students can choose to accomplish in print, video, or multi-
media formats. At Concord High School in New Hampshire, where English 
teachers developed a mandatory Grade 11 course in Media/Communication as 
the required English course, students used video production to develop literary 
adaptations of a scene from Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying (Hobbs). At the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, undergraduate English faculty use video-production as-
signments to enable students to demonstrate their understanding of rhetorical 
and semiotic concepts (Weigel Information Commons, 2007).
The key elements from the “Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Media 
Literacy Education,” depicted in Table 1, show the principles and limitations 
that relate to student use of copyrighted materials in their academic and cre-
ative work. It highlights the diverse range of purposes for which students may 
wish to excerpt copyrighted material, including comment and criticism, illus-
tration, or stimulation of discussion. The principle behind student use of copy-
righted materials for media production is identified as fostering and deepening 
awareness of the constructed nature of all media, which is one of the key con-
cepts of media literacy (Thoman & Jolls, 2005). 
The media literacy educators in our focus groups affirmed that students 
have the right to use copyrighted materials in their compositions, but they ac-
knowledged that fair use must be considered within each specific teaching and 
learning context. 
Learning Context and Situation
Because some media literacy educators are training future professional 
media makers to adhere to vocational standards and others need to allow for 
wide experimentation to build creative skills, the application of fair use will 
vary by context and setting. Some educators felt that editing exercises that 
make use of copyrighted materials were appropriate for classroom use, but not 
appropriate for distribution. One college professor pointed out that students 
need to be made aware of professional norms, arguing, “they get to college and 
know nothing about professional behavior.”
Commentary and Critique
Although educators felt that in some instances, it is educationally valuable 
for students to go through the permissions-seeking process, they were in agree-
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Description Principle Limitations
Students strengthen 
media literacy skills by 
creating messages and 
using symbolic forms 
such as language, im-
ages, sound, music, and 
digital media to express 
and share meaning. In 
learning to use video-
editing software and in 
creating remix videos, 
students learn how 
juxtaposition re-shapes 
meaning. 
Students include 
excerpts from copy-
righted material in their 
creative work for many 
purposes, including 
comment and criticism, 
illustration, stimula-
tion of public discus-
sion, or in incidental 
or accidental ways (for 
example, when they 
make a video capturing 
a scene from everyday 
life where copyrighted 
music is playing).
Because media literacy 
education cannot thrive 
unless learners themselves 
have the opportunity to 
learn about how media 
functions at the most 
practical level, educators 
using concepts and tech-
niques of media literacy 
should be free to enable 
learners to incorporate, 
modify, and re-present 
existing media objects in 
their own classroom work. 
Media production can 
foster and deepen aware-
ness of the constructed 
nature of all media, one of 
the key concepts of media 
literacy. The basis for fair 
use here in embedded in 
good pedagogy.
Student use of copyrighted 
material should not be 
a substitute for creative 
effort. Students should be 
able to understand and 
demonstrate—in a manner 
appropriate to their devel-
opmental level—how their 
use of a copyrighted work 
re-purposes or transforms 
the original. 
For example, students may 
use copyrighted music for 
a variety of purposes, but 
cannot rely on fair use 
when their goal is simply to 
establish a mood or convey 
an emotional tone, or when 
they employ popular songs 
simply to exploit their ap-
peal and popularity. 
Material incorporated 
under fair use should be 
properly attributed wher-
ever possible. 
Students should be en-
couraged to make careful 
assessments of fair use, and 
should be reminded that at-
tribution, in itself, does not 
convert an infringing use 
into a fair one.
Table 1: Student Use of Copyrighted Materials in Their Academic and Creative Work.
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Table 1: Student Use of Copyrighted Materials in Their Academic and Creative Work. ment that educators and learners should not have to ask permission when using 
copyrighted materials for the purpose of critical analysis. Educators saw this 
use of copyrighted materials as deeply associated with First Amendment rights. 
For example, one filmmaker defended his right to use copyrighted material in 
a critical analysis, stating, “When The New York Times does negative reviews, 
how is that any different? They don’t ask the author’s permission to review 
the book.” A college professor agreed: “I don’t have to ask permission from 
Ray Bradbury to use three paragraphs of Fahrenheit 451.” Another educator 
took the argument one step further, maintaining that “you have to be able to 
critique materials without permission from the author—the Ku Klux Klan is 
not going to give you permission to do an analysis!” This example was power-
ful for many of the educators who held print and multimedia compositions to 
different standards. In fact, the standard is the same across the board: Just as a 
student has the right to deconstruct Ku Klux Klan materials in a written report 
without the Klan’s permission, she has the right to use the Klan’s materials in 
her own multimedia compositions. The social benefits of such an analysis are 
evident, regardless of the form in which the analysis takes place.
Sensitivity to Message Genre and Developmental Needs of Learners
All of the educators in our focus groups agreed that attribution in multi-
media compositions is desirable and appropriate, as a component of ethical 
behavior. However, there are some instances in which attribution should not 
be required because of developmental and genre-specific expectations. For ex-
ample, one technology educator explained that she had a student who created 
a 90-second video project on sex in the media that incorporated images from 
hundreds of different sources. It was not feasible or appropriate to this particu-
lar montage-style production for the student to list every source in the context 
of that specific project. Nor is it reasonable to expect the same level of detailed 
citation from a third grader as from a twelfth grader. However, for multimedia 
compositions, attribution should be taught and discussed as an important ethi-
cal dimension of creative work. 
Parallels of Fair Use Across Media Forms
Like Costanzo (2007), the media literacy educators we spoke to saw many 
parallels between media productions and written assignments. Using copy-
righted works without permission (but with attribution and generally in small 
amounts) was seen as a normative practice with deep parallels to the writing 
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process. As one college professor put it: “There is a good model that is already 
used in writing. The thesis statement should not be found in the particular as-
pects that you’ve borrowed.” A high school English teacher agreed: “Using the 
analogy of scholarly texts, you are framing analysis around it, not just hanging 
it out there like an ornament. Then I would say it is fair use.” Although each 
situation is different, educators agreed that students and teachers should gener-
ally be sensitive to the length or amount of copyrighted materials they use as 
well as their purpose and intended audience. Students can learn to reflect on 
the transformative use of copyrighted materials, asking: “In what ways does 
my use of the copyrighted work add value or re-purpose the work?” Reflec-
tive consideration of how and why they are using copyrighted materials deep-
ens student understanding of their own rhetorical, technological, and editorial 
choices.
Many of the educators in our focus groups maintained that students are 
more motivated to work on projects when they are allowed to incorporate 
images and sounds that are meaningful to them. Educators need to help en-
courage students to make reasoned choices about the ways in which they use 
copyrighted materials, but students should be allowed reasonable access to the 
cultural artifacts that they wish to examine. In our meetings, we heard count-
less examples of innovative student projects that had been curtailed due to 
copyright concerns. For example, in Philadelphia, one teacher had students re-
tell the story of Beowulf by making a comic featuring images of popular actors 
as Beowulf. In Chicago, one teacher had students create digital videos using 
“The Simpsons” to tell the story of Romeo and Juliet, and another had students 
use voiceover, music, and pictures to discuss their responses to the book To Kill 
a Mockingbird. Some of the innovative projects were stopped all together due 
to copyright concerns, but, more commonly, the activities were allowed to take 
place but not allowed to be shared beyond classroom walls. Students need to 
be able to make reasoned choices about the distribution of their compositions, 
including the option of posting their work online.
DEVELOPING AUDIENCES FOR STUDENT WORK
Whether working from the disciplinary frame of composition, education 
or media studies, educators share a common belief that “the existence of a 
real audience can qualitatively change how students conceptualize a produc-
tion work and what they learn from it” (Buckingham, 2003, p. 187). The 
Internet provides new ways for authors and audiences to interact with each 
other in ways that can be very powerful for the teaching and learning of self-
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expression, creativity, problem-solving and communication skills. Of course, 
it is important to note that, even apart from the context of educational set-
tings, students have fair use rights as independent creative authors themselves. 
As we discovered in our research, The Cost of Copyright Confusion for Media 
Literacy (Hobbs et al., 2007), most educators were unaware that the doctrine 
of fair use supports the use of copyrighted material in all manner of creative 
work, not just those activities that occur in the context of teaching and learn-
ing. As stated in the Code, “If student work that incorporates, modifies, and 
re-presents existing media content meets the transformativeness standard, it 
can be distributed to wide audiences under the doctrine of fair use” (Center 
for Social Media, 2008).
Authentic audiences are a means to increase student ability to analyze and 
reflect upon the content, form, and effectiveness of their messages—whether 
that means showing it to a city council or placing it online. In addition to deep-
ening student reflection, authentic audiences help students see themselves and 
their communities as worthy of attention, encourage students to become active 
as citizens in addressing community issues, support the possibility of social 
change, and enhance student motivation and engagement in ways that increase 
their investment in the process. 
Audience Response to Multimedia Composition is Part of the Process
The process of peer review, critique, and redrafting is essential for reflect-
ing on creative and editorial choices in compositions of all kinds. Composition 
educators have long recognized that students learn about writing from seeing 
how audiences respond to their work. According to Buckingham (2003), stu-
dent creations should not be viewed as end products, but as “a starting point 
for reflection or a basis for redrafting, rather than a summation and a dem-
onstration of what has been learned” (p. 136). Students need to have some 
genuine motivation to step back from their productions, and to reflect upon 
their theoretical implications: “Reflection or self-evaluation of this kind has to 
be driven by something more than abstract requirements of examiners—and 
it too should be recursive, part of an ongoing cycle of action and reflection” 
(Buckingham, p. 136). 
Student Work Must be Seen as Worthy of Attention
Sharing student work intensifies student motivation and promotes deeper 
reflection. For adolescents and young adults, this process can have powerful 
psyc4hological effects on self-esteem and identity development. Steven Good-
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man (2003) described the ways in which students at the Educational Video 
Center in New York City were able to reflect upon their choices when they 
screened their documentary, The Young Gunz, in public. He noted that being 
pressed to answer questions about their production choices and thoughts about 
the problem of youth violence was a powerful experience for students. Sharing 
their work with wider audiences can provide students with the kind of exter-
nal validation they may not receive elsewhere in their lives. Goodman also 
described the ways in which sharing their documentary with wider audiences 
helped students see themselves and their communities as worthy of attention 
when they heard their own voices and saw their own faces projected on a screen 
in community settings. When students are able to tell their stories to audi-
ences that include not only their teachers and peers but also parents, commu-
nity leaders, and other adults, the results can be powerful and long lasting. As 
Goodman wrote, “carried from the margins into the screening rooms of main-
stream institutions, these stories of anger, confusion, and sadness reverberated 
in lasting ways” (p. 46).
Access to Authentic Audiences Supports Civic Engagement
Sharing their work with public audiences can help students become active 
members of a community. Not only are students able to engage in dialogue 
that encompasses a greater range of viewpoints than those they might find in a 
typical classroom, but, also, by interacting with larger audiences, students are 
able to take on greater responsibility for the messages projected in their work. 
Goodman (2003) described how students took on the role of experts in their 
community screenings:
It was also strange for the Doc Workshop students to be up onstage in 
front of adults and peers, presenting their ideas as journalists and artists and 
answering questions as experts. This was a role that they had never had before. 
Even though some claimed their thinking about gun violence hadn’t changed, 
their talking about it had. That is, the crew was becoming practiced in public 
dialogue about public problems. They were getting used to the open and inter-
generational exchange of ideas about issues in their community, and the idea 
that in this public conversation, their ideas and experiences really mattered. 
After all, their video was at the center of it all. They may not have had all the 
answers. But by re-presenting a slice of life as they saw it—as raw and imperfect 
as it may be—back to the community from which it was taken, they were pos-
ing a problem that demanded a response.
Audiences can provide students with valuable feedback that can become 
platforms for social change. Instead of merely showing their work to their peers 
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in a classroom setting, when students are invited to show their work in the 
community—or online—they are more likely to interact with community 
leaders and others who can influence public policy or other forms of commu-
nity activism. Because many youth media production projects deal with issues 
important to teens (e.g., drugs, school violence, sexuality, stereotypes, dating) 
it is imperative that their messages reach the eyes and ears of people who can 
collaborate with youth to create social change. Clearly, the benefits of the civic 
dialogue that can occur from sharing these types of works should outweigh 
concerns about the incorporation of copyrighted materials.
Increased Investment in Learning
The promise and potential of an authentic audience can enhance student 
motivation and engagement in ways that increase their investment in the learn-
ing process. William Kist (2005) relayed a conversation he had with an 8th 
grader named Teri, who created an online advertisement for a class project. 
When he asked Teri what she thought of this type of project, she answered: 
“It’s more exciting and you learn more stuff, I think, because you’re doing 
something you like to a certain extent and ... then you can learn more stuff, 
because you want to research it, so you can get a good mark on your webpage, 
so you can show everyone else” (pp. 55-56). 
Media literacy educators in our focus groups recounted stories of low-per-
forming students who were able to shine when they felt genuine ownership 
and pride and were able to share that work in screenings, readings, or on the 
Internet. As one high school teacher argued: “The kid is not making any 
money. The kid’s not harming any one. What harm is being done by putting 
it out there? Versus how much good is being done by motivating the kids and 
giving them a real audience so they will spend 30 hours on something they 
would otherwise spend 40 minutes on if I was the only one who was going to 
see it?”
Pressures to Look “Professional”
In some cases, the ease of posting student productions to Web sites has 
also intensified pressures that student work look “professional,” by adhering 
to genre conventions and norms of framing, shot composition, sound quality, 
and more. This reflects the dynamic tension between the “vocational” and “ex-
pressive” wings of the media literacy community (Hobbs, 1998). Multimedia 
composition activities, constructed without sensitivity to this important ten-
sion, may encourage students to mimic professionals, resulting in the loss of 
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creativity and of a critical, analytical perspective (Davies, 1996). Video-sharing 
Web sites like YouTube have contributed to expanding student exposure to 
various hybrid and amateur genres, including non-narrative and experimental 
forms. For educators who showcase their students’ in-class productions on sites 
like Teacher Tube (http://www.teachertube.com), video-sharing Web sites may 
also interfere with the important instructional balance between process and 
product. Widespread distribution can contribute to over-valuing the formal 
qualities of a production, sometimes at the expense of message content or the 
learning process. This focus can contribute to hierarchically organized often 
teacher-centered productions, where students play roles as production assistants 
who support the implementation of adult creative energies. In these experienc-
es, students do not get a chance to experience the genuinely messy challenge of 
collaborative creative work. 
Distribution of Student Work is Fundamental
Educators in our interviews and focus groups believe that a reflective ped-
agogical stance is required to determine when it is appropriate to distribute 
student work and that there are a number of situations where student work 
should not be shared widely. As stated in the Code (Center for Social Media, 
2008), “educators should work with learners to make a reasoned decision about 
distribution that reflects sound pedagogy and ethical values” (p. 13). The edu-
cators in our focus groups recognized the need for students to distribute their 
creations to wide audiences, but they were sensitive about matching audience 
to purpose. For example, most did not feel that skill-building exercises (e.g., a 
video-editing assignment that makes use of copyrighted materials) require the 
same amount of distribution as a creative project. Many educators felt that the 
consideration of audience needs to be strategic and purposeful and that educa-
tors need to work with students to arrive at appropriate distribution choices. 
According to one college professor: “This is part of media education—helping 
kids figure out audience, purpose, expectations, and ramifications.” A youth 
media educator elaborated on the need for educators to think carefully and 
critically about the purpose of widespread online distribution of student-pro-
duced creative work:
I would have to make an ethical decision about whether to make something 
like that further available. The rush of noncommercial media makers to make 
things public is something that I have problems with. There is an assumption 
that the value lies in the mass audience. Our belief is that youth media can have 
a purposeful audience that can be very targeted and that this is part of what 
the young people think about when they are creating the work. If the goal is to 
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build media literate young people, the question is: who is the audience? There 
are many situations in which the young people can decide for themselves who 
they want to be the audience. If we make a video about a city ordinance and 
show it at the city council meeting I think that it is more powerful than put-
ting it on YouTube... I think that the main point is not to teach young people 
to imitate and replicate mainstream formula and norms. The value is not in the 
number of hits but in the content. 
Clearly, there are many circumstances where students benefit greatly from 
engaging in the process of sharing their compositions with real audiences. 
They also learn from the process of considering their target audience and the 
potential ramifications of distributing work broadly. 
CONCLUSION
When students appropriate mass media and popular culture texts, they 
engage a process that involves analysis, commentary, and creation. Compo-
sition teachers should recognize that student response to mass media is an 
important component of their identity formation, as students sort out their 
reactions to the complex, paradoxical, and very real forms of cultural power 
depicted in contemporary music, television, video games, and movies. How-
ever, in many school arts and writing programs, there is some hostility to 
overt signs of repurposed content that comes from mass media and popular 
culture materials. Educators who create rigid rules about the (non) use of 
such copyrighted materials sacrifice the opportunity to help young people 
think more deeply about ethical and legal issues of repurposing, even as most 
of the classic works of literature used in schools are themselves the product of 
appropriation and transformation. As Erin Reilly and Alice Robison (2007) 
argued, “sampling intelligently from the existing cultural reservoir requires 
a close analysis of existing structures and uses of this material; remixing re-
quires an appreciation of emerging structures and latent potential meanings” 
(p. 99). 
By educating themselves about copyright and fair use and developing a code 
of best practices, composition and media literacy educators are at the point of 
the spear in leading a user rights movement that helps all educators reclaim 
their fair use rights. As we see it, the “Code of Best Practices for Fair Use in 
Media Literacy Education” has a number of intended outcomes. First and fore-
most, it is a tool designed to educate educators about copyright and fair use. 
It will help persuade leaders, librarians, and publishers to accept well-founded 
assertions of fair use. It will be useful for promoting revisions to school policies 
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regarding the use of copyrighted materials used in education. It may discour-
age copyright owners from threatening or bringing lawsuits; in the unlikely 
event that such suits are brought, the Code will provide the defendant with a 
basis on which to show that her or his uses were both objectively reasonable and 
undertaken in good faith.
As writing and composition educators connect their pedagogical prac-
tices to a deeper understanding of copyright and fair use, they help students 
make connections between school and society. When students, with encour-
agement from their teachers, take on higher-level thinking skills and make 
their own judgments about fair use, they end up engaging in a process that 
forces them to consider their purpose and rationale for using copyrighted 
works, considering both the rights of owners and the rights of users. When 
they incorporate copyrighted materials into their compositions in new and 
transformative ways, these practices should be recognized as part of the cre-
ative process. When students share their works with authentic audiences, 
they are able to enter a dialogue about social, political, economic, and cul-
tural issues related to their roles as consumers and producers of mediated 
texts. These are the social benefits that the doctrine of fair use was crafted 
to support.
NOTES
1. Research methods for phase one of this project are described in The 
Cost of Copyright Confusion for Media Literacy (Hobbs et al., 2007). The in-
terview consisted of open-ended questions organized into three broad cat-
egories: (1) how teachers use copyrighted materials in the classroom or other 
educational settings for educational purposes; (2) how their students use 
copyrighted materials in their own creative work; and (3) how teachers use 
copyrighted materials in their curriculum development, materials production 
or other creative work. 
2. Research methods for phase two of this project are more fully described 
in the “Code of Best Practices for Fair Use in Media Literacy Education” 
(Center for Social Media, 2008). Ten focus groups were held in various U.S. 
cities. Focus groups participants were recruited through national member-
ship organizations, including the Alliance for a Media Literate America 
(AMLA), the Action Coalition for Media Education (ACME), the Student 
Television Network (STN) and the National Council of Teachers of English 
(NCTE), and organizations such as National Alliance for Media Arts and 
Culture (NAMAC) and Youth Media Reporter (YMR).
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16 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
TEACHING PRACTICES IN 
INTRODUCTORY WRITING 
COURSES
Nicole Nguyen
How will today’s undergraduate writers be confronted with copyright and 
intellectual property (IP) issues once they leave the safety of the composition 
classroom? As an undergraduate professional writing student at a land-grant, Big 
10, research-extensive institution, I came across the challenges of working within 
the bounds of IP issues, particularly in presenting my work online. Many of 
my professional writing classes involve a Web-related element, including several 
courses that required a final digital portfolio with examples of work done for that 
particular class. Inside the classroom, I had few questions as to what I could post 
online and who would be able to see it—I considered these Web postings as exist-
ing in a vacuum, with the instructor and the class as my audience. 
However, when I purchased my own domain name and bought my own 
Web space, created my personal Web site and digital portfolio, and began tell-
ing people about it (via word of mouth and posts on social-networking sites 
like Facebook and Livejournal), I realized that my work no longer existed in 
a vacuum. Conceivably, anyone with Internet access could get to my Web site 
and see—and potentially take from or use—my work. When I searched for 
ways to protect my material, I was unsatisfied with the options available to me, 
such as Creative Commons licensing. Putting a copyright symbol at the bot-
tom of every page was the most straight-forward way to protect my intellectual 
property, but if I did find that someone had infringed on my copyright, how 
would I be able to enforce my rights? And, more importantly, why hadn’t I been 
exposed to these kinds of issues in my professional writing classes? This ques-
tion is the driving force behind my research.
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In the fall of 2008, I conducted a study on copyright issues in first-year 
writing curriculum. What I found was that the challenges I experienced are 
not limited to me, but are common among college students and will become 
even more common as we move out of the university setting. In my experience, 
college classes do not sufficiently address IP/copyright issues. Here I report the 
findings of my study, which concerns what first-year writing students learn 
about IP and copyright, and whether these students feel prepared to use that 
knowledge outside of the university setting.
From what I could find, limited research has been done concerning IP or 
copyright and academics (other authors in this collection report on the limited 
existing work; see, for example, Amidon and Galin), and no research has been 
done to find out what students are actually taking away from their instruc-
tion in these issues. I decided to conduct this research in an attempt to fill this 
void. My research project goes into the classroom: first, I investigated if and 
how teachers of first-year writing classes teach IP and/or copyright through 
surveys, and then defined a target audience of classes whose professors have 
given instruction on IP and/or copyright. These students were surveyed as to 
how prepared they felt about IP and how effective they felt the instruction was. 
From these surveys, I further narrowed the pool of students and interviewed 
several students about their experiences. The interview questions focused on 
the effectiveness of the teaching, how confident they were about utilizing their 
IP knowledge outside of the university setting, and the issues for which they 
feel they need more instruction.
Casual observation has shown me that instruction on IP and copyright is-
sues in the university is lacking and that students do not know the options for 
protecting their work. Here, I present the findings of my empirical study that 
informs these casual observations. Ultimately, I hope the audience will be able 
to use my research to inform first-year writing curriculum and pedagogy as it 
intersects with the teaching of IP/copyright.
BACKGROUND RESEARCH
My main research question was: Are students learning enough about IP/
copyright in their first-year writing classes to feel confident that they can be 
successful in their future writing endeavors, both inside and outside of the 
university setting? Additionally, my research questions include the following:
•	 Are teachers of first-year writing courses teaching intellectual property 
(IP) and copyrights?
•	 How much time is being spent teaching IP/copyright?
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•	 Are students utilizing what they have learned about IP/copyright in 
their first-year writing courses? 
•	 Are students only using this information for in-class assignments, or for 
assignments in other classes as well? 
•	 Are students using this information for projects outside of school?
•	 After learning about IP/copyrights in class, do students feel that they 
have sufficient knowledge to make informed decisions about IP/copy-
right in the future?
To this end, I designed and implemented a mixed-method study using 
both a survey and interviews, drawing upon the work of John Creswell (2003), 
Huiling Ding (2007) and Martine Courant Rife (2008). I also draw upon the 
research of William Fisher et al. (2006); Marjorie Heins and Tricia Beckles 
(2005); Renee Hobbs, Peter Jaszi, and Patricia Auferheide (2007); and Rife 
(2008) in presenting the results of an IRB-approved, one-year study wherein 
I examined how and if teachers of first-year writing classes teach intellectual 
property and/or copyright. 
Intellectual Property in the Writing Classroom
As curriculum of college writing classes grows to include more digital com-
ponents, there is a growing need to educate students about basic copyright law 
as well as fair use (Logie, 2006; Rife & Hart-Davidson, 2006) and the chal-
lenges and problems associated with it. Of particular importance is situating 
these issues in the digital realm, because writing for the Web is increasingly 
becoming more common, especially in light of the fact that many Professional 
Writing (PW) courses (at Michigan State University and elsewhere) emphasize 
creating a digital portfolio, both for specific classes and to prepare seniors for 
representing their undergraduate work at graduation. Digital portfolios serve as 
purposeful collections of student work that allow students from various back-
grounds to demonstrate their strengths on a more even playing field than more 
traditional methods of assessment would (Georgi & Crowe, 1998). 
One scenario to consider is that of adding images to a digital portfolio re-
quired at the end of a class term. Particularly in lower-level classes, where stu-
dents have less of their own work to display, many students may go to the Web 
to find images and other visual embellishments to add interest to their digital 
portfolios. Often, this is done by simply typing in a keyword to a search en-
gine, then choosing an image from the search results, and inserting that image 
directly into a portfolio (perhaps in a banner image, or as a visual element in 
the content). Google image search results all come with a standardized warning 
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about copyright protections: “Image may be subject to copyright.” However, 
one must do additional research to find out whether or not each image is, in-
deed, copyrighted and how to get permission to use it. It is hopeful, I think, to 
assume that the average student will do little more than glance over this warn-
ing before appropriating the image for their own uses. In a class project, tak-
ing an image from an online source is generally considered fair use, so there is 
little problem. But if students are not informed about how the transition from 
student to non-student affects their ability to use Internet images, then we risk 
sending students the message that they can use images they’ve found online for 
anything, at any time. 
Current scholarship indicates that fair use is not properly understood by 
teachers or writing students (Rife, 2008). Additionally, Hobbs et al. (2007) 
reported that because of a lack of understanding of fair use and copyright, 
“teachers use less effective teaching techniques, teach and transmit erroneous 
copyright information, fail to share innovative instructional approaches, and 
do not take advantage of new digital platforms” (p. 1). The study, conducted 
by the Center for Social Media at the School of Communication at American 
University, is an important one because it explores the relationship between 
teaching practices and beliefs about copyright.
John Logie (2006) asserted that educators have an obligation to teach intel-
lectual property and copyright and to make transparent to students the chal-
lenges teachers face when dealing with copyright in the classroom. Particularly 
in disciplines involving digital communication and composition, there is an 
implied “awareness of and engagement with copyright questions” (p. 2). How-
ever, Logie pointed out that legislation such as the TEACH Act (or Technol-
ogy, Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002) creates a divided 
system, in which one tier presumably applies to non-networked classrooms, 
and a different, more complex set of rules applies to classrooms that engage in 
“distance delivery.” Logie described how many classroom instructors “have a 
tradition of selective non-compliance with copyright laws,” such as those set 
forth in the TEACH Act, of which students are often unaware. He suggested 
that actually introducing students to copyright laws—to the frustrations in-
herent in attempting to follow the laws or in composing and communicating 
peacefully alongside them—is an “important step toward eventually recalibrat-
ing copyright for the Internet era” (p. 3).
Why First-Year or Introductory Writing Classes?
For my research, I chose to concentrate on the IP/copyright instruction in 
first-year or introductory writing classes for several reasons. First, given the 
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size of the student body and range of subjects offered at MSU (more than 
46,000 students and over 200 programs of study), concentrating only on writ-
ing classes would give me a manageable subject pool. Second, every student at 
MSU is required to take two writing classes: one “Tier I” (or first-year) class 
and one Tier II class (taken at the upper-level, in the major). Tier I classes are 
usually taken in the first year of university study, and because the class is a uni-
versity requirement, these classes contain students of various backgrounds and 
majors. Tier I writing classes at MSU are offered with many different themes, 
including (among others) science and technology, law and justice, and women 
in America. Students may choose which class to take, and many will choose a 
particular 100-level writing class that corresponds in some way to their major. 
For instance, students interested in a legal career might take the law and jus-
tice themed course, while students interested in women’s studies might take 
the class focused on women in America. Third, from a student’s perspective, it 
makes sense to include basic copyright/IP instruction in the curriculum of an 
introductory writing class so that students can continue to use and build upon 
that knowledge as they progress toward their degrees. Intellectual property and 
copyright knowledge is especially important for Professional Writing students 
as they become communicators in the workforce—performing usability tests, 
developing web content, managing communication projects, suggesting com-
munication strategies, performing content management, etc. (see DeVoss & 
Julier, 2009, for an overview of the MSU PW program). According to Rife 
(2008), professional and technical writers “may easily become leaders among 
their peers; therefore, we might hope the information and ways of knowing 
they bring with them from academia are accurate and useful” (p. 11).
I visited and surveyed three writing classes—WRA 110 Writing: Science 
and Technology; WRA 115 Writing: Law and Justice in the U.S.; and WRA 
202: Introduction to Professional Writing. Readings in the two 100-level cours-
es were derived from their themed subject areas. As in many writing classes, the 
goals were to develop skills in narration, persuasion, analysis, and documen-
tation. The science and technology and law and justice themes of the writing 
classes were two of eight theme options for the 100-level writing classes offered 
that semester, and there were no prerequisites for enrolling in any of these class-
es. The Introduction to Professional Writing class, however, is a 200-level class 
intended for students in the beginning of the Professional Writing major. The 
only prerequisite for taking WRA 202 is the completion of the Tier I writing 
course. The focus of the upper-level class is less on narrative or persuasive writ-
ing skills and more on professional style and studies of rhetoric. In accordance 
with the three focus options in the major (editing and publishing, digital and 
technical writing, and writing in communities and cultures) students are ex-
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posed to many different aspects of professional writing, in particular, writing 
across media and writing for the Web. The technological components of these 
classes ensure that the students have some engagement with digital intellectual 
property concerns, which I saw as an important aspect of my research.
FINDINGS
Teacher Survey
In early fall 2008, I sent a call for survey participants to an email list of 
teachers of WRA classes, directed at teachers of Tier I writing or introduc-
tory Professional Writing classes. This list included all of the teachers in the 
program (including graduate teaching assistants); the email request contained 
a brief description of the research and invited teachers who had an IP or copy-
right component to their class to respond. From this call for participants, I 
received four responses (which may or may not be indicative of the number 
of classes that include IP in the curriculum). Of those four, two actually par-
ticipated in the survey, and both agreed to let me visit their classes to recruit 
student participants.
Both teachers spent 3 weeks or more on IP/copyright issues during the se-
mester, and their instruction methods were very different. One teacher, Jes-
sica,* used an article about the history of fair use in two ways: first, to introduce 
the issues and present information to students, and, second, as a writing tool. 
The students had to read the article and remix it into a two-page press release. 
The second teacher, Brian, integrated IP/copyright discussions into the course-
work throughout the semester and had a guest lecturer visit the class.
Student Survey
The student survey contained several brief questions asking how the stu-
dents had learned about IP/copyright in their writing class, as well as whether 
they had received any instruction in IP/copyright before. About 78% of the 
students in the Introduction to Professional Writing class stated that they had 
received instruction in this subject before, and their previous experiences var-
ied. Most of the previous instruction the students listed dealt with plagiarism 
and using citation when writing papers. One student mentioned learning about 
Creative Commons licensing in a Web-authoring class. Responses to one ques-
tion were particularly interesting: When asked how long their current writing 
class had spent on IP/copyright, answers varied from one or two class sessions 
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(42.9%), 1 or 2 weeks (35.7%), to 3 weeks or more (21.4%). As mentioned ear-
lier, Jessica, the instructor for this class, responded that her class spent 3 weeks 
or more on IP instruction. This may indicate a pronounced difference in per-
spective for the definitions of intellectual property and copyright. When paired 
with the student responses to the question about previous IP instruction, it ap-
pears that unless the subject matter is explicitly labeled as pertaining to IP or 
copyright, students may not associate the material as fitting into that category. 
More than three-fourths (78.6%) of students stated that they had the oppor-
tunity to put their knowledge about copyright/IP to use for a class assignment. 
The majority of these students indicated that they used this knowledge for the 
class in question, though two students wrote in detail about projects for other 
classes in which they were using their IP knowledge.
The law and justice themed class had similar results, despite my expecta-
tions that students in this class might be more informed in copyright or intel-
lectual property because of my assumption that students who chose to take this 
class would be more interested in the subject matter. Two-thirds of the par-
ticipants said that they had previous instruction on copyright and intellectual 
property, though none elaborated on what kind of instruction. The responses 
regarding how much time the teacher spent on IP varied mainly between two 
answer choices: 57.1% indicated that they spent one or two class sessions, while 
33.3% said that they spent 1 to 2 weeks on the subject. About 57.0% of the 
participants for this class indicated that they had the opportunity to put their 
knowledge about copyright/IP to use for a class assignment.
Only about half (52.9%) of those in the Writing: Science and Technology 
class said that they had no previous experience learning about IP/copyright, 
and those who had learned about it in the past said that they learned about IP 
in high school, rather than other college classes. In response to how long their 
current writing class had spent on IP/copyright, answers were similar to those 
for the law and justice course: one or two class sessions (58.8%), 1 or 2 weeks 
(35.3%), to 3 weeks or more (5.9%).
Identifying and Explaining Trends in Survey Results
Across the survey results from the three different classes, there is a trend of 
under-estimation of the amount of time that teachers spent teaching intellec-
tual property/copyright. “I use, mainly, a journal article on the history of the 
fair use doctrine. Students read it and remix it into a two page press release. We 
grapple with this project for two weeks (plus revision time),” Jessica said about 
the inclusion of IP in her syllabus. Students, however, did not list the journal 
article or the remixed press release. Instead, they noted that their teacher used 
Nicole Nguyen
302
slides to give them instruction on IP. Again, this shows a marked difference be-
tween the perception of subject matter for students and teachers. Because this 
is present in all three of the classroom student surveys, it represents a general 
trend in student perception. What is not evident from these surveys, however, 
is whether or not there is any overlap in what the students listed as the tools 
used to teach them intellectual property and what tools the teachers actually 
intended to use in instruction.
Student Interviews/Vignettes: Caroline’s Vignette 
Caroline is a Professional Writing (PW) junior who, at the time of the inter-
view, was enrolled in the introductory PW class (WRA 202). During her inter-
view, Caroline displayed a view of intellectual property and copyright confined 
to experiences writing research papers for classes and different methods of cita-
tion. When asked how long her PW class had studied copyright, she indicated 
that this instruction was minimal and consisted of 3 hours, total, throughout 
the semester. Despite her restrictive definition of IP and copyright, Caroline 
expressed curiosity about other aspects of copyright and had questions beyond 
those asked and discussed in class. However, these questions still dealt specifi-
cally with writing research papers and primarily with issues of source use and 
plagiarism: for example, how much can be paraphrased before you should in-
clude a citation? When I asked Caroline if she had any concerns about protect-
ing her work, she asked for an example of a situation where her work would 
need protecting. Until that point, she had not considered her work in any other 
context than a hard copy turned in to a teacher. I described a hypothetical 
situation in which she would put examples of her work on a personal Web site 
or portfolio, which is a requirement for graduating PW students at Michigan 
State University. She grasped the idea immediately, expressing concerns about 
people taking whole work (or parts) that she published online. She drew on her 
knowledge of how easy it is to simply use something from a Web site without 
including attribution, consulting a copyright or use statement, or contacting 
the author for permission. When asked if she felt that she had enough knowl-
edge about copyright or IP to make a judgment about an issue concerning 
copyright/IP outside of the university setting, she said that she was more con-
fident in her ability to research and find answers than in her actual knowledge. 
She said that if she was faced with a situation relating to copyright, she would 
know how and where to look to find the appropriate response. 
Caroline’s responses to my interview questions suggest that she is knowl-
edgeable enough about copyright and IP issues to recognize where there may 
be cause for concern, but only if prompted. She indicated that her definitions 
Intellectual Property Teaching Practices
303
and views of IP and copyright have been shaped by writing classes—English 
classes in high school and PW classes at MSU. It can be inferred from her re-
sponses that because these writing classes frame copyright and IP only in terms 
of research papers, that students do not naturally make a connection between 
copyright and their rights as creators, or between copyright concerns and the 
growing availability and easy access to work on the Internet.
Student Interviews/Vignettes: Alice’s Vignette
Alice is a PW sophomore enrolled in the introductory Professional Writing 
course (WRA 202) at the time of the interview. She also is pursuing graphic 
design as a hobby. She seemed very comfortable with the idea of intellectual 
property and copyright in the classroom, and was willing to volunteer her con-
cerns about these issues. Alice said that she had been first exposed to copyright 
issues in a Web-authoring class at MSU, where her instructor talked about 
copyright and IP in terms of images on the Web. Alice recognized that copy-
right concerns are present everywhere because “everybody’s always worried 
about what’s copyrighted.” She also said that studying rhetoric and the use of 
visuals helped her realize that she has not observed much originality in visuals 
(this point raises multiple questions and issues worthy of research and discus-
sion, but these questions and issues are beyond the scope of this chapter).
When asked if she felt confident about making copyright judgments out-
side of the classroom, Alice responded that her confidence depended on the 
area. She would be more confident working with copyright for images because 
that’s where she initially learned about copyright. She said she would be less 
confident about video copyrights, though her discussion of the ideas presented 
in Bound by Law, a comic about copyright in documentary films, shows that 
she has a good handle on basic concepts. Alice also said that she does not think 
that copyright is common sense, and that important copyright/IP issues should 
be dealt with by someone who has studied the issues, like a copyright or intel-
lectual property lawyer.
Her class instruction on copyright made Alice more conscious of copyright 
in her graphic design work, as it pertains to using images from the Web, tak-
ing source code from a Web site, or observing Creative Commons licensing 
(especially when using Flickr images). Having been exposed to copyright and 
IP concerns in another class, Alice expressed that she wanted to know more 
about why copyright is important. Her Web-authoring class only touched on 
the rules to observe when looking for images on the Web, but her introductory 
PW writing course concentrated a bit more on “why copyright and citation is 
such a big deal.” She implied, though, that this instruction was not sufficient, 
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and said that she would like someone to explain what people can and cannot 
do in terms of copyright, and then explain why. Alice’s responses seem to show 
curiosity and awareness of copyright and IP issues beyond what was presented 
in her classes.
Identifying and Explaining Trends in the Interviews
The student interviews did not really exhibit many trends, in part because 
I was only able to do two in-person interviews (despite having six total volun-
teers; four of the six did not respond to my follow-up email asking to schedule a 
time and place to conduct the interview). Caroline and Alice’s responses to the 
interview questions were so different in nature that it is difficult to say whether 
or not their responses are representative of the complete range of student expe-
riences with intellectual property instruction. One thing that these two inter-
views do suggest, however, is that a student’s prior interest in the subject is a 
key factor in how well they receive the instruction in class. The curiosity that 
Caroline showed towards the end of her interview seemed to indicate that she 
would be receptive to more instruction on the subject and would likely be able 
to put knowledge to use with a push in the appropriate direction. Alice’s curi-
osity, however, seemed to be in and of itself a driving force for endeavoring to 
learn more about intellectual property on her own time.
CONCLUSIONS
Answering the Research Questions
Are teachers of first-year writing courses teaching intellectual property (IP) and 
copyright? Based on the survey results from the initial teacher–participant re-
cruitment survey, it might appear that teachers of first-year or introductory 
writing classes are not teaching IP/copyright. These results, however, are by no 
means definitive. Non-participation does not necessarily mean that teachers 
are not including IP/copyright in their curriculum. Teachers of introductory 
writing classes may have chosen not to participate in this survey for a variety 
of reasons, including the fact that it was conducted by an undergraduate stu-
dent as independent research. In response to the initial recruitment email, at 
least one teacher responded to me with a number of questions concerning why 
I was conducting this research and how it pertained to my studies as an under-
graduate. After receiving my responses, this teacher declined to participate in 
the study. Additionally, one must consider that a low response rate for online 
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surveys is not unusual (Andrews, Nonnecke, & Preece, 2003).
How much time is being spent on teaching IP/copyright? For the two teachers 
who did participate, it can be concluded that teachers who do include IP/copy-
right in their curriculum do so for a significant amount of time—3 weeks or 
more in the cases of Jessica and Brian. Their attitudes toward the importance of 
teaching intellectual property/copyright in writing classes may correspond to 
the amount of time that they spend teaching the subject. On a scale from 1 to 
5, with 5 as “extremely important,” both teachers ranked teaching IP/copyright 
to first-year writing students as a 4 or 5. 
Are students utilizing what they have learned about IP/copyright in their first-
year writing courses? Over half of the students surveyed (59.6%) said that they 
have had the opportunity to put to use the knowledge gained from instruction 
about intellectual property/copyright during their writing class. I would specu-
late, though, that for students interested in learning about IP/copyright, the 
answer would be yes more often than for students not interested in the subject. 
Are students only using this information for in-class assignments, or for assign-
ments in other classes as well? Are students using this information for projects 
outside of school? For the most part, the students indicated that they used what 
they learned for in-class assignments. Those who defined copyright/IP instruc-
tion as information about plagiarism and citations said that they used their 
knowledge for other classes where they had to write papers. Very few partici-
pants described using the information for projects outside of school. My suspi-
cion here, however, is that, at this point in their academic careers, few students 
think that they are taking part in projects outside of school. One flaw in this 
question is that I did not specify what constitutes an outside project. The word 
“project” carries a school-related connotation that I did not recognize when 
I created the surveys. Web-related social activities such as Facebook, Flickr, 
MySpace, and maintaining a personal Web site or blog that I generally consider 
to be part of an outside project are likely not included in the participants’ defi-
nitions of “projects outside of school.”
After learning about IP/copyrights in class, do students feel that they have suf-
ficient knowledge to make informed decisions about IP/copyright in the future? 
This is a tricky question to answer after such a small study. After two in-depth 
interviews, I received such different pictures of how students received and used 
instruction on IP that I cannot really come to a conclusion. To get a fuller pic-
ture of how and what students learn would require a much larger study. Still, 
though, based on my experience, coupled with the research I have done here, 
I say no, students do not feel sufficiently prepared based on the knowledge 
gained in their introductory writing class. Even Alice—who had received pre-
vious instruction in the subject, is very interested in the subject on her own, 
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and has been able to incorporate what she’s learned so far—does not feel that 
her instruction has been sufficient. However, this leads to another question: 
Can one ever really be sufficiently prepared? Copyright and intellectual prop-
erty law is very complicated and continues to evolve in tandem with digital 
communication. The nature of the subject is constantly changing, so basic 
principles learned in the first year of college may never be wholly sufficient. 
The goal here, I think, is to instill a spirit of curiosity, awareness, and ethics 
that would lead a responsible student to, at least, think about whether or not 
there are IP/copyright considerations to make in their work—and to continue 
to think about these issues once they graduate and are part of the work force. 
NOTE
1. Student and teacher names in this chapter are pseudonyms.
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17 MOVING BEYOND 
PLAGIARIZED / NOT 
PLAGIARIZED IN A POINT, 
CLICK, AND COPY WORLD
Leslie Johnson-Farris
My journey from ordinary, average community college composition in-
structor to intellectual property rights pedagogical philosopher began during 
spring semester in 2005. Working in class one day, students prepared mini-pre-
sentations on a logical fallacy they were assigned to teach their classmates. I had 
done this lesson many times before, but this time students could use Micro-
soft PowerPoint because we were scheduled in a computer-equipped classroom. 
Two students stood up to give their presentation on “equivocation.” They start-
ed by projecting a picture of President Bill Clinton, his finger wagging in the 
air. With a click of the mouse, the famous words also appeared on the screen: 
“I did not have sexual relations with that woman.” 
I walked away from that class session impressed not only by students’ ef-
forts, but also by how easily the ability to point, click, and copy was neces-
sarily changing my classroom. The picture of Bill Clinton was undoubtedly 
copyrighted by the Associated Press or some similar organization, so I began 
asking myself some important questions: “Why shouldn’t my students have 
the same right to use such materials in educational settings that I have?” and 
“Wouldn’t it be overkill to ask students to fully document such uses in perfect 
MLA style?” 
At semester’s end, the point, click and copy world came crashing into my 
pedagogy in a more unwelcome way. In the blind read part of our portfolio 
assessment process, I received an essay that I had already seen. Unmistakably, 
the essay was the same work a current student had submitted to me in her port-
folio—a rough draft from earlier in the semester, but clearly the same essay. I 
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made copies of my student’s essay and the essay I read in the assessment pro-
cess, and delivered them to our portfolio coordinator, who passed them on to 
the other instructor involved. 
Two days later, I confronted my student with what I had discovered. The 
student broke down in my office, cried profuse tears, and swore her innocence. 
I had little reason to doubt her: I had read numerous drafts of the essay, begin-
ning with the initial paragraphs; I had also seen her work on that very essay 
several times with peer assistants in our writing center. My trust in her was not 
misplaced. When confronted by my colleague, the other student involved in the 
situation confessed: Overwhelmed by many factors, he had discreetly helped 
himself to a friend’s essay while supposedly resolving her computer problems. 
From there, I began searching for answers. I searched for college copyright, 
fair use, and plagiarism policies on the Internet. Plagiarism policies were plenti-
ful, but many were vague like my own college’s policy: 
Each student is expected to be honest in their own work ... 
When producing work for a course, students are expected to 
present their own ideas and to appropriately acknowledge the 
incorporation of another person’s work. Not doing so is dis-
honest. (Lansing Community College)
Most were better, giving at least some specifics about the types of activities 
considered plagiarism; a few laid out specific consequences. However, copy-
right and fair use policies specifically directed at students creating academic 
work were difficult to find. The preamble to such polices often reads like that 
of my institution: 
In the educational setting faculty and staff often have the 
need to use or incorporate, in whole or in part, existing works, 
information or materials in connection with course prepara-
tion, course presentation or course materials. (Lansing Com-
munity College)
Students, even as employees of the college, seem not to be considered end 
users of the policy. A few, like the copyright and fair use policy of Butler Com-
munity College, include student employees in the mix, but don’t specifically 
include student classroom activities: 
All Butler Community College faculty, staff, and students are 
expected to act as responsible users of the copyrighted works 
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of others ... This policy applies to Butler faculty, staff, stu-
dents, and other entities performing collaborative work or ser-
vice for the college, whether compensated by the College or 
not.
In short, college policies that clearly acknowledged student fair use rights 
in preparing academic assignments—especially for media materials—were vir-
tually non-existent.1 In my first forty-six tries, I found only one college that 
specifically mentioned student work in its fair use statement. Colleges seem to 
produce only one explanation of copyright and fair use directed at students: 
warnings about and prohibitions against peer-to-peer file sharing, specifically 
using any college resources to do so. 
College policies concerning intellectual property seem to focus on econom-
ic rather than educational issues. Our official statements sometimes address 
students as quasi-professionals developing content in their student employee 
positions or as consumers of college resources. When it comes to students as the 
most junior members of the academic community, we provide dire warnings 
of copyright violation, but we provide little backing for students as creators of 
their own intellectual property. Our official policies often fail to acknowledge 
the applicability of copyright and fair use to student academic work. If we 
examine our college webpages, we will probably find help for students nego-
tiating copyright issues—with perhaps a small mention that student work is 
automatically copyrighted once it’s put into some tangible form. As instructors, 
we expect students to contribute to our academic discourse (on a level appro-
priate to their development), but we give little recognition to student rights in 
such situations and overwhelmingly focus on their responsibilities. Worse yet, 
we tend to focus on one sub-issue concerning intellectual property: plagiarism. 
Yet, if students are not taught the inherent value of their own work in educa-
tional settings, we cannot expect them to understand the value of others’ work. 
I find this situation especially troubling in community college settings with 
their often intense focus on career training and an over-dependence on adjunct 
faculty. At my institution, we are seeing a heavy influx of students returning for 
job training, and nearly all pass through our transfer composition or business/
technical writing courses. These students will join a workforce and produce 
documents using a variety of sources and images available with the click of a 
mouse. Unfortunately, our transfer composition courses don’t always reflect or 
address this reality. Newly trained adjunct faculty do enter our classrooms with 
pedagogy that more accurately faces this changing world; they tend to believe 
that students should, at the very least, be including images in their written work 
and should consider the implications of using a variety of others’ intellectual 
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property. However, in our intensive exit competency assessment, our students 
often face trouble when images are included, because “we are teaching writing.” 
Our faculty discussions of student competency are too often limited to white 
pages of black, printed text and our discussions of intellectual property are lim-
ited to plagiarism and source usage. Because 80% of our faculty are poorly paid 
adjuncts (many of whom finished their advanced degrees 10 or more years ago), 
they have little chance for professional development outside of the college’s 
Center for Teaching Excellence, which, in serving a broad spectrum of faculty 
needs, is not going to address the latest issues in composition and professional 
writing. Too often, community colleges are meeting the future head-on with 
20th-century, if not 19th-century, ideas about written communication and in-
tellectual property. How are we supposed to train 21st-century workers if we 
are not teaching them to communicate effectively in the 21st century?
Inspired by Jim Porter, Kate Latterell, Dànielle Nicole DeVoss, Johndan 
Johnson-Eilola, and Stuart Selber (2006) and their call to recognize much of 
the student use of digital materials as fair use and not plagiarism in its most 
classic sense, I went to our Curriculum and Instruction Council, the body 
charged with making such decisions. At that point, in 2006, I asked for two 
things: First, a more well-defined definition of plagiarism with some clear con-
sequences for those students who intend to deceive, and second, a clear state-
ment of student fair use rights. When it came to the issue of blatant academic 
dishonesty, some council members supported a change, but others did not. The 
idea of a student fair use statement met with confusion. Reactions varied from 
those who saw no need for such a policy, to those who thought students would 
be covered under the faculty fair use statement, to those who didn’t know what 
I was talking about. 
In the end, only the plagiarism policy was changed. Our current statement 
considers plagiarism as including “but not limited to the use, by paraphrase 
or direct quotation or the inclusion of electronic sources, of the published or 
unpublished work of another person without full and clear acknowledgment.” 
Unfortunately, I think my efforts resulted in a step backwards. If an instruc-
tor chooses to do so, the current policy could be used against students who use 
a cartoon or photograph from the Web in a PowerPoint presentation but only 
give minimal acknowledgement—even if the student avoided complete docu-
mentation for sound rhetorical purposes, such as not distracting too greatly 
from the presentation’s visual design.2
Still, the next semester, students in my classes continued to weave borrowed 
media materials into great classroom projects with little formal documentation 
(in what many of my colleagues would consider incidences of plagiarism or 
copyright violation). And at the semester’s end while reading portfolios as an 
Moving Beyond Plagiarized / Not Plagiarized 
313
external reader, I found that a former student, who previously failed a course 
with me, gave his essay to a friend when they re-took that class together. At the 
time, I also served as our college’s Writing Across the Curriculum coordinator. 
When our Center for Teaching Excellence asked for workshop suggestions, 
plagiarism made its way high on the list, and I got the call. Instructors largely 
wanted to know “how do I catch the villains?” not “how do I help students be-
come good, independent thinkers and ethical researchers?” 
Now, over three years later, I still present the plagiarism workshop on a 
regular basis. If faculty members have suspicions that a student has submitted a 
plagiarized essay, someone tells them my name and I talk with them about the 
problem. Much of the conversation revolves around how to respond to the situ-
ation because of the institution’s near silence on the issue. My college’s official 
outlook on the issues of copyright, fair use, and plagiarism has changed little, 
but I feel as if I’ve changed immensely. Despite somehow finding myself as the 
college’s de facto plagiarism expert, I encourage my Children’s Literature stu-
dents to borrow pictures of book covers from Internet booksellers when com-
pleting various projects. We’ve had many instructors and even a dean call for 
the purchase of a plagiarism-detection service, and my opinion is usually asked. 
I always give a vehement “no,” pointing out student rights to their own work. 
DONE, NOT DONE
My experiences call to my mind T.H. White’s retelling of the Arthurian 
legends, The Once and Future King. In the book, Merlin sends young Arthur 
to live as an ant. Once there, the future king learns the ants’ way of thinking: 
“done” or “not done.” College composition instructors (as well as college policy 
makers) too often view plagiarism as something a student has “done” or “not 
done.” In reality, though, the inclusion of others’ intellectual property into our 
own work takes on myriad possibilities, where, like all good writing, audience 
and purpose influence how the writer must handle the situation. I have come 
to realize that in our discussion of intellectual property our focus is too narrow, 
our vocabulary too limited, and our pedagogy too restricted. And so, after my 
failed attempts to change college policy, I began to consider all of the questions 
that no one seemed to answer: Isn’t intellectual property, not plagiarism, the 
true overarching issue? How can we talk about plagiarism when we don’t talk 
about the value, both philosophically and monetarily, of someone’s creative 
works and ideas? How can we emphasize the need for student research when 
we don’t mention that their ability to include part of another’s work in their 
own is protected by the fair use doctrine? How can we even expect students to 
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understand why we have plagiarism policies and require documentation if we 
don’t discuss the value that the academy places on original thought? How can 
we prepare them for a world of work where the issues will expand to copyright 
infringement and not just plagiarism? Instead of confining copyright and fair 
use to a sign by the departmental copier, shouldn’t I be bringing these issues 
into my classroom, helping my students understand the complicated world in 
which they must create?
In answering these questions for myself, I decided that a “done, not done” 
mentality will no longer serve students—if it ever truly did. If a structure and 
policies do not exist within the college to address these issues, real change would 
have to start on the ground, in my classroom. I could begin helping students to 
think about how they use the intellectual property of others and their responsi-
bilities in using those materials. Furthermore, if, as Porter and DeVoss (2006) ar-
gued, the ability to “remix” using digital works may help create economic growth, 
then those who can successfully negotiate that terrain will be in demand as em-
ployees. The ability to include all kinds of graphics and media in many different 
kinds of communication has eliminated the days of grey pages of texts in nearly 
all contexts; the digital environment in which our current students will work re-
quires them to include, not just refer to, the intellectual property of others—and 
they must be prepared to consider their rights and obligations in doing so.
Community college instructors, especially, might see such an addition to 
their pedagogy as a drain on already precious time. After all, our teaching load 
is heavy. Although College Composition and Communication guidelines state 
that a teaching load should be limited to 60 students per semester, a 2007 sur-
vey by Two-year College English Association found that the average load was 
94 students; over 20% of community college writing faculty reported teach-
ing between 111 and 130 students each semester (Jaschik, 2007). Kami Day 
(2008) acknowledged that 
when community college teachers think about teaching source 
citation, they think often about teaching students not to pla-
giarize or about what the consequences should be for plagia-
rism, partly because they do not have much time to spend 
learning about and problematizing plagiarism and are not 
aware of its complexities and gatekeeping functions. (p. 44)
However, as community college instructors, the needs of students to ne-
gotiate the various uses of others’ intellectual property in various digital en-
vironments can no longer be ignored. According to the American Association 
of Community Colleges (2008a), students at two-year schools make up 46% 
Moving Beyond Plagiarized / Not Plagiarized 
315
of the undergraduate population and 41% of first-time freshmen. Of those 
students, 63% intend to eventually complete four-year degrees (2008b). As De-
Voss and Annette Rosati (2002) pointed out:
Admittedly, most first-year writing courses and curricula are 
already packed, perhaps overloaded—testament to the impor-
tance of first-year writing. But as we work toward accultur-
ating students into the processes and function of academic 
writing and engaging them in appropriate academic processes, 
we must make room for addressing new research and writing 
spaces. (p. 201)
Knowing that I could no longer overlook these complex and pressing needs, I 
set out to change how I discuss intellectual property within my classroom. Spe-
cifically, I wanted students to understand their rights and responsibilities and to 
learn to think critically about the multitude of ways those rights and responsibili-
ties will influence the work they produce in my class and in the future. My goal, 
overall, was to integrate discussions about intellectual property into our everyday 
activities as much as possible. When composition teachers explore the issues sur-
rounding intellectual property, we perhaps limit that conversation to the “pla-
giarism and source usage day” and fail to see how these issues fit into the other 
subjects we must cover. Consequently, it’s little wonder that when we look at add-
ing to our burden a more comprehensive pedagogy about intellectual property, 
we may want to say “no more.” However, by addressing the issues in small pieces 
at the appropriate times, perhaps we can weave the necessary discussions into our 
everyday classroom experiences, with little or no need to give up course time. 
In its final report on plagiarism, the U.K.’s Joint Information Systems Com-
mittee (JISC) for higher education found that encouraging academic honesty 
requires that institutions provide students
with clear explanations of what is valued (integrity, hon-
est, wide-ranging research, choosing and using others’ ideas 
etc.) and why academic conventions are important. Students 
should encounter the information in printed material, discuss 
it with teachers, and see staff treating each other in accor-
dance with the principles (Carroll, 2004)
In small doses throughout each term, I attempt to do just that: Put the 
expectations in writing, encourage discussion about such issues (both in the 
outside world and in their own writing for the class), and model my decision-
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making processes when it comes to borrowed intellectual property. In this way, 
I’ve added very little to my workload, but I have extended the breadth and 
depth of our deliberations about these issues. The purpose in describing the 
work in my classroom here is to demonstrate that it is possible to expand the 
discussion of intellectual property well beyond the “done, not done” mode of 
teaching plagiarism in the first-year composition classroom—without detract-
ing from important tasks already at hand. Instead, by changing how we present 
our course documents and cover topics such as the conventions of documenta-
tion, research, and source usage, we can begin to prepare students to negotiate 
the digital environment in which they must work and produce written com-
munication.
EVERYDAY WORK WITH INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CONCERNS
Course Policies and Documents
The first day of any class is usually spent in course logistics, such as re-
viewing the syllabus and grading policies. I include definitions of intellectual 
property, copyright, fair use, and plagiarism in my syllabus. Even if I point out 
those particular policies with my class and direct students to Web sites that 
define copyright and fair use and provide resources for avoiding plagiarism, I 
can’t just say “go and look.” I have also had to teach myself to express the vari-
ous definitions in everyday terms, understandable to students fresh out of high 
school as well as those who have been out of school for many years. Intellectual 
property, I try to tell students, is much like real estate: It is property a person 
can own. Although the ideas behind creative works—such as books, songs, and 
paintings—can’t be touched and manipulated like physical property, they still 
belong to the creator. Copyright is a law that guarantees creators of such mate-
rials control over how their works and ideas are used in the future. Copyright 
law, I try to explain, prevents others from making money off the creator’s ideas; 
in other words, copyright holders can charge or require permission for someone 
to use their original work. If someone unethically uses that work without the 
creator’s permission or paying for such use, we call that infringement. Luckily, 
I tell my classes, the fair use doctrine provides exceptions to copyright control 
for educational and other creative purposes. Plagiarism, I try to point out, is a 
very different—but still unethical—use of someone else’s intellectual property. 
Plagiarism is claiming (or giving the appearance of claiming) someone else’s 
intellectual property as one’s own, especially in academic settings. 
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I attempt to set the discussion within the context of the academic world and 
the world they will enter as professionals. We talk about how plagiarism (taking 
credit for work not their own) will be their main concern while in college. In 
submitting papers using outside sources for college credit, they’re using parts 
of another’s work and not attempting to make money; therefore, fair use pro-
tects them from copyright infringement. Unfortunately, if they submit some-
one else’s work as if it were their own, they are attempting to receive that college 
credit dishonestly. In this case, they have committed plagiarism. In completing 
their course work, they may not be faced with decisions about using copyright-
ed materials outside those fair use principles. Someday, however, such decisions 
could affect their job, their employer, and the financial and legal standing of 
all involved. If they don’t examine who owns an idea or creative work and 
don’t analyze their motives in using all or part that original work, they could 
be asking for trouble. In my class, in future classes, and in their careers, they 
absolutely must consider audience and purpose (as well as personal motive) if 
they hope to make the best decisions they can about the uses of others’ works. 
My students also begin the semester learning a simple truth they’ve prob-
ably never deeply considered: They own the rights to the work they produce 
in my class—and indeed the work they produce in any class. I spell out those 
rights along with my limited rights to read and respond to their work in my 
syllabus. On the very first day, students complete, only if they so choose, an 
“Informed Consent for Use of Student Work” that reinforces their ownership 
of their work and gives me the ability to use their work in certain settings. 
If administrators, instructors, and copyright holders wonder why students 
hold so little respect for the intellectual property rights of others in a digi-
tal age, we should probably look no further than how we view student work. 
To catch the students who knowingly and unknowingly plagiarize, more and 
more colleges require students to submit every essay to a plagiarism-detection 
service. Plagiarism-detection services require that students sign releases, essen-
tially acknowledging that the service has “the right to ‘reproduce, display, dis-
close, and otherwise use’ student work for their business purposes” (CCCC IP, 
2006). The underlying message here is, of course, that their original work holds 
little value in comparison to the need to catch others who submit unoriginal 
work. Although most students probably never consider that their work has any 
creative value, they need to begin somewhere, understanding that their ideas 
and thoughts hold value and that they deserve authorial and legal credit for 
them. We should start that understanding in our composition classrooms. We 
cannot expect them to make good decisions about the ownership and credit 
of others’ work until they see themselves as authors who must make decisions 
about how they will allow others to use their intellectual property.
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The Philosophy and Mechanics of Documentation
In the reflections my students complete throughout the semester, they regu-
larly vent their frustration at the mechanics and seemingly arbitrary rules of 
the MLA documentation system. To combat such resistance, I used to fall back 
on the “do it or it’s plagiarism” mentality—clearly just another version of that 
“done, not done” mode of thinking. Now, I realize the importance of explain-
ing to students the rationale behind documentation and citation, no matter 
what system a student is required to use in an essay. In a sense, I attempt to 
answer the question so many students ask about documentation: “Why do we 
have to do this?” To answer that question, we begin by referring back to the syl-
labus and to information about copyright, fair use, and plagiarism. When I ask 
them about the audience and purpose of their college essays, students reliably 
respond with “you, my other professors” and “to show that I’m learning some-
thing.” Students and I, therefore, work under the assumption that what we do 
is for the sake of education and not for economic gain—that what they’re doing 
falls under fair use. Still, that recognition alone doesn’t answer their “why do 
we have to do this?” question when it comes to documentation. Consequently, 
we need to discuss certain values in the academic world, touching on three 
important points.
First is that those in a college or university setting value original thinking. 
Students create knowledge. Very importantly, though, that original thinking 
and newly created knowledge doesn’t just come from nowhere, but from careful 
consideration of what others have said. As members of the academy, we include 
the basis for our new knowledge and ideas within our written work. When we 
incorporate such source materials in an educational setting, we do not need to 
ask for permission, but we do need to fulfill our responsibility to recognize the 
creators of those materials, thus avoiding plagiarism. Because we place equal 
value on original thinking and positioning ourselves within the ideas of oth-
ers, we have an exceptionally high responsibility to fulfill in formal essays. To 
demonstrate that we have included the ideas and knowledge of others as well as 
added to the larger academic discussion, college writers need to clearly distin-
guish their own ideas and knowledge from the ideas and knowledge of others. 
Citation signals to readers that “the borrowed materials end here.” Looking at 
professional essays and sample student essays helps students to understand that 
even the most rudimentary citations help to distinguish the writer’s research 
from their own knowledge.
Second, we discuss how educators value knowing the dependability of a 
source. We also have our own credibility or ethos to maintain. The more au-
thority our sources have, the better we look as writers. Along those same lines, 
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I tell students that they just might inspire someone to find and read one of 
their sources. I’ve demonstrated how an idea presented in an article I read on 
plagiarism led me to yet another article and that article led to yet more and 
varied reading. I point out how I discovered the second article by tracing the 
references in the first article I read and how the same scenario played out in the 
works cited of the next article.
Third, people in the business of creating and disseminating knowledge—
particularly college professors and students—largely want acknowledgement 
for their ideas. My students admit readily that they want their work acknowl-
edged with a good grade. I hope to build on that point and explain that college 
professors want to have their ideas acknowledged by others—whether those 
others agree with them or not. In considering such intellectual property issues, 
Laura Murray (2008) argued that “plagiarism and copyright infringement are 
transgressions against two distinct but overlapping economies of knowledge: 
citation systems and market systems” (p. 174). With this in mind, I now at-
tempt to guide student use of others’ work in a way that will make them think 
in both their academic and professional careers. Borrowing Murray’s notion of 
citation as “the currency of our research,” I tell students that we really should 
recognize others’ ideas, even if they’re covered under the doctrine of fair use 
in their school work. Consequently, we must always ask ourselves a question, 
“must I pay with the currency of citation or the U.S. dollar?” In the essays they 
write during their college career, I hope students consistently answer that they 
must pay with the currency of citation. I also hope that when the question of 
paying for intellectual property comes up in their professional lives, they will 
again give careful consideration to audience and purpose and decide on the 
proper pay: recognition or financial payment, as needed.
Even with their understanding the need for citation, students balk at pay-
ing attention to the details of MLA documentation style. To impress upon 
students the value of well-done documentation, I’ve returned to the “pay with 
citation currency” idea: I’ve been holding Works Cited auctions. I bring in 
samples of several works cited pages from real student essays, including both 
poor and excellent examples. Students are then assigned to role play the author 
of one source on any one of the works cited. The question, of course, becomes, 
“were you happy with the ‘citation pay’ you received for your intellectual prop-
erty?” We can set an “exchange rate” for each sample works cited by reversing 
the process and have some students “bid” on the work cited they want for their 
essay. The monetary analogy seems to work; students come to understand that 
poorly done documentation is worth very little in the currency of citation, so 
we set out to learn and use the mechanics of documentation to the best of our 
ability.
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Research and Source Evaluation
My institution emphasizes library research, and many of my colleagues view 
the Web as the enemy—the tempter, seducing students into plagiarism and 
poor choices about materials used in their essays. DeVoss and Rosati (2002) 
pointed out, however, that “to make the Web a better research space—a space 
where students will be doing critical, thoughtful, thorough research instead of 
searching for papers to plagiarize—we must engage students in tasks appropri-
ate to the complexity of the online space” (p. 201). Most of us, in our under-
graduate composition courses, were taught to look up a source in references 
such as Periodicals for College Libraries to determine its appropriateness for our 
essays. In our current digital environment, the Web can be used to provide 
students with a much deeper and richer view of the sources they are using. 
My students begin the process of evaluating sources with exactly what they’re 
supposed to be using in their essays, a periodical found on and downloaded 
from the library subscription databases. Unfortunately, that span of several 
gray pages provides very little context for the student to reach any conclusions 
about the source, but browsing the publication’s Web site provides more insight 
into a source’s value than any reference work.
When researching and evaluating sources, students and I look at their sourc-
es through the same lens of intellectual property and academic values. Students 
take a source—from The Nation or The National Review, for instance—and 
first find the homepage for the publication. Immediately, the headlines and po-
litical cartoons clue students into any potential biases in the source. When they 
visit the sites for Time or Newsweek, they are annoyed by the pop-up ads, but 
they are absolutely clear that the purpose of these publications, on some level, 
is to make money. In visiting the online presence of scholarly journals, students 
see the editorial boards, submission guidelines, and intended audience for these 
publications. They learn to follow important links like “About Us,” where they 
can learn whether the authors of the source are journalists or experts on some 
level. Side searches can help them find the curriculum vitae of the “expert” 
authors in journals and how the publications stack up against a variety of Web 
sites dedicated to their topics. All along, we ask the same questions students 
should always be asking about the value of these sources, framing our discus-
sions and reports in the terms of academic values and intellectual property we 
have already discussed:
•	 Does the source reference and integrate the work of others?
•	 Does the source say something new or intriguing about the topic?
•	 Does the source pull from a plurality of ideas or just a few?
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•	 Does the source pay with “the currency of citation” for the ideas of 
others?
•	 Is the authorship of the source clear? If not, is the ownership of the 
source clear?
In 15–20 minutes of surfing, students instinctively learn more about the 
value of authorship and ownership of intellectual property (and how it can en-
hance their own work) than I could teach in days of lecture.
 The Requisite Plagiarism Discussion
When presenting the general topic of plagiarism, the discussion must center 
on what constitutes both proper use and misuse of others’ intellectual prop-
erty. The goal, as Porter and DeVoss stated in a 2006 conference presentation, 
is that “instead of becoming plagiarism police, our role should be to teach 
students how to make ethical decisions regarding copying and the re-use of 
others’ text.” The U.K. Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) found 
that plagiarism must be explained to students in “everyday language” in con-
junction with examples of both acceptable and unacceptable behaviors (Car-
roll, 2004). If ethical decision-making is indeed the goal, then, necessarily, 
the discussion centers on two variables familiar to all first-year composition 
instructors: audience and purpose. Appropriate to this goal is a problem-based 
learning approach in which students must make decisions for themselves about 
the motives behind utilizing others’ works. I have tried several versions of this 
task: the latest involves students examining a variety of works regarding the use 
or misuse of others’ intellectual property, some of it clearly copyrighted mate-
rial. These works include:
•	 an essay purchased from an online paper mill;
•	 an essay filled with ideas cut and pasted from sources, improper para-
phrases, and missing citations;
•	 a church bulletin, featuring the famous picture of a sailor kissing a nurse 
on Times Square during V-E Day celebrations (with no recognition of 
the photographer or copyright holder), to commemorate Veteran’s Day;
•	 a PowerPoint presentation, submitted for an assignment in an online 
class, in which borrowed pictures are referenced only with the photog-
rapher’s name and URL;
•	 a YouTube video, usually a mash-up, such as Monty Python’s “Camelot” 
playing against scenes from the original Star Trek series; and
•	 a television commercial featuring a popular song as background 
music.
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Students are told only that the works utilize the intellectual property of 
others. Working in groups, they research and discover the original source ma-
terials; locate definitions and policies concerning copyright, fair use, and pla-
giarism (including those of our own institution); make a determination as to 
the appropriate use of the intellectual property; and pose recommendations for 
further action. Students are told they must examine the purpose and intended 
audience for the work they scrutinize, and they report their findings to the 
entire class. 
In the discussion that follows, I have to give the warning that all good com-
position teachers must: Misrepresenting the works of others as your own will 
most likely result in failure. At this point, I have tried to expand the vocabu-
lary I use, hoping to move beyond simply a monolithic offense of plagiarism. 
Although “everyday language” is important, students need to know that pla-
giarism is not just a blanket offense. For example, when I present prohibitions 
against buying, borrowing, or stealing an essay, I make sure to use the word col-
lusion, the term used in British and Australian universities for such an offense. 
Similarly, when students piece together parts of other works to make themselves 
sound better, I refer to it as mosaic plagiarism. I explain how this type of pla-
giarism, like collusion, is intended to deceive readers into thinking the writer 
created something new. My experience working with other faculty members has 
taught me that our vague college policy and the lack of clear policies and con-
sequences in individual syllabi lead to a great deal of the worst instances of pla-
giarism on campus. Therefore, students and I refer back to the syllabus and the 
policy I noted to them at the semester’s start, and I make clear the consequences 
for this worst of offenses: If students are caught intentionally misrepresenting 
another’s work as their own, they will receive a 0.0 in the course. 
Our discussion eventually leads us to inadvertent plagiarism, that offense 
committed by students who do not yet have adequate skills in documenta-
tion and source integration. To assist students in learning how to correctly 
and ethically integrate sources, they submit copies of the actual sources to me 
along with their essays and they are expected to revise to eliminate poor source 
integration. If they still are not correcting plagiarism that’s the result of poor 
source integration or documentation in revised essays (especially after they’ve 
been warned about the problem), they should not expect a 2.0—the grade that 
will make the course acceptable as a core, transferable class—because they have 
not met the course learning objectives. Time and opportunity to learn must be 
given to students as they learn these academic conventions; they will not grow 
as authors unless we clearly distinguish between the various types of plagiarism 
for them and provide them with the methods to adjust to the standards of au-
thorship in academia.
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Intellectual Property in Digital Realms
Because our program’s outcomes are still firmly anchored in print-based 
production, finding methods to teach students about intellectual property in 
digital and online environments has been difficult. However, even for such 
text-heavy classes, composition teachers can find some means for teaching 
about digital rights management. My students maintain a wiki that they pass 
onto future generations of students. They leave written advice on a variety of 
topics for making it successfully through Composition II. They illustrate their 
ideas with photographs they take themselves, short videos on topics of inter-
est, and add screen shots of essays to illustrate points. Before they start adding 
to the wiki, we click on the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 3.0 
License link that appears at the bottom of our page. They explore the Creative 
Commons site and learn what rights we are retaining for our work. In addi-
tion to learning where they can find “free” resources, students have also had to 
make the difficult decision not to use “the perfect” cartoon or picture because 
they do not have the rights to do so. 
MOVING FORWARD, IF ONLY A STEP AT A TIME
As composition instructors, we can no longer ignore that communication is 
changing. Students are already heavy consumers of multimodal texts, not only 
taking in the written word that appears on their computer screen, but also the 
video, pictures, and graphic materials that surround it. We need not doubt that 
they have the ability to copy and paste or otherwise embed what they find on 
the Web into their work. Moreover, the 21st-century workplace will probably 
demand that they do so—and that they do so ethically. No one, especially in 
an academic environment, would argue that we should allow students to dis-
honestly take credit for the work of others; however, we need to prepare stu-
dents to make the best, most creative use of what the digital world has to offer 
and do so in a way that appropriately recognizes others’ intellectual property. 
As Kathleen Henning (2003) posited: “Teaching must integrate the best of 
technology with the best of the ‘old’ ways, accepting inevitable change even if 
it doesn’t seem better at first” (p. 311).
Compositionists understand reading and writing as basic literacies. 
However, if we carefully examine current pedagogy, we will find that we 
have long been imparting another kind of literacy—the literacy of intellec-
tual property—even though we never saw it as such. We have always taught 
about plagiarism and the proper citation of source material. Like it or not, 
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the onslaught of the digital realm has increased the urgency and scope 
of that literacy. We must now think about issues of copyright, fair use, 
and digital management rights in addition to plagiarism. Deborah Brandt 
(1995) noted that literacy has two ways of expanding. First, a literacy can 
increase vertically as we learn and accumulate of a certain kind of literacy; 
for example, we can expand our written or spoken vocabulary. Second, lit-
eracy can increase horizontally by adding on new types of literacies. Once, 
we only had a spoken vocabulary, but eventually we learned to read and 
write as well as do math. We need to expand intellectual property rights 
literacy both vertically and horizontally in our first-year composition class-
rooms. 
Such an expansion will no doubt be uncomfortable for many of us, and 
we surely will only be scratching the surface of that new literacy. Fortunately, 
we need not overturn everything we are currently doing. Instead, writing in-
structors simply need to examine what they are already teaching and find 
methods for including a deeper discussion of intellectual property use and 
abuse. Through my experience, I’ve learned that by making intellectual prop-
erty part of our regular discussions, students are beginning to ask questions as 
they go. After reading a sample student essay, one young woman asked, “She 
used the exact word I wanted for my essay, but I didn’t know so until I read it. 
If I use that word, is it plagiarism?” The class overwhelmingly decided no; it 
was not plagiarism. She was not stealing the writer’s ideas; she was simply re-
alizing that she had found the exact word she was searching for. While doing 
his research, another student found an article title, based on a pun, and he 
wanted to use that same pun for his title. His peer reviewers, before I could 
even give input, had already decided that he could probably use a similar pun 
but couldn’t “steal” the exact title. They, too, have now expanded the discus-
sion of intellectual property beyond a “done, not done” view of plagiarism. 
Hopefully, they also now care more about the precedents for and originality 
of their own work.
In a point, click, and copy world, writing instructors must be called 
to become intellectual property pedagogical philosophers. We must ad-
vocate for clear but strong policies against the misuse of intellectual 
property, including the abuse of student rights to their own work. As we 
stand up for our own rights to fairly and ethically use others’ intellec-
tual property in our academic pursuits, we must also insist on students 
having those same rights in their academic pursuits. Although the work 
of expanding the literacy of intellectual property begins with infusing 
it into many facets of our first-year composition courses, it cannot end 
there.
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NOTES
1. As an example, Chris Boulton’s (2007) master’s thesis analyzed print 
advertisements for designer children’s clothing. However, unable to clear the 
copyright on many of the advertisements he examined, the University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst, based on their graduate school’s Guidelines for Mas-
ter’s Theses and Doctoral Dissertations, forced the removal of the ads from 
bound copies and versions available through university’s Web site. UMass 
guidelines fail to even mention fair use exceptions for its students pursuing 
any research that might involve commenting on copyrighted materials. For 
more information, refer to Open Access resources at http://www.openstudents.
org/2008/07/08/fair-game/
2. To my knowledge no student has yet to face serious disciplinary action 
for such source usage. Similarly, the policy has had little effect on those who 
commit truly serious infractions. In fall semester 2008, a developmental writ-
ing student submitted a purchased essay as part of his portfolio for exit compe-
tency assessment, and was caught. When his instructor awarded him a 0.0 for 
his efforts, he told her, “I didn’t get much for my $45, did I?” The student then 
simply retook the placement test and received the bare minimum score needed 
for entrance into our transfer-level composition course.
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18 COUTURE ET ÉCRITURE: 
WHAT THE FASHION 
INDUSTRY CAN TEACH THE 
WORLD OF WRITING 
Brian Ballentine
“Fashion has always been about inspiration. Designers are in-
spired by nature, by culture, by events, by other designers. But 
there is a difference between inspiration and plagiarism.” 
stopfashionpiracy.com
In “Framing Plagiarism,” Linda Adler-Kassner, Chris Anson, and Rebecca 
Moore Howard (2008) stated that “plagiarism is hot. Nor is that heat limited to 
the popular media; colleges, faculty, and students are equally consumed by the 
notion that plagiarism is widespread and uncontrollable” (p. 231). Plagiarism 
has now found application and resonance in the world of fashion. The above 
epigraph is taken from the opening narration of an approximately 10-minute 
video decrying the ills of fashion piracy and advocating increased intellectual 
property protection, specifically copyright, for clothing design. Indeed, the use 
of the word “plagiarism” to describe copied fashion design should be viewed 
as rhetorical and deliberate. As Moore Howard (2007) reminds us elsewhere, 
“plagiarism is a discourse developed with that of copyright;” and although it 
is an ancient term, it was not until the rise of the printing press and its “mon-
etary opportunities” in the 18th century did the term become common (p. 7). 
As such, it is the perfect word selection for those wishing to excoriate pirates 
in the name of “protecting” originality when profits are concerned. However, 
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as Jessica Litman (1994) argued, “the model suggesting that production and 
dissemination of valuable, protectable works is directly related to the degree of 
available intellectual property protection is much too simplistic. In fact, history 
teaches us a more equivocal lesson” (p. 46). 
Delving into that history and intellectual property’s ambiguity, law profes-
sors Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman (2006) argued convincingly that 
the “fashion industry flourishes despite a near-total lack of protection for its 
core product, fashion designs” (p. 1762). The absence of protection runs coun-
ter to how we typically understand the role intellectual property “should” play 
when a creative work such as design is involved. Cutting-edge designs parad-
ing down a fashion runway in Paris or New York are digitally photographed 
and emailed off to design houses where they are reverse engineered (or perhaps 
more appropriately, reverse designed) and then mass produced at a discounted 
rate for the general public. Celebrities showing off exclusive haute couture on 
the red carpet generate the same results. However, rather than stifling innova-
tion, the missing copyright protection for fashion designs creates what Raus-
tiala and Sprigman called a “piracy paradox” where the rapid proliferation of 
copied artifacts actually benefits designers by making trends obsolete faster, 
thus pushing innovation and increasing sales. The process of shortening the 
shelf-life of new designs and quickening what is known as the “fashion cycle” is 
called “induced obsolescence” in the fashion industry (p. 1722). Fashion design 
thrives in this largely unexplored “negative space” within intellectual property 
law (Raustiala & Sprigman, p. 1776). 
This chapter details my experience in this negative space—teaching a busi-
ness and professional writing course where the student body was comprised 
almost entirely of Textile, Apparel, and Merchandizing (TAM) majors. When 
we arrived at the portion of the course that dealt with the intersections of 
writing, intellectual property, and ethics, the students took a keen interest in 
learning more about copyright law’s minimal sway within fashion design. In 
the academic setting, students receive constant reminders regarding the ills of 
plagiarism and copying and the importance of citing sources as inherent to 
upholding academic integrity. The opportunity to explore academic integrity 
and issues of intellectual property by pairing them with the current debates 
from the world of fashion was, I thought, too good of a teaching opportunity 
to let go by. In the middle of the semester, I adjusted the course readings and 
assignments and asked student groups to prepare to argue for or against fashion 
“piracy.” 
The trouble with “teaching” plagiarism is that “many cases of so-called 
plagiarism occur at the borders where one set of (typically academic) values 
and practices blurs into another (typically public) set of values and practices” 
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(Adler-Kassner et al., 2008, p. 239). Along with Adler-Kassner and her col-
leagues, I do not condone blatant plagiarism of another writer’s work, but I do 
believe the world of fashion stages an effective teaching environment by con-
trasting an academic context with this unique professional space. In this chap-
ter, I argue that the deliberate introduction of intellectual property issues and 
this specific fashion debate offer an effective means of reaching the goals and 
objectives for a business and professional writing course. In the first section, I 
briefly introduce course goals and examine class dialogue surrounding intel-
lectual property. This beginning portion of the chapter serves as a backdrop for 
untangling some of the relationships knotting together plagiarism, copyright, 
and trademark. That untangling also necessitates a brief overview of the pro-
tection that intellectual property law provides for the world of fashion and how 
those protections are minimal in the United States as compared to Europe. I 
then examine a bill introduced twice to the U.S. Congress, the Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act, written to extend Title 17 of U.S. Code to grant copyright 
protection to fashion designs for 3 years. After discussing several student proj-
ects that argued for and against the passage of the bill, I claim ultimately that 
students left the writing class with more than just a set of rules regarding what 
they cannot do and instead developed more nuanced conceptions of intellec-
tual property and plagiarism. 
EXPLORING “NEGATIVE SPACES” IN 
THE WRITING CLASSROOM
Maybe not in large enough quantities, but curriculum yoking writing in-
struction and intellectual property exists; this chapter is just one small explor-
atory offering (Howard, “Syllabi”; see, also, other chapters in this volume). 
The course and curriculum discussed here relate to a business and professional 
writing course enrolling juniors and seniors from a wide range of majors. Be-
cause the course satisfies a university general education requirement, it is not 
uncommon to find science, engineering, and humanities majors of all kinds 
taking the course. This particular semester happened to enroll a large majority 
of TAM majors—19 of 22 students. 
Course goals for business and professional writing classes emphasize fos-
tering critical thinking skills as students evaluate rhetorical situations, assess 
audience needs, and compose and revise work (see Herrington, 1981; Knob-
lauch & Brannon, 1983; Odell, 1980). A persistent challenge to any number of 
writing courses, but especially courses like business and professional writing or 
technical writing, is that they attempt to prepare students for communicative 
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contexts governed by value systems and protocols often much different from 
academic standards. According to Jessica Reyman (2008), “a division between 
workplace practices and academic expectations distances our classrooms from 
the workplace and presents students with an unclear picture of what is allow-
able and in what contexts it is allowable” (p. 64). In reflecting on my own 
professional experience as a software engineer responsible for a great deal of 
writing, much of the work our team produced was highly derivative and, by 
academic standards, “plagiarized.” For a group of software engineers develop-
ing new applications for the medical market, our company had established a 
particular professional ethos and its technical and promotional documentation 
helped support that ethos. It would have been presumptuous, if not foolish, for 
each of us to compose materials in such a fashion that strove to demonstrate 
“authenticity” or “original authorship.” The goal was to appear as a unified 
front of products and services; for our writing to accomplish that goal, we bor-
rowed and patch wrote. Indeed, George Pullman (2005) suggested that techni-
cal and professional communicators would be wise to become accustomed to 
“thinking about text as reusable chunks of information” (p. 50). 
Responding to these variances in professional writing contexts and practic-
es, one of Reyman’s (2008) proposed curricular solutions integrates “discussion 
of legal definitions of authorship” explicitly into her course (p. 64). Rather than 
just preaching plagiarism guidelines, Reyman advocates expanding on the legal 
guidelines for what constitutes work-for-hire as well as examining the fair use 
doctrine. Finally, she is a proponent of pushing students to apply critical think-
ing skills to intellectual property and authorship:
Introducing scenarios, both in the classroom and in text-
books, that ask students to wrestle with understandings of the 
legal and ethical implications of copying and re-use allows for 
exploration of plagiarism as a context-specific concept. Sce-
narios addressing such concerns might include nontraditional 
acts of composition, such as ghostwriting, work-for-hire, col-
laboration, and using boilerplates, that challenge the single-
author model. (p. 65) 
Her solution is admirable, but for many of us it may mean stepping out-
side our classroom comfort zones. That said, addressing what Moore Howard 
(2007) called the “widespread hysteria” over Internet plagiarism will require 
facing these challenges. Again, this is no easy task; from legal scholars like 
Litman we do not exactly get words of encouragement. Litman noted, “the 
moral of the story: some things are easier to teach than others. The current 
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copyright statute has proved to be remarkably education-resistant. One part 
of the problem is that many people persist in believing that laws make sense” 
(p. 50). 
My attempt to introduce students to a more nuanced understanding of 
intellectual property and its relationship to writing was by way of using the 
current debates within the fashion industry as a scenario. The scenario is for-
tuitous in that we are witnessing the law while it is attempting to make sense 
of itself. Or, rather, we are witness to industry executives and their legal teams 
lobbying for greater protection for an industry that may or may not be best 
served without that protection. My approach was to prepare students to take 
part in that discussion with short readings and research and then ask them to 
argue for or against the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. 
The first step was to select readings that would outfit students with the 
necessary vocabulary to participate in a conversation about intellectual prop-
erty. Common textbooks used in business and professional writing or techni-
cal writing courses will often have sections dedicated to ethics and writing and 
some may even quickly cover fair use or the fundamentals of copyright. Text-
books, however, do not typically take the opportunity to provide students with 
an adequate overview of intellectual property, or a discussion that even begins 
to parse its complexity. To compensate, I supplied students with the introduc-
tory chapter from The Law of Intellectual Property (Nard, Barnes, & Madison, 
2006). Although this book is designed for law students and contains a dense 
offering of legal cases in later chapters, the first chapter is an excellent over-
view of the mainstays of intellectual property: copyright, trademarks, patents, 
and trade secrets.1 Even better for my purposes, the section of the introduc-
tion dedicated to trademark law contains a news story on a police raid in New 
York City’s Chinatown confiscating counterfeit merchandise by Louis Vuitton, 
Kate Spade, and Fendi, and a quick overview of a logo infringement case. I also 
asked students to read the details of the proposed Design Piracy Prevention 
Act on the Open Congress Web site. The site traces the progress of the bill and 
shows members of Congress backing the proposal. Students also watched the 
10-minute video supporting the bill on the Web site stopfashionpiracy.com. 
Finally, there is a useful, although very brief, summation of Raustiala and Sp-
rigman’s (2006) article available from The New Yorker online titled “The Piracy 
Paradox” (Surowiecki, 2007). 
Student groups were allotted 12–15 minutes to argue their cases in front 
of the class. Presentations surpassed my expectations regarding overall quality 
and insightfulness, but also surprised me in that the dominant stance argued 
against the passage of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. The class was divided 
into six teams comprised of three to four students. Of those six teams, only one 
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advocated for the passage of the bill. As I kept reminding students, I was not 
there to judge right or wrong on the bill, but to assess the rhetorical maneuvers 
made within their arguments. I also reminded them that in addition to dem-
onstrating their abilities to conduct research and analyze data, the goals for the 
course insist that they demonstrate their aptitude with comprehending and 
evaluating potential ethical and legal dilemmas associated with writing and 
research. While I am not suggesting these goals are in any way exceptional for 
a writing course, asking students to address the dilemma posed by a pairing of 
intellectual property law and the fashion industry’s plea for protection did pro-
vide a unique learning scenario for students. More importantly, it changed the 
subjects of intellectual property and plagiarism from lecture-driven segments 
of the course to a dialogic one where students were engaged with critiquing the 
present and future reach of the law. As a class, we set out to make sense of this 
“negative space.”
UNTANGLING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FASHION
Trademarking Fashion 
Protection for fashion comes primarily from trademark law and not copy-
right. Under the Federal Trademark Act, otherwise known as the Lanham Act, 
a trademark is “any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof 
used by a person…to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a 
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate 
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown” (15 U.S.C. sec. 1127). 
These provisions benefit both the consumer and the trademark holder. First, 
consumers are spared confusion between brands. Consequently, the time re-
quired to identify a particular product and make a decision regarding its as-
sociative quality is shortened. That is, it is easy to distinguish Coca-Cola from 
other competing colas because trademark law prohibits other companies from 
assimilating Coke’s appearance. Coke consumers have come to rely on a par-
ticular quality, consistency, and taste associated with its brand identity. As a re-
sult, consumers receive a second benefit in that companies have an incentive to 
maintain these levels of consumer expectations. Companies can spend a great 
deal of time and money developing what is known as “good will” with their 
consumers; although good will is intangible, for many companies it is often 
valued at “millions of dollars” (Nard et al., 2006, p. 2). Finally, companies use 
trademark protection to prevent competitors from abusing or trading on their 
established consumer good will. A competitor’s sub-par offering that uses, for 
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example, a counterfeit trademarked logo to create an incorrect brand associa-
tion, can lead to a dilution of the original brand.2 
Trademark goes into effect as soon as an individual or company uses a mark 
to “identify goods or services for sale to the public. Therefore, federal or state 
registration of a trademark is not necessary in order for a company to own, use, 
or even enforce a trademark” (ASME, 2001, p. 32). Most individuals and com-
panies serious about protecting their trademarks, however, do register with the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks 
can be held in perpetuity so long as the trademark holder continues to use their 
mark. Registering with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office helps signal the 
desire for continued protection and serves as a warning to others wishing to 
compete in the same market. According to the Lanham Act, violations consti-
tute the following: 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with 
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any 
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; 
... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the rem-
edies hereinafter provided. (15 U.S.C. sec. 1114) 
Despite the real threat of litigation, counterfeit products have plagued the 
fashion industry for years; perhaps the most common form of abuse is the rep-
lication of trademarked logos.
Logo misappropriation is one of the easiest methods to capitalize on an 
established brand’s good will. Counterfeit or “knock-off” goods are a cheap-
er—often both in terms of price and quality—impersonation of a desirable, 
higher-end consumer product. For example, Gucci and Louis Vuitton hand-
bags and purses bearing the company’s respective logos are valued by consum-
ers because their ownership suggests or even confers a particular social status: 
“These are goods whose value is closely tied to the perception that they are val-
ued by others” (Raustiala & Sprigman, 2006, p. 1718). As Brian Hilton, Chong 
Ju Hoi, and Stephen Chen (2004) argued, “who is buying and from whom is 
what gives a product its credibility. In the absence of a means to assess quality 
directly people use ‘surrogate’ indicators of quality” (p. 347). However, there is 
an even better reason that these designs are so quickly copied: Trademark rarely 
succeeds in protecting fashion designs when a logo or product-differentiating 
mark is not part of that design. Raustiala and Sprigman pointed out instances 
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where designers strived to integrate their logo pervasively into a complete prod-
uct design; Louis Vuitton or Coach handbags that have their logos repeated all 
over the bag in a wallpaper-like pattern are examples. There are other unique 
instances where protection is upheld, such as Burberry’s trademarked plaid, 
but on the whole, the uses for trademark law in the world of fashion are “quite 
limited” (Raustiala & Sprigman, p. 1701). 
Copyrighting Fashion
The limitations of trademark law have led advocates for fashion design pro-
tection to explore copyright as an alternative method. Currently, the wide array 
of creative works that copyright protects—including art, sculpture, and other 
pictorial works—does not extend to any item that may be classified as a “useful 
article.” Title 17 of the U.S. Code elaborates on what may and may not qualify 
as a copyrightable work:
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship in-
sofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as de-
fined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features 
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of ex-
isting independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 
(17 U.S.C. sec. 107) 
Raustiala and Sprigman (2006) clarified that a fashion designer’s sketch 
would qualify for copyright protection as an artistic work. However, the 
final product (whether it be a jacket, shirt, skirt, or pants) that emerges as 
a result of the sketch does not retain any protection, as that final product is 
deemed “useful.” Similarly, utilitarian designs cannot be protected within 
the scope of trademark law either. According to U.S. law, therefore, the cuff 
of a shirt or the shape of a lapel can almost always be associated with some 
functional aspect of a garment, which results in those designs being left 
open for copying.
As advocates for increased fashion protection will point out, the European 
community does possess legal means to deter copying designs. Arguing for 
increased protection for U.S. fashion designers, Karina Terakura (2000) re-
counted a 1994 lawsuit where Yves St. Laurent sued Ralph Lauren in a French 
court for copying. The garment in question was a sleeveless tuxedo gown. The 
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Yves St. Laurent version sold at a much higher price point of approximately 
$15,000, where the Ralph Lauren version was a $1,000 offering. Models wore 
the gowns in the courtroom for the judge, who, after examining them, said, 
“clearly there are differences ... [Lauren’s] buttons aren’t gold, while Mr. St. 
Laurent’s are. The St. Laurent dress also has wider lapels and I must say is more 
beautiful, but of course, that will not influence my decision” (Terakura, pp. 
613-614). Ironically, and without mention of a potential conflict of interest, 
Terakura reported that the judge herself owned two fashion boutiques in Paris. 
The original ruling dictated that Ralph Lauren pay a fine of $411,000, but 
that fine was later reduced to an undisclosed sum. Although Terakura judged 
the original sum as “relatively low,” she did find the ruling in favor of Yves St. 
Laurent “comforting” (p. 614). 
Terakura’s (2000) stance is set on a traditional incentive model that predicts 
more protection begets more innovation; she worried that “without the origi-
nal creators of fashion styles, the world would not be provided with an array of 
beautiful clothing” (p. 618). And according to the traditional model, the only 
way to ensure that these “original creators” keep producing is to provide pro-
tection for their work. Terakura continues, “Imitation is a form of flattery, but 
when imitators continuously benefit from other’s work, creativity diminishes. 
Creators need protection from imitators” (p. 618). Indeed, this is what Jona-
than Barnett (2005) referred to as the “standard incentive thesis that pervades 
much academic, judicial, and policy discussion of intellectual property” (p. 
1381). It is also this line of thinking that is the backbone of the Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act.
THE DESIGN PIRACY PROHIBITION ACT
The Design Piracy Prohibition Act was a twice-proposed bill that would 
have amended Title 17 of the U.S. Code to extend copyright protection to 
fashion designs. The bill “excludes from such protection fashion designs that 
are embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer or owner 
more than three months before the registration of copyright application” (Open 
Congress). The bill would have provided copyright protection for 3 years and it 
would have been the responsibility of the Register of Copyrights to evaluate the 
originality of a design. The bill had sponsorship from several well-known Sena-
tors including Barbara Boxer, Hillary Clinton, and Charles Schumer. At the 
time of this writing, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act had been introduced in 
the 109th and the 110th Congress; in both instances, the bill lapsed without 
a vote. Given the current economic climate, it is uncertain whether or not the 
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bill will be re-introduced into the 111th Congress and, even if it is, whether or 
not Congress will take time to address the bill. 
In the bill’s first instantiation, labeled H.R. 5055, it was referred to the 
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. Com-
mittee members heard expert testimonies from fashion designers, lawyers, and 
the United States Copyright Office. Serendipitously, many of these statements 
are available online and there was no shortage of fodder for students as they 
built cases for or against the bill. Students found the U. S. Copyright Office’s 
statement on the bill with ease. The final paragraph concludes:
The Office does not yet have sufficient information to make 
any judgment whether fashion design legislation is desirable. 
Proponents of legislation have come forward with some anec-
dotal evidence of harm that fashion designers have suffered as 
a result of copying of their designs, but we have not yet seen 
sufficient evidence to be persuaded that there is a need for leg-
islation. (U. S. Copyright Office)
However, students discovered just as quickly that there was no shortage of bill 
defenders. For example, Susan Scafidi is a law professor who has written on fash-
ion and intellectual property and also keeps a blog called Counterfeit Chic. In 
her opening statement on H. R. 5055, delivered to the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, she advocated for the bill’s passage:
At this point in our history, America should not be a safe 
haven for copyists. The failure to protect fashion design is 
both inconsistent with our international policy and a disad-
vantage to our own creative designers—especially the young 
designers who represent the future of the American industry 
and who are particularly vulnerable to copying. 
The stopfashionpiracy.com Web site has also amassed testimonials from 
American and European designers representing major corporations like Ar-
mani, Chanel, and Hermès, all advocating for the Design Piracy Prohibition 
Act. The U.S. and U.S. design houses, they argue, are at a severe disadvantage 
in a growing global economy without fashion copyright. Many of the testimo-
nials warn that this multi-billion dollar industry could atrophy in the U.S. and 
that the decline would come, at least in part, as a direct result of technology 
and globalization. Before the days of the Internet, copying a design could take 
months or as long as a year to perfect. Designers are now working and showing 
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their wares in environments where they know little can remain secret for long. 
According to a testimonial by Giovanna Ferragamo, a member of the board 
of directors for the well-known Italian designer Salvatore Ferragamo, copied 
designs appear in stores at the same time and in some cases prior to, the release 
of the originals. In an effort to promote awareness for the dilemma and the 
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, designers have started describing design piracy 
as “counterfeit without the label”. Proponents argue that so long as the model, 
shape, and overall design cannot be protected, then their hard work will con-
tinue to be “stolen in plain sight” (Stop Fashion Piracy). 
In addition to technology’s influence on design piracy and the fashion cycle, 
the global economy brings inescapable competitive realities. For example, East-
ern countries have undeniably lower production costs. Many of the companies 
producing pirated fashion take advantage of these lower costs, which, in turn, 
lowers the costs to consumers enticed to buy the cheaper imitated designs. 
Short of inspecting a garment’s label for its authenticity, a consumer would 
need to be a fashion expert in many cases to distinguish the copy from the orig-
inal design. Frustrated and fearing the potential of huge profit losses, design 
houses are turning to copyright to protect designs and hold onto a competitive 
edge. Copyright’s protective reach, as noted in this collection’s introduction, 
has been extended significantly over the last several decades, to a degree where 
copyright reform activists and legal scholars question whether or not the law in 
its current form continues to serve its original purpose. 
COPYRIGHT’S PURPOSE: THE POWER 
TO PROMOTE PROGRESS
More important than the need to protect, if copyright law was derived from 
the Constitution granting Congress the right “to promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts,” it is difficult to imagine more law doing a better job 
than the fashion industry’s existing system. Despite the compilation of testi-
monials advocating for fashion’s right to copyright protection, it is also hard to 
ignore the evidence of a thriving fashion industry whose gross U.S. revenues 
exceed $173 billion and globally are estimated at over $784 billion annual-
ly (Raustiala & Sprigman, 2006). With a tongue-in-cheek delivery, Litman 
(2008) imagined what our lives would be like if we did not have copyright for 
fashion designs: 
Imagine for a moment that some upstart revolutionary pro-
posed that we eliminate all intellectual property protection 
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for fashion design. No longer could a designer secure fed-
eral copyright protection for the cut of a dress or the sleeve 
of a blouse…The dynamic American fashion industry would 
wither, and its most talented designers would forsake clothing 
design for some more remunerative calling like litigation. And 
all of us would be forced to either wear last year’s garments 
year in year out, or to import our clothing from abroad. (pp. 
44-45)
Litman does eventually remind her readers that, “of course, we don’t give 
copyright protection to fashions…We never have” (p. 46). For those in opposi-
tion to the Design Piracy Prevention Act, the rampant copying of competing 
designs appears only to spur more innovation and more revenue for an industry 
that is constantly rolling out new merchandise to the public. Some legal schol-
ars, such as Barnett (2005), have gone so far as to make arguments that even 
trademark infringement behooves a brand. Barnett contended that introducing 
counterfeit goods allows designers to charge what he called a “snob premium” 
to fashion-conscious consumers who desire to set themselves apart from the 
“non-elite” (p. 1384). The result is a hyper-inflated popularity for the brand 
that has more consumers setting their sights on acquiring the “real” item. Al-
though there is not a major initiative afoot to strip fashion of its trademark pro-
tection, legal scholars are questioning the efficacy of applying copyright to an 
industry that survives by blending and borrowing ideas from a rich history of 
past designs. Representing a rare “negative space” within intellectual property 
law, fashion’s missing copyright protection counter-intuitively promotes huge 
levels of productivity, innovation, and profit. 
Legal scholar Lawrence Lessig has written extensively on copyright law’s 
stifling effects on cultural progression and argues that the law has expanded 
to the point of deterring its original purpose of promoting innovation. In Free 
Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity, Lessig (2004) recounted a legal 
anomaly similar to fashion’s missing intellectual property protection from the 
world of Japanese comics. He described the phenomenon of doujinshi comics, 
which are a kind of “copycat” work created based on existing, often main-
stream, comics. Doujinshi comics are clear violations of copyright law in that 
they are derived from other works. Even though doujinshi works have come to 
take up a large portion of the Japanese comics market, there is no active ef-
fort to shut them down. Similar to Raustiala and Sprigman’s (2006) argument 
against fashion copyright, Lessig cited research that suggests the copycat com-
ics actually make the entire market “more wealthy and productive” (p. 27). In 
an effort to understand why, exactly, the comics are allowed to exist in the first 
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place, Lessig himself seemed most satisfied with the reality that there simply 
are not enough lawyers to enforce what would amount to an overwhelming 
number of cases. He posited that “regulation by law is a function of both the 
words on the books and the costs of making those words have effect” (p. 27). 
To rephrase a cliché, then, the so-called cure for fashion’s perceived illness may 
be much worse than the illness itself. 
WRITING INSTRUCTION AND PLAGIARISM
Plagiarism Detection
Fashion’s anxiety over the perceived illness of rampant copying in the age of 
the Internet and globalization resembles what Moore Howard (2007) described 
as a “sense of impending doom” brought on by a perceived technological threat 
poised to “undo the entire educational enterprise” (p. 3). Moore Howard pro-
vided examples from scholars and critics whose work she believes advances the 
less-than-critical assumption that there is a causal relationship between tech-
nology and plagiarism. While the fashion industry is lobbying for extending 
copyright to protect designs from plagiarism, many instructors (or at least their 
institutions) are resorting to protectionist methods by purchasing licenses for 
plagiarism-detection services such as Turnitin.com. Among the many critiques 
leveled at such services is Lisa Emerson’s (2008) concern that in the wrong 
hands, “Turnitin becomes a blunt instrument to accuse those struggling to 
grasp a complex intellectual skill of moral failure—with huge repercussions for 
those students” (p. 190).
To a great degree, embracing plagiarism-detection services has been the re-
sponse of my institution. As part of an effort to promote “Digital Literacy” on 
campus, the university library posted a number of learning modules and tuto-
rials on their Web site. One of those tutorials is dedicated to stopping plagia-
rism. The introductory page informs students and instructors that “the word 
plagiarism comes from the Latin plagiarius meaning ‘kidnapper’” and offers 
a cartoon rendering of a thief in a black mask making off with a sack full 
of “writing,” “words,” “knowledge,” and “ideas” (WVU Libraries Plagiarism 
Tutorial). A second cartoon depicts a student being literally kicked out of the 
dean’s office with a paper labeled “plagiarized” having fallen to the floor. (In 
the tutorial’s defense, it does offer some useful basics on paraphrasing and cit-
ing source materials.) It closes, however, with yet another cartoon image, this 
one of a gold badge with the words “plagiarism detective.” This portion of the 
tutorial reads:
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Plagiarism detection services, such as Turnitin.com, use spe-
cialized technology to compare student papers with informa-
tion found on the Internet as well as their own databases of 
previously submitted papers. Your professor may ask you to 
submit your papers electronically to Turnitin.com. Turnitin.
com will create an “originality report” that shows how much 
of your paper is original and how much, if any, is plagiarized. 
(WVU Libraries Plagiarism Tutorial)
The computer-generated originality report brings George Landow’s (1997) 
“Ms. Austen’s Submission” immediately to mind—a dystopian tale of a fu-
ture where “Amateur Authors” submit their work to an all-knowing computer 
called the Evaluator that serves as the arbiter of authorship at the Agency of 
Culture. This machine has the power to advance an Amateur to the status of 
“Author” or even a “Mass” or “Serious” author. Although the story concludes 
with a hypertextual array of possibilities for Ms. Austen, ranging from world-
wide success to complete rejection, Landow ends by providing a somber reflec-
tion: “machine intelligence necessarily reproduces someone’s ideology” (p. 296).
Buried not too deeply in plagiarism-detection software is an ideology that 
the kidnappers are our students, who will remain guilty until verified as ad-
equately “original.” Subtle and not-so-subtle encouragement to use Turnitin 
comes in surprising forms. For example, I just completed a university-man-
dated audit for one of the English department’s writing courses. These au-
dits offer “proof” to the university curriculum committee that a course meets 
set guidelines for what constitutes a writing-intensive course. The paperwork 
asks for a sample syllabus and assignments, and requires that the instructor 
respond to a series of questions. Among the many questions is: “How do you 
ensure that written work does in fact reflect the student’s own work? (i.e. Tur-
nitin or Safe Assign).” Given all of the opportunities to elaborate on course 
goals and how writing is integral to those goals, I was surprised by the ques-
tion and the suggested possibility of Turnitin. It is as if integrating multiple 
drafts and revisions along with peer and instructor evaluations would not 
begin to serve as a satisfactory answer to this question. Why couldn’t the 
question instead suggest, “i.e. demonstrably innovative curriculum and en-
gagement with students?” I view my university’s prompt as a signal that the 
field of writing has come to a point where it must evaluate what role technol-
ogy’s “protection” plays in the instruction of writing. Rather than flashing 
the badge of “plagiarism detective,” students may be better served with cur-
riculum that employs a deliberate introduction of intellectual property law 
and its many ambiguities to set a stage for a dynamic writing classroom. I am 
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suggesting that any writing classroom will benefit by shifting from offering 
lecture-based coverage of plagiarism “laws” to a student and teacher dialogue 
probing intellectual property and its more ambiguous and negative spaces. 
Giving students the opportunity to research and formulate their own ideas 
regarding intellectual property produced thoughtful presentations and con-
versation in my own class. 
Creating Dynamic Dialogue
Again, in my class, it surprised me that there was little support for copyright 
protection for fashion designs. The one and only group that made an argument 
for the passage of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act took the position that as 
fashion design majors they had hopes of working not for a big design house but 
striking out on their own with small, boutique-like labels. The group made a 
convincing case that without protection, the big design houses could appropri-
ate or “steal” (as they put it) their designs and bring them to market faster and 
with more marketing-driven attention. They also made the point that unlike 
writing, they do not have the option of citing sources of inspiration. The group 
was uncomfortable with the idea that it becomes the consumer’s responsibil-
ity to be informed about fashion to the degree that he or she could recognize 
a pirated design and then make an informed decision on whether or not to 
buy. The Design Piracy Prohibition Act not only gives entrepreneurial design-
ers a fighting chance in fashion, they argued, but copyright for new designs 
would improve on trademark law by serving as another marker of authenticity 
to would-be consumers. 
The five remaining groups did not support the bill. All of the groups did, 
however, make a point to include a short reaffirmation for trademark law and 
its very necessary role in fashion. One of the groups began their presenta-
tion by circulating two Coach wallets—one authentic and one a counterfeit. 
Taking a cue from Barnett (2005), I asked if instead of being a problem for 
the world of fashion, that perhaps the presence of the fake wallet increased 
the value or desirability of the original. A student responded that it may 
be possible for a fake to have the reverse effect, however. She classified the 
counterfeit wallet as “true plagiarism” but did add that, “all the people that I 
care to impress do know the difference anyway.” The remainder of their pre-
sentation was an informative side-by-side comparison of the shape and style 
of the wallets’ designs which demonstrated subtle differences and near exact 
similarities between the two. The group maintained that they were against 
trademark infringements, such as the Coach knock-off, but concluded it 
would be detrimental to the progress of the industry if Coach could, for ex-
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ample, copyright the wallet’s closure strap or overall shape. They pointed to 
the language of the proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act, which states it 
would be the responsibility of the Register of Copyrights to process and pass 
judgment on the applications submitted for a registered copyright. That task 
alone, they speculated, would take many experts from the field and an enor-
mous amount of time. Indeed, those wishing to litigate would use an enor-
mous amount of resources to do so. Although we did not have time to read 
selections from Lessig (2004), the deductions by this student group appear 
to coincide with Lessig’s observations of the doujinshi comics phenomenon 
mentioned earlier and the number of lawyers it would require to prosecute all 
of the so-called violations.
It is worth noting that the student group that was not comprised of TAM 
majors also opposed the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, but approached their 
case with a much different example. The students enjoyed sampled or remixed 
music and all of them remembered the controversy surrounding the release of 
DJ Danger Mouse’s (2004) The Grey Album. The tracks on this album were 
a combination of an a cappella recording of Jay-Z’s The Black Album and in-
strumental tracks from the Beatles’ The White Album. Shortly after the release 
of The Grey Album in 2004, the record label owning the rights to the Beatles’ 
music served cease and desist orders to DJ Danger Mouse and all stores and 
Web sites selling his album. The student group played excerpts from The Grey 
Album and argued that what the class was hearing was actually an original 
work that distanced itself adequately from both of the other albums it sampled. 
In short, copyright was impeding music’s progress. The group suggested to the 
fashion majors in the room that they felt the music industry should serve as a 
warning for the world of fashion and that the Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
would be equally stifling.
CONCLUSION
In many respects, the worlds of fashion and writing instruction are undeni-
ably different. Fashion’s seasonal design cycles guarantee a fast-paced industry 
that moves today’s most desired clothing to a store’s sale rack tomorrow. Yet, 
the quest to identify, validate, and lay claim to originality feels remarkably fa-
miliar to a writing instructor. Naturally, copying makes many of us anxious, 
and according to the testimonials from major designers, copy-prevention poli-
cies should be written into U.S. code. Raustiala and Sprigman (2006), how-
ever, seem to suggest that fashion houses should recognize an exercise in futility 
when it is in front of them:
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Original ideas are few, and the existence of fashion trends 
typically means that many actors copy or rework the ideas 
of some originator (or copy a copy of the originator’s design). 
Some may originate more than others, but all engage in some 
copying at some point—or as the industry prefers to call it, 
“referencing” (pp. 1727-1728)
Conversely, if not ironically, perhaps Raustiala and Sprigman would find 
the academic discussions from the world of rhetoric and composition found in 
the scholarship of Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford (2001), Cheryl Geisler et al. 
(2001), and James Porter (1996) on the subjects of intertextuality and author-
ship useful for their research. In his “Intertextuality and the Discourse Com-
munity,” Porter (1986) suggested that “referencing” is an inescapable condition 
of text: “Not infrequently, and perhaps ever and always, texts refer to other 
texts and in fact rely on them for their meaning. All texts are interdependent: 
We understand a text only insofar as we understand its precursors” (p. 34). For 
fashion, the problem is what to do when a garment’s interdependence is instead 
utterly dependent on past work. That is, what is an appropriate response when 
referencing moves to blatant copying? As writing instructors, we call it plagia-
rism, and fashion has now taken up the term. For both fashion and writing, 
degrees of acceptable “referencing” remain a hot debate. In a very real and prac-
tical sense, the challenge to arrive at an acceptable equilibrium is an arduous 
task (if not more so for writing instructors), as writing contexts vary greatly be-
tween academic to professional settings. Reflecting on the need to understand 
these variances, especially as they pertain to business and professional writing 
and technical communication, John Logie (2005) posited that, “teachers have a 
special obligation to encourage students to engage with, examine, and critique 
the policies that will intersect with and impinge on their professional work” 
(p. 224). For the TAM majors in my business and professional writing course, 
proposed legislation in the form of the Design Piracy and Prohibition Act stood 
poised to implement major changes to industry policies and practices; another 
iteration of the bill is certainly possible. 
Although I am willing to confess my bias against the Design Piracy Prohi-
bition Act, this chapter is not necessarily an argument for or against its rein-
troduction and passage. Instead, the controversy within the fashion industry 
about whether or not copyright protection should be afforded to fashion de-
signs presents a window of opportunity for students to explore the reach and 
limits of intellectual property law in a manner that goes beyond simplified 
discussions of plagiarism policies. These overt introductions and discussions 
of the law and its effect on other professions and industries outside of the 
Brian Ballentine
344
classroom need to become more of the norm than the exception. Plagiarism 
policies, academic integrity, research methods, and source citations are all im-
portant to writing instruction. However, once students enter the workforce 
and the academic values of the writing classroom collide with a different pro-
fessional context, the real question will be whether or not students possess the 
critical thinking skills to assess their situation and respond in an appropriate, 
professional fashion. 
NOTES
1. For courses like technical writing that more often enroll students pursu-
ing science and engineering degrees, I have recommended elsewhere (Ballen-
tine, 2008) using the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ handbook, 
Intellectual Property: A Guide for Engineers. Despite its title, this 70-page text is 
useful for a range of audiences.
2. Related to the concept of dilution are trademark blurring and tarnish-
ment. Blurring is the “diminution of the uniqueness and individuality of the 
mark caused by another’s use of the same or similar mark” (Nard et al., 2006, 
p. 190). Tarnishment is a trademark infringement in which the violator creates 
a “negative association” by employing a deceptively similar mark or slogan. 
See Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 
1962) and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
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19 THE ROLE OF AUTHORSHIP 
IN THE PRACTICE AND 
TEACHING OF TECHNICAL 
COMMUNICATION 
Jessica Reyman
Writers working as technical communicators, whose primary role is to com-
municate complex technical information to the audiences who need it, face 
unique challenges in their roles as authors. Technical communicator concerns 
about issues of authorship and textual ownership derive from their dual roles 
as creators of works and users of others’ works. Therefore, their questions tend 
to be either “do I own this work?” or “can I use this work that someone else 
has authored?” Often the reason for asking such questions is to avoid claims 
of copyright infringement. Writers want to establish ownership of works that 
they’ve composed so that they know how they might reuse them, and they want 
to establish their rights to incorporate the work of others into their own proj-
ects when it is useful. Conscientious writers seek to establish who owns a work 
(either their own or another’s) so that they can proceed legally and ethically. 
Often technical communicators cannot easily determine ownership themselves, 
and the question soon becomes “should I ask my legal department about this?” 
Technical communicators who work within a corporate setting can rely on legal 
counsel for sound advice on whether or not they, as employees of a given or-
ganization, are authorized to claim ownership to or make use of copyrighted 
material. This advice aims to inform writers whether a particular activity is 
legal and to allow them to proceed without concern for liability. A question that 
technical communicators may not ask as frequently, however, is why the answers 
to questions about intellectual property are not always obvious. Why aren’t the 
lines between who owns what—between legal and illegal, ethical and unethical 
activity—clearly demarcated for writers working as technical communicators? 
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Instructors who teach technical communication at both the undergradu-
ate and graduate levels have a responsibility to inform students about potential 
legal constraints related to what they can claim ownership of and what they 
can make use of in their writing on the job. By educating future technical 
communicators on what copyright law says regarding ownership of works, in-
structors can help students participate in future workplace discussions that seek 
to answer the question “is this legal?” Technical communication instructors 
should discuss issues of textual ownership with students both in terms of legal 
authorship (or what author status allows legally) and rhetorical authorship (or 
what author status allows regarding agency and status within the profession). 
My treatment of technical communication authorship is limited to a corporate 
model of the writer, or the technical communicator whose job title might be 
“technical writer” or “content specialist,” but not necessarily all writers who 
may communicate specialized information to specific audiences on the job who 
also do not work as technical communicators within a corporate environment 
(e.g., lawyers, researchers, freelancers). 
In this chapter, I address the tension between industry models for legal 
ownership of intellectual property as supported through copyright law and 
the concept of authorship—a concept that informs technical communicators’ 
understandings of textual ownership, as discussed in technical communication 
scholarship. I begin by describing legal conceptions of authorship that apply to 
industry professionals working as technical communicators in corporate envi-
ronments. I then move to contrast that model with how authorship has been 
conceptualized among technical communication researchers and practitioners 
within the existing literature in the field. I close by arguing that instructors 
should address questions of legality and related implications. In doing so, in-
structors can more fully acknowledge the complexity of making legal and ethi-
cal decisions about textual ownership in the workplace. The aims of such an 
approach are to support ethical writing practices as well as to aid future techni-
cal communicators in establishing greater autonomy and increased professional 
status by becoming more active participants in discussions about intellectual 
property in their work environments. 
THE PERPLEXING CIRCUMSTANCES OF AUTHORSHIP
The legal standards for ownership and use of copyrighted materials are not 
always in line with writers’ understandings of textual ownership and use of oth-
ers’ materials as formed through their academic experiences. Technical com-
municators, particularly those who have recently moved from the academic to 
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the corporate world, are faced with perplexing circumstances. For instance, 
while technical writers and editors are held accountable for composing inno-
vative, usable, and compelling documents in the workplace, they often do not 
legally assume authorship of that work; instead, works are usually owned by 
the corporation they work for under the work-for-hire doctrine of copyright 
law. Another example is the way in which many technical communicators rely 
on existing materials in their writing, including templates and boilerplates, but 
also existing content composed by other writers, which runs counter to the 
concepts of originality and plagiarism learned in academic contexts. 
Because of this unique role of the technical communicator as nonauthor, 
situations in which questions about copyright and ownership arise are com-
mon for technical communicators. These situations often involve more than 
one writer and several variables that affect textual ownership. Consider these 
two cases:
Case #1: A technical communicator has recently joined a 
team responsible for writing user documentation to explain 
to customers how to install, maintain, and repair telecom-
munications equipment. She was asked to review existing 
documentation for a quality assessment and to revise the doc-
umentation as needed. As part of the assessment, she discov-
ered that parts of the documentation were identical to that 
found in user manuals that you could access freely online from 
a well-known, industry-leading competitor’s public Web site. 
Further, a search on related topics revealed that other material 
in the documentation was copied from public online forums 
where users posed questions and other users responded with 
solutions. How should this technical communicator proceed 
with revising the documentation at her company?
Case#2: A technical communicator who works for a small 
software company created, largely independently, the user 
manuals for a new software program. A larger corporation 
then purchased third-party rights to use the software program 
in a product of its own. As part of the program that was pur-
chased, the corporation acquired electronic copies of the user 
manuals. Because the product development and customiza-
tion project is on a fast track and because the user manuals are 
high quality, the technical publications department at the cor-
poration determined that if they use the software company’s 
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existing manuals, they can drastically reduce their document 
development time. The technical publications department is 
not sure whether the corporation has the rights to not only the 
software product, but also the user guides. 
In each of these cases, legal counsel, if available, would be able to assess the 
situation and arrive at a recommended course of action, often with the prima-
ry goal of mitigating risk for the corporation. Because of the variables involved 
(number of writers, different organizations involved, varying modes of access-
ing materials), the situations become too complex for most writers to analyze 
and arrive at a comfortable decision independently. However, technical com-
municators have much at stake in assigning authorship. Issues of textual own-
ership have great bearing on their work, determining not only how they will 
proceed on a given project but also the recognized value of their contributions 
within a workplace environment. Therefore, technical communicators should 
be informed enough to become active participants in the decision-making 
process, either collaborating with legal counsel or collaborating with their 
team and others involved to arrive at a satisfactory model for textual owner-
ship. Such participation requires that technical communicators understand 
what the law says and also the implications of models of textual ownership 
for their roles and status within the workplace. With this understanding, they 
can more confidently and soundly respond to difficult intellectual property 
related situations. 
LEGAL NON(AUTHORSHIP) FOR 
TECHNICAL COMMUNICATORS
As evidenced in other chapters in this collection, the field of rhetoric and 
composition has addressed concepts and troubles related to authorship at some 
length in its scholarship. Technical communication scholars, however, have 
engaged in rather dispersed discussions of the concept and often borrow from 
the growing body of scholarship on intellectual property studies among com-
positionists. While it is outside the scope of this chapter to summarize the 
scholarship on authorship in rhetoric and composition, one particularly useful 
source for this discussion is Rebecca Moore Howard’s (1999) Standing in the 
Shadow of Giants, which offers an argument for rethinking modern concep-
tions of authorship that have implications for teaching writing. In the opening 
chapters, Howard offers a review of scholarship on the history of the concept 
of authorship. Based on this history, she asserted that notions of authorship are 
The Role of Authorship
351
“culture-specific, arising not as a description of foundational facts about writ-
ing, but as cultural arbitraries that support larger social trends” (p. 76). Further, 
and most useful here, Howard described what she called “properties” of con-
temporary authorship that writing students and instructors commonly rely on. 
Although she focused largely on plagiarism and authorship in terms of its as-
sociation with morality among composition instructors and students, the other 
three properties she identified—autonomy, proprietorship, and originality—
are more pertinent to a discussion of authorship in technical communication. 
Howard noted that modern conceptions of authorship posit its autonomy (com-
posing individually), proprietorship (a “natural right,” in the Lockean sense, to 
own what one has produced through writing), and originality (the notion that 
writing comes from inner genius; pp. 76-85). 
Many written texts—and particularly those prepared in academic set-
tings—are valued among instructors and other readers for these properties. 
As Howard (1999) recognized, we need only look to discussions of plagiarism 
in the writing classroom or university plagiarism policies to see how prevalent 
these assumptions are. Howard’s description of the properties of authorship 
creates an appropriate springboard for a discussion about authorship and tech-
nical communication: As she noted, a disparity exists between composition 
student “patchwriting” practices and these properties of authorship. Technical 
communication scholars might note the differences between technical com-
munication student assumptions about ownership of texts and the proper-
ties of authorship that apply in workplace settings. Authorship as applied in 
technical communicator professional practices is a far cry from the concept of 
authorship purported in the academic environment. In a professional context, 
technical communication is rarely considered an individualized activity; it is 
not something to which we assign ownership by an individual writer; and it 
typically does not produce something valued most for its originality. Although 
the treatment of authorship in most university writing curricula (both com-
position and technical communication) typically continues to rely on these 
properties, such discussions do not reflect many of the actual practices and 
laws governing industry professionals working as technical communicators in 
corporate settings. 
Technical communicators often fail to achieve author status, as understood 
in academic settings, due in part to the types of composing activities they regu-
larly engage in; these activities may not resemble the activity of “authoring” as 
recognized in academic contexts. Namely, technical communicator activities 
involve collaborating with other writers, editors, or subject-matter experts as 
opposed to working autonomously, or reworking, building on, or reusing ex-
isting text rather than producing something entirely original. Consider these 
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common writing tasks that may lead some to question the status of the techni-
cal communicator working in corporate environments as autonomous, propri-
etary, and originary:
•	 collaborative writing: composing with others writers, editors, or sub-
ject-matter experts;
•	 repurposing: taking an existing document—perhaps written by another 
author—designed for one purpose, form, or audience and re-working it 
for a different purpose, form, or audience;
•	 single-sourcing: “creating multiple deliverables from one unmodified 
source document,” perhaps written by another author (Brierly, 2002, 
p. 15);
•	 using boilerplates and templates;
•	 corporate authorship: composing works not signed by a writer or, rath-
er, works that are signed by a representative not the writer.
In some instances, the large number of contributors can make it difficult 
to determine who all of the authors of a given text are. For instance, research 
articles in scientific journals, which technical writers and editors often help 
to compose and edit, routinely have large numbers of contributors. Due to 
the difficulties posed when assigning textual ownership among a large group 
of contributors, editorial boards governing these publications have developed 
authorship criteria for bylines in journals. The International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE; 2008), for instance, published criteria for 
determining authorship status in biomedical journals based on: 
1. substantial contributions to conception and design, acquisition of data, 
or analysis and interpretation of data; 
2. drafts of the article or critical revisions for important intellectual con-
tent; and 
3. final approval of the version to be published. 
Such guidelines suggest that identifying authors of a written work—where 
there is much collaboration in the design and completion of research, the anal-
ysis of data, and the writing and editing of the article—is not an easy task. 
To accommodate a large group of contributors, other forms of acknowledging 
individual work or assigning responsibility for content include titles such as 
“guarantor,” “clinical investigator,” “participating investigator.” Interestingly, 
“technical writer,” “medical writer,” and “editor” are not listed as examples of 
contributors deserving authorship credit. 
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Legal models for authorship in corporate settings likewise do not follow 
traditional, academic models of original, autonomous, and proprietary author-
ship. The work-for-hire doctrine of copyright law and contractual agreements 
negotiated between writers and the companies they work for may leave individ-
ual writers and editors with nonauthorship status—with little or no ownership 
rights over the works they compose. The work-for-hire doctrine of copyright 
law (see Amidon, this volume) governs the default assignment of copyright in 
an employee–employer relationship. Work-for-hire applies in two circumstanc-
es: when a technical communicator has prepared a work as part of his or her 
employment and when a technical communicator has been commissioned by 
an employer to complete a work and both parties have agreed via contract that 
the work should be considered a work for hire. This means that the work cre-
ated by a technical communicator within the scope of his or her employment 
becomes the sole property of the employer, even if he or she is no longer em-
ployed there. This also means that if a technical communicator is not employed 
permanently by the company and is working on a short-term contract, he or 
she still may relinquish rights to the work if agreed on through a contract with 
the employer. (For more on the work-for-hire doctrine, how it affects technical 
communicators, and its treatment in case law, see Herrington, 1999.) 
Under these conditions, which are typical for technical communicators 
working in professional settings, writers do not assume legal authorship of a 
work that they compose, even when the work is a solitary and original creation, 
that is, even if it does not rely on existing content and is carried out individu-
ally. In some cases, such as writing or editing for an ICMJE publication, the 
subject-matter experts assume ownership of the written work. And, in other 
cases, the corporation or a named representative assumes authorship. This sys-
tem of nonauthorship may prevent technical communicators from receiving 
recognition or credit for their work. Additionally, it may prevent them from 
retaining important rights—including opportunities for future financial gain 
from the work—as it can preclude writers from reusing or repurposing their 
work or from marketing their work to other audiences. These limitations are 
particularly restrictive when a writer intends to reuse work prepared for another 
employer, even if he or she no longer works for that employer. However, this 
system for establishing legal nonauthorship may, in fact, have some benefit for 
technical writers and editors, namely protecting them from liability for unin-
tended consequences caused by misuse of technical communication products 
or inaccuracies presented in materials they have written or edited. 
Legal guidelines for product liability include responsibilities such as “duty 
to warn and instruct.” U.S. liability law specifies that companies must include 
warnings about potential dangers and misuses associated with a product and 
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that these warnings not only be available to users but that they also be under-
standable. Often such warnings are distributed or reprinted in product doc-
umentation written by technical communicators who also often work as an 
intermediary between a company and the public. In this case, they may find 
themselves responsible, in part, for ensuring that their company avoids costly 
liability lawsuits; however, technical communicators are rarely legal experts 
(nor should they be expected to be). Management or any available legal counsel 
has the authority and knowledge to advise technical communicators on their 
responsibilities regarding product liability, a particularly complex area of the 
law; and having done so, a company may also assume liability if a legal claim 
arises, shielding a writer-for-hire from liability. Although the legal concept of 
liability may or may not directly relate to legal authorship, the common model 
of corporate authorship adopted in workplace settings suggests a certain level 
of protection for technical writers from sole responsibility. (For more in-depth 
discussion of liability law and the responsibilities of technical communicators, 
see Heylar, 1992; Manning, 1997; and Smith, 1990.) 
Another form of protection for technical communicators with nonauthor-
ship status is “guarantorship” of the accuracy and integrity of the content. The 
role of a “guarantor” is most commonly seen in medical writing, where tech-
nical writers and editors often compose articles that present content prepared 
by medical professionals and researchers. Medical writers are not identified 
as authors of the works they compose, and they are also often exempt from 
being identified as “guarantors” of the final product. Guarantors of a medical 
article, according to the ICMJE (2008) guidelines, are the “persons who take 
responsibility for the integrity of the work as a whole, from inception to pub-
lished article.” The names of any guarantors of an article are published, and 
these individuals “guarantee” the accuracy of information, taking responsibil-
ity for any safety issues that may arise based on the content. By not assuming 
an authorship status in the publication, technical communicators do not claim 
responsibility for the integrity of the material presented. 
By assuming legal authorship, corporations or subject-matter experts may 
assume responsibility for the text in three senses: credit for contributions in 
terms of resources and effort devoted to producing the work; liability for 
product safety; and guarantorship for the accuracy or integrity of the con-
tent. While technical communicators desire credit for their contributions, 
they often benefit from protection against liability and guarantorship for a 
written work. At times, this assignment of responsibility to another party is 
desirable, especially when it protects writers from consequences arising from 
situations in which they may not fully understand whether the data is ac-
curate (as in a scientific article) or whether an end-user has been sufficiently 
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warned of all potential harms of using a hazardous product (as in a user man-
ual). However, it is also important to note that, despite legal responsibility, 
technical communicators likely still feel compelled to consider the ethical or 
legal liabilities they potentially bring upon clients and end users. Technical 
communicators seek not merely to absolve themselves from legal responsibil-
ity, but also to contribute to safe and ethical practices within their writing 
environments. In an article on product liability, Pamela Heylar (1992) noted 
that technical communicators have a responsibility not only to write clear 
instructions and warnings that satisfy legal requirements for adequacy, but 
also to engage in practices that help their companies to work toward more 
safe and ethical product development practices. She advises technical com-
municators to work with product designers, human factors experts, and end 
users at all stages of the product development cycle to communicate about 
and gather feedback on their documentation. Her suggestions are consistent 
with the STC Code for Communicators, written in 1988 and included in the 
STC 1993–1994 annual report (see Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Society 
for Technical Communication, 2008), which specifies that writers “recognize 
[their] responsibility to communicate technical information truthfully, clear-
ly, and economically” and that to do so they hold themselves “responsible for 
how well [their] audience understands [their] message.” This sense of ethical 
responsibility among technical communicators likely will not change based 
on legal authorship status alone. Ethical and responsible technical communi-
cators already follow this code, despite their nonauthorship status. What may 
change based on authorship status, however, is the available means through 
which technical communicators participate in legal and ethical decision-
making on the job. 
Many technical communication students will be surprised to discover that 
they may not retain ownership of the works they prepare on the job. Instruc-
tors who share information about work-for-hire or common contractual agree-
ments governing textual ownership will help students make the transition from 
an academic concept of authorship (which characterizes authorship as propri-
etary, originary, and solitary) to the nonauthorship model most technical com-
municators will encounter after graduation. Discussions of concepts of textual 
ownership for technical communicators tend to focus on how copyright law 
and other contractual agreements affect, in practical terms, what a writer can 
or cannot do with a written product prepared in a workplace environment. In 
addition to creating limitations on how a writer might seek additional revenue 
for a work outside of the corporate environment it was originally prepared for, 
however, the denial of authorship status can also contribute to a lack of profes-
sional status and decision-making power for technical communicators. 
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AUTHORSHIP, AGENCY, AND PROFESSIONAL STATUS  
IN TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION
Rethinking the properties of academic authorship in light of the practical 
realities of legal authorship and common composing practices can help tech-
nical communication students better understand the different conceptions of 
textual ownership. Another goal in addressing intellectual property issues in 
the technical communication classroom is to help students develop a more 
complicated view of the role and status of technical communicators in the 
workplace. A more sophisticated understanding of nonauthorship among stu-
dents will lead them to explore what disenfranchises technical communicators 
as authors. By discussing questions of ownership and authorship, instructors 
and students can address the implications of assigned roles for technical com-
municators—as either neutral “conduits” of objective reality and “translators” 
of specialized information (i.e., nonauthors), or as “meaning-makers” within 
rhetorical contexts (i.e., authors). In the case of the former, technical commu-
nicators are relegated to the grunt work of “documenting” an already-designed 
product or “writing up” information provided by a subject-matter expert. In the 
latter case, however, they are granted the ability to contribute to the vitality and 
shape of the product, the organization, and the larger disciplinary discourses of 
science and technology. Future technical communicators who assume a form of 
authorship can more easily assume the role of contributor to meaning-making, 
as rhetorical agent, which in turn may lead to greater professional status. 
As discussed earlier, the structure of legal nonauthorship is prevalent both 
due to common technical communication practices falling outside what is 
considered “authoring” and to legal and contractual negotiations establish-
ing corporate or subject-matter authorship of works. However, this model of 
nonauthorship poses problems beyond the financial realm. Denying technical 
communicators authorship status may contribute to harmful misperceptions 
about the quality of their work as well as the status of technical communica-
tors as valuable participants in the workplace. From its inception, the field of 
technical communication has struggled to achieve status in both academic and 
industry settings as a specialized field of study and practice. Gerald Savage 
(2003) noted, in the introduction to Power and Legitimacy: The Historical and 
Contemporary Struggle for Professional Status, that “the technical communica-
tion field lacks the status, legitimacy, and power of mature professions” (p. 1). 
Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart Selber (2001) addressed reasons why this 
is the case by focusing on the need for “a coherent body of disciplinary knowl-
edge” (p. 408) that imbues students with a common skill set and knowledge 
base necessary for success in the workplace. Others have noted that the chal-
The Role of Authorship
357
lenges of establishing the value of technical communicators in industry settings 
may be due in part to the fact that works produced by technical communicators 
are not considered ends in themselves but rather a means to an end. Further, 
measuring the value of technical communicators cannot easily be shown by 
demonstrating how technical communication products contribute to a bottom 
line (Mead, 1998). In a field plagued by a struggle to establish its value both 
within the academy and in the workplace, nonauthorship status for technical 
communicators may function to obscure the nature of technical communica-
tors’ work and the worth of their contributions. By assigning nonauthorship to 
technical communicators, academics and industry professionals outside of the 
field fail to fully acknowledge their contributions and recognize their value as 
rhetorical agents, and instead view them as conduits. 
Jennifer Slack, David James Miller, and Jeffrey Doak (1993) argued that 
researchers and practitioners have much to gain by conceiving of the technical 
communicator as an author. Slack et al. applied three models of communi-
cation theory to technical communication practice: the transmission model, 
the translation model, and the articulation model. They argued that technical 
communication researchers and practitioners should embrace the articulation 
model, which allows technical communicators to assume the role of an author 
who actively contributes to the creation of meaning through their compos-
ing practices: “the articulation view allows us to move beyond a conception of 
communication as the polar contributions of sender and receiver to a concep-
tion of an ongoing process of articulation constituted in (and constituting) the 
relations of meaning and power operating in the entire context within which 
messages move” (p. 169). As authors, technical communicators hold increased 
responsibility for the content and messages they craft, and they become active 
participants in changes to the power relations operating in a given communi-
cation situation. Slack et al. make a compelling case for the value of technical 
communicators as contributors to the “articulation of meaning,” in arguing 
that by assuming authorship status, technical communicators would be free to 
contribute in ways that offer more than merely conveying facts. 
What is not so clear, however, is whether “author status” in a traditional 
sense is the most productive means for establishing or confirming the role of 
technical communicators as meaning-makers in rhetorical contexts. About 10 
years after its publication date, Slack (2004) wrote a response to her earlier, 
co-authored article stating that she had become “dissatisfied” with the direc-
tive “to go out into the world and assert authorship.” She later saw that “the 
assertion of authorship offers no guarantee to technical communicators that 
their work will attain a level of social responsibility they may hope for” (p. 161). 
Following Slack, I agree that asserting authorship, at least legal authorship, 
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may not be all that is required for technical communicators to achieve height-
ened professional status as rhetorical agents. Although it does allow, perhaps, 
increased freedom to seek financial reward for an individual writer’s contribu-
tions, it does not necessarily lead to increased responsibility for the meaning 
created through technical communication products. In other words, while re-
taining legal authorship status in a traditional sense may reward contributions, 
it does not automatically establish responsibility for communication products. 
A sense of responsibility for the integrity and quality of texts seems likewise nec-
essary for technical communicators to achieve greater autonomy in the work-
place and gain recognition as valued professionals. 
Outside of the Slack et al. (1993) article, technical communication schol-
arship addressing the concept of authorship has been sparse. Another area of 
scholarship we might look to for further insight into authorship in terms of both 
contribution and responsibility includes work that has chronicled the chang-
ing definitions of technical communication and its relationship to rhetorical 
meaning-making throughout its recent history (Dobrin, 2004; Miller, 1979; 
Rutter, 2004). Two landmark essays offer definitions that challenge theories of 
communication that limit our understanding of the technical communicator 
as an author and reveal the value of establishing rhetorical agency for techni-
cal communicators. In a 1979 article, Carolyn Miller argued that scholars and 
instructors in technical communication should no longer privilege a positivist 
view of science and technology, and instead view technical writing “rather than 
the revelation of absolute reality, [as] a persuasive version of experience” (p. 
52). Miller contended that it is useful to understand the work of the technical 
communicator as rhetorical, as contributing to the creation of meaning rather 
than merely transferring meaning (as a neutral conduit) or rendering meaning 
clearly (as through a windowpane). By doing so, researchers and practitioners 
can recognize how technical communicators participate in making rhetorical 
choices, as agents with responsibility for content and meaning. 
Russell Rutter (2004) offered a definition of technical communication that 
relies on a rhetorical and historical approach:
writing must be conceptualized as an activity that by its se-
lection and organization of information and its assessment of 
audience creates its own version of reality and then strives to 
win the consensus of its readers that this version is valid. If 
technical communicators create versions of reality instead of 
serving merely as windows through which reality in all of its 
pre-existent configurations may be seen, then technical com-
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munication must be fundamentally rhetorical: it builds a case 
that reality is one way and not some other. (p. 28)
By viewing technical communicators as creating “versions of reality,” rather 
than as neutral conduits, researchers, practitioners, instructors, and students 
alike can begin to understand the role of the technical communicator as one 
that does more than contribute to a bottom line or neutrally convey informa-
tion. By assuming a role of meaning-maker, technical communicators can con-
tribute to the shape of workplace activities, products, and the larger discourses 
of science and technology in positive ways. The views espoused by Miller (1979) 
and, subsequently, Rutter (2004) about the rhetorical work of technical com-
municators have been generally embraced in technical communication schol-
arship, which notes the usefulness of these definitions to better understanding 
how communicators can more ethically and responsibly participate in real-life, 
dynamic, and inherently complex professional communication practices. 
To write well as a technical communication professional, however, is often 
misperceived within the corporate setting as helping a company meet a fi-
nancial goal, conforming to pre-determined genre conventions, or neutrally 
transmitting information. This view carries over into the classroom: a cur-
sory glance at introductory textbooks or anecdotal evidence from instructors 
of courses in technical communication reveals that students do not always un-
derstand technical communicators as rhetorical agents (there are, of course, ex-
ceptions to this). Instead, works of technical communication have historically 
been viewed—by their readers, subject matter experts, students, instructors, 
and even some technical communication professionals—as authorless, both 
in terms of how writers contribute to content (“transparent” or “objective” or 
“just the facts”) and how they present material stylistically (“clear,” “precise,” 
“direct,” “comprehensive,” and “accurate”). Although technical communica-
tors have been valued in professional and academic settings for their efficiency 
or proficiency, they have not necessarily been valued for their contributions as 
meaning-makers. Defining technical communication according to the notion 
of transference of objective reality encourages defining technical communica-
tors as, at best, translators of technical material and, at worst, neutral conduits 
or even invisible window panes rather than as authors with rhetorical agency. 
The issue of rhetorical agency and its relationship to authorship status is 
not a given. Technical communicators who achieve legal authorship status may 
not necessarily act with agency to effect change within their workplaces, just 
as those with nonauthorship status may be able to participate meaningfully in 
important decision making. Rather, rhetorical agency, or what might be un-
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derstood as the capacity of an individual to shape an audience’s perception or 
the conditions of a situation through rhetoric, may preclude, confer, and/or be 
produced by authorship status. Recently, scholars of rhetoric interested in the 
concept of agency have begun to examine the social structures and forces that 
precede and facilitate rhetorical agency in particular contexts. Cheryl Geisler 
(2004), in an article summarizing the conversation about rhetorical agency 
at the 2003 meeting of the Alliance of Rhetoric Societies, noted an interest 
in understanding “the conditions for rhetorical agency” and “the possibilities 
created through the arrangement of social conditions” (p. 14). Christian Lun-
dberg and Joshua Gunn (2005), in a response to Geisler’s article, explored this 
understanding of agency further by asking, “what happens to the conventional 
rhetorical account of agency if it starts out by presuming that the agency pos-
sesses the agent, as opposed to the agent possessing agency?” (p. 97). In the case 
of technical communicators, we might ask under what conditions does agency 
possess the technical communicator? That is, although legal authorship status 
alone will not likely lead to increased agency for technical communicators, a 
workplace that values technical communicators’ contributions and more fully 
understands their roles as generators of meaning may produce conditions that 
facilitate greater rhetorical agency. This workplace may, in turn, lead to socially 
recognized authorship status, a sense of responsibility, power, and professional 
status among technical communicators that may or may not coincide with 
legal authorship. 
The rhetoricians above identify what Krista Kennedy (2009) called a “bi-
furcation of agent and agency” (p. 306). Kennedy noted that legal authorship 
status (as established in the U.S. Ninth circuit opinion in Aalmuhammed v. 
Lee, 2000) requires decision-making agency and authority over a text. She 
argued that corporate authorship models, insofar as they rely on work-for-
hire, create a situation where the writer lacks “the ability to induce the mo-
tivating factor in producing the work” (p. 8). She asserted that work-for-hire 
supports the notion that rhetorical agency is a condition of legal authorship: 
If the employer provides impetus for a written work, the conditions under 
which the work is created, and the resources and supported needed for its de-
velopment, then “the employer assumes ownership of the resulting work” (p. 
9). Kennedy recognized the ways in which authorship status—as determined 
through legal authorities—requires recognition of rhetorical agency among 
technical communicators. Technical communicators could be granted agency, 
or in Lundberg and Gunn’s (2005) terms, agency would possess technical 
communicators, only if they were able to claim the social status as mean-
ing- and decision-makers within their writing contexts. Recognizing a form 
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of rhetorical agency among technical communicators—that is, understanding 
how their writings involve more than recordings of objective reality but are 
instead generative acts that create meaning—may contribute to establishing 
legal authorship status. 
Such status as authors, however, does not necessarily, or even most impor-
tantly, rely on legal authorship status. Rather, author status may be social, in 
which writers are recognized as rhetorical agents within their workplace envi-
ronments and, perhaps, within the larger discourses of science and technol-
ogy. Jim Henry (2000) noted the usefulness of a “conceptual reframing of 
authorship, in the academy and in the workplace, to extend it to instrumental 
discourse, to include multiple contributors, and to take into account the effects 
of discourse as they reverberate within and beyond local cultures” (p. 150). 
By recognizing the ways in which authorship is constructed differently across 
professional writing activities, Henry shows how we might reconstruct writers’ 
roles as producers of organizational and cultural discourses and value systems. 
For instance, Henry argued that professional writers’ contributory expertise 
includes activities that often go unnoticed in workplace environments but are 
nevertheless essential, including 
shaping and reshaping product development processes, docu-
ment review procedures and dynamics and shaping informa-
tion that will travel beyond the organization and to the larger 
public. These activities affect practices and considerations 
within the workplace and establish relationships between the 
organization and larger culture. (pp. 154-155)
Recognizing a new conception of the author that may be separate from the 
legal author highlights the rhetorical effects of the technical communicators’ 
work, on the activities of their workplaces, their company’s culture, and for the 
larger discourses of science and technology. 
By assuming status as authors with rhetorical agency, technical communica-
tors can attain increased professional status as potential contributors to change 
within their communication contexts. Such an authorship requires more than 
recognition for individual contributions and the ability to seek financial gain 
granted through legal authorship. It also requires responsibility and recogni-
tion for meaning created and acknowledgement of participation in organiza-
tional, disciplinary, and cultural discourses. This rhetorical form of authorship 
is more than a title that offers legal ownership; it is also the status and power as 
meaning-making professionals within dynamic communication contexts. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING 
TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION
Nonauthorship status for technical communicators remains the default 
structure of textual ownership from a legal standpoint. In workplace contexts, 
technical communicators rarely rely on traditional composing models that are 
autonomous and original, nor are they automatically granted proprietorship 
over intellectual property. Corporate authorship and the work-for-hire doctrine 
may impose strict guidelines on—or even prevent altogether—the reuse and re-
purposing of work. And because much technical communication involves this 
kind of reuse and repurposing, these limitations can place significant financial 
and logistical burdens on technical writers and the companies for which they 
work. In addition, nonauthorship status has implications for the professional 
status of technical communicators. In assuming a role devoid of responsibil-
ity and authority over meaning-making in their texts, writers run the risk of 
perpetuating a view of technical communicators as nothing more than neutral 
conduits of objective reality. Because of these implications of nonauthorship 
status, technical communication instructors would do well to teach students 
about authorship from two perspectives: 
•	 Legal: How does copyright law affect technical communicators’ intel-
lectual property rights?
•	 Rhetorical: How can the status of author contribute to the professional 
integrity of technical communicators?
Gerald Savage (1996) asserted that in teaching ethical concerns, technical 
communication instructors should also help students “to reconceive the profes-
sion as one that can be practiced in alternative ways that would permit them 
greater autonomy and professional integrity” (p. 310, qtd. in Savage & Kynell-
Hunt, p. 11). By teaching technical communication students about intellectual 
property issues from these two perspectives, instructors can help to achieve that 
goal. Such instruction will require that technical communication instruction 
address the difficulties posed by nonauthorship status, not only in terms of 
the practical and financial limitations of the work-for-hire doctrine but also in 
terms of the need to establish the role of technical communicators as authors 
with rhetorical agency. If instructors are to encourage technical communica-
tion students to participate in the profession in “alternative ways” that allow 
increased status and agency, then future technical communicators need to un-
derstand and assert their roles as ones of authority and responsibility. 
Such an approach has implications for curricula in technical communica-
tion at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Of course, the amount of 
time to focus on intellectual property issues as a content unit in a course will 
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vary depending on educational level and need of students in the class, and on 
curricular design and need within a program. Addressing intellectual property 
from a legal perspective will involve introducing the work-for-hire doctrine and 
contract law to students (an excellent reference for this content is Herrington’s 
2003 Legal Primer for a Digital Age). The ways in which copyright law affects 
ownership of texts prepared in workplace settings will be new to most students, 
except perhaps those who have held jobs or completed internships in which 
they performed writing and editing tasks. Instructors can introduce what the 
law says and applications of this ownership model in terms of cases, real or 
hypothetical. 
To address intellectual property issues from a rhetorical perspective, class 
discussions and activities should work to break down the dichotomy between 
“technical communicator” and “author” as seemingly suggested by legal doc-
trine. It can be useful to prepare students for the workplace by introducing 
them to common composing practices that are collaborative and not autono-
mous, building on existing work rather than originary, and nonproprietary 
rather than owned. And it is likewise important that students understand the 
limitations on legal ownership of materials as determined by the work-for-hire 
doctrine. However, it may be necessary for instructors to look beyond typical 
legal approaches to determining authorship when discussing intellectual prop-
erty issues in the classroom because these approaches often fail to highlight the 
role of technical communicators as rhetorical agents. For instance, when at-
tending a local Society for Technical Communication (STC) chapter meeting 
on “Writing and Intellectual Property Rights: Respecting Others and Guard-
ing Your Own,” a patent attorney joined the group to discuss intellectual prop-
erty law and its impact on how technical communicators create and manage 
content in a digital age. Of note was this piece of advice: “Don’t be a creative-
ly lazy fan” (Brill, 2008). As this comment illustrates, a common perception 
about how intellectual property issues should be treated among technical com-
municators can further dichotomize technical communicators and authors. 
This advice suggests that reusing and repurposing materials is being “lazy,” 
when it is common practice for technical communicators; this advice also im-
plies that technical communicators are “users” or “fans” of existing material, 
but not creative meaning-makers. Rather than suggesting that technical com-
municators act out of responsibility or authority over their texts, they seem-
ingly act out of either “laziness” or fear of liability. A discussion of authorship 
and rhetorical agency, even though it strays from discussion about typical legal 
structures of ownership, can help here. Instructors can discuss with students 
how legal ownership (what can I do with this material and not face legal rami-
fications?) and authorship status (what are my responsibilities as an author?) are 
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distinct concepts, and both are useful in the work of technical communicators. 
Although a typical technical communicator does not work individually, creat-
ing works entirely from scratch and assuming singular ownership over texts, 
he or she should seek to maintain a form of authorship that grants him or her 
rhetorical agency. Through discussions of the competing roles of the technical 
communicator, students can see how authorship in technical communication 
can be understood from two perspectives: in terms of credit (or recognition of 
an individual’s contribution) and in terms of authority, which can lead to in-
creased agency as a professional. 
In practical terms, the use of real or hypothetical cases that pose complex 
questions about intellectual property for technical communicators is a sound 
teaching method for instructing students about intellectual property from a 
rhetorical perspective. Selected scenarios and cases can be used to spark dis-
cussion, but it is important to note that they cannot teach legal behavior. In-
structors and students should not seek to “solve” the cases by answering the 
question, “is this lawful?” Instead instructors and students should discuss the 
implications of different actions in terms of legal liability, ethics, and profes-
sional status. Such an approach will encourage legal and ethical activity, and it 
can also encourage students to actively participate in future workplace discus-
sions on the issues. Broadly speaking, the goals for teaching about intellectual 
property in the technical communication classroom are to help students clarify 
their own thinking and judgment on intellectual property issues, gain greater 
confidence in addressing complex questions about intellectual property, and 
articulate those judgments more effectively. 
Sample scenarios and cases might resemble the ones outlined in the open-
ing paragraphs of this chapter. These cases were selected because they do not 
lend themselves to clear-cut answers. The first case raises questions about re-
using and repurposing material. Through analyzing this case, students will 
see that the issue of legality (“who owns this work?”) is not always simple. 
Although it is common for technical communicators to reuse and repurpose 
existing material, they must first take into account the source of such mate-
rial. The work-for-hire doctrine specifies that the employer, rather than an 
individual writer, retains legal ownership of a work when it is prepared in the 
workplace. In this case, before the technical communicator can proceed with 
her revision of the existing documentation, she needs to determine who owns 
the work: her company, their competitor, the users participating in the online 
forum, or the party hosting the online forum? The technical communicator 
has discovered that portions of the work that she has been assigned to revise 
has been copied from two other sources for which the employer does not re-
tain ownership rights. The first source includes the user manuals that can be 
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accessed freely online from a well-known, industry-leading competitor’s Web 
site. While writers feel free to reuse and/or build on materials prepared within 
their own company, materials prepared in other workplaces cannot likely be 
reused. Even though the materials are accessible to the public on a free and 
open Web site, they cannot be used without the permission of the company 
who legally owns them. The second source is material written by end-users 
of the product, copied from online public forums where users pose questions 
and respond with solutions. Even if these forums are publicly accessible and 
unaffiliated with another company, this text could be owned by the user who 
wrote it or by the party responsible for hosting the online forum, depending 
on whether a user agreement is in place that establishes ownership. There-
fore, while the technical communicator likely will not be able to legally as-
sume ownership over the text she has been asked to revise, some interesting 
questions arise concerning her ethical responsibilities based on what she has 
discovered. If the end-users of the product have pointed out errors in existing 
documentation and provided solutions for how to solve other users’ problems, 
the technical communicator may feel compelled to share this new informa-
tion. How should she do so? 
The second case raises questions about receiving credit for the contributions 
made by a technical communicator. In this scenario, a writer has prepared user 
manuals for a new product, which have been packaged with the software and 
sold to a larger, third-party corporation. The technical publications depart-
ment at the corporation determined that if they used the software company’s 
existing documentation, they could drastically reduce their document devel-
opment time. However, they are not sure whether the corporation has legal 
ownership over the user guides. In this scenario, the reason for wanting to 
reuse the material appears to be related to efficiency—both in terms of time 
and money. It is likely that from a legal standpoint, such reuse would be per-
missible. If the corporation purchased the software and its documentation as a 
package, then the technical communicators there may be able to reuse the soft-
ware company’s existing documentation. However, such use may raise some 
interesting questions about the relationship between professional status and 
author status for technical communicators. Will the technical communicators 
at the corporation receive credit for the work in the form of monetary compen-
sation or increased professional status? What are the implications of packaging 
a software product and its documentation into a single unit? Does this model 
perhaps negatively affect the perception of the value added by the technical 
communicator to the overall quality of the product? Such questions reveal the 
implications of legal ownership models for the perceptions held of technical 
communicators by those outside of the field. 
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In scenarios such as these, instructors can demonstrate how questions about 
intellectual property for technical communicators raise deeper questions about 
authorship from legal and rhetorical perspectives. By teaching about intellec-
tual property issues in the technical communication classroom from these two 
perspectives, instructors can help students to gain greater confidence in ad-
dressing complex questions about intellectual property and to articulate those 
judgments more effectively. With this background, students will be able to 
participate more fully in discussions about intellectual property, an important 
first step toward better communicating their value as rhetorical agents within 
their future workplace cultures. 
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20 RESPONSE TO PART III—FAIR 
USE: TEACHING THREE KEY IP 
CONCEPTS 
Rebecca Moore Howard
My favorite part of Brian Ballentine’s chapter is his calm remark about 
teaching a business and professional course that included a portion “that dealt 
with the intersections of writing, intellectual property, and ethics.” It’s that 
phrase, offered so matter-of-factly, as if every writing course contained such 
material.
That not every writing course does is why Part III of Copy(Write) is so 
important. Renee Hobbs and Katie Donnelly tell us that writing instructors 
are increasingly “incorporat[ing] media literacy concepts into their educational 
practices.” But the movement has a long way to go. Produced by an under-
graduate student, Nicole Nguyen’s research underscores what professors Carol 
Haviland and Joan Mullin (2008) found in their cross-disciplinary, cross-in-
stitutional research: Instructors teach very little about intellectual property to 
their undergraduate students, and when they do, they focus on generic injunc-
tions against plagiarism. That’s a long way from the instruction that Jessica 
Reyman believes technical writers need, instruction that will help them under-
stand their intellectual property rights in workplaces beyond academia.
I appreciate Nguyen’s point that students may not identify the instruction 
they are receiving as belonging to the category of “intellectual property.” Still, 
as I teach an advanced undergraduate course for writing majors, I hear them 
express their interest in intellectual property and their indignation that they 
have heretofore been taught nothing about their own rights. In my course, after 
reading Haviland and Mullin (2008), as well as Susan Blum (2009), the stu-
dents deliberate on what sorts of follow-up research they want to do. Then they 
form collaborative research groups. Recently, one group decided to research 
issues of intellectual property on social-networking sites such as Facebook and 
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Twitter; another pursued the possibility of originality in music; a third ana-
lyzed the problems of intellectual property in the arts. These are the issues that 
they find fascinating, the issues they decide to research. 
Academic injunctions against plagiarism are stern, admonitory. In Al-
thusserian terms, they hail the student as feckless; through scare tactics, they 
demand obedience. Introduced to the range of IP issues that directly affect 
writers and given the choice of research topic, students in my class were not 
fascinated by academic plagiarism. Instead, they chose to research issues that 
cultural producers want to be informed about. In their research choices, they 
hail themselves as authors.
They make these choices even though, as Nguyen observes, it is in the 
frightening issues of plagiarism that students most often receive IP instruction. 
Leslie Johnson-Farris’ finding is not surprising: Campus IP regulations aimed 
at students are obsessed with preventing those students from appropriating the 
work of others. These policies usually pursue that goal without addressing stu-
dents’ rights in copy, or the extent to which fair use guidelines allow them to 
use the work of others for educational purposes. In fact, as Hobbs and Don-
nelly note, many instructors assume that remixing is merely copying, not cre-
ating. Hence, students typically receive instruction designed to contain their 
potential malfeasances in the context of what many are pleased to call the “pla-
giarism epidemic.” They are not customarily addressed as authors. They get 
the plagiarism half of intellectual property instruction, but not the copyright 
half—even when the plagiarism warnings are couched as warnings of copy-
right violation.
In my own teaching—including the faculty development workshops I 
conduct online and in person for colleagues around the country—I find that 
copyright and plagiarism are, in fact, rarely—if ever—differentiated. Faculty 
erroneously tell their students that plagiarism is a federal offense and that they 
could be prosecuted for it, or they say that using ideas derived from another 
infringes on that person’s copyrights. Few people, even instructors, are clear 
about the fact that plagiarism is locally defined and adjudicated within a com-
munity; that it includes both words and ideas; and that it transgresses against 
the reader, making the reader believe that the plagiarist is the producer of the 
words or ideas gleaned from a source. In my experience, a fair number of in-
structors are also not clear about the fact that copyright violation is legally de-
fined and adjudicated on the federal level; that copyright law typically covers 
only expression and not ideas; and that copyright infringement transgresses 
against the author, depriving that author of the cultural or monetary capital 
due him or her. It is a rare instructor who undertakes Johnson-Farris’ task of 
informing herself about these issues.
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It is significant, too, that Nguyen finds little instruction offered to students 
regarding the protection of their own rights in copy. In the field of composition 
studies, scholars have become accustomed to respecting and acknowledging 
students’ intellectual property. As editor of College Composition and Commu-
nication, Joseph Harris (1994) took the lead in establishing this principle; as 
a contributor to College English, Amy Robillard (2006) provided a vanguard 
extension of it when she argued for scholars to cite student work. “To cite stu-
dents,” Robillard said, “is to forward the argument that writing as a mode of 
learning is a dialogic process; teachers teach students to write, but students, in 
their writing, teach teachers about more than the results of particular pedago-
gies” (p. 263). Robillard addressed instructor interpellation of students as error-
makers, and directed our attention to the ways in which citing students moves 
scholars toward considering student work to be knowledge-making and not 
just ability-performing. Hobbs and Donnelly work from another perspective: 
that of the students. How do students come to think of themselves as authors 
and thus produce authentic texts? Certainly being published in a book like this 
or even being cited by their instructors are two ways, but most students will not 
have these experiences. Hobbs and Donnelly are right, then, to explore the ef-
fect of authentic audiences on students’ authorial self-perception. Regardless of 
whether they are published or are being cited by others, they are being listened 
to and learned from. Their writing is in circulation. Who doesn’t do their best 
writing in that circumstance?
Such thinking is, however, not necessarily the norm outside circles of com-
position scholarship. Not only are instructors willing to contribute students’ 
intellectual property to profit-making corporations such as Turnitin.com 
(which Ballentine delightfully pillories), but faculty are willing to appropriate 
the intellectual work of graduate students (Howard, 2008). Even in its most 
innocuous iterations, the reluctance to accord authoriality to students can be 
breathtaking, as in Johnson-Farris’ statement:
The idea of student fair use statement met with confusion. 
Reactions varied from those who saw no need for such a pol-
icy, to those who thought students would be covered under 
the faculty fair use statement, to those who didn’t know what 
I was talking about.
The foundational assumption of students as practicers rather than produc-
ers, I believe, makes it difficult to move faculty to a place where they see their 
students as knowledge-makers possessing valuable intellectual property, or as 
knowledge-makers in conversation with other texts.
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Changing that foundational assumption will not come from direct argu-
ment, such as Robillard’s (2006) article offers. Robillard describes the goal, but 
not the means. Valuable as her article is, it advocates a revolutionary practice to 
which most scholars will respond with reluctance or rejection. A missing piece, 
one essential to the success of Robillard’s article, is a widespread understanding 
of the relevant component IP concepts: plagiarism, copyright, and fair use. Un-
derstanding these concepts makes it possible for us to see the complexities and 
grace of intellectual property, in which we are all implicated. As we come to 
recognize that all three concepts are of importance to students and instructors 
alike, we become positioned to understand that our students, too, are authors. 
Knowledge-makers. Cultural producers with a stake in culture.
It is astonishing, really, to contemplate the enthusiasm with which the pro-
fessoriate pursues plagiarism, and the confusion these same educators have 
about the foundational concepts of plagiarism, copyright, and fair use. In 
many years of working for better institutional plagiarism policies, I have been 
continuously frustrated by administrators’ insistence on all-encompassing, 
simplistic definitions of the term plagiarism. The baby-step differentiation be-
tween “plagiarism” and “misuse of sources” advocated by the Council of Writ-
ing Program Administrators has, as far as I know, become policy in no college. 
Policy-makers in my own university’s revision of its plagiarism code took the 
not-so-bold step of introducing “misuse of sources” as an option for instructor 
interpretation of students’ imperfect acknowledgement of influence. 
It is in binary pairs that the phenomenon of plagiarism becomes clearest, 
as Marilyn Randall (1991) demonstrated when she differentiated plagiarism 
from quotation, and when Susan Stewart (1991) did the same for plagiarism 
and forgery. The failure to recognize the differences between plagiarism and 
copyright infringement thus not only blurs those differences, but obfuscates 
each category. It is in careful, collaborative, authoritative reports such as “The 
Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education” (Center for 
Social Media, 2008), whose genesis Hobbs and Donnelly explain, that blurred 
boundaries between fair use and creative remix lose their power to terrorize in-
structors (such as the English Education professor they describe).
Informing ourselves about IP issues does, as Ballentine acknowledges, take 
us out of our comfort zones. It will also, Hobbs and Donnelly point out, re-
quire us to ease up on process pedagogy as the foundational model of writing 
instruction. But, as Ballentine demonstrates, the effort is well worth it: Our 
courses become more pertinent to students’ real writerly lives as they become 
professionals in a wide range of fields. It is irresponsible for us to send students 
into the workplace with as little IP information as had the technical writers 
whom Reyman describes.
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Part III of Copy(Write) will be required reading in many of my future class-
es, and it will also inform the faculty development workshops I conduct. These 
chapters provide insightful, data-supported examinations of the problems we 
encounter when we fail to regard students as authors; when we confuse plagia-
rism with copyright violation; when we fail to understand the role of fair use 
in student and instructor work with intellectual property; and when we fail to 
make all of this explicit to students. We can do better, and these chapters pro-
vide good models for how we might move forward.
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21 AFTERWORD
Clancy Ratliff
After reading this collection of important and impressively diverse exami-
nations of copyright and intellectual property issues in writing studies, compo-
sition pedagogy, and academia in general, I have refined my position on some 
matters and reaffirmed my position on others. My idea of plagiarism, to start, is 
more nuanced than ever; I now understand more fully that “not cited” does not 
necessarily mean “plagiarized.” Composition scholars studying plagiarism have 
argued that instances of “not cited but not plagiarized” are possible, especially 
in the writing of students from cultures with different ideas about intellectual 
property. But in this collection, Hall and Vincelette examine parody, noting 
that parody works through allusion, and that a parody will not be successful if 
the audience does not catch the references. This is to say that the audience must 
distinguish the original—the parts that are not “the author’s own work”—in 
parody, and recognize that the author is not passing the source material off as 
his or her own. Moreover, citation is redundant because the audience already 
knows where the work came from. 
Johnson-Farris, too, presents a useful “not cited but not plagiarized” ex-
ample when she relays an anecdote of a student presentation, a slide from which 
featured a photograph of former president Bill Clinton. The photograph was 
not cited, but it would have been utterly unreasonable for the instructor to 
infer that the students had been close enough to Clinton to snap the photo-
graph themselves, when they were likely children to boot: The students gave 
the presentation in 2005, and the photograph was from the Monica Lewinsky 
scandal in 1998. Certainly the majority of writing teachers, and almost every 
writing program administrator, would agree that these students did not cite 
but did not plagiarize. This is an easy example, but it—and others throughout 
this collection—help me to see that even in the citation-obsessed context of 
academic writing, sources sometimes do not need to be cited, and also that, 
for the audience, sometimes it does not matter where the source material came 
from or who authored it. 
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Another major insight I gained from this book concerns fair use. For years 
now, I have thought to myself that the number of articles, conference presen-
tations, and informal discussions about fair use has been unnecessarily large. 
I couldn’t understand why so many of my colleagues so often reiterated the 
need for fair use. Of course fair use is needed for freedom of speech, and, 
yes, it’s troubling that universities are sometimes not willing to let teachers use 
any copyrighted material without permission and royalty payments, even when 
that use is fair. But I always thought that composition scholars were belabor-
ing the point. I preferred to focus my study on alternative models of copyright: 
the General Public License for software, configurations of Creative Commons 
licenses for other work, and the Creative Commons Founders’ Copyright when 
appropriate. I have advised students and colleagues that, when searching for 
materials and work to use for multimodal projects, search first for Creative 
Commons licensed and public domain content, and use all-rights-reserved 
work if the former is not suitable. I believed that an entire pool of intelligent, 
creative content exists on the Internet that composers want others to use, and I 
wanted to call others’ attention to that work.
And I still believe this. I insist that these new models and new projects are 
crucial tools to be used in the service of innovative writing pedagogy (and art 
pedagogy, science pedagogy, and so forth). Open textbooks—such as Writing 
Spaces: Readings on Writing, edited by Charles Lowe and Pavel Zemliansky, and 
Rhetoric and Composition: A Guide for the College Writer on Wikibooks, written 
by Matt Barton and students at St. Cloud State University—are projects that 
deserve more of our field’s attention and use. I still do think it is worth teachers’ 
and students’ time, when searching for source material for class work, to take 
advantage of the option to search Creative Commons licensed content only, 
which is available on Flickr, Google, and Yahoo!. 
However, I was struck by TyAnna Herrington’s alignment of philosophies 
of writing pedagogy with philosophies of copyright and authorship. By reveal-
ing the analogy among current–traditional pedagogy, objective epistemology, 
authoritarian government, and overbearing copyright—and by contrasting 
that with the analogy among social constructivist pedagogy, transactional epis-
temology, and democratic government—Herrington explains fair use stakes 
in a new and compelling way. But it was Janice Walker’s explanation of the 
need for fair use as a middle ground that especially affected my thinking about 
copyright and the use of creative and intellectual content. Walker cautions us 
against accepting the current state of copyright as a given, lest we forfeit our 
rights to fair use. At the same time, she argues that we reinforce the dichoto-
my between copyright-heavy and copyright-light when we automatically favor 
Creative Commons and public domain material over copyrighted material. 
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Now my commitment is renewed: I insist on using everything I am entitled 
to use—copyright and copyleft—in the service of contributing to knowledge 
and culture. 
In addition, my conviction that we need case studies and specific examples 
is strengthened after reading this collection. As Reyman and others among 
these chapters have maintained, the best way to highlight the legal and ethi-
cal problematics and complexities of authorship, including raising awareness 
among university administrators and students, is to teach using these engaging 
examples and to listen to others’ encounters with copyright and intellectual 
property. Nguyen’s chapter on if or how intellectual property issues are taught 
and how writing students digest such issues is testament to our need to contin-
ue integrating copyright into our courses, and Amidon’s analysis of universities’ 
intellectual property policies reminds us why it is in our self-interest as scholars 
and teachers to educate administrators about copyright. Ballentine’s work with 
fashion merchandising students provides one such story. Wiebe’s reflections 
about Sherrie Levine’s photography and his father’s “Humorous Incidents” is 
another. Westbrook provides an analysis of the Diebold emails, while Ridolfo 
and Rife pose the story of Maggie Ryan’s photograph and its use. Through his 
analyses of an old scrapbook and his own digital image collection, Whipple 
shows the subtle authorship at work in the act of compiling the work of oth-
ers. Dornsife uses anecdotes about Fleetwood Mac’s Rumours and the digitally 
remastered version of Star Wars to show problems with the idea of “a copy,” 
which suggests a certain distance from the original, a gap that no longer ex-
ists in the digital world. Galin reviews court cases involving scholars facing 
copyright issues, and Howard (whose example I intend to follow) listens to his 
students’ experiences with copyright issues and presents them as scenarios for 
fine-grain analysis. To build upon the contributions included in this volume, I 
will add a few illustrative cases I have experienced and learned from. 
In the course of my online life, I’ve gone to the sites of several feminist and 
environmentalist organizations, sites that usually feature information about 
emerging legislation affecting women or the environment, and the sites often 
ask users to contact their representatives in Congress. We have probably all 
seen these action letter interfaces: Users are asked to type their names and some 
contact information into designated fields on the left-side of the screen and on 
the right, there’s a “template” letter in another field. The user can send the text 
as is, add to it, change some words here and there, or erase the organization’s 
letter completely and write a letter from scratch. Often I unthinkingly click 
“send”—in much the same manner Barrios notes we agree to end-user license 
agreements. One time I realized, I’m passing this text off as my own. I’m taking 
something someone else wrote, putting my name on it, and turning it in. I now 
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use this as a classroom example in my writing courses. I have even announced 
to students, projecting a web site from my laptop, that I was about to plagia-
rize, then submitted the action letter, to call their attention to the difference 
between academic writing and a variety of other situations involving writing 
and authorship. 
In our teaching, we might also think further about possible analogies we 
can craft to illuminate students’ and colleagues’ understanding of intellectual 
property, plagiarism, authorship, and copyright. I posted one such analogy, 
which I called “Plagiarism and Parking Tickets,” on my blog some years ago: 
I live in a fairly large city, and it can be difficult and time-con-
suming to find parking. Sometimes I park in a metered spot 
without putting any money in the meter. When I have quar-
ters with me, of course I put them in the meter, but sometimes 
I don’t have any, and that’s all the meter will take. So I don’t 
put anything in there. Most of the time I go back out to my 
car to find no ticket, but occasionally I do get parking tickets. 
I know that when I don’t put money in the meter, I run the 
risk of getting a ticket. When I don’t put money in the meter, 
I feel a little guilty, I guess, but I won’t lose any sleep over it. 
I have no aspirations to go my whole life without getting any 
parking tickets. Keeping quarters with me and putting them 
in the meter isn’t something I take any pride in. Plus, when 
I get a ticket, I pay it, and if I factor the cost of the ticket in 
with all those times I got free parking, it evens out. Either way 
I’m paying for parking; the city’s going to get their money one 
way or another. ...
I’ve got a packed schedule with classes, extracurricular ac-
tivities, and a part-time job. Sometimes I buy essays online 
and turn them in for my classes. When I have the time and 
am engaged and motivated by the assignment, of course I do 
the writing myself, but sometimes I don’t have the time or 
interest, and I have to turn something in. I know that when I 
don’t do the writing myself, I risk getting turned in for plagia-
rism. When I don’t do the writing myself, I feel a little guilty, 
I guess, but I won’t lose any sleep over it. I have no aspirations 
to be a professional writer. Basically I just want to pass the 
course with a C or above. Plus, when I get caught, I just take 
the zero on the assignment, and if I factor that in with all the 
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time and headache I save not having to do an assignment that 
doesn’t interest me, it evens out. Besides, sometimes I get A’s 
on the papers I buy. The grade I get at the end is probably 
about the same as the grade I’d have gotten had I done all the 
work myself.
This analogy, I believe, puts the ethics of authorship and intellectual prop-
erty into perspective. Although plagiarism is certainly a violation of academic 
norms, teachers often get very upset when it happens to them, perceiving the 
action as a personal insult. However, for the student, the act of buying a paper 
may be simply for expediency’s sake—an act revealing only low prioritization 
of the assignment, poor time management, and perhaps a lack of maturity. One 
could make a similar analogy between writing and returning library books past 
the due date, which a colleague suggested to me. I plan to use these analogies as 
discussion prompts in the training of new teachers, but I may also use them in 
my first-year writing class; I expect that doing so—and encouraging students 
to come up with other analogues to plagiarism—could initiate an open dia-
logue about the ethics involved in academic writing. 
The third case I would like to share concerns copyright infringement and 
fair use. In December 2009, Australian artist Jane Korman released a video in 
which she, her children, and her elderly father, a Holocaust survivor, danced to 
Gloria Gaynor’s song “I Will Survive” at various sites associated with the Ho-
locaust. The video, titled “I Will Survive: Dancing Auschwitz,” went viral on 
YouTube in early July 2010. Viewers’ responses ranged from expressing outrage, 
to finding the video mildly offensive or distasteful, to crying joyfully. Many 
viewers remarked, on blogs and in comments under the video, that it was an im-
portant work, and the video garnered some attention from major news outlets, 
including Haaretz. Upon seeing the video, I reflected on it as an instance of why 
we need a robust public domain, or commons, of creative and intellectual work 
to use to make new works—and what a shame it would be if the rightsholder of 
“I Will Survive” were to send a cease and desist letter to YouTube, employees of 
which would likely remove the video due to claims of copyright infringement. 
The next time I tried to watch the video, I saw the following notice: “This video 
is no longer available due to a copyright claim by APRA/AMCOS.” These ab-
breviations stand for the Australasian Performing Right Association and Aus-
tralasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society. Although the video file has 
been copied and reposted by other users, the APRA and AMCOS are continu-
ing to limit the distribution of the video as much as possible. 
After the takedown of the video, some users posted comments about the use 
of “I Will Survive,” noting that because it was not used for profit, it should be 
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considered fair use. Also, it was used for the purpose of critical commentary; 
through the juxtaposition of the solemnity of the landmarks and the whimsy 
of the dancing, which sometimes resembled the movements of a cheerleading 
squad, the artist was making a statement that the Jewish people, represented by 
this healthy and vigorous family, have thrived in spite of devastating loss. This 
case could be examined in a class or other meeting for fruitful discussion about 
fair use and four-factor analysis, or a discussion about how the case does or does 
not embody the “Code of Best Practices for Fair Use in Media Literacy Educa-
tion,” explained in helpful detail by Hobbs and Donnelly. The whole song was 
used, but for critical commentary and in a not-for-profit context; the extent to 
which the use was transformative is thus open for debate. 
Korman’s work, an artistic statement of celebratory defiance of the Nazi 
regime, is an almost too obvious example of why fair use is essential for democ-
racy and free speech, as this book has shown. I would like to end by turning to 
a 2009 article in New Left Review in which Slavoj Žižek identified four “antago-
nisms” of global capitalism:
the looming threat of ecological catastrophe; the inappropri-
ateness of private property for so-called intellectual property; 
the socio-ethical implications of new technoscientiﬁc devel-
opments, especially in biogenetics; and last, but not least, new 
forms of social apartheid—new walls and slums. (p. 53) 
For Žižek, the first three of these antagonisms contain “an awareness of the 
destructive potential—up to the self-annihilation of humanity itself—in al-
lowing the capitalist logic of enclosing these commons a free run” (p. 54). He 
identified these issues as evidence for the “practical urgency” of “the commu-
nist hypothesis,” and more generally as evidence of the need for a cultural and 
intellectual commons (p. 53). What I appreciate here is the fact that Žižek situ-
ates intellectual property in the same constellation with bioethics and environmental 
damage. I do not mean to suggest that Žižek finds these all equally important, but I 
value his locating intellectual property in a system of capitalist logic alongside other 
major global problems. I value this collection as well for reminding us, as a community 
of scholars, of what is truly at stake when we talk about the right to copy.
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